On the implementation of the L-Nash bargaining solution in two-person bargaining games

The “Nash program” initiated by Nash (Econometrica 21:128–140, 1953) is a research agenda aiming at representing every axiomatically determined cooperative solution to a game as a Nash outcome of a reasonable noncooperative bargaining game. The L-Nash solution first defined by Forgó (Interactive Decisions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 229. Springer, Berlin, pp 1–15, 1983) is obtained as the limiting point of the Nash bargaining solution when the disagreement point goes to negative infinity in a fixed direction. In Forgó and Szidarovszky (Eur J Oper Res 147:108–116, 2003), the L-Nash solution was related to the solution of multiciteria decision making and two different axiomatizations of the L-Nash solution were also given in this context. In this paper, finite bounds are established for the penalty of disagreement in certain special two-person bargaining problems, making it possible to apply all the implementation models designed for Nash bargaining problems with a finite disagreement point to obtain the L-Nash solution as well. For another set of problems where this method does not work, a version of Rubinstein’s alternative offer game (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982) is shown to asymptotically implement the L-Nash solution. If penalty is internalized as a decision variable of one of the players, then a modification of Howard’s game (J Econ Theory 56:142–159, 1992) also implements the L-Nash solution.     

A projected gradient dynamical system modelling the dynamics of bargaining

We propose a projected gradient dynamical system as a model for a bargaining scheme for an asset for which the two interested agents have personal valuations that do not initially coincide. The personal valuations are formed using subjective beliefs concerning the future states of the world, and the reservation prices are calculated using expected utility theory. The agents are not rigid concerning their subjective probabilities and are willing to update them under the pressure to reach finally an agreement concerning the asset. The proposed projected dynamical system, on the space of probability measures, provides a model for the evolution of the agents, beliefs during the bargaining period and is constructed so that an agreement is reached under the minimum possible deviation of both agents from their initial beliefs. The convergence results are shown using techniques from convex dynamics and Lyapunov function theory.     

On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games

We prove that for superadditive games a necessary and sufficient condition for the bargaining set to coincide with the core is that the monotonic cover of the excess game induced by a payoff be balanced for each imputation in the bargaining set. We present some new results obtained by verifying this condition for specific classes of games. For N-zero-monotonic games we show that the same condition required at each kernel element is also necessary and sufficient for the kernel to be contained in the core. We also give examples showing that to maintain these characterizations, the respective assumptions on the games cannot be lifted. Received: March 1998/Revised version: December 1998     

Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory,part I: Theoretical preliminaries

Part I of this paper discusses the problem of how to model bargaining behavior, and outlines a few basic ideas of the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory. In particular, we discuss removal of imperfect equilibrium points from the game by using the uniformly perturbed game form. We also describe definition of the solution in terms of payoff-dominance and risk-dominance relations, and in terms of the net strategic distances, between the primitive equilibrium points. Part II of the paper will discuss the actual solutions our theory provides for some important classes of bargaining games.     

On the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution

In this note we provide a characterization of a subclass of bargaining problems for which the Nash solution has the property of disagreement point monotonicity. While the original d-monotonicity axiom and its stronger notion, strong d-monotonicity, were introduced and discussed by Thomson (J Econ Theory, 42: 50–58, 1987), this paper introduces local strong d-monotonicity and derives a necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be locally strongly d-monotonic. This characterization is given by using the sensitivity matrix of the Nash bargaining solution w.r.t. the disagreement point d. Moverover, we present a sufficient condition for the Nash solution to be strong d-monotonic.     

Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory,part II: Analysis of specific bargaining games

Part II of the paper (for Part I see Harsanyi (1982)) describes the actual solutions the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory provides for some important classes of bargaining games, such as unanimity games; trade between one seller and several potential buyers; and two-person bargaining games with incomplete information on one side or on both sides. It also discusses some concepts and theorems useful in computing the solution; and explains how our concept of risk dominance enables us to analyze game situations in terms of some intuitively very compelling probabilistic (subjective-probability) considerations disallowed by classical game theory.     

On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games

We study the committee decision making process using game theory. Shenoy  [15] introduced two solution concepts: the one-core and the bargaining set, and showed that the one-core of a simple committee game is nonempty if there are at most four players. We extend this result by proving that whether the committee is simple or not, as far as there are less than five players, the one-core is nonempty. This result also holds for the bargaining set.     

The qualitative analysis of a dynamical system of differential equations arising from the study of multilayer scales on pure metals II

We provide a qualitative analysis of the -dimensional dynamical system:

where is an arbitrary positive integer. Under mild algebraic conditions on the constant matrix , we show that every solution , , extends to a solution on , such that , for . Moreover, the difference between any two solutions approaches as . We then use this result to give a complete qualitative analysis of a 3-dimensional dynamical system introduced by F. Gesmundo and F. Viani in modeling parabolic growth of three-oxide scales on pure metals.

     

On the Bellman equation of the overtaking criterion: Addendum

In a previous note, we discussed the properties of solutions to the Bellman equation of the Gale overtaking criterion. The purpose of this note is to show that the dynamic programming approach may also be used for the Brock criterion.We are indebted to an anonymous referee who contributed to improve this paper.     

Learning from Own and Foreign Experience: Technological Adaptation by Imitating Firms

In this paper we study the adaptive behavior of firms which repeatedly have to make a production decision. In a single good market the firms use own experience as well as information gathered by observing competitors to iteratively choose a production technology out of a given set. The adaptive learning of the firms is described in a dynamic model and analyzed in a simulation framework. We show that a small but positive propensity to imitate is optimal for the firms and yields production efficiencies above 95% of the maximal value. Furthermore, we observe that in a competitive situation firms using optimal propensities to imitate outmatch pure imitators and nonimitators in production efficiency as well as in profits. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Interaction of Two Charges in a Uniform Magnetic Field: II. Spatial Problem

The interaction of two charges moving in ℝ³ in a magnetic field B can be formulated as a Hamiltonian system with six degrees of freedom. Assuming that the magnetic field is uniform and the interaction potential has rotation symmetry, we reduce this system to one with three degrees of freedom. For special values of the conserved quantities, choices of parameters or restriction to the coplanar case, we obtain systems with two degrees of freedom. Specialising to the case of Coulomb interaction, these reductions enable us to obtain many qualitative features of the dynamics. For charges of the same sign, the gyrohelices either “bounce-back”, “pass-through”, or exceptionally converge to coplanar solutions. For charges of opposite signs, we decompose the state space into “free” and “trapped” parts with transitions only when the particles are coplanar. A scattering map is defined for those trajectories that come from and go to infinite separation along the field direction. It determines the asymptotic parallel velocities, guiding centre field lines, magnetic moments and gyrophases for large positive time from those for large negative time. In regimes where gyrophase averaging is appropriate, the scattering map has a simple form, conserving the magnetic moments and parallel kinetic energies (in a frame moving along the field with the centre of mass) and rotating or translating the guiding centre field lines. When the gyrofrequencies are in low-order resonance, however, gyrophase averaging is not justified and transfer of perpendicular kinetic energy is shown to occur. In the extreme case of equal gyrofrequencies, an additional integral helps us to analyse further and prove that there is typically also transfer between perpendicular and parallel kinetic energy.      

On the Stability of Globally Projected Dynamical Systems

Two types of projected dynamical systems, whose equilibrium states solve the corresponding variational inequality problems, were proposed recently by Dupuis and Nagurney (Ref. 1) and by Friesz et al. (Ref. 2). The stability of the dynamical system developed by Dupuis and Nagurney has been studied completely (Ref. 3). This paper analyzes and proves the global asymptotic stability of the dynamical system proposed by Friesz et al. under monotone and symmetric mapping conditions. Furthermore, the dynamical system is shown to be globally exponentially stable under stronger conditions. Finally, we show that the dynamical system proposed by Friesz et al. can be applied easily to neural networks for solving a class of optimization problems.     

On the Detection of Limit Cycles by the Variational Velocity Method

This paper summarizes, clarifies, and corrects some aspects of the variational velocity methodfor the detection of limit cycles. After definitions and statements of the most important theoremsassociated with this method, some aspects of the proof of the main theorem are corrected andreworked. An example from the original paper in Acta Appl. Math. 48 (1997),13–32, is then discussed and criticized. Finally, the limitations of this method are discussed,especially as it applies to systems involving multiple limit cycles (and therefore as it applies toHilberts XVIth Problem).     

On the possibility of globally stabilizing invariant sets

In this paper we study the possibility of globally stabilizinginvariant sets of autonomous continuous nonlinear systems bythe state (output) feedback control law. We show that the topologicalstructure of invariant sets can give rise to obstruction tothe existence of a continuous control law for global stabilizationof invariant sets.     

On the Optimum Control of Differential-Algebraic Equations

We present a method, based on approximation theory, for the solution of optimum control problems of differential-algebraic systems of any index. Its essence is the rendering of any optimum control formulation of systems of differential-algebraic equations into one of a pure optimum control formulation of the Bolza type by means of characteristic functions approximated by damped pseudo-spectral expansions.     

On the controllability of predator-prey systems

In this paper, we obtain both global and local controllability results for a general nonautonomous predator-prey system using some techniques of nonlinear functional analysis such as the Schauder fixed-point theorem and contraction mapping principle.The first author would like to thank the Department of Science and Technology of India for sponsoring part of this work through Grant No. DST 12(21)/84-STP II.     

On the linearization of infinite-dimensional random dynamical systems

We present a new version of the Grobman–Hartman's linearization theorem for random dynamics. Our result holds for infinite-dimensional systems whose linear part is not necessarily invertible. In addition, by adding some restrictions on the nonlinear perturbations, we do not require for the linear part to be nonuniformly hyperbolic in the sense of Pesin but rather (besides requiring the existence of stable and unstable directions) allow for the existence of a third (central) direction on which we do not prescribe any behavior for the dynamics. Moreover, under some additional nonuniform growth condition, we prove that the conjugacies given by the linearization procedure are Hölder continuous when restricted to bounded subsets of the space.     

On the connections between symmetries and conservation rules of dynamical systems

The strict connection between Lie point‐symmetries of a dynamical system and its constants of motion is discussed and emphasized through old and new results. It is shown in particular how the knowledge of the symmetry of a dynamical system can allow us to obtain conserved quantities that are invariant under the symmetry. In the case of Hamiltonian dynamical systems, it is shown that if the system admits a symmetry of a ‘weaker’ type (specifically, a λ or a Λ‐symmetry), then the generating function of the symmetry is not a conserved quantity, but the deviation from the exact conservation is ‘controlled’ in a well‐defined way. Several examples illustrate the various aspects. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.