Coordinating a three-stage supply chain with competing manufacturers

It is common for multiple manufacturers to compete in one common market. This paper considers a three-stage supply chain consisting of two competing manufacturers, one distributor, and one retailer. The two manufacturers’ products are substitutable with each other, and both manufacturers sell their products through the common distributor and the common retailer. In this supply chain, three contract mechanisms are discussed. The first one is wholesale-price (WP) contracts. The second one is pairwise revenue-sharing (PRS) contracts indicating that the revenues are shared by all pairs of adjacent entities. The third one is spanning revenue-sharing (SRS) contract indicating that the retailer simultaneously shares his revenues with all supply chain members. First, we discuss the effects of competition between manufacturers on both decentralized and centralized supply chains under the WP contracts. Second, we discuss the coordination mechanisms. The PRS and SRS contracts are used to coordinate the entire supply chain. We present the drawbacks of the PRS contracts in coordinating this competing supply chain and suggest using the SRS contract instead. After an SRS contract is adopted, it is evaluated using the WP contracts as a benchmark. The conditions necessary for an SRS contract to achieve a win–win outcome are then presented. Finally, some numerical examples are provided.     

退货量依赖销售量和价格的供应链协调性

在假设零售商允许顾客退货且退货量依赖销售量和销售价格的条件下,本文研究了一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链的协调问题。研究表明:只有回购与回馈惩罚的联合契约能协调此供应链。最后给出了数值例子,并对主要参数进行了灵敏度分析。     

销售努力及双市场化期权下的三级供应链协调

本文针对需求随机且受到零售商销售努力影响的情况,研究了由制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链的协调问题。文章首先用双期权契约对三级供应链进行协调,即在制造商和分销商以及分销商和零售商之间都采用期权契约,发现在零售商独自承担努力成本的情况下仅通过双期权契约无法协调供应链。因此在双期权契约的基础上加入了努力成本共担契约,发现当期权价格满足某种线性关系以及零售商努力成本按特定比例分摊时,联合双期权契约和努力成本共担契约能顺利协调供应链。在此基础上,文章还引入了期权的市场化定价规则,研究了期权采用市场化定价规则对供应链协调产生的影响,研究表明,引入期权市场化定价规则增加了供应链协调需要满足的条件,降低了协调的可能性,且协调状态下的期权价格受到市场因素如利率、价格波动率等的影响。最后,文章给出了期权市场化定价规则下供应链协调的条件以及参数变化对协调的影响。     

竞争环境下多个损失规避零售商的供应链回购契约

研究由单个风险中性的供应商与多个竞争的损失厌恶零售商组成的两阶段供应链,在回购契约中考察竞争和零售商的损失厌恶态度对其最优订购决策和整个供应链协调性的影响.应用博弈论的方法,证明了该供应链博弈存在唯一的纯策略Nash均衡,而且竞争使得零售商的总订购量上升,而损失规避使得总订购量下降.竞争的存在削弱了损失厌恶效应对整个供应链协调性的影响.研究还发现,零售商的最优订购量随供应商的批发价增大而增大,随回购价格的增大而减少,并且在一定条件下回购契约可以使得供应链达到协调.     

低碳经济下三级供应链动态减排的微分博弈分析

在低碳经济的背景下,考虑到碳减排的连续性,引入时间因素,从动态角度将微分博弈的方法应用到三级供应链的减排决策中,构建了由一个供应商、一个制造商和一个零售商组成三级供应链的动态减排决策模型,比较分析在协同状态和非协同状态下产品减排量的变化曲线和供应链利润,同时还得到供应商、制造商和零售商的最优决策及利润。最后,使用算例分析的方法分析了各参数对产品减排量轨迹的影响,所得结论可以为供应商、制造商和零售商的决策提供理论依据。     

需求预测更新条件下两阶段电子商务供应链契约协调

研究了一类在贝叶斯需求预测更新情形下,生命周期中采用B2C与C2B两阶段进行产品销售的供应链模型,研究发现无法使用单一契约来协调供应链。在此基础上,设计了具有供应商价格折扣契约与零售商承诺订购契约的两阶段供应链契约协调机制,证明了两阶段协调机制能够实现供应链的帕累托改进。算例分析表明了两阶段契约协调机制的有效性,并发现能够实现供应链完美协调的契约参数不一定在帕累托集合内,供应链不一定能够达到完美协调;且由于零售商与供应商的最优契约参数不同,需要通过零售商与供应商之间的谈判达到纳什均衡。     

碳税政策下时变需求依赖库存与价格的供应链协调模型

研究由一个供应商和一个零售组成的二级供应链系统在碳税政策下的协调问题.对于市场需求率为时变函数且依赖于当前库存水平和销售价格的情形,建立分散式和集中式供应链决策模型.比较两种模型得出供应商和零售商合作能够提高供应链的整体利润但是也会产生更多的碳排放.分别利用批发价格契约和两部收费契约协调分散式决策模型得出供应链协调的条件.最后通过数值算例验证理论结果并分析碳税单价对供应链在两部收费契约下实现协调的影响.     

Coordinating a supply chain with effort and price dependent stochastic demand

This paper investigates the issue of channel coordination for a supply chain facing stochastic demand that is sensitive to both sales effort and retail price. In the standard newsvendor setting, the returns policy and the revenue sharing contract have been shown to be able to align incentives of the supply chain’s members so that the decentralized supply chain behaves as well as the integrated one. When the demand is influenced by both retail price and retailer sales effort, none of the above traditional contracts can coordinate the supply chain. To resolve this issue, we explore a variety of other contract types including joint return policy with revenue sharing contract, return policy with sales rebate and penalty (SRP) contract, and revenue sharing contract with SRP. We find that only the properly designed returns policy with SRP contract is able to achieve channel coordination and lead to a Pareto improving win–win situation for supply chain members. We then provide analytical method to determine the contract parameters and finally we use a numerical example to illustrate the findings and gain more insights.     

随机弹性需求下供应链销售价格与提前期联合决策及协调机制

研究了市场需求随机且对销售价格及提前期敏感的条件下,供应链如何制定最优的销售价格、提前期以及库存因子使得利润最大化。首先,分析了集中决策与分散决策供应链的最优决策,发现集中决策与分散决策模式下的提前期与库存因子是相同的,但分散决策下的销售价格更高、期望利润更低,且分散决策与集中决策供应链的利润之比随着需求对价格的敏感程度的增大而增大。然后建立了收入共享与成本分担的协调机制,并分析了其最优决策。研究发现,协调决策机制可以有效地压缩提前期,并能同时使供应链达到帕累托改进,但不能达到完美协调,而且还发现协调决策下制定的最优销售价格比分散决策要低。最后通过数值计算对三种供应链决策模式下的绩效进行了比较分析,结果表明供应链利润随着需求方差增大而减小,提前期压缩程度随着材料成本承担比例增大而增大。上述结论可以为企业制定销售价格与提前期决策以及企业间的协调提供有益的指导。     

公平偏好下基于批发价契约的供应链 协调研究

文中基于Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平偏好框架,构建公平偏好效用体系,以此为基础对采用批发价契约的报童模型展开行为研究,采用数理模型和数值分析方法分析了零售商和供应商的公平偏好行为对零售商和供应链系统最优订货量的影响,即零售商和供应商同时关注公平时,零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量趋于保守;并发现零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量随零售商的公平偏好程度增加而递减,但随着供应商公平偏好程度增加而递增,且供应链系统最优订货量变化趋势比零售商明显．然后,在此基础上分析比较得到,无论供应商和零售商是否偏好公平,批发价契约都不能实现供应链协调．最后,对批发价、零售价、供应商生产成本、零售商缺货成本和供应商缺货成本进行敏感度分析．     

考虑企业社会责任的三级供应链协调策略研究

为考察企业社会责任(CSR)对供应链绩效的影响,将消费者剩余作为企业参与社会责任活动的利润函数,研究了由单个制造商、单个分销商和单个零售商组成的三级供应链的协调优化问题.考虑两种情况:一种情况是零售商参与CSR活动,另一种情况是制造商参与CSR活动.研究表明,在制造商是斯坦克尔伯格(Stackelberg)博弈主导者的...     

基于模糊加值信息的供应链协调均衡研究

研究由一个供应商和两个零售商组成的供应链共享信息均衡问题。两个零售商具有不同的私有成本信息。当零售商不公开此成本信息时,其他的零售商和供应商只能推断出该信息的模糊分布。不同市场需求参数下,使零售商和供应商均达到最大利润的局势也有所不同。为了使供应链上的供应商和零售商达到双赢,分析了各同均衡策略存在的前提条件。     

存货质押融资模式下的供应链协调

针对供应商、零售商和银行组成的供应链金融系统,研究了存货质押融资模式下的供应链协调。零售商作为中小企业,资金有限,需要向银行申请贷款,然而零售商信用较低难以获得融资。供应商作为供应链的核心企业,采用含有回购价格和回购比例的回购契约为零售商提供担保,使得零售商融资得以实现。分析了不确定需求下供应链金融系统,供应链以及零售商的最优决策,给出了融资情况下供应链协调的条件,指出了在供应链协调情况下批发价格和回购策略对供应链收益分配的影响,说明了回购的作用:一方面使零售商易于获得银行融资,另一方面使供应链协调得以实现,指出了质押率、贷款利率和零售商自有资金等参数对最优决策的影响。数值算例验证了理论分析结果。     

需求不确定下制造商为核心的三级供应链协调

在需求不确定的情境下,研究由单一供应商、制造商和销售商组成的三级供应链系统的协调问题。设计了制造商—销售商采用期权契约,制造商—供应商采用回购契约的联合契约协调机制,分析了集中控制、分散控制和协调机制下供应链系统的最优决策。最后,通过数值算例说明了机制设计的有效性,并对分析结果进行验证。研究结果表明,通过制定合理的契约参数可以使供应链各成员的期望利润相比分散决策时有帕累托改进,从而实现三级供应链系统的协调。     

企业社会责任下碳减排优化策略与协调机制研究

基于企业社会责任(CSR)的视角,本文研究由生产低碳产品的制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链的最优策略及供应链协调问题。通过构造供应链成员具有社会责任感的效用函数,分析了CSR对各成员的利润和环境的影响。研究发现:制造商和零售商都是通过降低碳排放水平来体现社会责任感;无论制造商有社会责任感还是零售商有社会责任感,供应链的利润都增大;在收益共享-成本分摊合同(RC合同)下协调,可以使制造商和零售商实现双赢(帕累托最优);零售商应该承担更多的社会责任,降低碳排放水平。     

虚拟第三方下供应链激励协调

为了解决供应商隐藏成本信息、销售商隐藏努力行动所引起的逆向选择和道德风险问题,文章基于委托代理理论,引入虚拟第三方为协调主体,分别站在供应商和销售商的角度,通过设计合适的契约激励销售商努力工作和供应商“说真话”。研究结果表明,当供应链中只有道德风险存在时,可以通过如(16)式的契约(其中契约参数λ∈[0,1])实现供应链的完美协调;但是,当供应链中不仅仅存在道德风险还存在逆向选择时,该契约参数不再是区间[0,1]上任意的值,而是与供应链交易量q及供应商的生产成本c相关的定值(满足(29)式),此时的供应链才能实现协调;在该契约下,为获得更多的利益,供应商更有动机降低自身生产成本,销售商也更有积极性提高努力水平,从而实现“双赢”。最后,通过数值算例对模型进行了应用分析。     

Coordinating a three-echelon fresh agricultural products supply chain considering freshness-keeping effort with asymmetric information

This paper studies the coordination problem of a three-echelon supply chain system consisting of one supplier, third-party logistics service providers (TPLSP) and one retailer that provides seasonal fresh agricultural products to customers. The market demand for the retailer is assumed to be influenced by the retail price, the product's freshness and other random variables. Both quantity and quality losses are viewed as endogenous variables of the freshness-keeping effort, which is decided by the TPLSP. Dynamic game models for both the decentralized decision mode and the centralized decision mode are developed, and asymmetric demand information is considered in the decentralized decision mode. The analysis shows that decentralized decision making could result in the distortion of the order quantity and selling price and could ultimately result in a loss of supply chain profit. The TPLSP is motivated to exaggerate the demand, which could seriously damage the supplier's interests. Based on an analysis of the major influencing factors in the supply chain system, a coordination contract based on cost and revenue sharing (RS) is designed for the two transaction processes in the three-echelon supply chain system. We illustrate the proposed models with a numerical study and conduct a sensitivity analysis of some of the key parameters in the models. It is proven that with the designed contract, the sales volume can be significantly expanded, all the supply chain members can benefit from Pareto improvement, and both the retailer and the TPLSP have no incentive to exaggerate the market demand.     

考虑零售商风险规避及努力因素的供应链协调与优化模型

引入零售商风险规避偏好,在努力水平影响需求的两种模式下,分别建立了销售回馈与惩罚契约模型。随后,探讨了单纯的销售回馈与惩罚契约能否实现供应链协调,以及协调时各契约参数满足的条件。最后,通过数值分析对契约的协调性进行进一步分析。     

基于利润—CVaR的期权契约供应链协调

文章以一个风险厌恶销售商与风险中性供应商所组成的两级供应链为背景,以条件风险价值(CVaR)和期望利润的加权平均作为销售商的决策目标,对期权契约下销售商的订购策略及供应链协调问题进行了研究,并对比分析了销售商以CVaR为目标时的情形。在给出销售商在不同风险厌恶程度下的最优订购策略后,文章进一步给出了供应链相应的协调条件,并分析了此时期权权利金,销售商的风险厌恶程度和期望利润权重等参数对供销双方收益的影响,发现“利润-CVaR”法下销售商的风险厌恶程度对供销双方利润的影响与CVaR法下的情况有所不同,但权利金依然起到了分配整体供应链利润的作用,且销售商期望利润权重的增加会降低自身收益水平而提高供应商利润。最后,文章通过数值模拟的方式对上述结论进行了验证。     

Random yield supply chain with a yield dependent secondary market

This paper considers a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield and the retailer faces uncertain demand. There exists a secondary market for acquiring or disposing products by the supplier. We study both the centralized and decentralized systems. In the decentralized system, a no risk sharing contract and a risk sharing minimum commitment contract are analyzed. The supply chain with the risk sharing contract is further analyzed with a constant secondary market price and a yield dependent secondary market price. We present both the supplier’s and the retailer’s optimal strategies and provide insights for managers when making decisions under random yield risk and demand uncertainty. We find that the secondary market generally has a positive impact on supply chain performance and the actual effect of random yield risk on the supply chain performance depends on cost parameters and supply chain contract settings. Under certain conditions, reducing yield randomness may weaken the double marginalization effect and improve the chain performance. From the numerical study, we also show that there exists an optimal commitment level for the supply chain.