Contrast or assimilation: choosing camps in simple or realistic modeling

The contrast effect is a psychological phenomenon in which people exaggerate their differences. When making social comparisons, people cope with the discomforts associated with negative comparisons by criticizing others and splitting into smaller groups of similar others or by assimilation, depending on whether they perceive themselves as the member of a majority or minority group, respectively. This contrast or assimilation phenomena can explain the exaggeration of differences among computational simulation scholars. Those exaggerations are discussed in this paper as well as some realistic reasons for differences. Recognition of our status as minority group members and the virtues of assimilation and mutual support are advocated.

Putting the organization back into computational organization theory: a complex Perrowian model of organizational action

At best, computational models that study organizations incorporate only one perspective of how organizations are known to act within their environments. Such single-perspective models are limited in their generalizability and applicability to the real world and allow for researcher bias. This work develops a multi-agent simulation using eight different well-known organizational perspectives: Strategic choice, contingency theory, behavioral decision theory, enactment, resource dependence, institutional theory, population ecology, and transaction cost economics. A literature review of each field is applied to the construction of algorithms which, when combined with techniques derived from a literature review of computational modeling of organizations, was applied to the construction of a series of algorithms describing a multi-perspective computational model. Computer code was written based on the algorithms and run across different types of environments. Results were statistically analyzed to both validate the model and to generate contingency-oriented hypotheses. Conclusions were made with regard to the expected behavior of organizations and the model’s applicability toward further research.

Errors associated with simple versus realistic models

This paper addresses the relative errors associated with simple versus realistic (or science-based) models. We take the perspective of trying to predict what the model will predict as we begin to build the model. Any model building process can get the model “wrong” to a greater or lesser extent by making a theoretical mistake in constructing the model. In addition, every model needs data of some sort, whether it be obtained by experiments, surveys or expert judgment, and the data collection process is filled with error sources. This paper suggests a hypothesis that

Computational Construction as a Means to Coordinate Representations of Infinity

In this paper, we describe a design experiment aimed at helping students to explore and develop concepts of infinite processes and objects. Our approach is based on the design and development of a computational microworld, which afforded students the means to construct a range of representational models (symbolic, visual and numeric) of infinity-related objects (infinite sequences, in particular). We present episodes based on four students’ activities, seeking to illustrate how the available tools mediated students’ understandings of the infinite in rich ways, allowing them to discriminate subtle process-oriented features of infinite processes. We claim that the microworld supported students in the coordination of hitherto unconnected or conflicting intuitions concerning infinity, based on a constructive articulation of different representational forms we name as ‘representational moderation’.

The End of Moral Realism?

The author considers how constructivism, presently known to us essentially as a theory for generating rules of social cooperation, embodies a certain conception of justification that in turn may be thought of as a general theory. It is argued that moral realism and projectivism are by turns platitudinous and unsatisfactory as conceptions of justification; by contrast the general conception of justification in constructivism makes sense of reason giving and coherent rivalry. The author argues that once the right picture of justification is in place, the picture constructivism illustrates or embodies, the problem of moral ontology disappears.

Sperm, Eggs and Hunks: Biological Origins and Identity

In several publications Graeme Forbes has developed and defended one of the strongest arguments for essentialism about biological origins. I attempt to show that there are deep, as yet unrecognized, problems with this argument. The problems with Forbes’s argument suggest that a range of other arguments for various forms of origin essentialism are also likely to be flawed, and that we should abandon the seemingly plausible general metaphysical thesis that concrete entities that share all intrinsic properties are identical.

Concepts and Recipes

If concepts are explicated as abstract procedures, then we can easily show that each empirical concept is a not an effective procedure. Some, but not all empirical concepts are shown to be of a special kind: they cannot in principle guarantee that the object they identify satisfies the intended conditions.

Shape up or ship out: social networks,turnover, and organizational culture

This paper considers a formal model of cultural transmission in organizations, examining the interplay of structured social influence and organizational demography. A set of focused and fine-grained computational experiments elucidates this model’s assumptions, facilitates deeper explanations for some of its behavior, and explores the robustness and scope conditions of previously published conclusions. In doing so, this investigation highlights several important issues in the design and evaluation of computational experiments.

Computational modeling for reasoning about the social behavior of humans

The number of computationally-based models of human social behavior is growing rapidly. In fact, the current ease of programming is resulting in a plethora of tools with impressive interfaces but little theoretical power under the hood. Further, the overabundance of new toolkits for building models is facilitating the excessively rapid growth of simple proof-of-concept, or intellective, models. The current state of models range from the simplistic to the elaborate, from the conceptual to the empirical, and from the purely notional to the validatable. This review briefly describes the state of human social behavioral modeling. Key issues surrounding analysis and validation are discussed.

The Mathematical Pull of Temptation Revisited

In this paper, we defend and extend a (simple) mathematical model of akrasia.

Simplicity and reality in computational modeling of politics

Modeling a polity based on viable scientific concepts and theoretical understanding has been a challenge in computational social science and social simulation in general and political science in particular. This paper presents a computational model of a polity (political system) in progressive versions from simple to more realistic. The model, called SimPol to highlight the fundamental structures and processes of politics in a generic society, is developed using the combined methodologies of object-based modeling (OOM), the Unified Modeling Language (UML), and the methodology of Lakatos’ research programs. SimPol demonstrates that computational models of entire political systems are methodologically feasible and scientifically viable; they can also build on and progress beyond previous theory and research to advance our understanding of how polities operate across a variety of domains (simple vs. complex) and levels of analysis (local, national, international). Both simple and realistic models are necessary, for theoretical and empirical purposes, respectively.

Closure,Defeasibility and Conclusive Reasons

It is argued, on the basis of new counterexamples, that neither knowledge nor epistemic justification (or “epistemic rationality”) can reasonably be thought to be closed under logical implication. The argument includes an attempt to reconcile the fundamental intuitions of the opposing parties in the debate.

A Critique of Armstrong’s Truthmaking Account of Possibility

In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality. I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular, I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.

Some Advantages of One Form of Argument for the Maximin Principle

This paper presents a non-consequentialist defense of Rawls’s general conception of justice requiring that primary social goods be distributed so that the least share is as great as possible. It suggests that a defense of this idea can be offered within a Rossian framework of prima facie duties. The prima facie duty not to harm constrains people from supporting social institutions which do not leave their fellows with goods and resources above a certain threshold. The paper argues that societies in accord with the Rawlsian general conception come closest to meeting this requirement. This way of arguing for the conception enables the defenders of the theory to elude standard objections offered by utilitarians, libertarians, and even other egalitarians.

On the Coherence of Inversion

In this paper, I shall evaluate a strategy recently used to try to demonstrate the impossibility of behaviorally undetectable spectrum inversion. After showing that the impossibility proof proves too much, I shall identify where it goes wrong. In turn, I shall explain why someone attracted to functionalist and representationalist assumptions might rightly remain agnostic about the possibility of inversion.

Meta-ethics and Justification

The author takes up three metaphysical conceptions of morality — realism, projectivism, constructivism — and the account of justification or reason that makes these pictures possible. It is argued that the right meta-ethical conception should be the one that entails the most plausible conception of reason-giving, rather than by any other consideration. Realism and projectivism, when understood in ways consistent with their fundamental commitments, generate unsatisfactory models of justification; constructivism alone does not. The author also argues for a particular interpretation of how “objective moral obligation” is to be understood within constructivism.

Conversational Implicatures and Cancellability

In this paper I argue against a criticism by Matthew Weiner to Grice’s thesis that cancellability is a necessary condition for conversational implicature. I argue that the purported counterexamples fail because the supposed failed cancellation in the cases Weiner presents is not meant as a cancellation but as a reinforcement of the implicature. I moreover point out that there are special situations in which the supposed cancellation may really work as a cancellation.

Thing and Object

There is a fundamental ontological difference between two kinds of entity: things and objects. Unlike things, objects are not identical to any fusion of particulars. Unlike things, objects do not have mereological parts. While things are ontologically innocent, objects are not. Objects are meaty. I defend the distinction between things and objects, and provide an account of the nature of objects.

Do we self-regulate actions or perceptions? A test of two computational models

Self-regulation theories in applied psychology disagree about whether action or perceptions are the focus of regulation. Computational models based on the two conceptualizations were constructed and simulated. In one scenario, they performed identically and in conjunction with participants in a study of the goal-level effect (Vancouver et al., Organ Res Methods 8:100–127, 2005). In another scenario they created differentiating predictions and only the computational model based on the self-regulation of perceptions matched the data of participants. Implications for research and practice are discussed.