考虑支付意愿条件下服务成本对B2B电子中介定价策略的影响研究

对于B2B电子中介而言,除了考虑卖方企业使用B2B平台的支付意愿以外,如何进一步结合其服务卖方企业过程中成本支出的高低进行会员费的差异化定价,已成为管理实践中影响B2B电子中介获利能力的重要问题。针对上述问题,通过综合考虑支付意愿、服务成本等因素,构建了一个两阶段的、寡头垄断的B2B电子中介定价决策模型,探讨了考虑支付意愿这一条件下服务成本对B2B电子中介定价决策的影响。研究结果表明,当卖方企业之间服务成本高低差异较小时,B2B电子中介可忽视服务成本,主要基于支付意愿对卖方企业进行差异化定价,但这一差异化定价带来的利润却低于不基于任何因素的非差异化定价时的利润。当卖方企业之间服务成本高低差异较大时,B2B电子中介对于高服务成本的卖方企业主要基于其服务成本进行高定价,从而有选择性的流失部分服务成本较高的卖方企业;对于低服务成本的卖方企业主要基于其支付意愿进行低定价以保留这些服务成本较低的卖方企业,当服务成本高低差异足够高时,这一差异化定价带来的利润会较高。研究结果对于B2B电子中介如何通过差异化定价进行卖方企业的保留与获取以提高利润提供有益的指导。     

管制者与管制企业的定价博弈:一个双赢策略

管制企业为了利润最大化倾向于定价高于成本较多,而管制者为了社会福利最大化期望管制企业的定价等于成本.考虑管制企业与管制者间的定价博弈问题.通过对问题的仔细分析,得到了在成本信息不对称情况下管制企业与管制者间关于定价博弈的一个双赢定价策略.最后给出了一个数值算例.     

基于双重参照点的电子中介买卖双边匹配决策方法研究

本文从电子中介角度解决了买卖双方的匹配问题。首先,本文基于累积前景理论建立了双重参照点影响下的买卖双方交易达成条件的模型,并得到不同交易发生时电子中介的最优撮合价格和买卖双方的综合满意度。接着,本文针对中介企业发展的不同阶段和业务的淡旺季,构建了可供中介选择的利润导向型、客户导向型和折中型的买卖双边匹配模型。其中,在利润导向型模型中设定了关于客户满意度的阈值;在客户导向型模型中设定了关于利润的阈值;在折中型模型中同时考虑了利润和客户满意度,并设定了关于两者的阈值。最后,通过实例验证了提出方法和模型的有效性。     

基于网络顾客行为意向的物流服务供应链定价策略

就一个运营网络购物的供应链,分析物流服务需求方和服务提供方的定价和服务水平决策等问题。在成本共担优化模型中考虑基于顾客购买行为意向的产品需求函数,进而分别给出非合作、准合作和完全合作模式下供应链企业决策间的关系,以及网购顾客重购概率对最优定价策略的影响。结论有:证明三种合作模式下双方最优策略的存在性及存在条件;给出最优产品定价策略和服务定价策略间的数量关系,并证明其与网购顾客行为意向有关。数值分析表明,最优定价策略随服务水平和网购顾客重购概率的变化趋势受成本共担系数的影响;较小的成本分摊系数使最优产品定价随着服务水平和网购顾客重购概率的变化幅度增大。     

考虑质量成本的居家养老服务平台定价策略研究

人口老龄化背景下,为满足老年人日益增长的高质量养老服务需求,共享养老互联网平台开始涌现.为了探讨从服务质量角度研究质量成本投入对居家养老服务平台利润的影响,建立了以平台利润最大化为决策目标的考虑质量成本居家养老服务定价模型,构建长者和养老服务提供方效用函数,分别讨论了居家养老服务平台双方质量成本对最优定价、最优消费者剩余、最优生产者剩余以及平台最大利润的影响,并运用Matlab软件进行模拟分析,给出平台基于质量成本的最优定价策略.研究发现:居家养老服务平台增加双方质量成本投入会使得平台向长者和养老服务提供方收取较高的价格,同时带来双方体验感增加,平台网络外部性增强,有利于居家养老服务平台利润提升,最终促进共享养老产业健康发展.     

具有违约风险和交易费的房产期权定价

房价涨幅过快过高在中国房产市场已经是一个不容回避的问题.房产期权作为一种平衡买卖双方利益进行风险管理的有效工具应运而生.在Black-Scholes定价模型的基础上,考虑违约风险和交易费用这两个影响房产期权定价的重要因素,采用未定权益思想方法和△-对冲技巧建立了房产期权的定价模型,然后对模型进行求解,获得相应的数学公式,为考虑具有违约风险和交易费用影响下房产期权进行定价.     

异质性顾客视角下服务机制设计与定价策略研究

采取有效的服务策略并对顾客进行合理的服务定价是企业稳定市场需求至关重要的一点.文章考虑服务提供商设置服务优先权进行差异化定价和不设置服务优先权进行统一定价的两种服务机制,针对设置服务优先权时常规顾客因等待时间增加而产生的等待厌恶心理,研究了服务提供商服务机制选择与定价问题.结果表明当优先权顾客的市场规模较小且常规顾客的等待厌恶程度较大时,服务提供商应不设置服务优先权进行统一定价;否则,服务提供商应设置服务优先权进行差异化定价.此外,服务提供商在进行差异化定价时也可以通过提高服务速率进一步提升最优收益.     

电子中介中具有模糊信息的多属性商品交易匹配方法研究

以电子中介中买卖双方单数量同类商品交易为实际应用背景,研究了具有模糊信息的多属性商品交易优化匹配方法。首先,在给出模糊信息数学描述的基础上,从买卖双方视角提出了新的基于改进模糊信息公理的交易匹配度计算方法,由于该方法在计算中充分考虑了模糊信息情形下买卖双方对商品需求的满意程度,因而由其计算得到的交易匹配度更具有合理性和现实意义。接着,以最大化买卖双方交易匹配度为优化目标,建立了电子中介中具有模糊信息的单数量多属性商品交易匹配模型,并通过模型的求解获得最优的匹配结果。实例计算研究表明,本文提出的匹配方法是可行和实用的。     

考虑用户沟通成本的物流服务团购策略

根据客户参加团购的成本不同将客户分类(个体型和团体型),从而得到物流服务商不同的定价策略及最优解,并进一步将结果进行比较得出最优决策.研究结果表明:只有当个体型客户规模较大时,团购定价才是可行的.同时两类客户的沟通成本差异较为明显时,商家使用团购定价使得收益明显增加,团购组合定价才是最优策略.农村物流的市场特征恰好符合这团体型客户少,客户之间的沟通成本差异较大的特征.最后采用数值算例展示了农村物流服务商家采用团购定价能给企业带来更大的收益,进一步验证了上述结论.从而为物流服务商提供一种定价方法,也为农村物流服务的发展创造条件.     

迎难而上或静待时机：经济政策不确定性对能源企业的投资决策分析

本文以2007～2019年中国能源企业数据为样本，探讨经济政策不确定性对能源企业实体投资与虚拟投资的影响，并进一步检验实体投资成本与虚拟投资收益的中介效应。研究发现：经济政策不确定性对能源企业实体投资具有负向效应，对虚拟投资则为促进作用。同时，验证了实体投资成本与虚拟投资收益的中介效应，并进行了稳健性检验。研究丰富了经济政策不确定性与能源企业投资的理论，同时也为能源企业应对外界高不确定性冲击提供了参考。     

A fuzzy mathematical model for the joint economic lot size problem with multiple price breaks

This paper applies fuzzy mathematical programming to solve the joint economic lot size problem with multiple price breaks. In order to entice the buyer to increase the order quantity, it is a common practice for the seller to offer quantity discounts to the buyer. From the system viewpoint, the joint cost for the seller and buyer can be minimized only when the buyer increases his economic order quantity. The problem is how to determine the number of price breaks, as well as the quantity discount and order quantity at each price break, to achieve the optimal joint cost. Fuzzy mathematical programming provides a very efficient algorithm to solve the above problem simultaneously from the perspectives of the seller and the buyer. Another common problem in joint economic lot size model is how to split the system profit between the seller and the buyer. Whereas the traditional approach to this problem is to divide the profit based on a certain ratio determined by the bargaining power of both parties, fuzzy mathematical programming can achieve the same satisfaction level to both parties based on their respective cost functions.     

A game theory approach in seller–buyer supply chain

In this paper, several seller–buyer supply chain models are proposed which incorporate both cost factors as well as elements of competition and cooperation between seller and buyer. We assume that unit marketing expenditure and unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. The relationships between seller and buyer will be modeled by non-cooperative and cooperative games, respectively. The non-cooperative game is based on the Stackelberg strategy solution concept, where we consider separately the case when the seller is the leader (Seller-Stackelberg) and also when the buyer is the leader (Buyer-Stackelberg). Pareto efficient solutions will be provided for the cooperative game model. Numerical examples presented in this paper, including sensitivity analysis of some key parameters, will compare the results between different models considered.     

A pairwise-monotonic core selection for permutation games

In this article, a single-valued solution for permutation games is proposed. If we consider that each agent on the permutation game acts both as a buyer and as a seller, a related assignment game with the same reward matrix is defined. In this two-sided related market, the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation is considered. Then, each agent in the permutation game merges his payoff as a buyer and his payoff as a seller. This solution belongs to the core of the one-sided market and it is pairwise-monotonic.     

Designing win-win financial loan products for consumers and businesses

With the many possible designs that a financial company can offer to a consumer (eg terms, price, quality, features), a company can identify win-win products for both the consumer and the company. A key to identifying win-win products is to explicitly integrate the consumer's preferences for price and quality with the company's preferences for profit and market share. This paper builds a model that identifies the set of win-win products by integrating the preferences of buyer and seller. For any product not in this set, there is at least one product in the set that is better for both buyer and seller. The company's preferences are then used to select the optimal offer from the win-win set. Our development logically derives the results by focusing on financial products (eg loans, mortgages, credit cards) to consumers in the multitrillion dollar retail credit business.     

Global optimal policy for vendor–buyer integrated inventory system within just in time environment

Traditionally, inventory problems for the vendor and the buyer are treated separately. In modern enterprises, however, the integration of vendor–buyer inventory system is an important issue. This co-operative approach to inventory management contributes to the success of supply chain management by minimizing the joint inventory cost. The joint inventory cost and the response time can further be reduced when the buyer orders and the vendor replenishes the required items just in time (JIT) for their consumption. The inclusion of the JIT concept in this model contributes significantly to a joint inventory cost reduction. A numerical example and sensitivity analysis are carried out. The derived results show an impressive cost reduction when compared with Goyal’s model.     

Seller—buyer System Co-operation in a Monopolistic Market

This paper deals with a situation in which the buyer is in a monopolistic position with respect to the seller, and examines the issues and advantages of co-operation in a seller–buyer inventory control system. Game theory concepts form the foundation for the analysis of these issues. Initially, the relationship between the seller and the buyer is modelled as a non-cooperative two-stage game, and it is noted that the traditional EOQ formula is one of the results. Then, interactive game theory is utilized to address the problem of system co-operation as well as to determine optimal system order quantity-pricing strategies. Mutual incentives and motivations for system co-operation are also discussed. Among several alternative methods, the combination of an equal profit sharing role implemented via quantity discounting is demonstrated as the best mechanism for achieving system co-operation. Finally, the similarities and differences between the proposed model and those in the literature are discussed.     

平台型企业定价影响因素研究:以银行卡为例

本文运用双边市场理论,构建了平台型企业的定价模型及回归方程,并运用国内14家商业银行2001~2017年的实际运营数据,对构建的模型和方程进行了实证检验。研究结论表明,平台对买方价格决定的主要影响因素有:平台向消费者(买方)提供产品或服务的成本、买方边的需求价格弹性,产品(服务)差异化程度,以及相对方(商户)接入平台的数量;而平台对卖方价格决定的主要影响因素有:卖方给买方产生的网络外部性强度,卖方边的需求价格弹性,以及市场份额。     

Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with heterogeneous sellers

We consider a complete-information multilateral bargaining game in which a single buyer negotiates with two heterogeneous sellers selling perfect complementary units. While bilateral negotiations take place through a sequence of offers and counteroffers, the bargaining order is exogenously given. We solve for the conditions under which (a) the buyer prefers to negotiate with the lower-valuation seller first and (b) efficient (inefficient) outcomes emerge for the two bargaining orders. We find that the buyer prefers to negotiate with the lower-valuation seller first whenever the players are relatively impatient or the sellers are sufficiently heterogeneous. We show that there exists a unique efficient outcome when the buyer negotiates first with the lower-valuation seller and the sellers are sufficiently heterogeneous; however, significant delay in reaching agreements may arise when they are not. In case the buyer bargains with the higher-valuation seller first, an inefficient outcome is shown to exist even when players are extremely impatient.     

Pareto-optimal insurance contracts with premium budget and minimum charge constraints

In view of the fact that minimum charge and premium budget constraints are natural economic considerations in any risk-transfer between the insurance buyer and seller, this paper revisits the optimal insurance contract design problem in terms of Pareto optimality with imposing these practical constraints. Pareto optimal insurance contracts, with indemnity schedule and premium payment, are solved in the cases when the risk preferences of the buyer and seller are given by Value-at-Risk or Tail Value-at-Risk. The effect of our constraints and the relative bargaining powers of the buyer and seller on the Pareto optimal insurance contracts are highlighted. Numerical experiments are employed to further examine these effects for some given risk preferences.     

Prevention efforts,insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures

This paper studies an equilibrium model between an insurance buyer and an insurance seller, where both parties’ risk preferences are given by convex risk measures. The interaction is modeled through a Stackelberg type game, where the insurance seller plays first by offering prices, in the form of safety loadings. Then the insurance buyer chooses his optimal proportional insurance share and his optimal prevention effort in order to minimize his risk measure. The loss distribution is given by a family of stochastically ordered probability measures, indexed by the prevention effort. We give special attention to the problems of self-insurance and self-protection, and show that if the buyer’s risk measure decreases faster in effort than his expected loss, optimal effort is non-decreasing in the safety loading with a potential discontinuity when optimal coverage switches from full to zero. On the contrary, if the decrease of the buyer’s risk measure is slower than the expected loss, optimal effort may or may not be non-decreasing in the safety loading. In case of Pareto distributed losses, the seller sets the highest possible price under which the buyer still prefers full insurance over no insurance. We also analyze the case of discrete distributions: on the one hand, for self-protection, under the assumption that the marginal impact of the effort is higher on small losses than it is on catastrophic losses, the optimal effort is non-decreasing in the safety loading. On the other hand, in the case of self-protection, more conditions are needed, in particular, we obtain sufficient conditions for the optimal effort to be non-decreasing or non-monotone in the safety loading.