Linear values for interior operator games

Interior operator games were introduced by Bilbao et al. (2005) as additive games restricted by antimatroids. In that paper several interesting cooperative games were shown as examples of interior operator games. The antimatroid is a known combinatorial structure which represents, in the game theory context, a dependence system among the players. The aim of this paper is to study a family of values which are linear functions and satisfy reasonable conditions for interior operator games. Two classes of these values are considered assuming particular properties.     

On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs

Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that the equivalence is not preserved since these solutions can all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and a characterization on a subclass of games is provided.2000 Mathematics Subject Classification Number: 91A12.The authors thank two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their helpful comments.This author acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) through project 613-304-059.Received: October 2000     

Weighted shapley values for games in generalized characteristic function form

We study the family of weighted Shapley values for games in generalized characteristic function form. These values are defined and characterized.     

Whose deletion does not affect your payoff? The difference between the Shapley value, the egalitarian value, the solidarity value, and the Banzhaf value

This study provides a unified axiomatic characterization method of one-point solutions for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Any one-point solution that satisfies efficiency, the balanced cycle contributions property (BCC), and the axioms related to invariance under a player deletion is characterized as a corollary of our general result. BCC is a weaker requirement than the well-known balanced contributions property. Any one-point solution that is both symmetric and linear satisfies BCC. The invariance axioms necessitate that the deletion of a specific player from games does not affect the other players’ payoffs, and this deletion is different with respect to solutions. As corollaries of the above characterization result, we are able to characterize the well-known one-point solutions, the Shapley, egalitarian, and solidarity values, in a unified manner. We also studied characterizations of an inefficient one-point solution, the Banzhaf value that is a well-known alternative to the Shapley value.     

基于Solidarity值的河流水资源分配

河流水资源分配问题可以抽象为图限制下合作对策解的模型.基于图限制下合作对策的Solidarity值对参与者的收益分配进行分析,构造了Solidarity值的结构,给出了该值的分支有效性等四个性质,并利用这四个性质刻画了Solidarity值的唯一性.最后通过一个简单的实例,证明了河流水资源分配问题中,基于Solidarity值的收益分配比Myerson值更优.     

Density estimation using game theory

In this note we show that the mathematical tools of cooperative game theory allow a successful approach to the statistical problem of estimating a density function. Specifically, any random sample of an absolutely continuous random variable determines a transferable utility game, the Shapley value of which proves to be an estimator of the density function of binned kernel and WARPing types, with good computational and statistical properties.Authors acknowledge the financial support of Spanish Ministry for Science and Technology and FEDER through projects BFM2002-03213 and BEC2002-04102-C02-02 and of Xunta de Galicia through projects PGIDT00PXI20104PR and PGIDT03PXIC20701PN. They also thank the comments of two anonymous referees.     

The least square values and the shapley value for cooperative TU games

The main result proved in this paper is the fact that any Least Square Value is the Shapley value of a game obtained from the given game by rescaling. An Average per capita formula for Least Square Values, similar to the formula for the Shapley value (Dragan (1992)), will lead to this conclusion and allow a parallel computation for these values. The potential for the Least Square Values, a potential basis relative to Least Square Values and an approach similar to the one used for the Shapley value is allowing us to solve the Inverse problem for Least Square Values.     

Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency

Let f be a single valued solution for cooperative TU games that satisfies inessential game property, efficiency, Hart Mas-Colell consistency and for two person games is strictly monotonic and individually unbounded. Then there exists a family of strictly increasing functions associated with players that completely determines f. For two person games, both players have equal differences between their functions at the solution point and at the values of characteristic function of their singletons. This solution for two person games is uniquely extended to n person games due to consistency and efficiency. The extension uses the potential with respect to the family of functions and generalizes potentials introduced by Hart and Mas Colell [6]. The weighted Shapley values, the proportional value described by Ortmann [11], and new values generated by power functions are among these solutions. The author is grateful to anonymous referee and Associate Editor for their comments and suggestions.     

Comment on “A new approach of cooperative interval games: The interval core and Shapley value revisited”

The interval Shapley-like value for cooperative interval games was introduced by Han et al. (2012).A theorem of characterization of the interval Shapley-like value was provided in that paper. We show that there is an error in the proof of that theorem. We indicate how to avoid this error and complete the proof.     

Partially ordered cooperative games: extended core and Shapley value

In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined: the core concept, Shapley–Bondareva theorem and the Shapley value are extended for this class of games. The classes of standard, vector-valued and stochastic cooperative games among others are particular cases of this general theory. The research of the authors is partially supported by Spanish DGICYT grant numbers MTM2004-0909, HA2003-0121, HI2003-0189, MTM2007-67433-C02-01, P06-FQM-01366.     

Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games

In this paper we consider standard fixed tree games, for which each vertex unequal to the root is inhabited by exactly one player. We present two weighted allocation rules, the weighted down-home allocation and the weighted neighbour-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals both the set of weighted down-home allocations and the set of weighted neighbour allocations. Since every weighted down-home allocation specifies a weighted Shapley value (Kalai and Samet (1988)) in a natural way, and vice versa, our results provide an alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of weighted neighbour allocations is a generalization of the nucleolus, in the sense that the latter is in this class as the special member where players have all equal weights.     

Values for Interior Operator Games

The aim of this paper is to study a new class of cooperative games called interior operator games. These games are additive games restricted by antimatroids. We consider several types of cooperative games as peer group games, big boss games, clan games and information market games and show that all of them are interior operator games. Next, we analyze the properties of these games and compute the Shapley, Banzhaf and Tijs values.     

Some new results on least square values for TU games

In this paper we present some new results concerning the least square family of values for TU games. We first examine the stability of these values from a dynamic point of view and propose a reinteropretation of them from the standpoint of the propernsity to disrupt approach. In the second part the family of individually rational least square (IRLS) values is introduced and an alternative kernel-like formulation of them is provided. Finally we describe a natural and simple algorithm for calculating any IRLS value of a game. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Basque Government (Project PI95/101) and from the D.G.E.S. of the Ministerio de Educatión y Cultura (Project PB96-0247).     

市场力量、谈判能力与专利许可的Shapley值

分别在国内市场力量能否形成谈判能力的条件下,讨论了一个国外专利权人对两个国内厂商进行专利许可的两种谈判结果.若市场力量不能形成谈判能力,则国外专利权人将获得许可创造的全部利润;若市场力量能够形成谈判能力,则可能形成一种较为公平的、专利许可的Shapley值.结合现实中的专利许可实务,提出了将市场力量转化为谈论能力的建议.     

How to Distribute Costs Associated with a Delayed Project

In this paper we study how to distribute the cost caused by the delay of a project among the firms which are responsible for it. We present two rules, one based on serial cost sharing problems and the other, in game theory. Moreover, we introduce some desirable properties, inspired by well-known principles, and study which of them are satisfied by the rules.     

Sharing costs in highways: A game theoretic approach

This paper introduces a new class of games, highway games, which arise from situations where there is a common resource that agents will jointly use. That resource is an ordered set of several indivisible sections, where each section has an associated fixed cost and each agent requires some consecutive sections. We present an easy formula to calculate the Shapley value, and we present an efficient procedure to calculate the nucleolus for this class of games.     

On the consistency of the Banzhaf semivalue

In this note we show that the Banzhaf semivalue is consistent with respect to a suitable reduced game which keeps a clear parallelism with that defined by Hart and Mas-Colell in (1989) to prove the consistency of the Shapley value. We also use this reduced game property to characterize the Banzhaf semivalue.     

Shapley值与Winter值的解析关系

鉴于 Shapley 值和 Winter 值都是局中人边际贡献的平均值,探究了它们之 间的解析关系.证明了 Shapley 值是 Winter 值在层次结构集上对称概率分布下的期望均值. 作为这一结论的一个推论, 证明了 Shapley 值是 Winter 值在层次结构集的任意相似类中的平均值. 最后,还指出了这一结 论与推论的等价性.研究结果不仅扩展了 Shapley 值和 Owen 值与此对应的解析关系, 还大大简化了这些关系的已有证明.     

具有模糊权限结构和模糊支付的合作对策

具有权限结构的合作对策可刻画合作者之间具有等级限制的情形,而具有模糊权限结构的合作对策是对经典情形的拓广.进一步考虑具有模糊权限结构和模糊支付的合作对策,利用联盟的自主度算子和模糊Choquet积分,定义了这种合作对策的限制对策.在此基础上给出了两种模糊权限值,分别证明了这两种值满足的一些性质.最后利用一个算例说明这两种值在企业协作生产收益分配中的应用.