基于区间与模糊Shapley值的合作收益分配策略

将经典Shapley值三条公理进行拓广,提出具有模糊支付合作对策的Shapley值公理体系。研究一种特殊的模糊支付合作对策,即具有区间支付的合作对策,并且给出了该区间Shapley值形式。根据模糊数和区间数的对应关系,提出模糊支付合作对策的Shapley值,指出该模糊Shapley值是区间支付模糊合作对策的自然模糊延拓。结果表明:对于任意给定置信水平α,若α=1,则模糊Shapley值对应经典合作对策的Shapley值,否则对应具有区间支付合作对策的区间Shapley值。通过模糊数的排序,给出了最优的分配策略。由于对具有模糊支付的合作对策进行比较系统的研究,从而为如何求解局中人参与联盟程度模糊化、支付函数模糊化的合作对策,奠定了一定的基础。     

一种新的粗糙集模型及其应用

提出了一种新的基于区间直觉模糊关系和区间直觉模糊数的粗糙集模型.首先,介绍了区间直觉模糊集,区间直觉模糊关系和区间直觉模糊数等概念.然后,利用区间直觉模糊关系和区间直觉模糊数定义了一种新的粗糙集模型,并给出一些基本性质.最后将该模型应用于临床诊断系统中.实例验证了该粗糙集模型的有效性和实用性.     

区间值模糊推理

针对区间值模糊关系,讨论区间值模糊关系的合成运算及其运算性质,在此基础上研究简单区间值模糊推理和多重区间值模糊推理的两种模糊推理形式,给出4种区间值模糊推理的数学模型,并辅以实例来说明我们提出的区间值模糊推理方法的可行性。     

基于TOPSIS的区间直觉模糊多属性决策法

对基于区间直觉模糊信息的多属性决策问题进行了研究。给出了区间直觉模糊数之间的距离公式,并定义了区间直觉模糊正、负理想点,进而提出了一种基于TOPSIS的区间直觉模糊多属性决策方法。最后进行了实例分析。     

区间直觉模糊数的序优先度及其在群评价中的应用

区间直觉模糊数是处理模糊问题的一种准确且细腻的信息表达形式,其排序方法也是当今研究的热点问题之一.基于范数理论,提出一种新的概念:区间直觉模糊数的序优先度,给出相应的序优先度的计算公式,并探讨了区间直觉模糊数的序优先度的一些性质,同时给出基于区间直觉模糊数的序优先度的群评价算法,最后结合实例表明本文提出的方法是有效、可行的.     

区间灰数直觉模糊集及其G-TOPSIS模糊多属性决策方法

提出以区间灰数为隶属度、非隶属度和犹豫度的区间灰数直觉模糊集概念,定义了两个区间灰数直觉模糊集之间的距离.对于以灰直觉模糊数为属性值的模糊多属性决策,依据经典TOPSIS准则,提出了基于区间灰数直觉模糊集的模糊多属性决策方法G-TOPSIS.其包含两种方法:一是将区间灰数白化后,按直觉模糊集的TOPSIS方法进行;一是基于区间灰数直觉模糊距离的TOPSIS方法.示例分析表明了两种方法的有效性与一致性.     

基于核的区间直觉模糊信息集成的一类算子及其决策应用

定义了区间数核、区间直觉模糊数核的概念.并以此为基础,提出了区间直觉模糊数表示的模糊信息的几个集成算子:IIFKWA,IIFKWG,IIFKOWA IIFKOWG,IIFKHA,IIFKHG,研究了算子性质.探讨了集成算子在多属性决策中的应用,算例分析表明其具有可行性与有效性.     

局中人具有偏好关系的区间合作对策问题

针对传统的区间合作对策存在的问题,利用中心三角模糊数定义区间数的偏好关系,建立了局中人对收益有偏好关系的区间合作对策模型.定义了有相同偏好关系的区间合作对策的λ-区间核心,讨论了λ-区间核心非空的充要条件以及该区间核心的求解方法,并证明了λ-区间核心与(1-λ)截对策的区间核心之间存在双射关系.此外,对有不同偏好关系的区间合作对策进行了探讨.最后,通过一个收益分配的算例说明了该模型的适用性与该区间核心的可行性.     

模糊二人零和对策的纳什均衡求解

用三角模糊数刻画二人零和对策支付值的不确定性,提出了计算模糊二人零和对策纳什均衡解的多目标规划方法.给出了一种基于区间数比较的三角形模糊数排序方法,根据该方法将模糊二人零和对策转化为多目标线性规划.通过一个数值实例说明了该方法的有效性和实用性.     

区间直觉模糊数的新得分函数及其在多属性决策中的应用

通过对区间直觉模糊数的犹豫区间进行讨论,提出了区间直觉模糊数的新得分函数和精确函数,并讨论新的得分函数具有的性质,在此基础上给出了区间直觉模糊数的一种新的排序方法.进而,结合区间直觉模糊加权平均算子给出了属性值为区间直觉模糊数的多属性决策方法,并通过算例阐明该方法的可行性和有效性.     

一般化合成模糊对策的势指标

定义了一种新的合成模糊对策模型,我们称之为一般化合成模糊对策模型．并研究了这种模型的Shapley值和Banzhaf-Coleman势指标。     

基于Choquet积分的直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的Shapley值

本文针对联盟是直觉模糊集的合作博弈Shapley值进行了研究.通过区间Choquet积分得到直觉模糊联盟合作博弈的特征函数为区间数,并研究了该博弈特征函数性质。根据拓展模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值的计算方法,得到直觉模糊联盟合作博弈Shapley值的计算公式,该计算公式避免了区间数的减法。进一步证明了其满足经典合作博弈Shapley值的公理性。最后通过数值实例说明本文方法的合理性和有效性。     

收益模糊合作对策Shapley值的公理化

研究一类收益模糊的合作对策,这类对策联盟的模糊收益值可以用一个闭区间的形式来表示,本文定义了一个拓展的闭区间空间和一些闭区间线性运算算子,证明了这类对策的Shapley值可以用承载性、可替代性和可加性进行了公理化.     

The fuzzy core and Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids

In this paper, the generalized forms of the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids are given. An equivalent form of the fuzzy core is researched. In order to better understand the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids, we pay more attention to study three kinds of dynamic fuzzy games on matroids, which are named as fuzzy games with multilinear extension form, with proportional value and with Choquet integral form, respectively. Meantime, the relationship between the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids is researched, which coincides with the crisp case.     

The fuzzy core in games with fuzzy coalitions

In this paper, the fuzzy core of games with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp core. The fuzzy core is based on the assumption that the total worth of a fuzzy coalition will be allocated to the players whose participation rate is larger than zero. The nonempty condition of the fuzzy core is given based on the fuzzy convexity. Three kinds of special fuzzy cores in games with fuzzy coalition are studied, and the explicit fuzzy core represented by the crisp core is also given. Because the fuzzy Shapley value had been proposed as a kind of solution for the fuzzy games, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley function is also shown. Surprisingly, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley value does coincide, as in the classical case.     

Stability and Shapley value for an n-persons fuzzy game

The aim of the paper is to explain new concepts of solutions for n-persons fuzzy games. Precisely, it contains new definitions for ‘core’ and ‘Shapley value’ in the case of the n-persons fuzzy games. The basic mathematical results contained in the paper are these which assert the consistency of the ‘core’ and of the ‘Shapley value’. It is proved that the core (defined in the paper) is consistent for any n-persons fuzzy game and that the Shapley values exists and it is unique for any fuzzy game with proportional values.     

具有区间联盟值n人对策的Shapley值

本文提出了一类具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值.利用区间数运算有关理论,通过建立公理化体系,对具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值进行深入研究,证明了这类n人对策Shapley值存在性与唯一性,并给出了此Shapley值的具体表达式及一些性质.最后通过一个算例检验了其有效性与正确性.     

The Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games with multilinear extension form

In this paper, the definition of the Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games is given, which is obtained by extending the classical case. The specific expression of the Shapley function for fuzzy cooperative games with multilinear extension form is given, and its existence and uniqueness are discussed. Furthermore, the properties of the Shapley function are researched. Finally, the fuzzy core for this kind of game is defined, and the relationship between the fuzzy core and the Shapley function is shown.     

A Shapley function on a class of cooperative fuzzy games

In this paper, we make a study of the Shapley values for cooperative fuzzy games, games with fuzzy coalitions, which admit the representation of rates of players' participation to each coalition. A Shapley function has been introduced by another author as a function which derives the Shapley value from a given pair of a fuzzy game and a fuzzy coalition. However, the previously proposed axioms of the Shapley function can be considered unnatural. Furthermore, the explicit form of the function has been given only on an unnatural class of fuzzy games. We introduce and investigate a more natural class of fuzzy games. Axioms of the Shapley function are renewed and an explicit form of the Shapley function on the natural class is given. We make sure that the obtained Shapley value for a fuzzy game in the natural class has several rational properties. Finally, an illustrative example is given.