政府补贴政策下考虑风险规避的绿色供应链定价决策研究

在政府推行补贴政策背景下,通过建立博弈模型研究了政府补贴、制造商和零售商的风险规避对绿色供应链定价策略、产品绿色度、供应链各方利润及整体利润的影响。研究表明:制造商或零售商单方面的风险规避对对方来说都是有利的,但不同的是,仅制造商风险规避时,产品绿色度、批发价格、零售价格及其自身利润都将下降,供应链整体利润则既存在上升也存在下降的情况,当仅零售商风险规避时,产品绿色度、供应链整体利润都将上升,批发价格、零售价格及其自身利润则既存在上升也存在下降的情况;政府增加补贴会在一定程度上加重制造商的风险规避对其自身利润及产品绿色度的损害作用,却会在一定程度上减弱零售商的风险规避对其自身利润的损害作用,并增强零售商的风险规避对产品绿色度的提升作用。     

An integrated inventory model for a deteriorating item with allowable shortages and credit linked wholesale price

This study proposes a single manufacturer, single retailer integrated inventory model that includes deterioration and shortages in the retailer’s inventory. The manufacturer’s production process is assumed to be imperfect as it produces a certain percentage of defective items. The retailer performs a 100  % screening process immediately on receiving a lot from the manufacturer and returns the detected defective items to the manufacturer in the next delivery. The manufacturer disposes the defective items and incurs a disposal cost. To increase sales, (s)he offers a trade credit to the retailer. The retailer’s wholesale price varies linearly with the credit period. The objective is to determine the optimal replenishment cycle time, the time of running out of stock, the length of the credit period and the number of lots from the manufacturer to the retailer so as to maximize the total profit of the integrated system. A solution algorithm is designed and illustrated through numerical examples. Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis is carried out to study the influence of the model-parameters on the optimal solution.     

Tail behaviour of credit loss distributions for general latent factor models

Using a limiting approach to portfolio credit risk, we obtain analytic expressions for the tail behavior of credit losses. To capture the co‐movements in defaults over time, we assume that defaults are triggered by a general, possibly non‐linear, factor model involving both systematic and idiosyncratic risk factors. The model encompasses default mechanisms in popular models of portfolio credit risk, such as CreditMetrics and CreditRisk⁺. We show how the tail characteristics of portfolio credit losses depend directly upon the factor model's functional form and the tail properties of the model's risk factors. In many cases the credit loss distribution has a polynomial (rather than exponential) tail. This feature is robust to changes in tail characteristics of the underlying risk factors. Finally, we show that the interaction between portfolio quality and credit loss tail behavior is strikingly different between the CreditMetrics and CreditRisk⁺ approach to modeling portfolio credit risk.     

风险规避型零售商资金约束下双渠道闭环供应链的定价决策

针对单一风险中性制造商和单一风险规避零售商组成的双渠道闭环供应链,建立制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,讨论零售商分别通过银行贷款和延期支付解决资金约束问题时,各参与方的最优定价,分析回收率和零售商风险规避程度对决策结果的影响,并比较两种融资方式中决策结果的差异。研究表明:在双渠道闭环供应链中,零售商的资金约束不会影响批发价格、直销价格和零售价格随回收率的变化趋势。随着零售商风险规避程度的提高,银行贷款中批发价格的变化还与利率有关,直销价格始终降低;延期支付中批发价格始终提高,直销价格与之无关。当融资利率相等时,银行贷款中的批发价格始终高于延期支付,而直销价格和零售价格的相对大小还受利率和回收率的影响。     

Optimal inventory and insurance decisions for a supply chain financing system with downside risk control

This research considers a supply chain financing system consisting of a capital‐constrained retailer, a supplier and a risk‐averse bank. The retailer may be subject to credit limit because of the bank's downside risk control, and hence, credit insurance should be needed to enhance his financing ability. This paper develops a mathematical optimization model by incorporating insurance policy into the well‐known newsvendor financing model. The optimal inventory and insurance decisions under different scenarios, that is, no insurance, insurance with symmetric information and insurance with asymmetric information, are derived. This work also discusses how the retailer's capital level, the bank's risk aversion, and the insurer's loading factor affect the optimal inventory and insurance decisions. The results show that the retailer will use credit insurance if he is sufficiently capital‐constrained or the insurer's risk loading factor is low enough. Moreover, credit insurance can bring Pareto improvement to the supply chain financing system, which verifies the prevalence of credit insurance in practice. Several numerical experiments are presented to examine the sensitivities of key parameters. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

资金约束下基于CVaR的供应链协调性研究与融资策略选择

在零售商的资金约束下,供应商愿意提供贸易信用融资或者信用担保下的银行贷款。在考虑双方均为风险规避型的情况下采用CVaR风险度量方法建立了双方以及供应链的风险收益值模型,给出了两种融资模式下的供应链协调条件,最优订货量以及批发价格,并且研究了银行贷款利率对供应链协调以及供应商融资方式选择的影响。结果表明实现供应链协调的条件取决于生产成本、银行利率以及双方的风险规避程度,不同的银行利率会导致实现供应链协调的条件不同,供应商将根据双方风险规避程度选择提供给零售商的融资方式。     

Environmental corporate responsibility for investments evaluation: an alternative multi-objective programming model

The manufacturer who is a supplier of trade credit may face non-payment risk from customers and a capital shortage problem simultaneously. Trade credit insurance, as one of the most important risk management tools, has been widely used in companies’ daily operation. In this study, the manufacturer who allows customers to delay payment for goods already delivered purchases trade credit insurance to transfer and reduce non-payment risk and borrows money from a bank to accommodate the capital constraint problem. The Stackelberg game and loss-averse theory are used to establish a newsboy model including trade credit insurance, and the optimal insurance coverage and total sales of the manufacturer are thereby investigated. Subsequently, the interest rate decision of the bank under different risk-averse situations is also characterized. We find that the interest rate set by a loss-averse bank is equal to or greater than that given by a risk-neutral bank. The use of trade credit insurance can help the manufacturer expand sales and dramatically reduce its default risk. Both the bank and the manufacturer are better off due to the use of trade credit insurance, but contrary to what one might expect, the bank prefers giving a higher interest rate to the manufacturer when the premium rate is in a reasonable region, which indicates that the manufacturer cannot use the insurance to negotiate better financing terms.     

Supply chain performance and consumer surplus under alternative structures of channel dominance

Supply chain partnerships exhibit varying degrees of power distribution among the agents. This has implications for pricing and operational decisions in the channel and eventually influences the end customers. To understand how different power schemes affect the supply chain partners’ performance and consumer surplus, we study channel structures with a dominant manufacturer, a dominant retailer, and no single-agent dominance. Under random and price sensitive demand, channel dominance is interpreted in our setting as exerting power to determine the retail and wholesale prices as well as to transfer the inventory risk to the weaker party. We analyze all problems in a game-theory based framework and characterize the equilibrium retail price, wholesale price, and order/production quantity. We show that the manufacturer-dominated channel structure leads to the highest production quantity, the lowest retail price, and the largest expected surplus for an individual buyer; on the other hand, the entire channel profit and the total consumer surplus are highest when the retailer holds the channel dominance. While both the manufacturer and the retailer are better off when they become a power agent individually, channel dominance does not always guarantee higher share of channel profits, as we show under the manufacturer-dominated structure. Further insights are derived analytically and numerically from comparisons of the manufacturer/retailer dominance schemes with the no single-agent dominance structure and integrated channel. We also study extensions to investigate the effect of demand model and risk sharing, and we address industry settings with alternative schemes of holding cost, shortage penalty and salvage value.     

A dynamic binomial expansion technique for credit risk measurement: a Bayesian filtering approach

Credit risk measurement and management are important and current issues in the modern finance world from both the theoretical and practical perspectives. There are two major schools of thought for credit risk analysis, namely the structural models based on the asset value model originally proposed by Merton and the intensity‐based reduced form models. One of the popular credit risk models used in practice is the Binomial Expansion Technique (BET) introduced by Moody's. However, its one‐period static nature and the independence assumption for credit entities' defaults are two shortcomings for the use of BET in practical situations. Davis and Lo provided elegant ways to ease the two shortcomings of BET with their default infection and dynamic continuous‐time intensity‐based approaches. This paper first proposes a discrete‐time dynamic extension to the BET in order to incorporate the time‐dependent and time‐varying behaviour of default probabilities for measuring the risk of a credit risky portfolio. In reality, the ‘true’ default probabilities are unobservable to credit analysts and traders. Here, the uncertainties of ‘true’ default probabilities are incorporated in the context of a dynamic Bayesian paradigm. Numerical studies of the proposed model are provided.     

Re-assignment and consolidation of credit authorizations

When a customer is granted several credit lines with different risk levels, the bank usually stipulates an authorization for each credit line and a total authorization; moreover authorizations are sometimes given for sets of credit lines. The purpose of the paper is, given a set of credit lines with corresponding authorizations, and a customer's current credit utilizations, to find new utilizations of greatest risk to the bank, within the credit authorization limits and with regard to the current utilizations. These new utilizations, used as re-assigned authorizations enable the bank to assess the risks relative to residual commitment and possible overstepping for each credit line. Furthermore these risks can be aggregated over a set of customers for each credit line. An algorithm has been developed to compute these re-assigned authorizations; it is based on classical linear programming methods. This paper describes this algorithm and recommends its use to consolidate risks.     

Selling to the “Newsvendor” with a forecast update: Analysis of a dual purchase contract

We consider a supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a procure-to-stock retailer facing a newsvendor problem with a forecast update. Under a wholesale price contract, the retailer waits as long as she can and optimally places her order after observing the forecast update. We show that the retailer’s wait-and-decide strategy, induced by the wholesale price contract, hinders the manufacturer’s ability to (1) set the wholesale price and maximize his profit, (2) hedge against excess inventory risk, and (3) reduce his profit uncertainty. To mitigate the adverse effect of wholesale price contract, we propose the dual purchase contract, through which the manufacturer provides a discount for orders placed before the forecast update. We characterize how and when a dual purchase contract creates strict Pareto improvement over a wholesale price contract. To do so, we establish the retailer’s optimal ordering policy and the manufacturer’s optimal pricing and production policies. We show how the dual purchase contract reduces profit variability and how it can be used as a risk hedging tool for a risk averse manufacturer. Through a numerical study, we provide additional managerial insights and show, for example, that market uncertainty is a key factor that defines when the dual purchase contract provides strict Pareto improvement over the wholesale price contract.     

持股策略下随机需求低碳供应链融资决策均衡

随机市场需求且受制造商减排水平影响,考虑碳限额与交易机制,研究制造商进行单纯银行借贷和供应商投资持股的组合融资时的最优决策和利润情况,分析消费者低碳偏好、碳交易价格和供应商的投资持股比例对供应链的最优决策变量和利润的影响。研究发现:无资金约束、单纯银行借贷和组合融资下,消费者低碳偏好、碳交易价格和持股比例与制造商的减排水平和利润以及供应链系统的利润正相关,而供应商的批发价格和制造商的生产量与消费者低碳偏好正相关,与碳交易价格负相关,而持股比例与供应商的批发价格负相关,与制造商的生产量和减排水平正相关;持股策略下制造商的减排水平和生产量最大,无资金约束时次之,单纯银行借贷时最小;而无资金约束时供应商的批发价格最高,单纯银行借贷时次之,持股策略时最低;在持股比例满足一定条件下,供应商和制造商的利润优于单纯银行借贷时的利润,并且可以优于无资金约束时的利润,提高了供应链的竞争力和效率。     

Pricing/inventory decisions and profit shares in a non-integrated marketing channel for a single-period product

We consider the situation in which the manufacturer of a single-period product first sets the unit wholesale price and then the retailer responds with an order size. We present mostly analytical results on the effects of the problem's environmental parameters (such as shortage cost and demand uncertainty) on the optimal decisions (ie, the unit wholesale price and retailer's order size) and on the expected profits of the manufacturer and of the retailer. Some of these effects are counter-intuitive and/or contradict related results published recently for similar models. The most important finding is that demand uncertainty is always harmful to the manufacturer but is very often beneficial to the retailer. This means that when the manufacturer can set the wholesale price, the manufacturer should be much more supportive (or even aggressive) than previously advised towards activities such as market surveys and ‘Quick Response’ that reduce the retailer's market uncertainty; in contrast, the retailer need not be as enthusiastic about these activities.     

A simulation study of IT outsourcing in the credit card business

The use of Monte Carlo simulation for evaluation of financial risk of an information technology project selection decision is described. A major Thai bank considered the opportunity to expand credit card operations through information technology (IT). Alternatives considered were in-house development and outsourcing. There were many strategic reasons for the initiative. However, there were also many risks associated with the proposal. A Monte Carlo simulation spreadsheet model was used to model risk parameters, and to analyze key performance variables of financial performance. Key output variables were the number of cardholders expected, project net present value, net profit, and expected return on investment. The spreadsheet model made entry of model elements transparent, and Monte Carlo simulation provided clear visual display of the financial output variables. The bank used this information in its decision to outsource its credit card operations.     

Wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective

This paper develops a one-population (indirect) evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer/supplier and many (a sufficiently large number of) retailers to study how the retailer’s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price, its observability, the error probability of the observed result on the rival’s preference, the market scale and the retailer’s bargaining power. This paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer. We find that the profit (revenue) maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high (low). Given an appropriate wholesale price, the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers’ population. The larger the market scale, the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price. The cross effects of the retailer’s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process.     

The role of retailer’s performance in optimal wholesale price discount policies

The main goal of this paper is to model the effects of wholesale price control on manufacturer’s profit, taking explicitly into account the retailer’s sales motivation and performance. We consider a stylized distribution channel where a manufacturer sells a single kind of good to a single retailer. Wholesale price discounts are assumed to increase the retailer’s motivation thus improving sales. We study the manufacturer’s profit maximization problem as an optimal control model where the manufacturer’s control is the discount on wholesale price and retailer’s motivation is one of the state variables. In particular in the paper we prove that an increasing discount policy is optimal for the manufacturer when the retailer is not efficient while efficient retailers may require to decrease the trade discounts at the end of the selling period. Computational experiments point out how the discount on wholesale price passed by the retailer to the market (pass-through) influences the optimal profit of the manufacturer.     

Stress test for a technology credit guarantee fund based on survival analysis

A technology credit guarantee policy has been established to provide financial support to technology-based SMEs with a limited asset base. For an effective technology credit guarantee policy, risk management is essential. In this paper, we investigate a survival model that predicts start-up SMEs’ loan default probability at a given time based on technology attributes along with the economic environment and the firm’s characteristics at the time of the technology credit guarantee fund application. This, in turn, is used for the estimation of the technology fund risk along with a stress test. Our work is expected to contribute to reducing the risks associated with technology financing.     

供应商成本信息不对称下装配系统协同问题研究

本文研究的装配系统由两个供应商和一个制造商组成,其中一个供应商的成本信息为公共信息,另一个供应商的成本信息为其私有信息,制造商通过设计契约来揭示该私有信息。作为装配系统的主导者,制造商一方面以自身利润最大化为目标,另一方面希望通过系统协同来获得更多的利润。研究结果表明,制造商对两个供应商都采用批发价契约时,无法揭示供应商的私有信息;制造商对信息公开的供应商采用批发价契约,对拥有私有信息的供应商采用价格补贴契约时,可以揭示供应商的私有信息,但不能实现装配系统的整体协同;制造商对两个供应商都采用价格补贴契约时,在成功揭示供应商的私有信息的同时,也实现了装配系统的整体协同。数值分析结果表明,同制造商对两个供应商分别提供批发价契约和价格补贴契约时相比,制造商对两个供应商都提供价格补贴契约时,私有信息的揭示区间会变大,系统总利润和拥有私有信息的供应商的利润会增加,信息公开的供应商的利润会降低,制造商的利润可能增加也可能降低。     

Manufacturer's pricing strategy and return policy for a single-period commodity

This paper presents a model for designing the pricing and return-credit strategy for a monopolistic manufacturer of single-period commodities. That is, given the unit manufacturing cost and the unit retail sale price, the manufacturer determines: (i) the unit price C to be charged against the retailer; and (ii) the unit credit V to be given to the retailer for units returned. While the manufacturer is allowed to set C and V, the order quantity Q is set by the retailer in response to the manufacturer's C and V. Among the unexpected findings derived from our model are: (i) unless an external force supports the retailer, otherwise the manufacturer can usually design a (C,V)-scheme that gives himself the lion's share of the profit; (ii) depending on the risk attitudes of the manufacturer and the retailer, the optimal return policy can range from “no returns allowed” to “unlimited returns with full credit”; (iii) instead of losing his profit share to the retailer, a return-credits agreement can often be manipulated by a shrewd manufacturer to increase his profit.     

Designing win-win financial loan products for consumers and businesses

With the many possible designs that a financial company can offer to a consumer (eg terms, price, quality, features), a company can identify win-win products for both the consumer and the company. A key to identifying win-win products is to explicitly integrate the consumer's preferences for price and quality with the company's preferences for profit and market share. This paper builds a model that identifies the set of win-win products by integrating the preferences of buyer and seller. For any product not in this set, there is at least one product in the set that is better for both buyer and seller. The company's preferences are then used to select the optimal offer from the win-win set. Our development logically derives the results by focusing on financial products (eg loans, mortgages, credit cards) to consumers in the multitrillion dollar retail credit business.