模糊选择函数拟传递合理性的研究

本文在Georgescu模糊选择函数意义下,研究了一些模糊合理性条件之间的关系及模糊选择函数的拟传递合理性。首先,给出了模糊选择函数合理性条件FA1,条件FA2与条件Fγ的定义,研究了模糊选择函数G-合理性与条件FA1之间的关系。其次对合理性条件FA2,条件FPI及条件Fδ之间的关系进行了详细的讨论。最后得出了模糊选择函数拟传递合理的三个充分条件。     

模糊选择函数拟传递合理性的研究

本文在Georgescu模糊选择函数意义下,对模糊合理性条件及拟传递合理性进行了深入研究。首先给出了模糊选择函数合理性条件FC1、条件FC2、条件FC3、条件FC4及条件FC5的定义并且重新定义了条件Fδ;其次讨论了它们与拟传递合理之间的关系;最后得出了模糊选择函数拟传递合理的一些充分条件及一个充要条件。     

模糊选择函数的拟传递合理性指标

介绍了模糊关系的拟传递指标和模糊选择函数的拟传递合理性指标.并在取小t-模下,讨论了拟传递指标与非循环指标之间的关系及拟传递合理性指标与模糊δ条件指标之间的关系.     

模糊选择函数的合理性及拟传递合理性的刻画

首先给出模糊选择函数合理性的一个充分必要条件。然后将普通情况下Schw artz所提出的收缩扩张公理模糊化,在选择集为正规模糊集的前提下,研究了模糊选择函数拟传递合理性的刻画问题。我们指出,该模糊化后的条件仍是选择函数拟传递合理的必要条件,但已不再是拟传递合理的充分条件(我们用例子说明了这一点)。因此,在文章的最后,给出了比较强的一个充分条件。     

Georgescu模糊选择函数伪传递合理性的研究

本文研究模糊选择函数伪传递合理性。对普通选择函数伪传递合理的两个充要条件进行了模糊化,讨论了它们的独立性;证明了对Georgescu模糊选择函数而言,这两个条件仍是伪传递合理的充分条件,但不再是必要条件。     

模糊选择函数的Wψ-伪传递及Wψ-半序合理性刻画

在模糊偏好结构下,首先将Schwartz[1]提出的收缩扩张公理模糊化,在选择集为正规模糊集的前提下,研究模糊选择函数Wψ伪传递及Wψ半序合理的刻画问题.由于模糊化后的条件不再是选择函数伪传递合理的充分条件,因此,文章最后给出新的条件束刻画其合理性.     

模糊选择函数的Wφ-伪传递及Wφ-半序合理性刻画

在模糊偏好结构下,首先将Schwartz提出的收缩扩张公理模糊化,在选择集为正规模糊集的前提下,研究模糊选择函数Wφ-伪传递及Wφ半序合理的刻画问题。由于模糊化后的条件不再是选择函数伪传递合理的充分条件,因此,文章最后给出新的条件来刻画其合理性。     

模糊选择函数半序合理的充分条件

在G?del t-模下,研究了模糊选择函数的半序合理性.首先给出了模糊选择函数的合理性条件FA1.然后研究了该条件与模糊选择函数半序合理性之间的关系,得到了半序合理的一个充分条件.     

一个基于模糊偏好的选择函数

研究了一个基于模糊偏好关系的模糊选择函数。首先对文献中基于普通关系的最好元集所确定的选择函数进行了回顾,并给出了进一步结果。然后,讨论了该选择函数的模糊化形式,给出了基于模糊偏好的选择集确定模糊选择函数的充要条件,同时研究了该选择函数的合理性性质。     

Georgescu模糊选择函数的Suzumura合理性条件的研究

研究了Georgescu模糊选择函数的Suzumura合理性条件之间的关系.首先,在Georgescu模糊选择函数框架下,利用模糊逻辑联结运算给出了这些合理性条件的定义.其次,详细地研究了它们之间的关系,得到了一些有意义的结果,从而将Banerjee模糊选择函数的大部分结论推广到了Georgescu模糊选择函数.最后,对于不成立的结论,也举反例加以说明.     

关于Nielson Zeta函数的有理性

Ａ．Ｌ．Ｆｅｌ＇ｓｈｔｙｎ和Ｖ．Ｂ．Ｐｉｌｙｕｇｉｎａ定义了Ｎｉｅｌｓｏｎｚｅｔａ函数并证明关于其有理性的一些结果，本文改进了他们的一些结果。     

Adaptive approaches to stochastic programming

Economists have found a need to model agents who behave in ways that are not consistent with the traditional notions of rational behavior under uncertainty but that are oriented in some looser manner toward achieving good outcomes. Adaptation over time in a myopic manner, rather that forward-looking optimization, has been proposed as one such model of behavior that displays bounded rationality. This paper investigates the relationship between adaptation as a model of behavior and as an algorithmic approach that has been used in computing solutions to optimization problems. It describes a specific adaptive model of behavior in discrete choice problems, one that is closely related to adaptive algorithms for optimization, and shows that this model can be fruitfully applied in studying several economic issues.     

Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma

This paper proposes an aspiration-based dynamic model for cooperation where a large population of agents are matched afresh every period to play a Prisoner's Dilemma. At each point in time, agents hold a common aspiration level which is updated on the basis of some “population statistic”, i.e. a certain scalar summary (e.g. average payoff) associated to the current state. On the other hand, those agents who feel “dissatisfied” (relative to current aspiration) switch actions at a rate which is increasing in the magnitude of the dissatisfaction. The resulting process is shown to converge in the long run under quite general conditions. Moreover, if agents are responsive enough, the long-run social state displays some extent of cooperation, with a constant positive fraction of the population (always less than half) choosing to cooperate in every period. Received: January 1998/Revised version: October 1998     

基于Agent仿真的个体有限理性与众包绩效的关系研究

如何筛选有限理性参与者是企业实施众包的关键问题。通过引入个体有限理性,扩展了经典的NK模型,构建了模拟竞赛式众包问题解决过程的多主体仿真模型,研究了个体有限理性水平、个体有限理性系统化程度以及个体有限理性水平标准差对众包绩效的影响。仿真结果显示,个体有限理性水平对提高众包绩效有显著的正向影响,尤其是在任务复杂性较高的情况下;个体有限理性系统化程度和个体有限理性水平标准差对众包绩效也有正向影响,但依赖于个体有限理性水平。当企业有一个复杂性较高的任务时,如果追求所有方案的整体改善,企业需要招募有限理性水平较高的个体,并组成有限理性系统化程度较高且有限理性水平标准差较大的群体;如果追求少数优质方案,企业需要招募有限理性水平较高的个体,并组成有限理性系统化程度较低且有限理性水平标准差较大的群体。     

The survival value of assuming others to be rational

I study the evolution of rationality, using an indirect evolutionary approach, in which nature selects a decision-making procedure, and the procedure chooses actions in matching-games. The main result is that in order for (knowledge of) rationality to survive, it is necessary and sufficient that the rational procedure respects the attraction principle. That is, when a rational agent eliminates a strictly dominated action A, he should only increase the choice probability of the actions actually dominating A and not change the choice probability of other undominated actions. The attraction principle sharpens gametheoretic predictions. Attraction effects have been verified in psychological experiments. Received: November 1997/Final version: January 2000     

To reveal or not to reveal? Strategic disclosure of private information in negotiation

Within the bargaining literature, it is widely held that negotiators should never reveal information that will lead to disclosure of their reservation prices. We analyze a simple bargaining and search model in which the informed buyer can choose to reveal his cost of searching for an outside price (which determines his reservation price) to the uninformed seller. We demonstrate that buyers can be made better off by revealing their search cost. More interestingly, we also find that, depending on the assumed distribution of search costs, sometimes buyers with relatively low search costs should reveal their private information whereas in other cases buyers with relatively high search costs should do so. We then test our model experimentally and find that subjects’ behavior is not entirely consistent with theoretical predictions. In general, bargainers’ behavior is better explained by a bounded rationality model similar to “fictitious play”.     

Complexity of games and bounded rationality

An attempt is made to propose a concept of limited rationality for choice junctions based on computability theory in computer science.

Starting with the observation that it is possible to construct a machine simulating strategies of each individual in society, one machine for each individual's preference structure, we identify internal states of this machine with strategies or strategic preferences. Inputs are possible actions of other agents in society thus society is effectively operating as a game generated by machines. The main result states that effective realization of game strategies bound by the “complexity of computing machines'.     

Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs

A consistent pair specifies a set of rational strategies for both players such that a strategy is rational if and only if it is a best reply to a Bayesian belief that gives positive probability to every rational strategy of the opponent and probability zero otherwise. Although the idea underlying consistent pairs is quite intuitive, the original definition suffers from non-existence problems. In this article, we propose an alternative formalization of consistent pairs. According to our definition, a strategy is rational if and only if it is a best reply to some lexicographic probability system that satisfies certain consistency conditions. These conditions imply in particular that a player's probability system gives infinitely more weight to rational strategies than to other strategies. We show that modified consistent pairs exist for every game.This article is based on Chapter 3 of my Ph.D. thesis finished at the University of Bonn in fulfillment of the requirements of the European Doctoral Programme. For helpful comments and discussions, I would like to thank Eddie Dekel, Larry Blume, Tilman Börgers, Martin Dufwenberg, Frank Schuhmacher, Ariel Rubinstein, Avner Shaked, and seminar participants at Tel Aviv and Iowa City. Financial assistance by the German Academic Exchange Service is gratefully acknowledged.