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1.引言 本世纪70年代初期,Chen C.I.,Simann M.和Cruz J.B.,Jr,首次把Stackelberg策略概念,引入到对策中来,建立了二人主从对策模型。由于这类对策有广泛的实际背景,因此,主从对策便成为80年代对策论中的一个热门方向。我们在[5]和[6]中提出了有多个“主人”和多个“从人”的(m,n)-人主从对策,并给出了SN-解,S∑-解和SQ-解的概念及其存在条件。 相似文献
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将BOT项目公司的股东简化为建设承包商、设备供应商和主要投资人,然后根据假设条件求出了承包商和供应商作假的最优概率,在此基础上的研究表明项目公司的稳定性与作假被查实的罚金密切相关,且当作假的查处成本降低到一定的水平时,项目公司会具有更好的稳定性.在项目公司有三个股东的情况下,股东在意图作假时不会像只有两个股东那样只权衡自己被查实的概率、惩罚的力度和查处自己的成本,同时还会考虑另一股东作假的概率和项目公司股权的分布并且会比较自己作假和另一股东作假的相对收益.最后为投资人建议了一些应对措施. 相似文献
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考虑供给侧为双寡头车企组成的汽车卖场,以没有“双积分”政策约束作为参照条件,构建有“双积分”政策约束时燃油车是否减排的模型,分别对其进行Bertrand博弈求解分析,从定价视角探讨“双积分”政策对燃油车和新能源汽车发展的作用机制,并通过数值分析进一步直观验证“双积分”政策的作用效果。研究表明:每台新能源汽车积分值设置过大不利于促进燃油车减排水平的提高,且存在合理的新能源汽车积分值区间,可以实现“既鼓励先进,又制约落后”的双重目的。“双积分”政策对涉及燃油车生产的制造商不利,当每台新能源汽车积分值较小时,其获得的利润较无“双积分”政策约束时减小;对仅生产新能源汽车的制造商有利,其获得的利润总是较无“双积分”政策约束时增大。 相似文献
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基于系统动力学相关理论,分析云南区域物流的动力学机制,构建区域物流系统动力学模型,探讨云南区域物流未来的发展态势.利用系统动力学模型的“战略与策略实验室”功能,通过考虑四种政策方案分析,模拟不同影响因素对云南物流业以及经济的促进作用,根据模型模拟的结果,有针对性地提出云南省发展物流业的对策建议:增强云南省区域竞争力,优化资源配置,为打造云南省为面向东南亚、南亚“一带一路”的桥梁枢纽提供理论支撑和政策指导. 相似文献
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Fisheries regulation is considered necessary to counteract the effects of competitive forces which can lead to a “tragedy of the commons”. Yet management initiatives have often failed because they did not take into account competitive responses of fishing enterprises. In particular, open access fisheries provide strong incentives for the development of excessive harvesting capacity. This in turn leads to harvesting that is concentrated in space and time, with adverse effects on both the resource and markets. A coalition of fishermen, such as a fishermen's cooperative, has interests similar to those of a sole owner, and thus would be expected to produce more efficient behaviour. In practice, however, fishermen's cooperatives seldom persist. Game theory is used to explore relationships between the coalition structure of the industry, economic variables, and regulation. The models are based loosely on a purse seine fishery for herring. The results suggest that the potential to form stable coalitions is affected by changes in price and harvest. Changes in regulation also affect stability of coalitions. When interpreted in the light of historical changes in the herring fishery, these results suggest that industry may not accept regulations which do not permit formation of stable coalitions. 相似文献
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通过对一个随机游戏的分析,提出“近似马氏稳态时间”定理并加以证明,而后利用马氏链模型和对策论建立解决方案的最佳模型,并利用此模型预测足球比赛的胜、负的概率。 相似文献
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在存款保险市场中,道德风险的产生增加了存款保险机构运行成本.本文运用相关知识建立了双方的博弈模型,讨论了均衡状态下双方的最优博弈策略,并在此基础上建立促使银行选择风险小的投资的激励模型. 相似文献
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Donald H. Negri 《Natural Resource Modeling》1990,4(4):521-537
This paper computes open loop and subgame perfect Nash equilibria for an infinite horizon, common property resource model with congestion and stock externalities. The model permits the comparison of the game-theoretic approach and the traditional commons literature, which preceded the widespread recognition of the games, because the underlying assumptions are equivalent. With access to the commons restricted, the subgame perfect equilibrium captures the inefficiency associated with the strategic scramble to capture the resource reserves the open loop does not. Under sole ownership, the two equilibrium concepts coincide with the surplus maximizing extraction policy. In free access, the extraction strategies under both equilibrium concepts coincide with complete rent dissipation. 相似文献
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首先给出带参数的纳什均衡问题Γ(x),在此基础上给出了具有带参数的纳什均衡约束的两阶段主从博弈问题G.可以证明带参数的纳什均衡点是存在的,即无论领导者选择何种策略,跟随者的最佳回应集都是非空的.最后推出了关于两阶段主从博弈均衡点的存在性定理. 相似文献
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ABSTRACT. We combine new concepts of noncooperative coalition theory with an integrated assessment model on climate change to analyze the impact of different protocol designs on the success of coalition formation. We analyze the role of “single versus multiple coalitions,”“open versus exclusive membership,”“no, weak and strong consensus about membership” and “no transfers versus transfers.” First, we want to find out whether and how modifications of the standard assumptions affect results that are associated with the widely applied cartel formation game in the noncooperative game theoretic analysis of international environmental agreements. Second, we discuss normative policy conclusions that emerge from the various modifications. Third, we confront our results with evidence on past international environmental treaties and derive an agenda for future research. 相似文献