基于减排框架的最优技术政策选择研究

基于减排框架,本文分别引入研发补贴政策、研发卡特尔(简称“R&D卡特尔”)、竞争研发联盟(简称“RJV竞争”)及卡特尔研发联盟(简称“RJV卡特尔”)等四种技术政策,构建了一个多阶段博弈模型,研究单一技术政策、技术组合政策情形下双寡头企业减排研发绩效、利润及社会福利水平,并进一步利用数值模拟方法探讨政府和企业最优的技术政策选择,政府和企业最优技术政策选择结果的差异及其影响因素。研究结论表明:首先,从政府角度来看,组合政策的效果总是相对优于单一技术政策,并且政府最优的技术政策选择为RJV卡特尔与补贴组合政策。其次,无论溢出率取何值,政府和企业最优的技术政策选择都是一致的。最后,排污税取值影响政府和企业最优技术选择的一致性,当排污税较小时,企业最优的技术政策选择为RJV竞争与补贴组合政策(或RJV竞争政策);当排污税较大时,企业最优的技术选择为单一的技术政策。为了使政府和企业的最优技术政策选择一致,政府应选择一个合适的排污税。     

考虑环境污染的随机经济增长模型

本文主要考虑了环境污染对个体福利的负面效应,把环境污染水平纳入效用函数,由此建立了一个随机经济增长模型.分析了经济均衡时税收,政府环保投资,私人环保投资对经济增长率和社会福利的影响.同时还求出了最优的增长率和个人资本与财富比,消费和财富比.     

Transnational remanufacturing decisions under carbon taxes and tariffs

Considering the influence of carbon taxes and tariffs on transnational closed-loop supply chains, this paper establishes three remanufacturing modes of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in an exporting country. In one remanufacturing mode, the OEM conducts remanufacturing itself, and in the other two modes, the OEM authorizes a retailer in the importing country to engage in remanufacturing. Next, we analyse the optimal pricing and carbon emissions reduction decisions of the OEM and retailer in the different modes and further study how different levels of carbon tax and tariff combinations impact OEM remanufacturing decisions, the social welfare of importing countries and the environment. The results show the following. (1) When the carbon tariff is high, the optimal sales of remanufactured products increase. However, this does not contribute to the continuation of the product system; thus, it is short sighted for the government to hastily set high carbon tariffs to discourage the import of new products to protect domestic enterprises. (2) Carbon tariffs cannot effectively encourage the OEM to invest in emission reduction because carbon tariffs are passed on to consumers in importing countries through price adjustment. However, carbon tax may be an indirect factor affecting the OEM's willingness to invest in emission reduction. (3) The OEM favours allowing the retailer to remanufacture when the carbon emissions of the remanufactured products are similar to those of new products. Co-investment in emission reduction has the potential to align the profit maximization of the OEM with the social welfare maximization of the importing country. (4) It is not profitable for the importing government to set high carbon tariffs to protect its own enterprises.     

基于碳关税和配额的再制造决策研究

在跨国闭环供应链中考虑碳关税、碳配额和碳税三种政策的影响,分别建立了出口国制造商(OEM)再制造模型和OEM授权进口国零售商进行再制造模型,得到不同模型中OEM和零售商的最优价格、最优销售量、最优利润,进一步分析了产品碳排放总量是否超过配额的不同情形下新产品碳排放量对新产品和再制造品价格、销售量的影响以及其中碳关税和碳税发挥的作用.结果表明,在配额限制下,存在碳关税、碳税以及两种政策共同约束的取值区间,当税率水平在不同区间时,新产品碳排放量对两种产品的价格、销售量有不同的影响.     

碳税政策下时变需求依赖库存与价格的供应链协调模型

研究由一个供应商和一个零售组成的二级供应链系统在碳税政策下的协调问题.对于市场需求率为时变函数且依赖于当前库存水平和销售价格的情形,建立分散式和集中式供应链决策模型.比较两种模型得出供应商和零售商合作能够提高供应链的整体利润但是也会产生更多的碳排放.分别利用批发价格契约和两部收费契约协调分散式决策模型得出供应链协调的条件.最后通过数值算例验证理论结果并分析碳税单价对供应链在两部收费契约下实现协调的影响.     

Climate policy under fat-tailed risk: an application of FUND

We apply four alternative decision criteria, two old ones and two new, to the question of the appropriate level of greenhouse gas emission reduction. In all cases, we consider a uniform carbon tax that is applied to all emissions from all sectors and all countries; and that increases over time with the discount rate. For a one per cent pure rate of the time preference and a rate of risk aversion of one, the tax that maximises expected net present welfare equals $120/tC in 2010. However, we also find evidence that the uncertainty about welfare may well have fat tails so that the sample mean exists only by virtue of the finite number of runs in our Monte Carlo analysis. This is consistent with Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem. We therefore consider minimax regret as a decision criterion. As regret is defined on the positive real line, we in fact consider large percentiles instead of the ill-defined maximum. Depending on the percentile used, the recommended tax lies between $100 and $170/tC. Regret is a measure of the slope of the welfare function, while we are in fact concerned about the level of welfare. We therefore minimise the tail risk, defined as the expected welfare below a percentile of the probability density function without climate policy. Depending on the percentile used, the recommended tax lies between $20 and $330/tC. We also minimise the fatness of the tails, as measured by the p-value of the test of the null hypothesis that recursive mean welfare is non-stationary in the number of Monte Carlo runs. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at the 5 % confidence level, but come closest for an initial tax of $50/tC. All four alternative decision criteria rapidly improve as modest taxes are introduced, but gradually deteriorate if the tax is too high. That implies that the appropriate tax is an interior solution. In stark contrast to some of the interpretations of the Dismal Theorem, we find that fat tails by no means justify arbitrarily large carbon taxes.     

基于消费者效用模型的贵重首饰经销商决策行为研究

以异质性消费者为对象,研究关税税率调整对贵重首饰经销商决策行为的影响。在个人理性与激励相容的约束条件下,构建基于异质性消费者效用模型的需求函数,分析不同市场类型下经销商的最优决策选择。考虑消费者价格敏感度对社会福利的影响,并在此基础上分析了最优关税税率水平。研究发现:(1)贵重首饰经销商决策行为不仅受政府关税税率的影响,还受消费者价格敏感度的影响;(2)在消费者价格敏感度一定的前提下,若想通过关税来调控贵重首饰市场,关税税率应该控制在一定的区间范围;(3)在关税税率一定的条件下,贵重首饰市场的类型主要受消费者价格敏感度的影响。     

A dynamic analysis of protection and environmental policy in a small trading developing country

We analyze a dynamic model of protection and environmental policy in a small trading developing country (DC). The DC government protects the import competing (and the polluting) sector of the economy with a tariff. The employment and output effects of three different pollution taxes are analyzed. These taxes incorporate different assumptions about the DC government's ability to commit to its announced policy. First, we describe the taxes, we study the dependence of these taxes on the tariff, and we show that in general an activist environmental policy is called for, irrespective of the length of time to which the government can commit to its announced policy. Second, we identify a situation in which the conduct of environmental policy raises welfare unambiguously, and the situations in which it does not do so. Finally, we show that the time inconsistency of certain optimal programs can prevent the DC government from achieving its environmental and employment objectives.     

双寡头垄断结构下的技术授权及社会福利分析——基于内生技术创新的视角

在具有水平差异且进行古诺竞争的双寡头结构中考虑技术拥有企业内生决定降低成本技术的创新程度,分析不同授权方式下技术拥有者利润、消费者剩余以及社会总福利的变化,并对不同授权方式下的技术创新程度进行比较。研究表明:技术拥有者通过双重收费、特许权收费方式总能实现利润增加,且双重收费方式能带来最大利润,而固定收费方式可能降低其利润;固定收费方式下消费者剩余、社会总福利高于双重收费,更高于特许权收费方式;技术创新程度与技术授权方式以及产品替代程度有关,且无论产品的替代程度如何,双重收费方式下的技术创新程度达到最大。     

基于供应链视角的环境保护税社会分配效应研究

2018年实施的《环境保护税法》确立了排污征税的法律依据。环境保护税会增加成本并沿着供应链向下游逐级转移,从而改变社会分配格局。对此,基于供应链视角研究环境保护税的社会分配效应:首先,分析环境保护税沿着供应链的逐级转移,发现环境保护税会同时减少企业利润和消费者剩余;其次,比较企业利润和消费者剩余的减少程度,发现环境保护税会提高消费者的社会分配地位,也会提高零售企业的社会分配地位,但是会降低制造企业的社会分配地位;最后,比较环境保护税减少的企业利润和消费者剩余与形成的税收收入之间的相对大小,发现环境保护税会导致净社会福利损失,而且税负分担非常不均衡,制造企业承担最多,零售企业次之,消费者最少。     

DYNAMIC CORRECTIVE TAXES WITH FLOW AND STOCK EXTERNALITIES: A FEEDBACK APPROACH

In confronting a consumer good whose production process is associated with both flow and stock externalities, a corrective tax is introduced to restore efficiency. The objective is to maximize social welfare over time when the stock pollutant obeys an arbitrary dynamic process. The model makes it possible to derive the optimal corrective tax as a closed form feedback control law. This feedback rule can be applied for qualitative purposes such as parameter analysis or studying the time path of the corrective tax. It can also be used for quantitative purposes, for example, evaluating an actual policy or assessment of the optimal tax for a certain case. It is here used to study how the optimal corrective tax, both as a function of time and as a function of the pollution level, depends upon the decay function. It is shown that, depending upon the initial conditions and the structure of the economy and the decay function, most outcomes are possible.     

供应链视角下的增值税改革影响研究

构建了一个制造商和一个零售商所组成的两级供应链模型,研究增值税税率下调对供应链决策和社会福利的影响.结果表明,下调制造商、零售商增值税税率都会使产品零售价降低,提高零售商和制造商的利润.下调增值税税率给制造商带来的利润增量大于给零售商带来的利润增量.制造商税率下调导致批发价降低,零售商税率下调反而提高批发价.社会福利的变化趋势与潜在需求规模有关.当潜在需求规模较高时,社会福利总是随降税幅度的增大而增大,且税率降低后的社会福利大于税率降低前;当潜在需求规模中等时,社会福利随降税幅度的增大而减小,但税率降低后的社会福利仍大于税率降低前;当潜在需求规模较小时,社会福利随降税幅度的增大而减小,增值税税率下调损害了社会福利.     

碳关税对发展中国家的经济影响及对策分析

研究碳关税对美国进口贸易的影响,以碳关税与普通关税的区别为出发点,建立一个3阶段博弈模型,导出最优碳关税和最优出口补贴的表达式.结果显示:引入碳关税将减少发展中国家对美国出口,并能增加发达国家的福利.此外,还考察了影响碳关税水平的一些重要因素,包括机会成本、补贴时机、企业数目、产品水平差异化和市场分割,针对这些因素,提出了发展中国家应对碳关税政策的对策建议.     

基于社会福利最大化的油气资源税费研究

合理的油气资源税费能够引导企业优化开发决策,平衡当代与后代利益关系,实现跨期资源有效配置。从跨期油气资源最优分配的角度,通过最优控制理论构建寡头垄断市场中社会福利最大化和企业利润最大化目标下的油气资源开发决策模型,并以社会福利最大化目标下的资源开发决策为基准,研究从价、从量、储量三种不同形式的油气资源税费对资源开发决策的调节作用,研究发现:(1)征收从价税费,最优的从价税率为26.4%,政府既可以保障社会最优,还可以获得较多的税费收入;(2)征收从量税费,从量税率为1.77元/吨,政府可以保证社会福利最大化,但相比从价税费政府的税费收入较少;(3)征收储量税费,社会福利最大化下的储量税费为-0.13元/吨,也就是政府需向企业进行补贴才可以保证社会最优,会形成一定的财政压力。     

“公司+农户”型订单农业供应链的政府税收补贴机制

基于“公司+农户”型订单农业背景,引入“随行就市,保底收购”的合约价格方式并考虑农产品流通中的数量损耗,探究了政府向公司征税并将税收收入补贴给农户对于订单农业供应链决策及运作的影响。首先,在政府对农户的补贴系数外生时,以政府征税不补贴为基准模型,对比分析了政府征税不补贴和征税补贴两种情形下的均衡结果,发现:若公司对农产品深加工,则进项税率小于销项税率,政府对农户进行税收补贴,可激励农户提高生产量并促使公司降低保底价格,进而增加双方期望收益,即征税补贴是征税不补贴的帕累托改善;若公司对农产品初加工,进项税率等于销项税率,则税收补贴带来的收益全部被公司利用其强势地位所攫取,单纯的税收补贴难以实现农户增产增收的目的。随后,在政府补贴系数内生时,证明了深加工情形下存在唯一最优的税收补贴系数使得政府社会福利最大化,且最优的税收补贴系数随各参数的变化存在上下界。最后,引入数值算例验证了上述结论,同时发现,深加工情形下政府决策的最优税收补贴系数随流通损耗率的增加而减小,随销项税率和供应链边际利润率的增大而增大;社会福利和公司的期望收益对流通损耗率的变化较之农户的期望收益对其变化更为敏感。     

Local air pollutant emission reduction and ancillary carbon benefits of SO2 control policies: Application of AIM/CGE model to China

While a great deal of literature has been published in recent years on the ancillary benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation (e.g., reductions in local air pollution), less attention has been focused on the climate benefits of local air pollution strategies themselves. Local air pollution is, however, a more immediate issue now faced by developing countries. This study assesses the impacts on local air pollutant emission reduction and ancillary CO₂ emission reduction of SO₂ control policies in China, such as a sulphur tax, SO₂ total emissions control (TEC), and improvement of energy efficiency, based on the Asia-Pacific Integrated Model (AIM)/Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) country model. The simulation period is from 1997 to 2020. Major conclusions include the following: an SO₂ emission cap will help to control SO₂ emissions, but will result in a large GDP loss; the role of a SO₂ emission tax at the present level is very limited; and an ancillary carbon reduction benefit can be achieved through the introduction of SO₂ control policies in China.     

环境规制、环境研发与绿色技术进步

为鼓励和引导绿色技术发展,驱动预防性技术和处理性技术协同进步,有必要开发环境规制的绿色技术进步导向功能,并探究其传导机理。论文通过建立双寡头同时博弈模型对环境规制、环境研发与绿色技术进步进行关联分析。研究表明:环境研发是环境规制推动绿色技术进步的重要传导路径;环境补贴力度会显著影响环境规制政策组合的技术进步效果;绿色技术进步导向的环境规制的政策组合存在一个普适性较强的应用策略;环境税和环境补贴的规制政策组合能够有效增进社会福利,具体表现为通过污染预防技术和污染处理技术的协同进步带来的产量增加、生产成本减少、污染产生量减少以及污染处理量增加。     

COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING IN AN INTERNATIONAL RIVER POLLUTION MODEL

In this paper, we study international river pollution problems. We introduce a model in which countries located along a river from upstream to downstream derive benefits from causing pollution, but also incur environmental costs from experiencing its own pollution and the pollution of all its upstream countries. The total welfare, being the sum of all benefits minus the sum of all costs, is maximized when all countries cooperate. Several principles from international water law are applied to find reasonable and fair distributions of the total welfare that can be obtained under full cooperation. Such a distribution of the welfare at efficient pollution levels can be implemented by monetary compensations.     

Limited self-control and long-run growth

This paper integrates imperfect self-control into the standard model of endogenous growth. In their long-run savings decisions individuals take into account a cost of self-control, which depends on the consumption temptations of their impatient short-run self. I obtain a closed-form solution for consumption and show that within a certain range of self-control an investment subsidy can be useful in order to reduce consumption and to increase investment, growth, and welfare of the long-run self. A consumption tax, perhaps surprisingly, is found to be counterproductive. It induces individuals with limited self-control to consume even more.     

财政分权的博弈分析

构建一个完全信息两阶段博弈模型,分别对财政分权的两个极点—完全分权和完全集权进行讨论,研究财政分权对经济增长及社会福利的影响.