交货期差异下的双渠道订货与协调优化策略

由于顾客往往具有不同交货期的期望,从而导致线上与线下渠道冲突加剧,同时也为其进行合作提供了基础。因此针对该问题,以一个开辟线上渠道的制造商和一个线下零售商组成的双渠道供应链系统为研究对象,分别建立了考虑交货期差异下二者合作时的利润优化模型。在此基础上,首先采用不动点定理证明了制造商开辟的线上渠道与线下零售商订货纳什均衡的存在性与唯一性,并探讨了二者均衡订货量与交货期差异率的关系;其次,证明了仅仅采用批发价格与服务费用契约无法协调制造商与线下零售商组成的供应链系统,进一步优化设计了两部定价协调机制,并实现二者的双赢。最后通过算例证明了纳什均衡的存在性以及订货均衡与交货期差异率的关系。     

考虑权力结构的产品服务供应链服务渠道选择及协调研究

在制造业服务化转型过程中,传统的产品供应链转变为了产品服务供应链,为顾客提供产品和服务,服务可以由制造商或零售商提供,权力结构会对服务渠道的选择产生影响。本文通过建立博弈模型,研究了制造商为核心、零售商为核心以及制造商与零售商权力均等三种权力结构下最优服务渠道的选择问题,并应用两部定价契约对最优服务渠道的结果进行协调。研究发现,当制造商为核心时,最优的服务渠道为零售商提供服务,当零售商为核心时,最优的服务渠道为制造商提供服务,当制造商与零售商权力均等时,不存在最优的服务渠道。两部定价契约可以实现最优服务渠道的协调,最后通过数值仿真对结论进行了验证。     

Contracting with demand uncertainty under supply chain competition

We examine supply chain contracts for two competing supply chains selling a substitutable product, each consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Both manufacturers are Stackelberg leaders and the retailers are followers. Manufacturers in two competing supply chains may choose different contracts, either a wholesale price contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is not shared, or a revenue-sharing contract in which the retailer??s demand forecasting information is shared. Under supply chain competition and demand uncertainty, we identify which contract is more advantageous for each supply chain, and under what circumstances.     

零售商主导的模糊供应链博弈——考虑销售努力的情形

以包含一个制造商与一个零售商的两级供应链为研究对象,考虑零售商居于主导地位并付出销售努力时供应链各成员的决策。结合经济环境的不确定性,将市场需求函数和制造商的制造成本、零售商的经营成本视为模糊变量;运用斯塔克尔伯格模型刻画零售商和制造商之间的博弈过程,并引入期望值模型、机会约束模型来解决最优决策问题;通过一个数值算例证明了供应链博弈模型的有效性。研究表明,在均衡结果中,考虑到零售商所承担的销售努力成本,其总体期望值利润相比于制造商而言偏低,但单位产品边际利润较高。原因在于,零售商的主导地位使其不仅通过销售努力提高产品销量,提高了供应链的整体利润,同时也能够采用压低批发价格的方式,使自身在供应链中获取更多收益。     

Coordination of supply chains by option contracts: A cooperative game theory approach

Manufacturer–retailer supply chains commonly adopt a wholesale price mechanism. This mechanism, however, has often led manufacturers and retailers to situations of conflicts of interest. For example, due to uncertain market demand, retailers prefer to order flexibly from manufacturers so as to avoid incurring inventory costs and to be able to respond flexibly to market changes. Manufacturers, on the other hand, prefer retailers to place full orders as early as possible so that they can hedge against the risks of over- and under-production. Such conflicts between retailers and manufacturers can result in an inefficient supply chain. Motivated by this problem, we take a cooperative game approach in this paper to consider the coordination issue in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain using option contracts. Using the wholesale price mechanism as a benchmark, we develop an option contract model. Our study demonstrates that, compared with the benchmark based on the wholesale price mechanism, option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto-improvement. We also discuss scenarios in which option contracts are selected according to individual supply chain members’ risk preferences and negotiating powers.     

The impact of power structure on the retail service supply chain with an O2O mixed channel

While the Internet has provided a new means for retailers to reach consumers, it has fundamentally changed the dynamic of competition in the retail service supply chain. The mix of offline and online channels adds a new dimension of competition, and one central issue of this competition is the pricing strategy between the two channels. How to set prices for both online and offline channels? What is the impact of the supply chain power structure on pricing decisions and the performance? This research aims to address these questions by focusing on a retail service supply chain with an online-to-offline (O2O) mixed dual-channel. From the Supplier-Stackelberg, Retailer-Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretical perspectives, we obtain the optimal prices and maximum profits for both the retailer and supplier under different power structures. The analysis result provides important managerial implications, which will be beneficial to retailers to develop proper pricing strategies.     

Price discount based on early order commitment in a single manufacturer–multiple retailer supply chain

Early order commitment (EOC) is a strategy for supply chain coordination, wherein the retailer commits to purchasing from a manufacturer a fixed order quantity a few periods in advance of the regular delivery lead time. In this paper, we formulate and analyze the EOC strategy for a decentralized, two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers, who face external demands that follow an autocorrelated AR(1) process over time. We characterize the special structure of the optimal solutions for the retailers’ EOC periods to minimize the total supply chain cost and discuss the impact of demand parameters and cost parameters. We then develop and compare three solution approaches to solving the optimal solution. Using this optimal cost as the benchmark, we investigate the effectiveness of using the wholesale price-discount scheme for the manufacturer to coordinate this decentralized system. We give numerical examples to show the benefits of EOC to the whole supply chain, examine the efficiency of the discount scheme in general situation, and provide the special conditions when the full coordination is achieved.     

竞争环境下基于退换货的网购供应链动态均衡研究

研究竞争环境下基于退换货的网购供应链动态均衡模型.此供应链包含多个生产商、电商、快递商及需求市场.将快递商的运输速度作为竞争的一个重要因素进行研究.通过正弦函数说明,网购供应链的市场需求也呈季节性变化.利用纳什均衡及变分不等式得到各层决策者的竞争均衡解.通过分析换货比重得出电商应减少消费者的退货率,以提高整条供应链的利润和竞争能力.并利用数值算例说明模型的正确性与合理性.     

Revenue management for a supply chain with two streams of customers

In this paper, we consider revenue management for a service supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier has a limited capacity of a perishable product and both the supplier and the retailer face customers. Each customer may choose to buy a product from either the supplier or the retailer by considering prices and the cost associated with switching. For the centralized model, the supplier determines the selling prices for both herself and the retailer, and the retailer simply collects a commission fee for each product sold. We derive monotone properties for the revenue functions and pricing strategies. Further, we show that the commission fee increases the retailer’s price while decreasing the supplier’s and leads to efficiency loss of the chain. For the decentralized decision-making model, the supplier and the retailer compete in price over time. Two models are considered. In the first, the retailer buys products from the supplier before the selling season and in the second the retailer shares products with the supplier in retailing. For both models, we discuss the existence of the equilibrium and characterize the optimal decisions. Numerical results are presented to illustrate properties of the models and to compare the supply chain performance between the centralized and the decentralized models.     

Two-period pricing and decision strategies in a two-echelon supply chain under price-dependent demand

This paper presents a two-period supply chain model which is comprised of one manufacturer and one retailer who are involved in trading a single product. The demand rate in each period is dependent on the selling prices of the current period and the previous period. We assume that the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader and declares wholesale price(s) to the retailer who follows the manufacturer’s decision and sets his selling prices for two consecutive periods. The manufacturer adopts one of the two pricing options: (1) setting the same wholesale price to both the selling periods (2) setting different wholesale prices to two different selling periods. Based on these pricing options, we develop four decision strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer and compare them. For a numerical example, we study the effects of these decision strategies on the optimal results of the supply chain. Further, we graphically analyze under what circumstances a particular decision strategy plays a dominant role.     

考虑消费者退货的双渠道订货量决策研究

在考虑消费者退货下,构建由制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链模型,研究了双方的订货量决策问题,并分析不同策略以及决策顺序对均衡结果和制造商开通直销渠道的影响。研究发现:在单渠道中,提供退款保证可提高订货量、制造商和零售商利润。当直销成本较大时,制造商将不开通直销渠道;提供退款保证有利于制造商开通直销渠道。在双渠道中,提供退款保证能够提高直销量、总订货量和制造商利润;直销量、总订货量、制造商利润和总利润都随直销成本递减;在顺序决策下,制造商利润和总利润更高。     

The risk and information sharing of application services supply chain

We study an application services supply chain consisting of one application service provider (ASP) and one application infrastructure provider (AIP). The AIP supplies the computer capacity to the ASP that in turn sells the value-added application services to the market. The market is characterized by a price-sensitive random demand. The ASP’s objective is to determine the optimal price of its service to the market and the optimal capacity to purchase from the AIP. The AIP’s goal on the other hand is to maximize its profit from selling the capacity to the ASP.     

价格竞争下风险规避对闭环供应链决策的影响研究

基于零售商销售价格与回收价格竞争情形,构建了一个可持续的闭环供应链.考虑决策者风险规避行为,研究了闭环供应链成员的定价决策问题.利用博弈论,在风险中性与风险规避特性下分别探讨了批发价格,零售价格和回收价格的最优决策,并建立了它们的表达式.研究结论表明,仅当零售商具有风险规避时,制造商决策不受零售商的影响,而仅当制造商具...     

不同博弈框架下多竞争零售商的双渠道供应链定价决策研究

在Bertrand竞争、Stackelberg竞争及集中决策下,研究由单制造商与多竞争零售商组成的双渠道供应链的定价决策问题。运用两阶段优化技术、博弈论及矩阵论,讨论了多竞争零售商与单制造商在价格方面相互竞争的问题,给出不同市场竞争模式及集中决策下供应链成员的博弈均衡解。对比不同博弈框架及集中决策下供应链成员的定价决策,通过数值实验分析了价格敏感度及零售商个数对最优定价决策和最大利润影响,给出一些管理学理论与见解,为双渠道供应链中各成员的管理者制定最优决策提供理论支持。     

Coordination mechanism for the supply chain with leadtime consideration and price-dependent demand

We study a coordination contract for a supplier–retailer channel producing and selling a fashionable product exhibiting a stochastic price-dependent demand. The product’s selling season is short, and the supply chain faces great demand uncertainty. We consider a scenario where the supplier reserves production capacity for the retailer in advance, and permits the retailer to place an order not exceeding the reserved capacity after a demand information update during a leadtime. We formulate a two-stage optimization problem in which the supplier decides the amount of capacity reservation in the first stage, and the retailer determines the order quantity and the retail price after observing the demand information in the second stage. We propose a three-parameter risk and profit sharing contract that coordinates the supply chain. The proposed contract permits any agreed-upon division of the supply-chain profit between the channel members.     

Trade credit competition between two retailers in a supply chain under credit-linked retail price and market demand

The paper considers a supply chain system in which the sole manufacturer supplies the same product to two retailers who compete in offering trade credit period to customers. Both the market demand and retail prices vary with the trade credit periods offered by the retailers. The manufacturer also provides a trade credit period to both the retailers to settle down their accounts. The net profit function of the supply chain is derived considering possible relationships among the trade credit periods offered by the manufacturer and the retailers and the time when each retailer receives the last payment from his customer. An algorithm is developed to find the optimal solution of the proposed model. From the numerical study, it is observed that a two-level trade credit financing can increase profits not only for the manufacturer and the retailers but also for the whole supply chain.     

基于学习效应的供应链信息共享研究

供应链中存在着广泛的信息共享,既包括上下游企业间的纵向性共享,也包括同层企业间的横向信息共享.以一个具有学习效应的供应链为研究对象,为研究信息共享对分散型供应链中零售商决策的影响,提出了一个具有横向信息共享的供应链模型.以Cournot博弈为研究手段,求解了零售商的均衡订货决策和信息共享策略.在此模型中,生产商为多个零售商提供类似的产品,每个零售商具有自己独立的终端市场.零售商面对单周期需求,该需求可以在本周期内满足或者在第二阶段延迟交货.由于学习效应的存在,第二阶段生产商的批发价格是第一阶段总订货量的减函数.零售商在观察到自身的需求之前,达成信息共享的协议.研究结果表明,当第一阶段的均衡订货数量低于需求时,零售商间无共享私有信息的动机,该结果和寡头模型信息共享的相关结果相反.除此之外,在一个总体需求稳定的市场中,信息共享的影响随着零售商数量的增加而递减.此结果对企业在不同市场情况下选择信息共享策略具有重要价值.     

交易流动性不对等环境下基于收入共享契约的供应链协调

供应链中存在单一生产商、单一零售商和一个交易流动性不对等的第三方B2B电子交易市场。在零售需求不确定的情况下,分别建立了供应链集中决策模型、传统固定合约均衡决策模型、收入共享契约分散决策模型,验证了收入共享契约在多渠道采购环境下仍可以协调供应链,分析了使供应链达到帕累托改进的收入共享契约的参数设定,最后分别从卖出流动性和买入流动性两个角度讨论了交易流动性对供应链的影响。研究结果表明,卖出流动性好的电子交易市场可以促使供应链达到最优生产量,实现整体收益的最大化;两种交易流动性的趋好都会提高供应链效率,但生产商更偏好卖出流动性好的电子交易市场。     

线上商品与多种快递服务的组合优化研究

针对网上销售的商品所捆绑的快递服务无法满足顾客多样化需求,而快递服务商又失去了市场空间的问题,提出一种“线上商品+多种快递服务”的组合销售模式,以扩大电商的市场规模,提高快递服务商的利润和差异化竞争水平。在市场细分和顾客需求调查的基础上,综合考虑电商、快递服务商、网购顾客三方的利益,以快递服务商收益最大为目标,构建基于顾客选择行为的“线上商品+多种快递服务”组合销售模式优化模型。以SP调查为数据基础,优化线上商品与多种快递服务的组合销售模式及确定各组合销售模式的均衡价格。模型的求解结果准确地揭示了顾客在网上购物时的快递服务选择行为、快递服务商的末端利润与组合模式之间的关系。     

由零售商负责回收的多期闭环供应链网络均衡

本文研究了零售商回收模式下多期闭环供应链网络均衡问题。制造商通过零售渠道将产品销售给消费者,以满足消费市场需求,同时消费产生的废旧品由零售商回收返回制造商处进行再制造,通过产品库存和回收废旧品连接相邻规划期。运用变分不等式理论和互补理论,分别刻画了制造市场、零售市场和消费市场的均衡,接着构建了多期闭环供应链网络均衡模型。利用变分不等式的投影收缩算法,对模型进行求解。算例着重分析了废旧品利用率对网络均衡状态和供应链成员利润的影响。结果表明:当制造商的废旧品利用率逐渐增加时,回收量逐渐增加,制造商的利润先减后增,零售商利润一直增加,而供应链总利润一直增加,供应链网络中的最优决策变量主要受到回收量约束的影响。