The Nash rationing problem

This paper studies the problem of allocating utility losses among n agents with cardinal non-comparable utility functions. This problem is referred to as the Nash rationing problem, as it can be regarded as the translation of the Nash bargaining problem to a rationing scenario. We show that there is no single-valued solution satisfying the obvious reformulation of Nash’s axioms, nor a multivalued solution satisfying a certain extension of these axioms. However, there is a multivalued solution that is characterised by an appropriate extension of the axioms. We thus call this mapping the Nash rationing solution. It associates with each rationing problem the set of points that maximises a weighted sum of utilities, in which weights are chosen so that all agents’ weighted losses are equal.We are grateful to Carmen Herrero, Paola Manzini, Karl Schlag, William Thomson, Fernando Vega-Redondo and two careful referees for useful comments. Financial support form the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, under project SEJ2004-08011ECON, and the Generalitat Valenciana, are gratefuly acknowledged.     

A Bridge Between Bilevel Programs and Nash Games

We study connections between optimistic bilevel programming problems and generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We remark that, with respect to bilevel problems, we consider the general case in which the lower level program is not assumed to have a unique solution. Inspired by the optimal value approach, we propose a Nash game that, transforming the so-called implicit value function constraint into an explicitly defined constraint function, incorporates some taste of hierarchy and turns out to be related to the bilevel programming problem. We provide a complete theoretical analysis of the relationship between the vertical bilevel problem and our “uneven” horizontal model: in particular, we define classes of problems for which solutions of the bilevel program can be computed by finding equilibria of our game. Furthermore, by referring to some applications in economics, we show that our “uneven” horizontal model, in some sense, lies between the vertical bilevel model and a “pure” horizontal game.     

Computing equilibria of Cournot oligopoly models with mixed-integer quantities

We consider Cournot oligopoly models in which some variables represent indivisible quantities. These models can be addressed by computing equilibria of Nash equilibrium problems in which the players solve mixed-integer nonlinear problems. In the literature there are no methods to compute equilibria of this type of Nash games. We propose a Jacobi-type method for computing solutions of Nash equilibrium problems with mixed-integer variables. This algorithm is a generalization of a recently proposed method for the solution of discrete so-called “2-groups partitionable” Nash equilibrium problems. We prove that our algorithm converges in a finite number of iterations to approximate equilibria under reasonable conditions. Moreover, we give conditions for the existence of approximate equilibria. Finally, we give numerical results to show the effectiveness of the proposed method.     

The Tempered Aspirations solution for bargaining problems with a reference point

Gupta and Livne (1988) modified Nash’s (1950) original bargaining problem through the introduction of a reference point restricted to lie in the bargaining set. Additionally, they characterized a solution concept for this augmented bargaining problem. We propose and axiomatically characterize a new solution concept for bargaining problems with a reference point: the Tempered Aspirations solution. In Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975), aspirations are given by the so called ideal or utopia point. In our setting, however, the salience of the reference point mutes or tempers the negotiators’ aspirations. Thus, our solution is defined to be the maximal feasible point on the line segment joining the modified aspirations and disagreement vectors. The Tempered Aspirations solution can be understood as a “dual” version of the Gupta–Livne solution or, alternatively, as a version of Chun and Thomson’s (1992) Proportional solution in which the claims point is endogenous. We also conduct an extensive axiomatic analysis comparing the Gupta–Livne to our Tempered Aspirations solution.     

Divergence points and normal numbers

In Olsen and Winter (J Lond Math Soc 67(2):103–122, 2003) and Baek et?al. (Advan Math 214:267–287, 2007) the authors have introduced the notion of “normal” and “non-normal” points of a self-similar set as a main tool for studying the Hausdorff and the packing dimensions of a set of divergence points of self-similar measures. In this paper we will extend the results about the Hausdorff and the packing dimensions of “non-normal” points of a self-similar set in a point of view of Bisbas (Bulletin des Sciences Mathématiques 129(1):25–37, 2005). Namely, we will prove that both the Hausdorff and packing dimensions remain the same if we consider subsets determined by the normality to some bases. This will be proved using the techniques from Bisbas (Bulletin des Sciences Mathématiques 129(1):25–37, 2005) and the construction of suitable measures. Simultaneously this will also give simpler proofs of some of the results from Olsen and Winter (J Lond Math Soc 67(2):103–122, 2003) and Baek et?al. (Advan Math 214:267–287, 2007).     

Estimates of the Nash–Aronson type for degenerating parabolic equations

We consider second-order parabolic equations describing diffusion with degeneration and diffusion on singular and combined structures. We give a united definition of a solution of the Cauchy problem for such equations by means of semigroup theory in the space L ₂ with a suitable measure. We establish some weight estimates for solutions of Cauchy problems. Estimates of Nash–Aronson type for the fundamental solution follow from them. We plan to apply these estimates to known asymptotic diffusion problems, namely, to the stabilization of solutions and to the “central limit theorem.”     

SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES: A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME APPROACH

In the current paper we examine a game-theoretic setting in which three countries have established a regional organization for the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation. We demonstrate that the nucleolus and the Shapley value give more of the benefits to the coalition with substantial bargaining power than does the Nash bargaining scheme. We also compare the results that are obtained by using the nucleolus and the Shapley value as solution concepts. The outcomes from these solution concepts depend on the relative efficiency of the most efficient coalition. Furthermore, the question of fair sharing of the benefits is considered in the context of straddling stocks.     

On the Approximate Controllability of Stackelberg–Nash Strategies for Linearized Micropolar Fluids

We study a Stackelberg strategy subject to the evolutionary linearized micropolar fluids equations, considering a Nash multi-objective equilibrium (non necessarily cooperative) for the “follower players” (as is called in the economy field) and an optimal problem for the leader player with approximate controllability objective. We will obtain the following three main results: the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and its characterization, the approximate controllability of the linearized micropolar system with respect to the leader control, and the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg–Nash problem, where the optimality system for the leader is given.     

The Schwartz space of a smooth semi-algebraic stack

Schwartz functions, or measures, are defined on any smooth semi-algebraic (“Nash”) manifold, and are known to form a cosheaf for the semi-algebraic restricted topology. We extend this definition to smooth semi-algebraic stacks, which are defined as geometric stacks in the category of Nash manifolds. Moreover, when those are obtained from algebraic quotient stacks of the form X/G, with X a smooth affine variety and G a reductive group defined over a number field k, we define, whenever possible, an “evaluation map” at each semisimple k-point of the stack, without using truncation methods. This corresponds to a regularization of the sum of those orbital integrals whose semisimple part corresponds to the chosen k-point. These evaluation maps produce, in principle, a distribution which generalizes the Arthur–Selberg trace formula and Jacquet’s relative trace formula, although the former, and many instances of the latter, cannot actually be defined by the purely geometric methods of this paper. In any case, the stack-theoretic point of view provides an explanation for the pure inner forms that appear in many versions of the Langlands, and relative Langlands, conjectures.     

A remark on the paper “Laterally closed lattice homomorphisms”

A new and simple proof of the main result of the paper “Laterally closed lattice homomorphisms” by Toumi and Toumi (J Math Anal Appl 324:1178–1194, 2006) is given following the paper “Extension of Riesz homomorphisms, I” by Buskes (J Aust Math Soc Ser A 39(1):107–120, 1985).     

Retracted: Blow‐up results for evolution problems on ℝn

Retraction: The article “Blow‐up results for evolution problems on ?ⁿ”, Math. Nachr. 278, 1033–1040 (2005); DOI 10.1002/mana.200310289 by Ali Hakem, published online on 8 June 2005 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) has been retracted. The retraction is due to an identical publication in another journal, namely Bull. Belg. Math. Soc. – Simon Stevin, 12 (2005), no. 1, 73–82 and agreed by the author, the journal Editors‐in‐Chief and Wiley.     

Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules

We analyze bargaining situations where the agents’ payoffs from disagreement depend on who among them breaks down the negotiations. We model such problems as a superset of the standard domain of Nash (1950). We first show that this domain extension creates a very large number of new rules. In particular, decomposable rules (which are extensions of rules from the Nash domain) constitute a nowhere dense subset of all possible rules. For them, we analyze the process through which “good” properties of rules on the Nash domain extend to ours. We then enquire whether the counterparts of some well-known results on the Nash (1950) domain continue to hold for decomposable rules on our extended domain. We first show that an extension of the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining rule uniquely satisfies the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) properties. This uniqueness result, however, turns out to be an exception. We characterize the uncountably large classes of decomposable rules that survive the Nash (1950), Kalai (1977), and Thomson (1981) properties.     

An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games

In this paper, we report the results of a series of experiments on a version of the centipede game in which the total payoff to the two players is constant. Standard backward induction arguments lead to a unique Nash equilibrium outcome prediction, which is the same as the prediction made by theories of “fair” or “focal” outcomes. We find that subjects frequently fail to select the unique Nash outcome prediction. While this behavior was also observed in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) in the “growing pie” version of the game they studied, the Nash outcome was not “fair”, and there was the possibility of Pareto improvement by deviating from Nash play. Their findings could therefore be explained by small amounts of altruistic behavior. There are no Pareto improvements available in the constant-sum games we examine. Hence, explanations based on altruism cannot account for these new data. We examine and compare two classes of models to explain these data. The first class consists of non-equilibrium modifications of the standard “Always Take” model. The other class we investigate, the Quantal Response Equilibrium model, describes an equilibrium in which subjects make mistakes in implementing their best replies and assume other players do so as well. One specification of this model fits the experimental data best, among the models we test, and is able to account for all the main features we observe in the data.     

Dynamical insurance models with investment: Constrained singular problems for integrodifferential equations

Previous and new results are used to compare two mathematical insurance models with identical insurance company strategies in a financial market, namely, when the entire current surplus or its constant fraction is invested in risky assets (stocks), while the rest of the surplus is invested in a risk-free asset (bank account). Model I is the classical Cramér–Lundberg risk model with an exponential claim size distribution. Model II is a modification of the classical risk model (risk process with stochastic premiums) with exponential distributions of claim and premium sizes. For the survival probability of an insurance company over infinite time (as a function of its initial surplus), there arise singular problems for second-order linear integrodifferential equations (IDEs) defined on a semiinfinite interval and having nonintegrable singularities at zero: model I leads to a singular constrained initial value problem for an IDE with a Volterra integral operator, while II model leads to a more complicated nonlocal constrained problem for an IDE with a non-Volterra integral operator. A brief overview of previous results for these two problems depending on several positive parameters is given, and new results are presented. Additional results are concerned with the formulation, analysis, and numerical study of “degenerate” problems for both models, i.e., problems in which some of the IDE parameters vanish; moreover, passages to the limit with respect to the parameters through which we proceed from the original problems to the degenerate ones are singular for small and/or large argument values. Such problems are of mathematical and practical interest in themselves. Along with insurance models without investment, they describe the case of surplus completely invested in risk-free assets, as well as some noninsurance models of surplus dynamics, for example, charity-type models.     

Stability of solutions for Ky Fan's section theorem with some applications

In this paper, we prove that “most of” problems in Ky Fan's section theorem (in the sense of Baire category) are essential and that for any problem in Ky Fan's section theorem, there exists at least one essential component of its solution set. As applications, we deduce both the existence of essential components of the set of Ky Fan's points based on Ky Fan's minimax inequality theorem and the existence of essential components of the set of Nash equilibrium points for general n-person non-cooperative games with non-concave payoffs.     

The $$$$-seril cost shring rule

A new family of cost sharing rules for cost sharing problems is proposed. This family generalizes the family of \(\alpha \)-serial cost sharing rules (Albizuri in Math Soc Sci 60:24–29, 2010) which contains the serial cost sharing rule (Moulin and Shenker in Econometrica 60:1009–1037, 1992) among others. Every rule of the family is characterized by means of two properties.     

On optimal reinsurance treaties in cooperative game under heterogeneous beliefs

In this paper, we study the optimal reinsurance policies as the result of a two-person cooperative game. We assume that both the insurer and the reinsurer are risk averse and expected-utility maximizers. In addition, we assume that they “agree to disagree” on the distribution of the underlying losses in the contract negotiation.In our analysis, we consider two scenarios. In the first one, the reinsurance premium is fully negotiable, whereas in the second one, the premium is determined by the reinsurer using the expected value premium principle. For both scenarios, we first derive the set of Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts and then identify the reinsurance contract corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution as well as that corresponding to the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution.     

Bundle methods for sum-functions with “easy” components: applications to multicommodity network design

We propose a version of the bundle scheme for convex nondifferentiable optimization suitable for the case of a sum-function where some of the components are “easy”, that is, they are Lagrangian functions of explicitly known compact convex programs. This corresponds to a stabilized partial Dantzig–Wolfe decomposition, where suitably modified representations of the “easy” convex subproblems are inserted in the master problem as an alternative to iteratively inner-approximating them by extreme points, thus providing the algorithm with exact information about a part of the dual objective function. The resulting master problems are potentially larger and less well-structured than the standard ones, ruling out the available specialized techniques and requiring the use of general-purpose solvers for their solution; this strongly favors piecewise-linear stabilizing terms, as opposed to the more usual quadratic ones, which in turn may have an adverse effect on the convergence speed of the algorithm, so that the overall performance may depend on appropriate tuning of all these aspects. Yet, very good computational results are obtained in at least one relevant application: the computation of tight lower bounds for Fixed-Charge Multicommodity Min-Cost Flow problems.     

Scheduling for a processor sharing system with linear slowdown

We consider the problem of scheduling arrivals to a congestion system with a finite number of users having identical deterministic demand sizes. The congestion is of the processor sharing type in the sense that all users in the system at any given time are served simultaneously. However, in contrast to classical processor sharing congestion models, the processing slowdown is proportional to the number of users in the system at any time. That is, the rate of service experienced by all users is linearly decreasing with the number of users. For each user there is an ideal departure time (due date). A centralized scheduling goal is then to select arrival times so as to minimize the total penalty due to deviations from ideal times weighted with sojourn times. Each deviation penalty is assumed quadratic, or more generally convex. But due to the dynamics of the system, the scheduling objective function is non-convex. Specifically, the system objective function is a non-smooth piecewise convex function. Nevertheless, we are able to leverage the structure of the problem to derive an algorithm that finds the global optimum in a (large but) finite number of steps, each involving the solution of a constrained convex program. Further, we put forward several heuristics. The first is the traversal of neighbouring constrained convex programming problems, that is guaranteed to reach a local minimum of the centralized problem. This is a form of a “local search”, where we use the problem structure in a novel manner. The second is a one-coordinate “global search”, used in coordinate pivot iteration. We then merge these two heuristics into a unified “local–global” heuristic, and numerically illustrate the effectiveness of this heuristic.     

Miura transformation for the “good” Boussinesq equation

It is well known that each solution of the modified Korteveg–de Vries (mKdV) equation gives rise, via the Miura transformation, to a solution of the Korteveg–de Vries (KdV) equation. In this work, we show that a similar Miura-type transformation exists also for the “good” Boussinesq equation. This transformation maps solutions of a second-order equation to solutions of the fourth-order Boussinesq equation. Just like in the case of mKdV and KdV, the correspondence exists also at the level of the underlying Riemann–Hilbert problems and this is in fact how we construct the new transformation.