不同推介模式下网络零售商广告策略研究

研究了不同推介模式下网络零售商的广告策略问题,通过Nash静态博弈方法求解无推介、单向推介以及双向推介三种模式下零售商均衡零售价格、广告努力水平及利润。研究发现:无推介情况下,两零售商均衡广告策略为同时投入广告。单向推介情况下,若利润分享比例较小,则两零售商同时投入广告;若利润分享比例较大,则随着广告成本系数的增大,两零售商均衡广告策略从仅有被推介零售商投入广告转变为同时投入广告。双向推介情况下,若广告成本系数较小,则两家零售商都不投入广告;若广告成本系数较大,则两家零售商同时投入广告。此外,还分析了零售商均衡广告策略下的推介动力问题。     

Supply chain coordination through integration of innovation effort and advertising support

This study integrates firms’ innovation and advertising decisions in a two-echelon supply chain, where a monopoly manufacturer sells products to ultimate consumers through an autonomous retailer. Considering that both innovation and advertising contribute to the product demand, we first investigate the optimal equilibriums of channel members under two different game structures: the non-cooperative and cooperative. In the non-cooperative structure, the manufacturer controls the innovation effort and wholesale price while the retailer controls the advertising rate and retail pricing. In the cooperative structure, the manufacturer agrees to share part of retailer’s advertising expenditure. We find that both the optimal operation and marketing decisions are sensitive to effects of innovation and advertising on demand as well as the manufacturer’s cost reduction coefficient due to innovation. Further, we find that the manufacturer always prefers cooperation. Meanwhile, only when the firms’ investments significantly contribute to the market mechanism, does the retailer have incentive to implement a cooperative program. In addition, we further propose a new two-way subsidy policy to coordinate channel members’ business functions.     

Advertising Response Functions and Media Planning

In the first part of this paper the definition and use of advertising response functions are examined critically. It is shown that advertising response functions cannot be regarded as models of the advertising process whose parameters are known, that only a small section of the complex functions often postulated is relevant to media planning, that measures of advertising impacts or exposures are relative rather than absolute, and consequently that the “response function” only shows a notional relationship between advertising response and exposure, which normally needs to be calibrated to the advertising appropriation.In the second part a media planning system which utilizes a “control parameter” rather than a “response function” is described. The main feature of the “control parameter” is that it adapts itself so that an appropriate relationship between response and exposure is used, whatever the appropriation. Other features of the system are described.     

Optimal advertising pulsation policies: a dynamic programming approach

This study formulates and solves an advertising pulsation problem for a monopolistic firm using dynamic programming (DP). The firm aims at maximising profit through an optimal allocation of the advertising budget in terms of rectangular pulses over a finite planning horizon. Aggregate sales response to the advertising effort is assumed to be governed by a modified version of the Vidale–Wolfe model in continuous time proposed by Little. Using a numerical example in which a planning horizon of one year is divided into one, two through ten equal time periods, computing routines are developed to solve 150 DP problems. Computational results show among other findings that the performance yielded by the DP policy dominates the uniform advertising policy (constant spending) for a concave advertising response function and the advertising pulsing policy (turning advertising on and off) for a linear or convex response function.     

A Game-Theoretic Analysis for Coordinating Cooperative Advertising in a Supply Chain

In this paper, we investigate the coordination of cooperative advertising decisions in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer and the retailer invest in national and local advertising, respectively. The manufacturer also agrees to share part of the total local-advertising costs with the retailer. The model is analyzed using game theory. We also compare the results of our analysis with similar results from the literature developed for cooperative advertising.     

Consumer Behaviour and Optimal Advertising

Using Nicosia's formulation of consumer behaviour, optimal advertising strategies are derived. Other studies, using empirical data, have shown that advertising should be concentrated at the early part of the product life cycle and the paper discusses what assumptions about consumer behaviour must be made to obtain that results. Specifically, it is shown under what conditions pulsing advertising campaigns are optimal.     

Advertising coordination games of a manufacturer and a retailer while introducing a new product

Two kinds of vertical cooperative advertising program are considered in a distribution channel constituted by a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer pays part of the retailer’s advertising costs. In the first participation scheme, the manufacturer chooses his/her advertising participation rate in the retailer’s advertising effort and then each player determines the advertising effort that maximizes his/her profit. In the second scheme, the retailer chooses the manufacturer’s participation rate and then the manufacturer determines the advertising efforts of both players with the objective of maximizing the manufacturer’s profit. Each participation scheme corresponds to a special Stackelberg game: the manufacturer is the leader of the first, while the retailer is the leader of the second. The Stackelberg equilibrium advertising efforts and participation rate in both games are provided. Then the equilibrium strategies of the two players in the analyzed scenarios are compared with the Nash equilibrium in the competitive framework. Finally, the conditions which suggest a special kind of agreement to a player are analyzed. This work was supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research and the University of Padua.     

On the impact of advertising initiatives in supply chains

Advertising plays an important role in affecting consumer demand. Socially responsible firms are expected to use advertising judiciously, limiting advertising of “bad” products. An example is the advertising initiative adopted by several major food manufacturers to limit the advertising of unhealthy food categories to children. Such initiatives are based on the belief that less advertising will lead to less consumption of these unhealthy food categories. However, food manufacturers usually distribute products to consumers through retailers whose advertising is not restricted by those initiative programs. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of such advertising initiative in a leader–follower supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. We assume that both the manufacturer and the retailer can choose to participate in the advertising initiative by reducing their advertising levels. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. We show that the effectiveness of the advertising initiative critically depends on the leader’s participation in the initiative. If the leader is willing to reduce the advertising level below a threshold, the market coverage of the product can drop significantly. On the other hand, if only the follower participates in the initiative, the market coverage is likely to expand in the majority of cases. Managerial implications of this research are also discussed.     

供应链互补产品广告投入和捆绑销售联合决策研究

以一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链为研究对象,制造商生产两种互补产品,零售商可选择分开或捆绑两种销售策略。考虑互补品的负交叉弹性和广告外部性的特点,构建基于溢出效应的需求模型,运用博弈论的方法,求解零售商采取分开和捆绑两种销售策略时的均衡结果。通过比较不同销售策略下的均衡结果及利润关系,探讨在分散式和集中式两种情况下,零售商的最优广告投入和捆绑销售的联合决策问题。最后,通过数值算例,讨论产品互补程度和广告成本系数对决策结果的影响。研究结果表明,无论是在分散式还是集中式决策下,当产品互补程度较高或广告成本系数低时,分开销售是占优策略而广告费用较高;当产品互补程度较低且广告成本系数高时,捆绑销售是占优策略且广告费用较低。     

Vendor Management Inventory with consignment contracts and the benefits of cooperative advertising

Most of the cooperative advertising literature has focused on studying the effects of such programs considering marketing variables. This paper integrates production and inventory management with pricing and advertising considerations to assess the effects of cooperative advertising programs in bilateral monopolies. We consider a supply chain where a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) along with a consignment contract is implemented to coordinate the chain. We develop and solve a differential model for two games. The first one is a benchmark scenario where no cooperative advertising is offered, while the manufacturer offers the cooperative program in the second game. The main results show that cooperative advertising programs, usually considered as successful marketing initiatives, can be very difficult to implement in a supply chain undertaking a VMI policy with a consignment contract, in which operations and marketing interface is taken into account. A cooperative program mainly hurts the manufacturer’s profits, and can be profit-Pareto-improving only in a few cases. Although the retailer is generally willing to receive a support from the manufacturer, she can opt for a non-cooperative program when the largest part of the supply chain profits goes to the manufacturer. We developed several special cases to strengthen our findings.     

Co-op advertising models in manufacturer–retailer supply chains: A game theory approach

In the literature of cooperative (co-op) advertising, the focus of research is on a relationship in which a manufacturer is the leader and retailers are followers. This relationship implies the dominance of the manufacturer over retailers. Recent market structure reviews have shown a shift of retailing power from manufacturers to retailers. Retailers have equal or even greater power than a manufacturer when it comes to retailing. Based on this new market phenomenon, we intend to explore the role of vertical co-op advertising efficiency with respect to transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer through brand name investments, local advertising expenditures, and sharing rules of advertising expenses. Three co-op advertising models are discussed which are based on two noncooperative games and one cooperative game. In a leader–follower noncooperative game, the manufacturer is assumed to be a leader who first specifies the brand name investment and the co-op subsidization policy. The retailer, as a follower, then decides on the local advertising level. In a noncooperative simultaneous move game, the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to act simultaneously and independently. In a cooperative game, the system profit is maximized for every Pareto efficient co-op advertising scheme, but not for any other schemes. All Pareto efficient co-op advertising schemes are associated with a single local advertising level and a single brand name investment level, but with variable sharing policies of advertising expenses. The best Pareto efficient advertising scheme is obtained taking members' risk attitudes into account. Utilizing the Nash bargaining model, we discuss two situations that (a) both members are risk averse, and (b) both members are risk neutral. Our results are consistent with the bargaining literature.     

Retail competition and cooperative advertising

We consider a cooperative advertising channel consisting of a manufacturer selling its product through a retailer in competition with another independent retailer. The manufacturer subsidizes its retailer’s advertising only when a certain threshold is positive. Moreover, the manufacturer’s support for its retailer is higher under competition than in its absence.     

Using mixture‐amount modeling to optimize the advertising media mix and quantify cross‐media synergy for specific target groups

One of the critical decisions in media planning is how to allocate advertising efforts across different media. While studies indicate that marketers can create positive synergy effects by spreading their effort across several media, there is little understanding of how much should be invested in each specific medium to optimize advertising results. In this study, we apply a novel methodology, mixture‐amount modeling, which allows advertisers to determine the optimal allocation of advertising effort across media as a function of the total advertising effort. Moreover, we test how the optimal allocation and the resulting response change for consumers with distinctive media usage patterns and varying degrees of product category experience. Based on these results, we quantify the potential synergy between media and calculate the synergistic capacity for specific target groups. We apply the model to data from 52 beauty care advertising campaigns that ran on TV and in magazines in the Netherlands and Belgium. We determine the optimal allocation of advertising investments (measured through Gross Rating Points) to maximize campaign recognition. Our findings support the existence of positive synergistic effects between magazine and TV advertising and illustrate that these effects depend on consumers' media usage and product category experience.     

Optimal Advertising and Pricing in a Dynamic Durable Goods Supply Chain

Cooperative advertising is an incentive offered by a manufacturer to influence retailers’ promotional decisions. We study a dynamic durable goods duopoly with a manufacturer and two independent and competing retailers. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, announces his wholesale prices and his shares of retailers’ advertising costs, and the retailers in response play a Nash differential game in choosing their optimal retail prices and advertising efforts over time. We obtain the feedback equilibrium policies for the manufacturer and the retailers in explicit form for a linear demand formulation. We investigate issues, like channel coordination and antidiscriminatory legislation, and also study a case, when the manufacturer sells through only one retailer and the second retailer sells a competing brand.     

Advertising strategies in a franchise system

The main question of this research is: Who should undertake promotional and brand-image advertising if the franchisor and franchisees act so as to maximize their respective profits? To address this question, we study a two-stage advertising game between a franchisor and two adjacent franchisees. In the first stage of the game, the franchisor chooses between three advertising models – centralizing or delegating the two types of advertising to the franchisees or delegating only promotional advertising. In the second stage, given the franchisor’s choice of an advertising model, the two franchisees decide whether or not to cooperate. Our main findings are that (1) the franchisees should cooperate if the franchisor delegates either both brand-image and promotional advertising or promotional advertising, although cooperation between franchisees does not necessary improve the franchisor’s profits. (2) The choice of an advertising arrangement critically depends on the margins as well as the costs of performing both promotional and brand-image advertising. We also discuss the conditions under which the three advertising models should be implemented.     

A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands

We study the relationship between the pricing and advertising decisions in a channel where a national brand is competing with a private label. We consider a differential game that incorporates the carryover effects of brand advertising over time for both the manufacturer and the retailer and we account for the complementary and competitive roles of advertising. Analysis of the obtained equilibrium Markov strategies shows that the relationship between advertising and pricing decisions in the channel depends mainly on the nature of the advertising effects. In particular, the manufacturer reacts to higher competitive retailer’s advertising levels by offering price concessions and limiting his advertising expenditures. The retailer’s optimal reaction to competitive advertising effects in the channel depends on two factors: (1) the price competition level between the store and the national brands and (2) the strength of the competitive advertising effects. For example, in case of intense price competition between the two brands combined with a strong manufacturer’s competitive advertising effect, the retailer should lower both the store and the national brands’ prices as a reaction to higher manufacturer’s advertising levels. For the retailer, the main advantage from boosting his competitive advertising investments seems to be driven by increased revenues from the private label. The retailer should however limit his investments in advertising if the latter generates considerable competitive effects on the national brand’s sales.     

A goodwill model with predatory advertising

We investigate the dynamic advertising policies of two competing firms in a duopolistic industry, assuming a predatory phenomenon between their advertising campaigns. The resulting model is a differential game which is not linear-quadratic. We show that there exists a Markovian Nash equilibrium, and that it leads to time constant advertising strategies. According to this model, predatory advertising produces a negative externality: the interference between the advertising campaigns decreases the total demand of the market.     

On the superiority of pulsing under a concave advertising market potential function

The authors study the superiority of advertising pulsing policy (turning advertising on and off in a cyclic fashion) over its uniform (constant spending) counterpart that costs the same under the assumption that sales dynamics follow a modified Vidale–Wolfe aggregate advertising model. The authors show that pulsing can be superior if the product of the concave market potential function and the linear or concave advertising response function is convex in advertising. Similar to previous studies in the literature, the average undiscounted profit over the infinite planning horizon is considered as a performance measure according to which alternative advertising pulsation policies are compared.     

Non-linear advertising capital model with time delayed feedback between advertising and stock of goodwill

According to the classical Nerlove-Arrow model, advertising expenditure can be considered as a capital investment to create present and future demand for the firm's products and, hence, to create present and future revenues for the firm. Advertising is assumed to influence via stock of goodwill which cumulatively counts for the effects of the firm's current and past advertising outlays. The paper presents a time delayed feedback model describing the relations between advertising and goodwill. Three different types of effects of advertising upon the dynamics of goodwill are modelled. The advertising policy of the management is incorporated into the model via a non-linear advertising function. The advertising function controls the advertising outlay e.g. by budget constraint and by the actual and target values of goodwill. The behavior of the model is analysed both analytically and numerically. Special attention is given for deriving the stability conditions for the limiting solution. The cases of repelling or chaotic limiting solutions are analysed by bifurcation and state space diagrams. Several numerical examples are given.     

不同决策模式下的双渠道供应链合作广告博弈分析

本文研究了双渠道供应链中非合作广告模式、合作广告模式和战略联盟模式下的合作广告问题,给出了不同决策模式下的均衡解。对比分析发现:战略联盟模式中品牌广告和零售商广告投入水平最高,网络广告投入水平最低且零售渠道的产品需求最高。合作广告模式和战略联盟模式中的系统收益与广告比率负相关,与产品网络适应度正相关。