基于结构元理论的模糊合作博弈Owen联盟值

研究具有模糊参与度和模糊收益的模糊合作博弈各局中人的Owen联盟值问题。首先,重新定义了模糊Owen联盟值的具体形式,并证明其满足新定义的5条公理。利用模糊结构元理论和限定运算理论去计算求解,最后用一个实例验证了模糊Owen联盟值方法,并对结果进行分析。     

一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值

讨论一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策,其中局中人通过优先联盟整体参与大联盟的合作,同时优先联盟内部有合取权限结构限制,利用两阶段Shapley值的分配思想并考虑到权限结构对优先联盟内合作的限制,给出了此类合作对策的解。 该解可看做具有联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值的推广。 证明了该解满足的公理化条件,并验证了这些条件的独立性。     

Shapley值与Winter值的解析关系

鉴于 Shapley 值和 Winter 值都是局中人边际贡献的平均值,探究了它们之 间的解析关系.证明了 Shapley 值是 Winter 值在层次结构集上对称概率分布下的期望均值. 作为这一结论的一个推论, 证明了 Shapley 值是 Winter 值在层次结构集的任意相似类中的平均值. 最后,还指出了这一结 论与推论的等价性.研究结果不仅扩展了 Shapley 值和 Owen 值与此对应的解析关系, 还大大简化了这些关系的已有证明.     

基于联盟结构的模糊合作博弈的收益分配方案

研究了具有联盟结构的企业联盟模糊情况下各局中人的收益分配问题.首先拓展了Owen联盟值在经典意义下满足的5个公理,利用Choquet积分给出了基于联盟结构的模糊合作博弈的Owen联盟值,即模糊Owen联盟值的具体形式,并证明该联盟值满足新定义的5个公理.最后用实例验证了模糊Owen联盟值方法,并对计算结果进行分析。     

具有模糊权限结构和模糊支付的合作对策

具有权限结构的合作对策可刻画合作者之间具有等级限制的情形,而具有模糊权限结构的合作对策是对经典情形的拓广.进一步考虑具有模糊权限结构和模糊支付的合作对策,利用联盟的自主度算子和模糊Choquet积分,定义了这种合作对策的限制对策.在此基础上给出了两种模糊权限值,分别证明了这两种值满足的一些性质.最后利用一个算例说明这两种值在企业协作生产收益分配中的应用.     

具有联盟结构的position值

position值是图对策中著名的分支有效解, 该值充分体现了图的边在合作中的贡献, 因而也可作为网络中心性的一种测度方法。本文基于van den Brink等提出的具有联盟结构与图结构的合作对策, 将position值推广到具有联盟结构的图对策上, 提出了具有联盟结构的position值, 该值可以作为受优先联盟约束的网络中心性的一种测度方法。本文首先证明了具有联盟结构的position值可以由分割分支有效性和平衡边贡献性所唯一刻画。其次, 以跨国天然气管道网的收益分配为例, 对这个值与其他值做了比较分析。     

具有区间联盟值n人对策的Shapley值

本文提出了一类具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值.利用区间数运算有关理论,通过建立公理化体系,对具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值进行深入研究,证明了这类n人对策Shapley值存在性与唯一性,并给出了此Shapley值的具体表达式及一些性质.最后通过一个算例检验了其有效性与正确性.     

模糊联盟合作对策的收益分配研究

针对现实环境中联盟组成的不确定性, 本文研究了具有模糊联盟的合作对策求解问题。提出了模糊联盟合作对策的一种新的分配方式,即平均分摊解,并给出了这种解与模糊联盟合作对策Shapley值一致的充分条件。同时,还提出了模糊联盟合作对策的Shapley值的一个重要性质。最后,结合算例进行了分析论证。     

基于多维线性扩展的模糊联盟合作对策tau值性质与计算方法

研究模糊联盟合作对策tau值的计算方法及其性质. 利用多维线性扩展方法定义了模糊联盟合作对策的tau值, 证明了其存在性、唯一性等性质, 并推导出基于多维线性扩展凸模糊联盟合作对策tau值的计算公式. 研究结果发现, 基于多维线性扩展的模糊联盟合作对策tau值是对清晰联盟合作对策tau值的扩展, 而清晰联盟合作对策tau值仅是其特例. 特别地, 对于凸模糊联盟合作对策, 利用其tau值计算公式, 可进一步简化求解过程.     

基于匹配序的合作对策联盟形成决策方法及其应用

合作对策中,联盟的形成过程是联盟一切活动的基础,直接影响着合作的稳定性与可持续发展。本文在分析局中人心理,情感,现实等因素对联盟形成所产生影响的基础上,首先定义了主观偏好标度值量化了心理、情感等因素,定义了收益分配函数将现实因素量化,构建了综合匹配函数作为局中人选择合作伙伴的一个序标准,通过定义匹配请求、交互匹配、直接交互匹配等概念,构建了基于匹配序的联盟形成决策模型,并证明了在特定情况下直接交互匹配的存在必然性。其次,给出了基于匹配序的联盟形成方法步骤,演化了大联盟的形成过程。最后通过具体实例验证了该决策方法的有效性与合理性。结果表明,该方法能有效的形成一系列可行且稳定的联盟结构,能快速演化联盟的形成过程,为有效解决联盟形成问题奠定了良好基础。     

The Constrained Equal Awards Rule for Bankruptcy Problems with a Priori Unions

In this paper, we provide two extensions of the constrained equal awards rule for bankruptcy situations to the class of bankruptcy situations with a priori unions. We present some characterisations and relations with corresponding games. The two new extensions are illustrated by a specific application.     

Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach

This paper is devoted to the game theoretic analysis of decision situations, in which the players have veto power over the actions undertaken by certain other players. We give a full characterization of the dividends in these games with a permission structure. We find that the collection of these games forms a subspace of the vector space of all games with side payments on a specified player set.Two applications of these results are provided. The first one deals with the projection of additive games on a permission structure. It is shown that the Shapley value of these projected games can be interpreted as an index that measures the power of the players in the permission structure. The second application applies the derived results on games, where the organization structure can be analysed separately from the production capacities of the participating players.     

Modification of the Banzhaf Value for Games with a Coalition Structure

In this paper we introduce a new coalitional value in the context of TU games with an a priori system of unions, which it is called the symmetric coalitional Banzhaf value. This value satisfies the property of symmetry in the quotient game, the quotient game property, and it is a coalitional value of Banzhaf. Several characterizations are provided and two political examples illustrate the differences with respect to the Owen value and the Banzhaf–Owen value.     

Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications

In the field of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, various restrictions on coalition formation are studied. The most studied restrictions are those that arise from restricted communication and hierarchies. This survey discusses several models of hierarchy restrictions and their relation with communication restrictions. In the literature, there are results on game properties, Harsanyi dividends, core stability, and various solutions that generalize existing solutions for TU-games. In this survey, we mainly focus on axiomatizations of the Shapley value in different models of games with a hierarchically structured player set, and their applications. Not only do these axiomatizations provide insight in the Shapley value for these models, but also by considering the types of axioms that characterize the Shapley value, we learn more about different network structures. A central model of games with hierarchies is that of games with a permission structure where players in a cooperative transferable utility game are part of a permission structure in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. This permission structure is represented by a directed graph. Generalizations of this model are, for example, games on antimatroids, and games with a local permission structure. Besides discussing these generalizations, we briefly discuss some applications, in particular auction games and hierarchically structured firms.     

Axiomatizations of Banzhaf permission values for games with a permission structure

In games with a permission structure it is assumed that players in a cooperative transferable utility game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. We provide axiomatic characterizations of Banzhaf permission values being solutions that are obtained by applying the Banzhaf value to modified TU-games. In these characterizations we use power- and player split neutrality properties. These properties state that splitting a player’s authority and/or contribution over two players does not change the sum of their payoffs.     

具有模糊支付的模糊合作对策中局中人间的相互影响

基于郭嗣琮[19～21]提出的关于模糊数的限制运算,本文探讨了具有模糊支付的模糊合作对策中局中人间的相互影响问题。给出了局中人间相互影响的表达式。当所给模糊合作对策具有相互独立性和k-单调性时,论述了一些基本性质。通过对Shapley函数概念的推广,得到相应的模糊Shapley度量指标。并对所给指标满足的性质进行了研究。最后通过算例分析来说明所给指标有效性和实用性。     

On a Priori Energy Estimates for Characteristic Boundary Value Problems

Motivated by the study of certain non linear free-boundary value problems for hyperbolic systems of partial differential equations arising in Magneto-Hydrodynamics, in this paper we show that an a priori estimate of the solution to certain boundary value problems, in the conormal Sobolev space \(H^1_{ tan}\) , can be transformed into an \(L^2\) a priori estimate of the same problem.     

The Compromise Value for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs

This paper introduces and studies the compromise value for cooperative games with random payoffs, that is, for cooperative games where the payoff to a coalition of players is a random variable. This value is a compromise between utopia payoffs and minimal rights and its definition is based on the compromise value for NTU games and the τ-value for TU games. It is shown that the nonempty core of a cooperative game with random payoffs is bounded by the utopia payoffs and the minimal rights. Consequently, for such games the compromise value exists. Further, we show that the compromise value of a cooperative game with random payoffs coincides with the τ-value of a related TU game if the players have a certain type of preferences. Finally, the compromise value and the marginal value, which is defined as the average of the marginal vectors, coincide on the class of two-person games. This results in a characterization of the compromise value for two-person games.I thank Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.