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1.
In this work, a new axiomatization of the Shapley is presented. An associated game is constructed. We define a sequence of games, when the term of order n, in this sequence, is the associated game of the term of order (n−1). We show that the sequence converges and that the limit game is inessential. The solution is obtained using the inessential game axiom, the associated consistency axiom and the continuity axiom. As a by-product, we note that neither the additivity nor the efficiency axioms are needed. Accepted September 2001  相似文献   

2.
Hamiache axiomatized the Shapley value as the unique solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity and associated consistency. Driessen extended Hamiache’s axiomatization to the enlarged class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values. In this paper, we introduce the notion of row (resp. column)-coalitional matrix in the framework of cooperative game theory. The Shapley value as well as the associated game are represented algebraically by their coalitional matrices called the Shapley standard matrix MSh and the associated transformation matrix Mλ, respectively. We develop a matrix approach for Hamiache’s axiomatization of the Shapley value. The associated consistency for the Shapley value is formulated as the matrix equality MSh = MSh · Mλ. The diagonalization procedure of Mλ and the inessential property for coalitional matrices are fundamental tools to prove the convergence of the sequence of repeated associated games as well as its limit game to be inessential. In addition, a similar matrix approach is applicable to study Driessen’s axiomatization of a certain class of linear values. In summary, it is illustrated that matrix analysis is a new and powerful technique for research in the field of cooperative game theory.  相似文献   

3.
In terms of the similarity of matrices, by combining the dual operator and the linear mapping with respect to Hamiache’s associated game on the game space, the Shapley value for TU-games is axiomatized as the unique value verifying dual similar associated consistency, continuity, and the inessential game property.  相似文献   

4.
Irinel Dragan 《TOP》2006,14(1):61-73
The main result proved in this paper is the fact that any Least Square Value is the Shapley value of a game obtained from the given game by rescaling. An Average per capita formula for Least Square Values, similar to the formula for the Shapley value (Dragan (1992)), will lead to this conclusion and allow a parallel computation for these values. The potential for the Least Square Values, a potential basis relative to Least Square Values and an approach similar to the one used for the Shapley value is allowing us to solve the Inverse problem for Least Square Values.  相似文献   

5.
Luis M. Ruiz 《TOP》1999,7(1):163-168
In this note we show that the Banzhaf semivalue is consistent with respect to a suitable reduced game which keeps a clear parallelism with that defined by Hart and Mas-Colell in (1989) to prove the consistency of the Shapley value. We also use this reduced game property to characterize the Banzhaf semivalue.  相似文献   

6.
We propose two variations of the non-cooperative bargaining model for games in coalitional form, introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357–380, 1996a). These strategic games implement, in the limit, two new NTU-values: the random marginal and the random removal values. Their main characteristic is that they always select a unique payoff allocation in NTU-games. The random marginal value coincides with the Consistent NTU-value (Maschler and Owen in Int J Game Theory 18:389–407, 1989) for hyperplane games, and with the Shapley value for TU games (Shapley in In: Contributions to the theory of Games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317, 1953). The random removal value coincides with the solidarity value (Nowak and Radzik in Int J Game Theory 23:43–48, 1994) in TU-games. In large games we show that, in the special class of market games, the random marginal value coincides with the Shapley NTU-value (Shapley in In: La Décision. Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1969), and that the random removal value coincides with the equal split value.   相似文献   

7.
Interior operator games were introduced by Bilbao et al. (2005) as additive games restricted by antimatroids. In that paper several interesting cooperative games were shown as examples of interior operator games. The antimatroid is a known combinatorial structure which represents, in the game theory context, a dependence system among the players. The aim of this paper is to study a family of values which are linear functions and satisfy reasonable conditions for interior operator games. Two classes of these values are considered assuming particular properties.  相似文献   

8.
9.
鉴于 Shapley 值和 Winter 值都是局中人边际贡献的平均值,探究了它们之 间的解析关系.证明了 Shapley 值是 Winter 值在层次结构集上对称概率分布下的期望均值. 作为这一结论的一个推论, 证明了 Shapley 值是 Winter 值在层次结构集的任意相似类中的平均值. 最后,还指出了这一结 论与推论的等价性.研究结果不仅扩展了 Shapley 值和 Owen 值与此对应的解析关系, 还大大简化了这些关系的已有证明.  相似文献   

10.
A mean value for games with communication structures   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
The mean value is a new extension of the Shapley value for games with communication structure representable by a simple graph; only pairwise meetings can occur, although some of them might not be permitted. The new value is characterized by a set of axioms of which the one with the most far-reaching effect is an associated consistency property already used in various contexts. The mean value of an n-player unanimity game is the arithmetic average of the mean values of (n–1)-player unanimity games with connected support, which means games in which the deleted players are not articulation point of the considered graph.I wish to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful remarks. The usual disclaimer applies.Received: April 2002/Accepted: February 2004  相似文献   

11.
We develop a general framework of incomplete information games under ambiguity which extends the traditional framework of Bayesian games to the context of Ellsberg-type ambiguity. We then propose new solution concepts called ex ante and interim Γ-maximin equilibrium for solving such games. We show that, unlike the standard notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium, these concepts may lead to rather different recommendations for the same game under ambiguity. This phenomenon is often referred to as dynamic inconsistency. Moreover, we characterize the sufficient condition under which dynamic consistency is assured in this generalized framework.  相似文献   

12.
We will find 3 maximal subclasses with respect to essential, superadditive and convex games, respectively such that a game is in one subclass, so are its reduced games.  相似文献   

13.
Games with cooperation structure are cooperative games with a family offeasible coalitions, that describes which coalitions can negotiate in the game. We study a model ofcooperation structure and the corresponding restricted game, in which the feasible coalitions are those belonging to apartition system. First, we study a recursive procedure for computing the Hart and Mas-Colell potential of these games and we develop the relation between the dividends of Harsanyi in the restricted game and the worths in the original game. The properties ofpartition convex geometries are used to obtain formulas for theShapley andBanzhaf values of the players in the restricted game in terms of the original gamev. Finally, we consider the Owen multilinear extension for the restricted game.The author is grateful to Paul Edelman, Ulrich Faigle and the referees for their comments and suggestions. The proof of Theorem 1 was proposed by the associate editor's referee.  相似文献   

14.
This paper presents two new axiomatizations of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Two associated games are defined and a consistency axiom is required. The construction of the associated games presupposes that coalitions behave in an aggressive manner towards players who are not members of the same unions and in a friendly manner towards players that do belong to their unions. The consistency axiom necessitates the definition of only one associated game which is not a reduced game. Received: February 1999/Revised version: January 2000  相似文献   

15.
We study the family of weighted Shapley values for games in generalized characteristic function form. These values are defined and characterized.  相似文献   

16.
This paper examines proposals for decision making with Dempster-Shafer belief functions from the perspectives of requirements for rational decision under ignorance and sequential consistency. The focus is on the proposals by Jaffray & Wakker and Giang & Shenoy applied for partially consonant belief functions. We formalize the concept of sequential consistency of an evaluation model and prove results about sequential consistency of Jaffray-Wakker’s model and Giang-Shenoy’s model under various conditions. We demonstrate that the often neglected assumption about two-stage resolution of uncertainty used in Jaffray-Wakker’s model actually disambiguates the foci of a belief function, and therefore, makes it a partially consonant on the extended state space.  相似文献   

17.
A new class of values for cooperative games with level structure is introduced. We apply a multi-step proceeding to the weighted Shapley values. For characterization, two well-known axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values are extended, the first one by efficiency and weighted balanced contributions and the second one by weighted standardness for two-player games and consistency. We get a new axiomatization of the Shapley levels value too.  相似文献   

18.
NA样本半参数回归模型估计的矩相合性   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1  
考虑了误差为NA序列的半参数回归模型,利用非参数估计方法给出了模型参数的最小二乘估计和加权最小二乘估计,并在适当条件下得到了它们的矩相合性.  相似文献   

19.
双边配给问题描述了现实生活中一类带有二部图结构的稀缺资源配置问题, 例如, 在自然灾害期间救援物资的配给; 电力和天然气等自然资源按需分配; 高校引进人才调配等。本文通过求解线性规划, 并从联盟边际贡献的角度出发定义了双边配给问题的一个Shapley解。之后, 通过合作对策模型和解的公理化方法说明新解的合理性。首先, 建立双边配给问题的合作对策模型, 论证了新解与双边配给合作对策的Shapley值一致; 其次, 证明了Shapley解是唯一满足优先一致性的有效配给方案。最后, 将Shapley解应用于博物馆通票问题的研究, 探讨了博物馆合作制定通票后所得单票和通票收益的分配方式。  相似文献   

20.
双边配给问题描述了现实生活中一类带有二部图结构的稀缺资源配置问题, 例如, 在自然灾害期间救援物资的配给; 电力和天然气等自然资源按需分配; 高校引进人才调配等。本文通过求解线性规划, 并从联盟边际贡献的角度出发定义了双边配给问题的一个Shapley解。之后, 通过合作对策模型和解的公理化方法说明新解的合理性。首先, 建立双边配给问题的合作对策模型, 论证了新解与双边配给合作对策的Shapley值一致; 其次, 证明了Shapley解是唯一满足优先一致性的有效配给方案。最后, 将Shapley解应用于博物馆通票问题的研究, 探讨了博物馆合作制定通票后所得单票和通票收益的分配方式。  相似文献   

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