The Role of the Visual System in Emotion Perception

Looking at a person’s expression is a good way of telling what she feels—what emotions she has. Why is that? Is it because we see her emotion, or is it because we infer her mental state from her expression? My claim is that there is a sense in which we do see the person’s emotion. I first argue that expressions are physical events that carry information about the emotions that produce them. I then examine evidence suggesting that specific brain areas and structures are involved in the process that extracts such information and makes it available in the content of visual experience. I consider only what happens in early stages of visual processing and make no claim about the role of simulation and empathy.     

The Problem of Emotional Significance

What does it mean to say that an emotional response fits the situation? This question cannot be answered simply by specifying the core relational theme (loss or risk, say) associated with each emotion: we must also explain what constitutes an emotionally significant loss or risk. It is sometimes suggested that emotionally significant situations are those that bear on the subject’s interests or concerns. I accept that this claim is plausible for some emotional responses, and I propose a particular way of interpreting it. I suggest that, for many emotions, emotional significance is determined by the subject’s likes and dislikes – that is, settled dispositions to find a certain situation pleasant or distressing. I contrast this account with other preference-based accounts and with an account that appeals to the subject’s interests. I argue that we should prefer the likes-based account to these rival views.     

Naturalising Austin

In this paper I will try to defend a quasi-naturalistic interpretation of J.L. Austin’s work. I will rely on P. Kitcher’s 1992 paper “The Naturalists Return” to compile four general criteria by which a philosopher can be called a naturalist. Then I will turn to Austin’s work and examine whether he meets these criteria. I will try to claim that versions of such naturalistic elements can be found in his work.     

Karma Theory,Determinism, Fatalism and Freedom of Will

The so-called theory of karma is one of the distinguishing aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. At the same time that the theory can be seen as closely connected with the freedom of will and action that we humans supposedly have, it has many times been said to be determinist and fatalist. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in some deepness the relations that are between the theory of karma on one side and determinism, fatalism and free-will on the other side. In order to do that, I shall use what has been described as the best formal approach we have to indeterminism: branching time theory. More specifically, I shall introduce a branching time semantic framework in which, among other things, statements such as “state of affairs e is a karmic effect of agent a”, “a wills it to be the case that e” and “e is inevitable” could be properly represented.     

Epistemic Conditions on “Ought”: E=K as a Case Study

In The Norm of Belief, John Gibbons claims that there is a “natural reaction” to the general idea that one can be normatively required to Ø when that requirement is in some sense outside of one’s first person perspective or inaccessible to one. The reaction amounts to the claim that this is not possible. Whether this is a natural or intuitive idea or not, it is difficult to articulate exactly why we might think it is correct. To do so, we need a view about the relationship between agents’ capacities to accord with normative requirements and the conditions under which those normative requirements obtain. I offer an account of the epistemic dimension of this relationship. The goal is to provide enough of a story about the natural reaction to make accounting for it look like an important desideratum for any theory of the nature of normative requirements—whether these are moral or epistemic. To focus the discussion, I use Timothy Williamson’s knowledge-first view of evidence as an example of a view in epistemology that generates the natural reaction. One upshot of the discussion, then, is a detailed account of what is troubling about Williamson’s influential but controversial view of evidence.     

Veber on knowledge and factuality

The article deals with the development of the philosophy of France Veber (1890–1975), the pupil of Meinong and a main Slovene philosopher. One of the most important threads of Veber’s philosophy is the consideration of knowledge and factuality, which may be seen as a driving force of its development. Veber’s philosophical development is usually divided into three phases: the object theory phase, the phase when he created his philosophy of a person as a creature at the crossing of the natural and the spiritual world, who as an active, not merely passive subject possesses her own causal powers, and the third phase, when he supplemented his earlier philosophy with the theory of a special side of our experience which he called hitting-upon-reality. It is a direct experience of reality, a special kind of intentionality, which is however fundamentally different from presentational intentionality, which alone is taken into account by object theory or phenomenology. The questions of knowledge and factuality are closely connected in Veber’s philosophy since, pace Veber, knowledge is a kind of, we may say, justified experience the object of which is a factual entity. Hence, if we want to understand what knowledge is, we must face the challenge of comprehending factuality. There are five stages to be noted in the development of his epistemology. The first two belong to his object theory phase, the third to his person phase, the fourth is characterised by his distinguishing and exploring truth and validity with regard to the thought about God, and the basis of the fifth phase lies in his theory of hitting-upon-reality. In Introduction to Philosophy and The System of Philosophy, that is in the year 1921, Veber believed that factuality (“truth,”) was a property of the object, which we do present, but we do not present the factuality of this factuality (that is why he distinguishes between the merely objective truths and truths that are in addition transcendental truths). In 1923, in The Problems of Contemporary Philosophy and in the work Science and Religion, he already rejected such a view. There is something that makes things factual, but that is a complete unknown X. Therefore we cannot even say what kind of an entity this factuality is. Some people would probably demand the following formulation: if X is an ultimate mystery, we should not claim even that it is an entity. In The Problems of Presentation Production (1928) Veber claimed that factuality is not a property since this would lead to a regressum ad infinitum. Philosophy (1930) related internally correct experience to personal will. In The Book about God (1934) he developed the thesis that factuality depends on the act of God. In The Question of Reality (1939) he importantly modified, developed and enriched the thesis that we do not present reality with his theory of immediate experience of (hitting upon) factuality.     

Geometry of foliations on the Wiener space and stochastic calculus of variations

Stochastic Calculus of variations deals with maps defined on the Wiener space, with finite dimensional range; within this context appears the notion of non-degenerate map, which corresponds roughly speaking to some kind of infinite dimensional ellipticity; a non-degenerate map has a smooth law; by conditioning, it generates a continuous desintegration of the Wiener measure. Infinite dimensional Stochastic Analysis and particularly SPDE theory raise the natural question of what can be done for maps with an infinite dimensional range; our approach to this problem emphasizes an intrinsic geometric aspect, replacing range by generated σ-field and its associated foliation of the Wiener space. To cite this article: H. Airault et al., C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, Ser. I 339 (2004).     

Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered

One controversial position in the debate over dispositional and categorical properties maintains that our concepts of these properties are the result of partially considering unitary properties that are both dispositional and categorical. As one of its defenders (Heil 2005, p. 351) admits, this position is typically met with “incredulous stares”. In this paper, I examine whether such a reaction is warranted. This thesis about properties is an instance of what I call “the Partial Consideration Strategy”—i.e., the strategy of claiming that what were formerly thought of as distinct entities are actually a unified entity, partially considered. By evaluating its use in other debates, I uncover a multi-layered prima facie case against the use of the Partial Consideration Strategy in the dispositional/categorical properties debate. In closing, I describe how the Partial Consideration Strategy can be reworked in a way that would allow it to sidestep this prima facie case.     

New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism

In this paper, I argue that (non-presentist) endurantism is incompatible with the view that properties are universals. I do so by putting forward a very simple objection that forces the endurantist to embrace tropes, rather than universals. I do not claim that this is bad news for the endurantist—trope theory seems to me by all means more appealing than universals—rather, I would like to see this result as a further motivation to embrace tropes. I then also put forward a (more controversial) reason to believe that at least some versions of perdurantism also require tropes rather than universals.     

Final compactness and separability in regular symmetrizable spaces

In 1966 A. V. Arkhangel'skii posed the following question: Is it true that every regular finally compact symmetrizable space is separable? S. I. Nedev soon showed that a regular finally compact symmetrizable space is hereditarily finally compact. Consequently any counterexample to Arkhangel'skii's conjecture must be an L-space. Applying the technique of iterated forcing we prove that in the axiom systemZFC for set theory it is consistent to assume the existence of a regular (hereditarily) finally compact symmetrizable space X that is nonseparable. Thus it is impossible to prove using the axiom systemZFC that every regular finally compact symmetrizable space is separable. The space X has additional properties as well: it has a basis consisting of open/closed sets (i.e., it is zero-dimensional in the sense ofind, it can be mapped continuously and one-to-one onto a separable metric space, it is α-left and has cardinality ω₁. Bibliography: 25 titles.     

Crédibilité paramétrique,corrélation et tarification bonus-malus

Is an actuarial rating of bonus-malus type based on the parametric credibility model of mixed Poisson distributions too differentiated? To answer this question, we enlarge the model of mixed Poisson distributions by considering mixed negative binomial distributions. The correlation coefficient between the annual claim numbers for an individual can then be adjusted, and we calculate the differences between the ratings coming from this new model of parametric credibility. An application of these results to a car portfolio shows that adjustment of the correlation may yield significantly smaller rating differences than those coming from the classical model. To cite this article: D. Pierre-Loti-Viaud, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, Ser. I 339 (2004).     

The non-codified use of problem structuring methods and the need for a generic constitutive definition

When we use a PSM what is it we are actually doing? An answer to this question would enable the PSM community to considerably enlarge the available source of case studies by the inclusion of examples of non-codified PSM use. We start from Checkland’s own proposal for a “constitutive definition” of SSM, which originated from trying to answer the question of knowing when a claim of SSM use was legitimate. By extending this idea to a generic constitutive definition for all PSMs leads us to propose a self-consistent labelling schema for observed phenomena arising from PSMs in action. This consists of a set of testable propositions, which, through observation of putative PSM use, can be used to assess validity of claims of PSM use. Such evidential support for the propositions as may be found in putative PSM use can then make it back into a broader axiomatic formulation of PSMs through the use of a set-theoretic approach, which enables our method to scale to large data sets. The theoretical underpinning to our work is in causal realism and middle range theory. We illustrate our approach through the analysis of three case studies drawn from engineering organisations, a rich source of possible non-codified PSM use. The combination of a method for judging cases of non-codified PSM use, sound theoretical underpinning, and scalability to large data sets, we believe leads to a demystification of PSMs and should encourage their wider use.     

On the cardinalities of finite topologies

Following the ideas of Sharp [2,3], we will give a partial answer to the question: “Let k be an integer, k ? 2. What is the smallest integer m for which there is a topology on m points with k open sets.” We state several results in the theory of finite topologies by introducing the idea of generating topologies. Using this concept, it is possible to derive existence theorems and get numerical results in an easy manner.     

Bar-On on Self-Knowledge and Expression

I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’ solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate avowals about our own present mental states, but how we can reasonably regard ourselves as entitled to claim self-knowledge. Addressing this aspect of the problem of self-knowledge requires confronting questions about the metaphysical nature of mental states, questions that Bar-On’s approach seeks to avoid.     

A simple generalization of Ger?gorin��s theorem

It is well known that the spectrum of a given matrix A belongs to the Ger?gorin set ??(A), as well as to the Ger?gorin set applied to the transpose of A, ??(A ^T ). So, the spectrum belongs to their intersection. But, if we first intersect i-th Ger?gorin disk ?? _i (A) with the corresponding disk $\Gamma_i(A^T)$ , and then we make union of such intersections, which are, in fact, the smaller disks of each pair, what we get is not an eigenvalue localization area. The question is what should be added in order to catch all the eigenvalues, while, of course, staying within the set ??(A)??????(A ^T ). The answer lies in the appropriate characterization of some subclasses of nonsingular H-matrices. In this paper we give two such characterizations, and then we use them to prove localization areas that answer this question.     

Can I be an Instantaneous Stage and yet Persist Through Time?

An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts.     

What is (Correct) Practical Reasoning?

This paper argues that practical reasoning is a mental process which leads a person from a set of existent mental states to an intention. In Section 1, I defend this view against two other proposals according to which practical reasoning either concludes in an action itself or in a normative belief. Section 2 discusses the correctness of practical reasoning and explains how the correctness of instrumental reasoning can be explained by the logical relations that hold between the contents of the mental states. In Section 3, I explore the correctness of normative practical reasoning. I conclude with the sceptical view that correct practical reasoning cannot require us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do.     

Empirisch begründete Idealtypenbildung. Ein methodisches Prinzip zur Theoriekonstruktion in der interpretativen mathematikdidaktischen Forschung

How does the development of ideal types contribute to an empirically based construction of theories in the interpretative research of mathematics education? Before answering this question I clarify what is meant by the termstheory andideal type. Personal ideal types, ideal types of actions andsituational ideal types are going to be distinguished. Representing research examples. I show that forming ideal types can be considered as a methodical principle for empirically grounded theory construction with common features and different heuristics.     

Friedman-reflexivity

In the present paper, we explore an idea of Harvey Friedman to obtain a coordinate-free presentation of consistency. For some range of theories, Friedman's idea delivers actual consistency statements (modulo provable equivalence). For a wider range, it delivers consistency-like statements.We say that a sentence C is an interpreter of a finitely axiomatised A over U iff it is the weakest statement C over U, with respect to U-provability, such that $U+C$ interprets A. A theory U is Friedman-reflexive iff every finitely axiomatised A has an interpreter over U. Friedman shows that Peano Arithmetic, PA, is Friedman-reflexive.We study the question which theories are Friedman-reflexive. We show that a very weak theory, Peano Corto, is Friedman-reflexive. We do not get the usual consistency statements here, but bounded, cut-free, or Herbrand consistency statements. We illustrate that Peano Corto as a base theory has additional desirable properties.We prove a characterisation theorem for the Friedman-reflexivity of sequential theories. We provide an example of a Friedman-reflexive sequential theory that substantially differs from the paradigm cases of Peano Arithmetic and Peano Corto.Interpreters over a Friedman-reflexive U can be used to define a provability-like notion for any finitely axiomatised A that interprets U. We explore what modal logics this idea gives rise to. We call such logics interpreter logics. We show that, generally, these logics satisfy the Löb Conditions, aka K4. We provide conditions for when interpreter logics extend S4, K45, and Löb's Logic. We show that, if either U or A is sequential, then the condition for extending Löb's Logic is fulfilled. Moreover, if our base theory U is sequential and if, in addition, its interpreters can be effectively found, we prove Solovay's Theorem. This holds even if the provability-like operator is not necessarily representable by a predicate of Gödel numbers.At the end of the paper, we briefly discuss how successful the coordinate-free approach is.