On the existence of a walrasian equilibrium in a model of interregional economic relations

We establish rather general conditions for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in the interregional interaction models studied in a series of articles on multiregional economic systems. In contrast to the complicated technical assumptions of the previously announced existence theorem, the conditions here amount to simple modifications of the standard requirements of equilibrium analysis: the absence of regional ??cornucopia?? and strict autarchy of all participants of the model. Furthermore, strict autarchy is directly analogous to the well-known positivity conditions of initial supply for the classical exchange model. In addition to a proof of the main result we discuss its application to the comparative analysis of unblocking states and Walrasian and Edgeworthian equilibrium states of the multiregional economic systems under consideration.     

Cooperative location games based on the minimum diameter spanning Steiner subgraph problem

In this paper we introduce and analyze new classes of cooperative games related to facility location models. The players are the customers (demand points) in the location problem and the characteristic value of a coalition is the cost of serving its members. Specifically, the cost in our games is the service diameter of the coalition.We study the existence of core allocations for these games, focusing on network spaces, i.e., finite metric spaces induced by undirected graphs and positive edge lengths.     

A cooperative location game based on the 1-center location problem

In this paper we introduce and analyze new classes of cooperative games related to facility location models defined on general metric spaces. The players are the customers (demand points) in the location problem and the characteristic value of a coalition is the cost of serving its members. Specifically, the cost in our games is the service radius of the coalition. We call these games the Minimum Radius Location Games (MRLG).We study the existence of core allocations and the existence of polynomial representations of the cores of these games, focusing on network spaces, i.e., finite metric spaces induced by undirected graphs and positive edge lengths, and on the ?_p metric spaces defined over R^d.     

Edgeworth equilibrium in a model of interregional economic relations

We introduce an analog of an Edgeworth equilibrium for a class of multiregional economic systems. We analyze the game-theoretic aspects of the coalition stability of regional development plans and establish a quite general existence theorem for an Edgeworth equilibrium. We discuss the questions of coincidence of the set of these equilibria with the fuzzy core and the set of theWalrasian equilibria of the multiregional systemin question.Our methods rest on a systematic accounting for the polyhedrality of the sets of balanced coalition plans.     

区间值合作对策的广义区间Shapley值

研究区间Shapley值通常对区间值合作对策的特征函数有较多约束,本文研究没有这些约束条件的区间值合作对策,以拓展区间Shapley值的适用范围。首先,本文指出广义H-差在减法与加法运算中存在的问题,进而提出了一种改进的广义H-差,称为扩展的广义H-差。然后,基于扩展的广义H-差,定义了区间值合作对策的广义区间Shapley值,并用区间有效性、区间对称性、区间哑元性和区间可加性等四条公理刻画了该广义区间Shapley值。同时,证明了该值的存在性与唯一性,而且得到了该值的一些性质。研究表明,任意的区间值合作对策的广义区间Shapley值都存在。最后,以算例说明该广义区间Shapley值的可行性与实用性。     

Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games

The paradigm of randomly-furcating stochastic differential games incorporates additional stochastic elements via randomly branching payoffs in stochastic differential games. This paper considers dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structure are derived. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to problems where the evolution of the state and future environments are not known with certainty. Important cases abound in regional economic cooperation, corporate joint ventures and environmental control. An illustration in cooperative resource extraction is presented.     

Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs

We study the approximation of the least core value and the least core of supermodular cost cooperative games. We provide a framework for approximation based on oracles that approximately determine maximally violated constraints. This framework yields a 3-approximation algorithm for computing the least core value of supermodular cost cooperative games, and a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a cost allocation in the 2-approximate least core of these games. This approximation framework extends naturally to submodular profit cooperative games. For scheduling games, a special class of supermodular cost cooperative games, we give a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing the least core value. For matroid profit games, a special class of submodular profit cooperative games, we give exact polynomial-time algorithms for computing the least core value as well as a least core cost allocation.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>-Person Second-Order Games: A Paradigm Shift in Game Theory

In this paper, we present a new approach to n-person games based on the Habitual domain theory. Unlike the traditional game theory models, the constructed model captures the fact that the underlying changes in the psychological aspects and mind states of the players over the arriving events are the key factors, which determine the dynamic process of coalition formation. We introduce two new concepts of solution for games: strategically stable mind profile and structurally stable mind profile. The theory introduced in this paper overcomes the dichotomy of non-cooperative/cooperative games, prevailing in the existing game theory, which makes game theory more applicable to real-world game situations.     

基于多维线性扩展的模糊联盟合作对策tau值性质与计算方法

研究模糊联盟合作对策tau值的计算方法及其性质. 利用多维线性扩展方法定义了模糊联盟合作对策的tau值, 证明了其存在性、唯一性等性质, 并推导出基于多维线性扩展凸模糊联盟合作对策tau值的计算公式. 研究结果发现, 基于多维线性扩展的模糊联盟合作对策tau值是对清晰联盟合作对策tau值的扩展, 而清晰联盟合作对策tau值仅是其特例. 特别地, 对于凸模糊联盟合作对策, 利用其tau值计算公式, 可进一步简化求解过程.     

Core,least core and nucleolus for multiple scenario cooperative games

Multiple scenario cooperative games model situations where the worth of the coalitions is valued in different scenarios simultaneously or under different states of nature. In this paper we analyze solution concepts for this class of games keeping the multidimensional nature of the characteristic function. We obtain extensions of the notions of core, least core and nucleolus, and explore the relationship among these solution concepts.     

On coalition formation: a game-theoretical approach

This paper deals with the question of coalition formation inn-person cooperative games. Two abstract game models of coalition formation are proposed. We then study the core and the dynamic solution of these abstract games. These models assume that there is a rule governing the allocation of payoffs to each player in each coalition structure called a payoff solution concept. The predictions of these models are characterized for the special case of games with side payments using various payoff solution concepts such as the individually rational payoffs, the core, the Shapley value and the bargaining set M₁ ⁽ⁱ⁾. Some modifications of these models are also discussed.     

拟阵上模糊合作对策的Banzhaf函数

首先通过对清晰拟阵定义的拓展,给出了模糊拟阵的概念。通过定义具有多线性扩展形式的模糊合作对策在静态结构和动态结构拟阵上B anzhaf函数的公理体系,分别探讨了此类模糊合作对策在这两种拟阵上关于B anzhaf函数的存在性和唯一性。同时,通过定义具有Choquet积分形式模糊合作对策在静态结构和动态结构拟阵上B anzhaf函数的公理体系,分别探讨了此类模糊合作对策在这两种拟阵上关于B anzhaf函数的存在性和唯一性。     

Two Game Models for Cooperation with Implicit Noncooperation

We propose two flexible game models to represent and analyze cases that cannot be modeled by current game models. One is called sharing creditability game (SCG) and the other is called bottomline game (BLG). The new models transform cooperative games into new games that incorporate auxiliary information (noncooperative in nature) usually neglected in previous theories. The new games will be solved only by traditional noncooperative game theory. When the new solutions are applied to the original games, the solutions can reflect the auxiliary information in addition to the original objectives of the decision makers or players. Generally, the new solutions are different from the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions of the original games. Existing transferable utility (TU) games and noncooperative games will coincide with special cases of the two new game models. Using SCG and BLG, the prisoner’s dilemma can be reformulated and a richer set of decisions can be considered for the players. The two new game models have potential applications in military and socioeconomic situations.This research was partly funded by the College Engineering, Ohio State University.     

Linear Transformation of Products: Games and Economies

In this paper, we introduce situations involving the linear transformation of products (LTP). LTP situations are production situations where each producer has a single linear transformation technique. First, we approach LTP situations from a (cooperative) game theoretical point of view. We show that the corresponding LTP games are totally balanced. By extending an LTP situation to one where a producer may have more than one linear transformation technique, we derive a new characterization of (nonnegative) totally balanced games: each totally balanced game with nonnegative values is a game corresponding to such an extended LTP situation. The second approach to LTP situations is based on a more economic point of view. We relate (standard) LTP situations to economies in two ways and we prove that the economies are standard exchange economies (with production). Relations between the equilibria of these economies and the cores of cooperative LTP games are investigated.     

一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值

讨论一类具有限制联盟结构的合作对策,其中局中人通过优先联盟整体参与大联盟的合作,同时优先联盟内部有合取权限结构限制,利用两阶段Shapley值的分配思想并考虑到权限结构对优先联盟内合作的限制,给出了此类合作对策的解。 该解可看做具有联盟结构的合作对策的两阶段Shapley值的推广。 证明了该解满足的公理化条件,并验证了这些条件的独立性。     

Parameterized fairness axioms on cycle-free graph games

We study cooperative transferable utility games with a communication structure represented by an undirected graph, i.e., a group of players can cooperate only if they are connected on the graph. This type of games is called graph games and the best-known solution for them is the Myerson value, which is characterized by the component efficiency axiom and the fairness axiom. Recently the average tree solution has been proposed on cycle-free graph games, and shown to be characterized by the component efficiency axiom and the component fairness axiom. We propose e{\epsilon} -parameterized fairness axiom on cycle-free graph games that incorporates the preceding fairness axioms, and show the existence and the uniqueness of the solution. We then discuss a relationship between the existing and our proposed solutions by a numerical example.     

Stochastic games with two non-absorbing states

In the present paper we consider recursive games that satisfy an absorbing property defined by Vieille. We give two sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium payoff in such games, and prove that if the game has at most two non-absorbing states, then at least one of the conditions is satisfied. Using a reduction of Vieille, we conclude that every stochastic game which has at most two non-absorbing states admits an equilibrium payoff. This paper is part of the Ph.D. thesis of the author completed under the supervision of Prof. Abraham Neyman at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank Prof. Neyman for many discussions and ideas and for the continuous help he offered. I also thank Nicolas Vieille for his comments on earlier versions of the paper.     

Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominated imputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem 1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms also characterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balanced games, and superadditive games.      

Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications

In the field of cooperative games with restricted cooperation, various restrictions on coalition formation are studied. The most studied restrictions are those that arise from restricted communication and hierarchies. This survey discusses several models of hierarchy restrictions and their relation with communication restrictions. In the literature, there are results on game properties, Harsanyi dividends, core stability, and various solutions that generalize existing solutions for TU-games. In this survey, we mainly focus on axiomatizations of the Shapley value in different models of games with a hierarchically structured player set, and their applications. Not only do these axiomatizations provide insight in the Shapley value for these models, but also by considering the types of axioms that characterize the Shapley value, we learn more about different network structures. A central model of games with hierarchies is that of games with a permission structure where players in a cooperative transferable utility game are part of a permission structure in the sense that there are players that need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. This permission structure is represented by a directed graph. Generalizations of this model are, for example, games on antimatroids, and games with a local permission structure. Besides discussing these generalizations, we briefly discuss some applications, in particular auction games and hierarchically structured firms.     

Values for Interior Operator Games

The aim of this paper is to study a new class of cooperative games called interior operator games. These games are additive games restricted by antimatroids. We consider several types of cooperative games as peer group games, big boss games, clan games and information market games and show that all of them are interior operator games. Next, we analyze the properties of these games and compute the Shapley, Banzhaf and Tijs values.