群体决策中Suzumura一致性选择函数理性化的充要条件

研究了Suzumura一致性选择函数的展示偏好描述,在已有的展示偏好定义基础上,给出了Suzumura一致性选择函数的展示偏好公理,并证明了该公理是Suzumura一致性选择函数理性化的充要条件.     

Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats

In this paper, we examine the manipulability properties of social decision rules which select a non-empty subset of the set of alternatives. Assuming that if an individual prefers x to y, then he prefers the outcome set {x, y} to {y}, and also {x} to {x, y}, we show that a wide class of scf's which allow ties even in pairwise choice violates one of the weakest notions of strategyproofness — a single individual can profitably misrepresent his preferences, even when he takes into account the possibility of countercoalitions. This class of scf's also violates exact consistency — no equilibrium situation gives the same outcome set as the ‘true profile’.     

Unions and the axiom of choice

We study statements about countable and well‐ordered unions and their relation to each other and to countable and well‐ordered forms of the axiom of choice. Using WO as an abbreviation for “well‐orderable”, here are two typical results: The assertion that every WO family of countable sets has a WO union does not imply that every countable family of WO sets has a WO union; the axiom of choice for WO families of WO sets does not imply that the countable union of countable sets is WO. (© 2008 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

Countable choice and compactness

We work in set-theory without choice ZF. Denoting by the countable axiom of choice, we show in that the closed unit ball of a uniformly convex Banach space is compact in the convex topology (an alternative to the weak topology in ZF). We prove that this ball is (closely) convex-compact in the convex topology. Given a set I, a real number p1 (respectively p=0), and some closed subset F of [0,1]^I which is a bounded subset of ℓ^p(I), we show that (respectively DC, the axiom of Dependent Choices) implies the compactness of F.     

A rational random behaviour model of choice

In this paper, a multinomial-Dirichlet-geometric model of consumer brand choice is developed. This individual-level stochastic choice model is derived as an extension of Theil's theory of rational random behaviour. These behavioural assumptions permit modelling of changes in likelihood of purchase as consumers are confronted with environmental factors whose occurrence and exact nature could not be anticipated at the planning stage of a shopping trip. Moreover, the model allows for uncertainties about future events which might affect actual choice to be built into the choice process alongside a traditional choice model which reflects preferences and/or utilities (and potential uncertainties surrounding them). Empirical results using consumer diary purchase panel data indicate a strong superiority of the model developed compared with previous models which assume stationary preference vectors.     

Restricted domains,arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and non-manipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives

An n-person social choice problem is considered in which the alternatives are n dimensional vectors, with the ith component of such a vector being the part of the alternatives affecting individual i alone. Assuming that individuals are selfish (individual i must be indifferent between any two alternatives with the same components), that they may be indifferent among alternatives and that each individual may choose his preferences out of a different set of permissible preferences, we prove that any set of restricted domains of preferences admits an n person non-dictatorial Arrow-type social welfare function if and only if it admits a two-person Arrow-type social welfare function: we characterize all the sets of restricted domains of preferences which admit two-person Arrow-type social welfare functions (and therefore also admit n-person Arrow-type social welfare functions) and then we prove that we also characterized all the sets of restricted domains of preferences which admit nondictatorial, nonmanipulable, noncorruptible and rational social choice correspondences.     

Multi-utilitarianism in two-agent quasilinear social choice

We introduce a new class of rules for resolving quasilinear social choice problems. These rules extend those of Green [9]. We call such rules multi-utilitarian rules. Each multi-utilitarian rule is associated with a probability measure over the set of weighted utilitarian rules, and is derived as the expectation of this probability. These rules are characterized by the axioms efficiency, translation invariance, transfer monotonicity, continuity, and additivity. By adding recursive invariance, we obtain a class of asymmetric rules generalizing those Green characterizes. A multi-utilitarian rule satisfying strict monotonicity has an associated probability measure with full support.I would like to thank Youngsub Chun, Federico Echenique, Jerry Green, Biung-Ghi Ju, William Thomson, and Walter Trockel for comments and discussions. Two anonymous referees also provided comments that proved very useful. All errors are my own.     

Social choice for bliss-point problems

This paper's concern is the axiomatic determination of social choice correspondences Ψ for a class of n-person problems that are characterized by some — generally — non-feasible bliss-point u(V)(?V∈τ . Meeting appropriate assumptions of ‘planner's rationality’ it is shown that Ψ is necessarily norm-induced, i.e. one can find some norm |·| in Rⁿ s.t. Ψ(V) = {u?V|6u-u(V)6=min{6v-u(V)6|v,V}}. The mathematical problem of recovering. from Ψ is one of integration which has its well-known parallel in the theory of revealed preference.     

The categorical approach to social choice theory

A number of different problems in social choice theory are given a common treatment in the framework of category theory. A social choice function is a map μ from a set Hom(A, PX) of profiles - in applications functions from a set A of agents to the set PX of linear orders on a set X of alternatives - to a set GPX the nature of which depends on the application. The main theorem established is applied to social welfare functions and strategy-proof voting schemes.     

On a compromise social choice correspondence

This paper analyzes the compromise social choice correspondence derived from the τ-value of digraph games. Monotonicity of this correspondence is shown. A connection between several properties of social choice correspondences based on game theoretical solutions and game theoretical properties of the underlying solutions is given. Applications to several game theoretic solutions are provided.     

The rigid relation principle,a new weak choice principle

The rigid relation principle, introduced in this article, asserts that every set admits a rigid binary relation. This follows from the axiom of choice, because well‐orders are rigid, but we prove that it is neither equivalent to the axiom of choice nor provable in Zermelo‐Fraenkel set theory without the axiom of choice. Thus, it is a new weak choice principle. Nevertheless, the restriction of the principle to sets of reals (among other general instances) is provable without the axiom of choice.     

Equity,efficiency and rights in social choice

The impossibility of a Paretian liberal presented by Sen shows the incompatibility of the Pareto principle with a mild claim of libertarian rights when they are required of the collective choice rule with unrestricted domain. In view of the profound implications of this paradox, it is no wonder that there are many serious attempts in the literature to seek for a general resolution thereof. In this paper, we try to explore an avenue which has been left relatively less cultivated in the attempts to try to find a way out of this paradox, the essential idea thereof being to restrict the ‘legitimate’ exercise of the liberatarian rights by the claims of justice or equity. It will be shown that the gist of the successful resolution of the Pareto libertarian paradox along this line lies in the impartiality of the principle of justice held by the individuals and the prevalence of the sympathetic acceptance of each other's subjective preferences.     

Ranking fuzzy choice functions by their rationality indicators

In this paper we study two rationality indicators and two normality indicators of a fuzzy choice function. They express the degree of rationality or normality of this fuzzy choice function. This way we can establish a hierarchy in a given family of fuzzy choice functions with respect to their degree of rationality.     

Computable choice functions for computable linear orderings

A choice set for a computable linear ordering is a set which contains one element from each maximal block of the ordering. We obtain a partial characterization of the computable linear order‐types for which each computable model has a computable choice set, and a full characterization in the relativized case; Every model of the linear order‐type α of degree ≤ d has a choice set of degree ≤ d iff α can written as a finite sum of order‐types, each of which either has finitely many blocks, or has order‐type n · η for some integer n.     

The axiom of choice and the law of excluded middle in weak set theories

A weak form of intuitionistic set theory WST lacking the axiom of extensionality is introduced. While WST is too weak to support the derivation of the law of excluded middle from the axiom of choice, we show that bee.ng up WST with moderate extensionality principles or quotient sets enables the derivation to go through. (© 2008 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences

A game form constitutionally implements a social choice correspondence if it implements it in Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the associated effectivity functions coincide. This paper presents necessary and sufficient conditions for a unanimous social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable, and sufficient and almost necessary conditions for an arbitrary (but surjective) social choice correspondence to be constitutionally implementable. It is shown that the results apply to interesting classes of scoring and veto social choice correspondences.     

Weak axioms of choice for metric spaces

In the framework of ZF, i.e., Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without the axiom of choice AC, we show that if the family of all non-empty, closed subsets of a metric space has a choice function, then so does the family of all non-empty, open subsets of . In addition, we establish that the converse is not provable in ZF.

We also show that the statement ``every subspace of the real line with the standard topology has a choice function for its family of all closed, non-empty subsets" is equivalent to the weak choice form ``every continuum sized family of non-empty subsets of reals has a choice function".