带有破坏性负顾客的Geo/Geo/1/MWV可修排队系统均衡策略研究

本文研究带有破坏性负顾客的离散时间Geo/Geo/1/MWV可修排队系统的顾客策略行为.当破坏性负顾客到达系统时,会移除正在接受服务的正顾客,同时造成服务台故障.服务台一旦发生损坏,会立刻接受维修,修理时间服从几何分布.服务台在工作休假期间会以较低的服务速率对顾客进行服务.我们求得系统的稳态分布,进一步给出服务台不同状态下的均衡进入率以及系统单位时间的社会收益表达式.最后对均衡进入率和均衡社会收益进行了数值分析.     

具有两类平行顾客的M/M/1重试排队系统均衡策略研究

本文研究具有两类平行顾客且服务台可靠的M/M/1重试排队系统的均衡策略.在该排队系统中,两类顾客平行到达,并服从不同参数的负指数分布.当顾客进入系统时,若观察到服务台为空,将立刻开始服务;若观察到服务台处于忙期,则进入重试空间等待重试.在完全可见和几乎可见两种情形下,基于“收益-成本”理论提出合理的效用函数并对两类平行顾客进行均衡分析.此外,建立单位时间的社会收益函数,给出最优社会效益分析.最后运用数值分析直观地表示出随着系统参数的改变,顾客行为策略的变化情况.     

具有两类故障特性的M/M/1排队系统均衡分析

考虑顾客在具有两种故障特性的马尔科夫排队系统中的均衡策略.在该系统中,正常工作的服务台随时都可能发生故障.假设服务台只要发生故障就不再接收新顾客,并且可能出现的故障类型有两种：（1）不完全故障：此类故障发生时,服务台仍有部分服务能力,以较低服务率服务完在场顾客后进行维修;（2）完全故障：此类故障发生时,服务台停滞服务并且立即进行维修,维修结束后重新接收新顾客.顾客到达时为了实现自身利益最大化都有选择是否进队的决策,基于线性“收益-损失”结构函数,分析了顾客在系统信息完全可见和几乎不可见情形下的均衡进队策略,及系统的平均社会收益,并在此基础上,通过一些数值例子展示系统参数对顾客策略行为的影响.     

带有N策略的不可靠重试队列的均衡策略分析

本文提出带有N策略和不可靠服务台且拥有恒定重试率的M/M/1排队系统,并研究了关于它的顾客策略行为和社会最优问题.在服务台前没有等待空间,如果顾客到达时发现服务台处于繁忙状态,则他要么选择加入轨道,要么选择离开系统.当服务台服务完一名顾客以后,他会按照恒定重试率和FCFS原则从轨道中选择重试顾客.当系统变空时,服务台会关闭直到轨道中的顾客数达到给定的阈值.假设顾客到达系统时会根据已知的信息和线性收支结构判断是否加入系统,我们得到了服务台处于不同状态下顾客的均衡到达率,并且发现该系统中到达顾客存在拥挤偏好(FTC)情形和拥挤厌恶(ATC)情形,另外还分析顾客均衡到达率的稳定性.因为得到的社会收益函数过于复杂,我们利用PSO算法得到服务台处于不同状态下顾客的社会最优到达率.最后,通过数值例子说明了系统性能指标的敏感性.     

带有负顾客和启动时间的排队系统最优策略分析

本文考虑带有负顾客和启动时间的排队系统的均衡策略和社会最优问题.负顾客到达时,会使得服务台故障,并且迫使正在接受服务的顾客离开系统.当系统中最后一名顾客的服务完成后,服务台立即关闭.当有新顾客到达时,服务台经历一段随机的启动时间,进而服务顾客.基于线性“收益-成本”结构,本文得到了顾客在几乎不可视和完全不可视两种情形下顾客的均衡进入概率.利用遗传算法得到顾客的最优进入概率.最后,通过数值例子展现了最优进入概率和最优社会福利关于系统参数的敏感性变化,并比较了两种信息水平下的最优社会福利.     

服务台不可靠的重试排队系统均衡分析

本文研究服务台不可靠的M/M/1常数率重试排队系统中顾客的均衡进队策略, 其中服务台在正常工作和空闲状态下以不同的速率发生故障。在该系统中, 服务台前没有等待空间, 如果到达的顾客发现服务台处于空闲状态, 该顾客可占用服务台开始服务。否则, 如果服务台处于忙碌状态, 顾客可以选择留下信息, 使得服务台在空闲时可以按顺序在重试空间中寻找之前留下信息的顾客进行服务。当服务台发生故障时, 正在被服务的顾客会发生丢失, 且系统拒绝新的顾客进入系统。根据系统提供给顾客的不同程度的信息, 研究队长可见和不可见两种信息情形下系统的稳态指标, 以及顾客基于收入-支出函数的均衡进队策略, 并建立单位时间内服务商的收益和社会福利函数。比较发现, 披露队长信息不一定能提高服务商收益和社会福利。     

服务台不可靠的重试排队系统均衡分析

本文研究服务台不可靠的M/M/1常数率重试排队系统中顾客的均衡进队策略, 其中服务台在正常工作和空闲状态下以不同的速率发生故障。在该系统中, 服务台前没有等待空间, 如果到达的顾客发现服务台处于空闲状态, 该顾客可占用服务台开始服务。否则, 如果服务台处于忙碌状态, 顾客可以选择留下信息, 使得服务台在空闲时可以按顺序在重试空间中寻找之前留下信息的顾客进行服务。当服务台发生故障时, 正在被服务的顾客会发生丢失, 且系统拒绝新的顾客进入系统。根据系统提供给顾客的不同程度的信息, 研究队长可见和不可见两种信息情形下系统的稳态指标, 以及顾客基于收入-支出函数的均衡进队策略, 并建立单位时间内服务商的收益和社会福利函数。比较发现, 披露队长信息不一定能提高服务商收益和社会福利。     

具有马尔可夫到达和部分故障的排队系统分析（英文）

研究一个MAP/M/1排队系统,顾客到达为马尔可夫过程,服务时间服从指数分布.该系统的服务台在任何时间点上都可能发生故障.当系统故障时,服务台以一种较低的速率运行而不是完全停止服务.利用矩阵几何理论,给出了系统的稳态性能指标,并做了数值例子.     

可修排队系统 E_m/G(M/H)/1的瞬态解

在现有的几篇可修排队系统文献中,都假定了顾客到达(间隔)时间服从指数分布。本文则首次研究了顾客到达时间服从Erlang分布的可修排队系统。我们研究的可修排队系统Em/G(M/H)/1,其已知的参数如下: (1)顾客到达时间分布是m阶、率为λ的Erlang分布; (2)顾客服务时间分布是一般连续型分布G(t),具有有限均值1/μ; (3)服务台的寿命分布(或称失效分布)是失效率为α的指数分布; (4)服务台的维修分布是一般连续型分布H(t),具有有限均值1/β。通过形成一个向量马尔可夫过程,即采用补充变量方法,我们导出了该系统所有感兴趣的指标。定理1 系统能达到稳定平衡的充要条件是     

具有两类平行顾客的不完全故障排队系统均衡分析

考虑了具有两类平行顾客,系统服务器不完全可靠且带延迟维修特性的排队系统中顾客的均衡策略行为.在该排队系统中,顾客的到达类型有两种,到达过程相互独立且分别服从不同的负指数分布.系统服务器不完全可靠,系统发生故障时,不再接受顾客,以较低的服务率服务完在场顾客后进行维修,直到恢复正常工作.假定顾客到达时为了实现自身利益的最大化都有选择进入和止步的决策,在系统信息完全可见和几乎可见两种情形下,文章分析了两类平行到达顾客的均衡止步策略和系统的平均社会收益,并在此基础上,通过一些数值例子展示系统参数对顾客策略行为的影响.     

Equilibrium pricing in an M/G/1 retrial queue with reserved idle time and setup time

Power consumption is a ubiquitous and challenging problem in modern society. To save energy, one should turn off an idle device which still consumes about 60% of its peak consumption and switch it on again when some jobs arrive. However, it is not tolerate for delay sensitive applications. Therefore, there is a trade-off between power consumption and delay performance. In this paper we study an M/G/1 retrial queueing system with setup times in which the server keeps idle for a reserved idle time after completion of a service. If there are arrivals during this reserved idle time, these customers can be served immediately. Otherwise, the server will be turned off for saving energy until a new customer comes to activate the server. The setup time follows an exponential distribution. Based on the reward-cost function and the expected payoff, all customers will make decisions on whether to join or balk the system upon arrival. Given these strategic behaviors we study the optimal pricing strategies from the perspective of the server and social planner, respectively. The optimization of the reserved idle time for maximizing the server’s profit is also studied. Finally, numerical experiments are presented to illustrate the impact of system parameters on the customers’ equilibrium behavior and profit maximization solutions.     

N-策略休假排队系统中异质信息顾客策略分析

本文研究N-策略休假M/M/1排队系统中的异质信息顾客策略和社会最优收益。来到系统的顾客分为两类,第一类顾客有系统信息,加入系统前知道服务员的状态和系统中顾客数;第二类顾客没有系统信息,加入系统前既不知道服务员的状态,也不知道系统中顾客数。利用粒子群优化算法,分析了两类顾客的最优策略行为和最优社会收益。结果表明,最优社会收益随着转换门限N的增大而减小,随着v和系统负载p的增大而增大。并且,第一类顾客的比例越大,社会收益越大。     

Equilibrium threshold strategies in observable queueing systems with setup/closedown times

This paper considers two types of setup/closedown policies: interruptible and insusceptible setup/closedown policies. When all customers are served exhaustively in a system under the interruptible setup/closedown policy, the server shuts down (deactivates) by a closedown time. When the server reactivates since shutdown, he needs a setup time before providing service again. If a customer arrives during a closedown time, the service is immediately started without a setup time. However, in a system under the insusceptible setup/closedown policy, customers arriving in a closedown time can not be served until the following setup time finishes. For the systems with interruptible setup/closedown times, we assume both the fully and almost observable cases, then derive equilibrium threshold strategies for the customers and analyze the stationary behavior of the systems. On the other hand, for the systems with insusceptible setup/closedown times, we only consider the fully observable case. We also illustrate the equilibrium thresholds and the social benefits for systems via numerical experiments. As far as we know, there is no work concerning equilibrium behavior of customers in queueing systems with setup/closedown times.     

Customer equilibrium and optimal pricing in an M/G/1 queue with heterogeneous rewards and waiting cost rates

We consider an unobservable M/G/1 queue in which customers are allowed to join or balk upon arrival. The service provider charges the same admission fee to all joining customers. All joining customers receive a reward from completion of service and incur a waiting cost. The reward and waiting cost rate are random, however the customers know their own values upon arrival. We characterize the customer’s equilibrium strategy and the optimal prices associated with profit and social welfare maximization.     

具有负顾客到达的M/G/1可修排队系统

本文考虑一个具有负顾客到达的M／G／1可修捧队系统．所有顾客(包括正顾客和负顾客)的到达都是泊松过程,服务器是可修的．Harrison和Pitel研究过具有负顾客到达的M／G／1捧队系统．这里我们推广到有可修服务器情形,系统的稳态解最后可以通过Fredholm积分方程解出．     

Strategic behavior and social optimization in Markovian vacation queues: The case of heterogeneous customers

We consider a single server queueing system in which service shuts down when no customers are present, and is resumed when the queue length reaches a given critical length. We assume customers are heterogeneous on delay sensitivity and analyze customers’ strategic response to this mechanism and compare it to the overall optimal behavior. We provide algorithms to compute the equilibrium arrival rates and also derive the monotonicity of equilibrium and optimal arrival rates. We show that there may exist multiple equilibria in such a system and the optimal arrival rate may be larger or smaller than the decentralized equilibrium one.     

On a BMAP/G/1 G-queue with setup times and multiple vacations

In this paper, we consider a BMAP/G/1 G-queue with setup times and multiple vacations. Arrivals of positive customers and negative customers follow a batch Markovian arrival process (BMAP) and Markovian arrival process (MAP) respectively. The arrival of a negative customer removes all the customers in the system when the server is working. The server leaves for a vacation as soon as the system empties and is allowed to take repeated (multiple) vacations. By using the supplementary variables method and the censoring technique, we obtain the queue length distributions. We also obtain the mean of the busy period based on the renewal theory.     

The effect of different arrival rates on the N-policy of M/G/1 with server setup

It is very important in many real-life systems to decide when the server should start his service because frequent setups inevitably make the operating cost too high. Furthermore, today's systems are too intelligent for the input to be assumed as a simple homogenous Poisson process. In this paper, an M/G/1 queue with general server setup time under a control policy is studied. We consider the case when the arrival rate varies according to the server's status: idle, setup and busy states. We derive the distribution function of the steady-state queue length, as well as the Laplace–Stieltjes transform of waiting time. For this model, the optimal N-value from which the server starts his setup is found by minimizing the total operation cost of the system. We finally investigate the behavior of system operation cost and the optimal N for various arrival rates by a numerical study.