DEA-based predictors for estimating fleet size changes when modelling the introduction of rights-based management

The introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) into a fishery is going to change not only the amount of catch a fleet can take, but often also changes the fleet structure, particularly if total allowable catches are decreased. This can have an impact on the economic, social and environmental outcomes of fisheries management. Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) modelling approaches are recognised as the most appropriate method for assessing impacts of management, but these require information as to how fleets may change under different management systems. In this study, we test the applicability of data envelopment analysis (DEA) based performance measures as predictors of how a fishing fleet might change under the introduction of ITQs and also at different levels of quota. In particular, we test the assumption that technical efficiency and capacity utilisation are suitable predictors of which boats are likely to exit the fishery. We also consider scale efficiency as an alternative predictor. We apply the analysis to the Torres Strait tropical rock lobster fishery that is transitioning to an ITQ-based management system for one sector of the fishery. The results indicate that capacity utilisation, technical efficiency and scale efficiency are reasonable indicators of who may remain in the fishery post ITQs. We find that the use of these measures to estimate the impacts of lower quota levels provides consistent fleet size estimates at the aggregate level, but which individual vessels are predicted to exit is dependent on the measure used.     

Individual transferable vessel quotas and efficient restructuring of the primary harvesting sector

Over the last three decades most of the world's fisheries have been subject to management programs that have tried to limit the use of key fishing inputs. Inevitably, these restrictions have proven ineffective at preventing rent dissipation and stock depletion. More noteworthy is that fishers have subverted the intentions of these restrictions by adjusting the primary harvesting technology. This has led to an inefficient industrial structure characterized by capital stuffing on the part of each vessel, excess employment, an inefficient mix of vessels in the fleet, and too many vessels altogether.A promising means of encouraging more efficient primary harvesting is the individual transferable vessel quota that allocates a given catch to each vessel, thereby giving an incentive to catch the quota at least cost. This paper examines efficiency gains and potential industry restructuring from the introduction of an ITVQ into a fishery that was previously subject to input restrictions.Using data from the British Columbia salmon fishery, this paper estimates restricted cost functions for each of four different vessel types and simulates the operations of a market for ITVQs. The demand for quota comes from individual vessels and is found by differentiating the cost function with respect to the shadow price of quota. The market for quota is in equilibrium when the total demand for quota is equal to the fixed supply of quota set by the government. This implicitly defines the equilibrium quota rental price. Results show that the ITVQ could generate unit rental prices for quota between 31 and 93 cents per pound (18–53% of the average landed price).Using this simulated price, each vessel's costminimizing strategy is defined and both low cost vessels (those that will buy quota) and high cost vessels (those that will sell quota and exit the fishery) are identified. Quota trades between the two groups result in efficiency gains. These include reduced capital stuffing, exit of less efficient vessel types, attainment of economies of scale, and an efficient composition of vessel types in the fleet. In aggregate these gains lead to an estimate of annual resource rent that is approximately equal to one third of the value of the catch.     

INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS AND PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES IN A FISHERY

This paper determines the conditions under which an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system will cause fishermen to engage in cost-decreasing, rather than cost-increasing, competition. If there are production externalities (e.g., congestion or stock externalities) present, the market price of a quota will not be fully reflected in these externalities. Thus, fishermen will not fully internalize the externalities in their effort decisions. Even if there are no production externalities, an individual fisherman imposes costs on others under open access by removing a fish that was available to all fishermen. An ITQ system allows the individual who values that fish most to obtain the right to harvest the fish, so each fisherman must internalize the full social cost. Thus, an ITQ system is capable of solving the common property externality but not the production externalities in a fishery.     

AN ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION FROM LIMITED ENTRY TO TRANSFERABLE QUOTA: NON-MARSHALLIAN PRINCIPLES FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Static analysis shows that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can dramatically increase economic efficiency comparable to a limited entry (LE) management by releasing excess capital. However, the transition from LE to ITQ management presents further efficiency questions. This paper shows that the rate of retirement of excess capital is determined by the opportunity cost of holding ITQ harvest rights on cost inefficient vessels. While restructuring is immediate with perfect foresight, delayed exit occurs with uncertainty and low opportunity costs of holding ITQ. Nearly cost-efficient fishers anticipate increasing their payoff by waiting for higher ITQ prices, e.g., game theoretic principles rather than static Marshallian principles apply. The results raise policy questions about allocating ITQ to incumbent fishers at no charge. The Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery which switched from LE to ITQ management in 1990 is analyzed as a case study. Results show that a large surplus was possible but unattained under LE management but also that adjustment has been slow and costly, consistent with the results of this paper.     

Regional economic impacts of fish resources utilization from the Barents Sea: Trade-offs between economic rent,employment and income

A multi-objective programming model has been developed to investigate the trade-offs among regional employment, regional income, and economic rent of the North Norwegian cod fisheries in the Barents Sea, where all vessels are regulated by an individual quota system. Fishery managers are confronted with the problem on how best to allocate the total allowable catch (TAC) among four vessel groups. It is apparent that depending on how fishery managers view the importance of each objective, the desirable allocation of TAC will differ. Therefore, the trade-offs information can be very useful to fishery managers indicating the relative “expensiveness” of trading one objective with another. Decision maps are generated depicting how the trade-offs between two objectives are affected by the third objective. Compromise solutions taking into account all three objectives will allocate the TAC to satisfy the maximum capacity of both the factory trawlers and the small-scale vessels with the remaining TAC distributed to the coastal fleet and fresh fish trawlers.     

THE VALUE OF SHORT‐RUN CLIMATE FORECASTS IN MANAGING THE COASTAL COHO SALMON (ONCORHYNCHUS KISUTCH) FISHERY IN WASHINGTON STATE

ABSTRACT. . In recent years our understanding of the intricate connections between climate variability, marine and freshwater environmental conditions and the responses of fish stocks has improved considerably. With predictable relationships between the environment and stock abundance, fishery managers should be able to forecast variation in stock survival and recruitment. Such forecasts present an opportunity for increasing the economic value of fisheries and for achieving other management objectives, such as stock conservation and maintenance of population diversity. After describing a 4‐step framework for addressing the question ‘What is a forecast worth?’ in a fishery decision‐making context, we introduce the management system for Washington's coastal coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) fishery. Then we apply the 4‐step framework to estimate the value of improved run size forecasts in the annual harvest management of coho salmon in Washington State. Our principal analytical tool is a stochastic simulation model that incorporates the main characteristics of the fishery. The paper concludes with a discussion of opportunities and constraints to the use of climate‐based forecasts in fishery management on various spatial and temporal scales, and we consider the challenges associated with forecasting variations in fish stock size caused by shifts in climate and related ocean conditions.     

EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF EXPECTED RETURNS FROM RESEARCH ON STOCK STRUCTURE FOR DETERMINATION OF TOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCH

An approach to incorporating new information using Bayes' theorem is applied to obtain estimates of expected returns from research on stock structure for determination of total allowable catch (TAC). Expected returns are measured relative to quantitative performance criteria that are inferred from fishery management objectives. Principles of the approach are outlined and a detailed case study of Tasmanian orange roughy is reported.     

THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON A STOCHASTIC,SPATIALLY DISTRIBUTED FISHERY

ABSTRACT. Survival rates and carrying capacities in a fishery may be strongly affected by variations in climatic factors. When the stock is under the control of a single manager, information about the stochastic growth parameters leads to improved economic returns. However, when the stock is transboundary, additional information concerning the stochastic parameters can lead to over harvesting and in turn to lower economic returns. When the harvests are taken sequentially by more than one fleet, additional information will benefit the first harvester while harming those who follow.     

IN-SEASON FISHERY MANAGEMENT: A BAYESIAN MODEL

A Bayesian model is presented for optimizing harvest rates on an uncertain resource stock during the course of a fishing season. Pre-season stock status information, in the form of a “prior” probability distribution, is updated using new data obtained through the operation of the fishery, and harvest rates are chosen to achieve a balance between conservation concerns and fishing interests. A series of fishery scenarios are considered, determined by the stock size distribution and the timing distribution; the uncertainty in the fish stock is seen to have a rather complex influence on optimal harvest rates. The model is applied to a specific example, the Skeena River sockeye salmon fishery.     

INFERRING A BIOPOLITICAL CONSENSUS VIEW OF STOCHASTIC DYNAMICS FOR MANAGEMENT OF A TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERY

ABSTRACT. Management of trans‐boundary fisheries is a complicated problem with biological, legal, economic and political implications. We propose a simple stochastic differential‐equation model to describe a biopolitical consensus view of fish stock dynamics. Estimates of the drift and diffusion terms of three stochastic differential equations are obtained using data from the southern bluefin tuna (SBT) fishery with a method based on the Kolmogorov‐Smirnov statistic. We refer to these estimated equations as alternative biopolitical consensus views of SBT stock dynamics. Each of these is used to generate a time series of optimal harvest that achieves the objective of maximizing the present value of expected fishery returns. These time series of optimal harvests are then compared to actual harvests for the period 1981 1997.     

THE INCOMPLETE‐INFORMATION SPLIT‐STREAM FISH WAR: EXAMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMPETING RISKS

ABSTRACT. . It is now widely recognized that climactic regime shifts, which aperiodically alter a harvested fish stock's biomass and spatial distribution, may lead to distorted fisheries management decisions which negatively impact the fishery, both biologically and economically. This is particularly true for trans‐boundary migratory stocks, where optimal management relies on coordination among independent nation‐states. Unanticipated changes in stock distribution and abundance can upset expectations of national authorities, leading them to sanction inappropriate harvesting levels by their separately managed fleets targeting the same breeding fish stock. Our theoretical studies are based on a spatially‐distributed stochastic model, which we have called the “split‐stream model,‘ where two separately managed fleets harvest simultaneously at two separate sites. Our key assumption is that competing fleet managers, when harvesting noncooperatively, hold incomplete and asymmetric private information of current stock recruitment and spatial distribution. When subsequently negotiating to coordinate their harvests, they agree that they will share their information and then bargain over partition of the gains from their cooperation. This bargaining process takes into account the fleet's relative competitive strengths, particularly due to private information asymmetries. In this present article we introduce a more complex information structure than had been assumed in our earlier work (McKelvey and Golubtsov [2002], McKelvey, Miller and Golubtsov [2003], Mckelvey et al. [2004]). Specifically, both stock‐growth and stock‐split parameters vary stochastically and asynchronously. Thus, when harvesting noncooperatively, each fleet may possess private knowledge which is unavailable to the other. We examine the interplay of the harvesting game's information structure with other fishery characteristics, such as the fleets' economics and operating characteristics and their attitudes toward risk, to determine the implications of such structure for the outcome of the harvesting game. All of these changes are made to capture new conceptual phenomena and expand the range of applicability of the model.     

AN INDICATOR FOR ECOSYSTEM EXTERNALITIES IN FISHING

Ecosystem externalities arise when one use of an ecosystem affects its other uses through the production functions of the ecosystem. We use simulations with a size‐spectrum ecosystem model to investigate the ecosystem externality created by fishing of multiple species. The model is based upon general ecological principles and is calibrated to the North Sea. Two fleets are considered: a “forage fish” fleet targeting species that mature at small sizes and a “large fish” fleet targeting large piscivorous species. Based on the marginal analysis of the present value of the rent, we develop a benefit indicator that explicitly divides the consequences of fishing into internal and external benefits. This analysis demonstrates that the forage fish fleet has a notable economic impact on the large fish fleet, but the reverse is not true. The impact can be either negative or positive, which entails that for optimal economic exploitation, the forage fishery has to be adjusted according to the large fish fishery. With the present large fish fishery in the North Sea, the two fisheries are well adjusted; however, the present combined exploitation level is too high to achieve optimal economic rents.     

AN INDIVIDUAL-BASED FISHERY MODEL AND ASSESSING FISHERY STABILITY

ABSTRACT. The stability of a fishery system was investigated using two forms of a stochastic computer simulation model that was individually based in terms of the fishing boats. Fish catch was partitioned among boats according to two catch processes: an unranked process in which all boats had equal ability to catch fish and a ranked catch model in which a boat's ability to catch fish depended on its wealth. Stock size, total catch, fleet size and individual boat wealth were modeled over a series of years. In the unranked catch model the fish stock size and fleet size were significantly more variable than in the ranked catch model.     

FISHERY SHARE SYSTEMS,ITQ MARKETS,AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF RENTS

Although, in most commercial fisheries, fishing crews are remunerated under a share system, the implications of share systems for individual transferable quotas markets have received relatively little attention. In this paper, we model the impact of extending crew shares of vessel operating costs to include payments for quota. Allocative efficiency is maintained as long as any share system is adopted consistently across the entire fleet. Making crews bear a share of quota costs, however, simply inflates the quota price: at market equilibrium the vessel owner's profit share is unaffected. Crews lose out if the vessel is leasing quota in, but gain if the vessel owner is a net seller of quota. We also consider the outcome if only net purchasers of quota involve crews in the cost of quota. Here, all vessel owners benefit, while all crews see a reduction in their earnings. These results are illustrated with a simple numerical example.     

Open access fisheries utilization with an endogenous regulatory structure: An expanded analysis

The paper expands the Homans/Wilen model of endogenous fisheries management by providing a more general dynamic formulation, by introducing a disaggregated vessel level analysis, by comparing three different strategies to achieve the target harvest level, and by considering the possibility of political intervention in setting target harvest levels based on the economic conditions of participants. It is demonstrated that using different regulations to support the same total harvest program will cause the fishery to behave differently with respect to the shape of the time path, equilibrium fleet size, season length, vessel daily output level, and in some cases the possibility of achieving an equilibrium. Also, political intervention to relax total harvest levels will change the time path and can change the equilibrium.     

Optimal harvesting in a predator-prey model with Allee effect and sigmoid functional response

This work deals with the determination of the optimal harvest policy in an open access fishery in which both prey and predator species are subjected to non-selective harvesting.The model is described by autonomous ordinary differential equation systems, the functional response of the predators is Holling type III and the prey growth is affected by the Allee effect. The catch-rate functions are based on the catch per unit effort (CPUE) or Schaefer’s hypothesis.The problem of determining the optimal harvest policy is solved by using Pontryagin’s maximal principle. The problem here studied is to maximize a cost function representing the present value of a continuous time-stream of revenue of the fishery.     

DO ACCURATE STOCK ESTIMATES INCREASE HARVEST AND REDUCE VARIABILITY IN FISHERIES YIELDS?

Abstract Fisheries managers normally make decisions based on stock abundance estimates subject to process, observation, and model uncertainties. Considerable effort is invested in gathering information about stock size to decrease these uncertainties. However, few studies have evaluated benefits from collecting such information in terms of yield and stability of annual harvest. Here, we develop a strategic age‐structured population model for a long‐lived fish with stochastic recruitment, resembling the Norwegian spring‐spawning herring (NSSH, Clupea harengus L.). We evaluate how uncertainties in population estimates influence annual yield, spawning stock biomass (SSB), and variation in annual harvest, using both the proportional threshold harvesting (PTH) and the current harvest control rule for NSSH as harvest strategies. Results show that the consequences of a biased estimate are sensitive to the harvest strategy employed. If the harvest strategy is suitably chosen, the benefits of accurate information are low, and less information about the stock is necessary to maintain high average yield. Reduced harvest intensity effectively removes the need for accurate stock estimates. PTH (a variant of the constant escapement strategy) with low harvest ratio and the current NSSH harvest control rule both provide remarkable stability in yield and SSB. However, decreased uncertainty will often decrease year‐to‐year variation in harvest and the frequency of fishing moratoria.     

THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT STRATEGIC VARIABLES IN NONCOOPERATIVE FISHERIES GAMES

Abstract In this paper, we use stock size, harvest quantity, and fishing effort as strategic variables. We model a two‐agent noncooperative fishery game, where the agents (nations) harvest a common fish stock. The planning horizon is infinite. The model is solved successively using one instrument at a time as the strategic variable in the game. The net present values of fishing and the escapement stock level from the three different models are compared to show how the choice of variables affects the results. The choice of strategic variable is not a trivial one, as the results are shown to be sensitive to the discounting, the stock's rate of growth, and the assumptions about the distribution of the fish in response to harvesting.     

BIOECONOMIC MODEL OF EASTERN BALTIC COD UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF NUTRIENT ENRICHMENT

Abstract The objective of this paper is to study the economic management of Eastern Baltic cod (Gadus morhua) under the influence of nutrient enrichment. Average nitrogen concentration in the spawning areas during the spawning season of cod stock is chosen to be an indicator of nutrient enrichment. The optimal cod stock is defined using a dynamic bioeconomic model for the cod fisheries. The results show that the current stock level is about half of the estimated optimal stock level and that the current total allowable catch (TAC) is about one‐fourth of the optimal equilibrium yield. The results also indicate that the benefit from a reduction in nitrogen very much depends on the harvest policies. If the TAC is set equal to the optimal equilibrium yield, the benefit of a nitrogen reduction from the 2009 level to the optimal nitrogen level would be about 604 million DKK over a 10‐year time horizon, given a discount rate of 4% per year. However, if a recovery management plan is chosen, the benefit would only be about 49 million DKK over a 10‐year time horizon.     

Dynamic Harvesting Under Imperfect Catch Control

We analyze the optimal harvesting rule of a monopolist in a managed single-species fishery environment where we allow the fishery control to be imperfect. The monopolist’s control action consists of legal and illegal actions. Illegal actions might be detected at random times, in which case the monopolist is subject to a deterrence scheme in line with the Common Fishery Policy implemented by the European Union. We show that the introduction of the management policy, together with the inability of the regulator to perfectly monitor fishing activities, creates an incentive to harvest not only beyond the allowed quota, but also beyond the harvest in an unregulated but otherwise equal situation. This effect is particularly pronounced at lower levels of the legal quota. We also show that, if the monopolist is sufficiently impatient, over-harvesting with severe depletion of the resource might even occur under a reinforced deterrence scheme that considers the permanent withdrawal of the fishing license.