Cooperative dynamics of snowdrift game on spatial distance-dependent small-world networks

We investigate the evolution of cooperative behaviors of small-world networking agents in a snowdrift game mode, where two agents (nodes) are connected with probability depending on their spatial Euclidean lattice distance in the power-law form controlled by an exponent α. Extensive numerical simulations indicate that the game dynamics crucially depends on the spatial topological structure of underlying networks with different values of the exponent α. Especially, in the distance-independent case of α=0, the small-world connectivity pattern contributes to an enhancement of cooperation compared with that in regular lattices, even for the case of having a high cost-to-benefit ratio r. However, with the increment of α>0, when r≥0.4, the spatial distance-dependent small-world (SDSW) structure tends to inhibit the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game.     

Statistical analysis of discrimination games

The hypothesis that meanings originate from discrimination tasks, in which an individual attempts to categorize N objects using a set of M sensory channels, is examined within a quantitative statistical perspective. Failure in discrimination triggers the refinement of a randomly-chosen sensory channel, starting thus an ongoing process, termed discrimination game, that ends only when all objects are differentiated. We show that the expected number of trials of a discrimination game diverges in the case of a single channel and scales with the power N^2/M for M ≥2.     

Promoting cooperation in social dilemmas via simple coevolutionary rules

We study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations within popular models of social dilemmas, whereby simple coevolutionary rules are introduced that may enhance players abilities to enforce their strategy on the opponent. Coevolution thus here refers to an evolutionary process affecting the teaching activity of players that accompanies the evolution of their strategies. Particularly, we increase the teaching activity of a player after it has successfully reproduced, yet we do so depending on the disseminated strategy. We separately consider coevolution affecting either only the cooperators or only the defectors, and show that both options promote cooperation irrespective of the applied game. Opposite to intuitive reasoning, however, we reveal that the coevolutionary promotion of players spreading defection is, in the long run, more beneficial for cooperation than the likewise promotion of cooperators. We explain the contradictive impact of the two considered coevolutionary rules by examining the differences between resulting heterogeneities that segregate participating players, and furthermore, demonstrate that the influential individuals completely determine the final outcome of the games. Our findings are immune to changes defining the type of considered social dilemmas and highlight that the heterogeneity of players, resulting in a positive feedback mechanism, is a fundamental property promoting cooperation in groups of selfish individuals.     

Dynamics of congestion transition triggered by multiple walkers on complex networks

The congestion transition triggered by multiple walkers walking along the shortest path on complex networks is numerically investigated. These networks are composed of nodes that have a finite capacity in analogy to the buffer memory of a computer. It is found that a transition from free-flow phase to congestion phase occurs at a critical walker density f_c, which varies for complex networks with different topological structures. The dynamic pictures of congestion for networks with different topological structures show that congestion on scale-free networks is a percolation process of congestion clusters, while the dynamics of congestion transition on non-scale-free networks is mainly a process of nucleation.     

Mapping dynamical systems onto complex networks

The objective of this study is to design a procedure to characterize chaotic dynamical systems, in which they are mapped onto a complex network. The nodes represent the regions of space visited by the system, while the edges represent the transitions between these regions. Parameters developed to quantify the properties of complex networks, including those related to higher order neighbourhoods, are used in the analysis. The methodology is tested on the logistic map, focusing on the onset of chaos and chaotic regimes. The corresponding networks were found to have distinct features that are associated with the particular type of dynamics that generated them.     

Characterization of complex networks by higher order neighborhood properties

A concept of higher order neighborhood in complex networks, introduced previously [Phys. Rev. E 73, 046101 (2006)], is systematically explored to investigate larger scale structures in complex networks. The basic idea is to consider each higher order neighborhood as a network in itself, represented by a corresponding adjacency matrix, and to settle a plenty of new parameters in order to obtain a best characterization of the whole network. Usual network indices are then used to evaluate the properties of each neighborhood. The identification of high order neighborhoods is also regarded as intermediary step towards the evaluation of global network properties, like the diameter, average shortest path between node, and network fractal dimension. Results for a large number of typical networks are presented and discussed.     

Growing distributed networks with arbitrary degree distributions

We consider distributed networks, such as peer-to-peer networks, whose structure can be manipulated by adjusting the rules by which vertices enter and leave the network. We focus in particular on degree distributions and show that, with some mild constraints, it is possible by a suitable choice of rules to arrange for the network to have any degree distribution we desire. We also describe a mechanism based on biased random walks by which appropriate rules could be implemented in practice. As an example application, we describe and simulate the construction of a peer-to-peer network optimized to minimize search times and bandwidth requirements.     

Effects of average degree on cooperation in networked evolutionary game

We study effects of average degree on cooperation in the networked prisoner's dilemma game. Typical structures are considered, including random networks, small-world networks and scale-free networks. Simulation results show that the average degree plays a universal role in cooperation occurring on all these networks, that is the density of cooperators peaks at some specific values of the average degree. Moreover, we investigated the average payoff of players through numerical simulations together with theoretical predictions and found that simulation results agree with the predictions. Our work may be helpful in understanding network effects on the evolutionary games.     

Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on weighted scale-free networks

This paper investigates the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on weighted scale-free networks. The weighted networks are generated by adopting Barabási-Albert scale-free network and assigning link weight with w_ij=(k_i×k_j)^β. Simulation results show that the cooperation frequency has a strong dependence on β. The value of β which is associated with the maximal cooperation frequency has been sought out. Moreover, Gini coefficient and Pareto exponent of the system’s wealth distribution are investigated. The inequality of wealth distribution is minimized at β≈−1.     

Influence of different initial distributions on robust cooperation in scale-free networks: A comparative study

We study the evolutionary Prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks, focusing on the influence of different initial distributions for cooperators and defectors on the evolution of cooperation. To address this issue, we consider three types of initial distributions for defectors: uniform distribution at random, occupying the most connected nodes, and occupying the lowest-degree nodes, respectively. It is shown that initial configurations for defectors can crucially influence the cooperation level and the evolution speed of cooperation. Interestingly, the situation where defectors initially occupy the lowest-degree vertices can exhibit the most robust cooperation, compared with two other distributions. That is, the cooperation level is least affected by the initial percentage of defectors. Moreover, in this situation, the whole system evolves fastest to the prevalent cooperation. Besides, we obtain the critical values of initial frequency of defectors above which the extinction of cooperators occurs for the respective initial distributions. Our results might be helpful in explaining the maintenance of high cooperation in scale-free networks.     

Walks on Apollonian networks

We carry out comparative studies of random walks on deterministic Apollonian networks (DANs) and random Apollonian networks (RANs). We perform computer simulations for the mean first-passage time, the average return time, the mean-square displacement, and the network coverage for the unrestricted random walk. The diffusions both on DANs and RANs are proved to be sublinear. The effects of the network structure on the dynamics and the search efficiencies of walks with various strategies are also discussed. Contrary to intuition, it is shown that the self-avoiding random walk, which has been verified as an optimal local search strategy in networks, is not the best strategy for the DANs in the large size limit.     

The backbone of a city

Recent studies have revealed the importance of centrality measures to analyze various spatial factors affecting human life in cities. Here we show how it is possible to extract the backbone of a city by deriving spanning trees based on edge betweenness and edge information. By using as sample cases the cities of Bologna and San Francisco, we show how the obtained trees are radically different from those based on edge lengths, and allow an extended comprehension of the “skeleton” of most important routes that so much affects pedestrian/vehicular flows, retail commerce vitality, land-use separation, urban crime and collective dynamical behaviours.     

Effect of imitation in evolutionary minority game on small-world networks

The system performance in an evolutionary minority game with imitation on small-world networks is studied. Numerical results show that system performance positively correlates with the clustering coefficients. The domain structure of the agents’ strategies can be used to give a qualitative explanation for it. We also find that the time series of the reduced variance σ²/N could have a phasic evolution from a metastable state (two crowds are formed but the distribution of their probabilities does not peak at p≈0 and p≈1) to a steadystate (the two crowds evolve into a crowd and an anticrowd with the distribution of their probabilities peaking at p≈0 and p≈1).     

Uncertainty of cooperation in random scale-free networks

We study the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game where the players are located on the nodes of a random scale-free network. The prisoner’s dilemma game is a powerful tool and has been used for the study of mutual trust and cooperation among individuals in structured populations. We vary the structure of the network and the payoff values for the game, and show that the specific conditions can greatly influence the outcome of the game. A variety of behaviors are reproduced and the percentage of cooperating agents fluctuates significantly, even in the absence of irrational behavior. For example, the steady state of the game may be a configuration where either cooperators or defectors dominate, while in many cases the solution fluctuates between these two limiting behaviors.     

Large-scale structure of time evolving citation networks

In this paper we examine a number of methods for probing and understanding the large-scale structure of networks that evolve over time. We focus in particular on citation networks, networks of references between documents such as papers, patents, or court cases. We describe three different methods of analysis, one based on an expectation-maximization algorithm, one based on modularity optimization, and one based on eigenvector centrality. Using the network of citations between opinions of the United States Supreme Court as an example, we demonstrate how each of these methods can reveal significant structural divisions in the network and how, ultimately, the combination of all three can help us develop a coherent overall picture of the network's shape.     

Evolving pseudofractal networks

We present a family of scale-free network model consisting of cliques, which is established by a simple recursive algorithm. We investigate the networks both analytically and numerically. The obtained analytical solutions show that the networks follow a power-law degree distribution, with degree exponent continuously tuned between 2 and 3. The exact expression of clustering coefficient is also provided for the networks. Furthermore, the investigation of the average path length reveals that the networks possess small-world feature. Interestingly, we find that a special case of our model can be mapped into the Yule process.     

The $-game

We propose a payoff function extending Minority Games (MG) that captures the competition between agents to make money. In contrast with previous MG, the best strategies are not always targeting the minority but are shifting opportunistically between the minority and the majority. The emergent properties of the price dynamics and of the wealth of agents are strikingly different from those found in MG. As the memory of agents is increased, we find a phase transition between a self-sustained speculative phase in which a “stubborn majority” of agents effectively collaborate to arbitrage a market-maker for their mutual benefit and a phase where the market-maker always arbitrages the agents. A subset of agents exhibit a sustained non-equilibrium risk-return profile. Received 5 June 2002 / Received in final form 21 November 2002 Published online 27 January 2003 RID="a" ID="a"e-mail: sornette@unice.fr RID="b" ID="b"CNRS UMR7536 RID="c" ID="c"CNRS UMR6622     

Evolution of cooperation in well-mixed N-person snowdrift games

We study the time evolution of cooperation in a recently proposed N-person evolutionary snowdrift game, by focusing on the details of the evolutionary dynamics. It is found that the analytic solution for the equilibrium fraction of cooperators as given previously by the replicator dynamics stems from a balance between the terms: the cost to contribute to a common task and the risk in refusing to participate in a common task. Analytic expressions for these two terms are given, and their magnitudes are studied over the whole range of parameter space. Away from equilibrium, it is the imbalance between these terms that drives the system to equilibrium. A continuous time first-order differential equation for the degree of cooperation is derived, for arbitrary interacting group size N and cost-to-benefit ratio. Analytic solutions to the time evolution of cooperation for the cases of N=2 and N=3 are obtained, with results in good agreement with those obtained by numerical simulations. For arbitrary N, numerical solutions to the equation give the time evolution of cooperation, with the long time limit giving the equilibrium fraction of cooperators.     

Analyzing and modeling real-world phenomena with complex networks: a survey of applications

The success of new scientific areas can be assessed by their potential in contributing to new theoretical approaches and in applications to real-world problems. Complex networks have fared extremely well in both of these aspects, with their sound theoretical basis being developed over the years and with a variety of applications. In this survey, we analyze the applications of complex networks to real-world problems and data, with emphasis in representation, analysis and modeling. A diversity of phenomena are surveyed, which may be classified into no less than 11 areas, providing a clear indication of the impact of the field of complex networks.     

Evolutionary ultimatum game on complex networks under incomplete information

This paper studies the evolutionary ultimatum game on networks when agents have incomplete information about the strategies of their neighborhood agents. Our model assumes that agents may initially display low fairness behavior, and therefore, may have to learn and develop their own strategies in this unknown environment. The Genetic Algorithm Learning Classifier System (GALCS) is used in the model as the agent strategy learning rule. Aside from the Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world network and its variations, the present paper also extends the spatial ultimatum game to the Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free network. Simulation results show that the fairness level achieved is lower than in situations where agents have complete information about other agents’ strategies. The research results display that fairness behavior will always emerge regardless of the distribution of the initial strategies. If the strategies are randomly distributed on the network, then the long-term agent fairness levels achieved are very close given unchanged learning parameters. Neighborhood size also has little effect on the fairness level attained. The simulation results also imply that WS small-world and BA scale-free networks have different effects on the spatial ultimatum game. In ultimatum game on networks with incomplete information, the WS small-world network and its variations favor the emergence of fairness behavior slightly more than the BA network where agents are heterogeneously structured.