Equilibrium points in specialn-person games

The set of Nash equilibria is computed for some generalized games. It is also studied for a subclass of standardn-person games.The authors acknowledge the support of CONICET (Consejo de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas de la Republica Argentina). The first author acknowledges the support from TWAS (Third World Academy of Sciences), Grant No. 86-33.     

New minimax inequality with applications to existence theorems of equilibrium points

A new minimax inequality is proved on a set which is the union of an increasing sequence of compact convex sets in a topological vector space. As applications, several existence theorems of equilibrium points for different games are obtained.The authors would like to thank the referees for their helpful suggestions.     

N-person differential games governed by infinite-dimensional systems

This paper discussesN-person differential games governed by infinite-dimensional systems. The minimax principle, which is a necessary condition for the existence of open-loop equilibrium strategies, is proved. For linear-quadraticN-person differential games, global necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium strategies are derived.This work was supported by the Science Fund of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Research Foundation of Purdue University.The problems discussed in this paper were proposed by Professor G. Chen, during the author's visit to Pensylvania State University, and were completed at Purdue University. The author would like to thank Professors L. D. Berkovitz and G. Chen for their hospitality.     

A new approach toN-person,nonzero-sum,linear differential games

It is shown that there exist equilibrium strategies forn-person, nonero-sum, linear differential games if the cost to each player is convex. The approach used is believed to be novel, and is based on a theorem of Fan.This research was supported by the National Research Council of Canada under Grant No. A-7790.     

Absorbing set forn-person games

This study tries to modify von Neumann and Morgenstern (vN-M) solution. As with John Harsanyi in 1974, vN-M solution is viewed in a dynamic sense. The final outcome of a game not only depends on the ability of players and standards of behavior of the particular society but also upon which imputation is proposed first. An absorbing property is obtained as a result of modifying the bargaining process of Harsanyi. This modified solution concept maintains the internal stability condition of vN-M solution, and replaces their external stability condition by this absorbing property.

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Zusammenfassung Diese Arbeit zielt auf eine Modifizierung des Begriffs der von Neumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) Lösung. In Anlehnung an John Harsanyi (1974) werden vN-M-Lösungen dynamisch interpretiert. Das endgültige Ergebnis eines Spiels hängt nicht nur von der Fähigkeit der Spieler und den Verhaltensstandards einer bestimmten Gesellschaft ab, sondern auch davon, welche Imputation zunächst vorgeschlagen wird. Durch eine entsprechende Modifizierung des von Harsanyi vorgeschlagenen Verhandlungsprozesses erhält man eine Absorbtionseigenschaft. Das demgemäß modifizierte Lösungskonzept erhält die interne Stabilitätsbedingung der vN-M-Lösung und ersetzt die externe Stabilitätsbedingung durch die Absorbtionseigenschaft.

     

Individual and collective rationality in a dynamic Pareto equilibrium

This paper deals with the problem of establishing the conditions for individual and collective rationality when a set of players cooperate in a Pareto equilibrium. To derive such conditions one follows the approach of the theory of reachability of perturbed systems. Open-loop and closed-loop concepts are discussed and are shown to be nonequivalent.The research of the first author was supported in part by Canada Council Grant No. S-701-491 and has benefited from collaboration with the Laboratoire d'Automatique Théorique de l'Université de Paris VII, Paris, France.     

On constructing games with a convex set of equilibrium strategies

Necessary and sufficient conditions on a convex setC (of strategy pairs) are given for the existence of a 2×n bimatrix game with equilibrium setC. This is done with the use of a geometric-combinatorial solution method for 2×n bimatrix games.

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Zusammenfassung Es werden notwendige und hinreichende Bedingungen an die konvexe MengeC der Strategiepaare für die Existenz eines 2×n Bimatrix Spieles mit GleichgewichtsmengeC aufgegeben. Dies wird durch eine geometrisch-kombinatorische Lösungsmethode für 2×n Bimatrix Spiele erreicht.

     

Stabilization through taxation inn-person games

In formulating solutions forn-person cooperative games, the concept of stability has played a dominant role. Although the core concept has the strongest stability, the core of a game is often empty. In this paper, the taxation system is incorporated into our framework, so that a modified solution concept, which enjoys the stability of core, can be developed. Various formulations based on principles such astaxation proportional to income andequity after tax are given.     

Topological degree and number of Nash equilibrium points of bimatrix games

In this paper, using the topological degree, we give a new proof of a well-known result: the number of Nash equilibrium points of a nondegenerate bimatrix game is odd. The calculation of the topological degree allows the localization of the whole set of non-degenerate equilibrium points.     

Existence of minmax points in discontinuous strategic games

In this note we prove the existence of minmax points for strategic form games where the sets of strategies are topological spaces and the payoff functions satisfy conditions weaker than continuity. The employed tools are the class of transfer weakly upper continuous functions and the class of weakly lower pseudocontinuous functions. An example shows that our result is of minimal character.     

A class of trilinear differential games

This paper characterizes a class ofN-person, general sum differential games for which the optimal strategies only depend upon remaining playing time. Such strategies can be easily characterized and determined, and the optimal play can be easily analyzed.We acknowledge the helpful comments of G. Leitmann and an anonymous referee.     

On Nash equilibria inN-person games over reflexive Banach spaces

In this note, an extended version of the Ky Fan inequality is obtained for reflexive Banach spaces. As an application of the result, it is proved that Nash equilibrium points exist under weaker conditions than those of Williams (Ref. 1).     

On generalized equilibrium points

Generalizations of the usual definition of saddle point and equilibrium point are introduced in this paper. The existence of these points is shown to be related to a class of functions that we call perturbed convex functions. First and second order conditions regarding the existence of these points are also proved.     

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria inN-person games over reflexive Banach spaces

Sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of Nash equilibrium points inN-person games when the strategy sets are closed, convex subsets of reflexive Banach spaces. These conditions require that each player's cost functional is convex in that player's strategy, weakly continuous in the strategies of the other players, weakly lower semicontinuous in all strategies, and furthermore satisfies a coercivity condition if any of the strategy sets is unbounded. The result is applied to a class of linear-quadratic differential games with no information, to prove that equilibrium points exist when the duration of these games is sufficiently small.This work was supported by a Commonwealth of Australia, Postgraduate Research Award.     

Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games

We examine a variety of stability and equilibrium definitions that have been used to study the formation of social networks among a group of players. In particular we compare variations on three types of definitions: those based on a pairwise stability notion, those based on the Nash equilibria of a link formation game, and those based on equilibria of a link formation game where transfers are possible.Bloch is also affiliated with the University of Warwick.     

On equilibrium points in bimatrix games

We discuss sensitivity of equilibrium points in bimatrix games depending on small variances (perturbations) of data. Applying implicit function theorem to a linear complementarity problem which is equivalent to the bimatrix game, we investigate sensitivity of equilibrium points with respect to the perturbation of parameters in the game. Namely, we provide the calculation of equilibrium points derivatives with respect to the parameters.     

On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and expost Nash equilibrium

Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable strategy vector implies the existence of an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies that is also expost stable. Through examples we demonstrate the ‘bounds obtained on the approximation’ are tight. The main results of this paper first appeared in University of Warwick Department of Economics Discussion Paper #710. 2004.     

On Nash equilibrium points and games of imperfect information

This paper considers a class of two-player, nonzero-sum games in which the players have only local, as opposed to global, information about the payoff functions. We study various modes of behavior and their relationship to different stability properties of the Nash equilibrium points.     

Chaos in a new fractional-order system without equilibrium points

Chaotic systems without equilibrium points represent an almost unexplored field of research, since they can have neither homoclinic nor heteroclinic orbits and the Shilnikov method cannot be used to demonstrate the presence of chaos. In this paper a new fractional-order chaotic system with no equilibrium points is presented. The proposed system can be considered “elegant” in the sense given by Sprott, since the corresponding system equations contain very few terms and the system parameters have a minimum of digits. When the system order is as low as 2.94, the dynamic behavior is analyzed using the predictor–corrector algorithm and the presence of chaos in the absence of equilibria is validated by applying three different methods. Finally, an example of observer-based synchronization applied to the proposed chaotic fractional-order system is illustrated.