Coherentism,Truth, and Witness Agreement

Coherentists on epistemic justification claim that all justification is inferential, and that beliefs, when justified, get their justification together (not in isolation) as members of a coherent belief system. Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “individual credibility” is needed for “witness agreement” to increase the probability of truth and generate a high probability of truth. It can seem that, from this result in formal epistemology, it follows that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive, that it is not the case that, under the requisite conditions, coherentist justification increases the probability of truth and generates a high probability of truth. I argue that this does not follow.     

The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content

Morphological content is information that is implicitly embodied in the standing structure of a cognitive system and is automatically accommodated during cognitive processing without first becoming explicit in consciousness. We maintain that much belief-formation in human cognition is essentially morphological: i.e., it draws heavily on large amounts of morphological content, and must do so in order to tractably accommodate the holistic evidential relevance of background information possessed by the cognitive agent. We also advocate a form of experiential evidentialism concerning epistemic justification—roughly, the view that the justification-status of an agent’s beliefs is fully determined by the character of the agent’s conscious experience. We have previously defended both the thesis that much belief-formation is essentially morphological, and also a version of evidentialism. Here we explain how experiential evidentialism can be smoothly and plausibly combined with the thesis that much of the cognitive processing that generates justified beliefs is essentially morphological. The leading idea is this: even though epistemically relevant morphological content does not become explicit in consciousness during the process of belief-generation, nevertheless such content does affect the overall character of conscious experience in an epistemically significant way: it is implicit in conscious experience, and is implicitly appreciated by the experiencing agent.     

Explaining modal intuition

The paper defends causal explanationism concerning our modal intuitions and judgments, and, in particular, the following claims. If a causally explainable mirroring or “pre-established harmony” between our mind and modal reality obtains, we are justified in believing it does. We do not hold our modal beliefs compulsively and blindly but with full subjective and objective justification. Therefore, causal explanation of our modal beliefs does not undermine rational trust in them. Explanation and trust support each other. In contrast, anti-explanationists (from Kant, through neo-wittgensteinians to T. Nagel and J. Pust), claim that causal explanation of intuitions and judgments undermines rational trust in them. They especially target causal explanation in terms of pre-established harmony between our mind, shaped by causal processes, and the underlying modal structure of reality. The paper argues against them. The argument builds upon the claim that the appeal to modal facts is indispensable for systematization and explanation of non-modal ones. Therefore, we should assume that modal facts exist and are not disjoint and isolated from actual facts. The modal structure of the universe intervenes in the non-modal reality. Causal processes indirectly carry information about deep modal structure. Any (reasonable candidate) causal explanation of our intuitional modal beliefs should start from this indirect contact with and information about modal facts. Therefore, if our intuitional modal beliefs are true and causally explainable (by a factual, non-modal explanans), they are true in virtue of the deep underlying modal structure. They are sensitive to modal reality and track it. We can come to know this fact, and thus strengthen our spontaneous trust in our modal intuitions.     

Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment

According to a recent view, known as the 'pragmatic encroachment' thesis, an agent’s non-truth-related factors are relevant to the epistemic status of her beliefs. In particular, in addition to truth-related factors, practical factors are said to be relevant to the question whether or not true belief amounts to knowledge. Despite the intuitive appeal of the thesis, however, it is puzzling how practical factors can impact the truth-related factors that ground the epistemic status of one's beliefs. In this paper, I will distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of the way in which practical factors are said to be thus relevant. Their differences are explicated in terms of the nature and the extent to which practical factors are said to impact the epistemic status of one's beliefs. I begin by considering a strong version of the thesis that suggests principles according to which the practical rationality of one's actions is a necessary condition on knowledge and justification. Having noted an inadequacy in the formulation of such principles, the arguments in their support are subsequently stated and criticized. Finally, I identify two modest versions of the thesis of pragmatic encroachment and argue that they, too, fail to explain how practical factors can bear on the epistemic status of one's beliefs.     

Non-Realist Cognitivism,Truth and Objectivity

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that (i) normative judgments are beliefs; (ii) that some normative beliefs are true; (iii) that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and (iv) that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim of this article is to argue that Parfit’s theory is problematic because its defenders have no resources to make sense of the nature of normative truth, which is an essential element of their view. I do this by showing how the traditional theories of truth are not available for the non-realist cognitivists.     

Transvaluationism, common sense and indirect correspondence

The problem of reconciling the philosophical denial of ontological vagueness with common-sense beliefs positing vague objects, properties and relations is addressed. This project arises for any view denying ontological vagueness but is especially pressing for transvaluationism, which claims that ontological vagueness is impossible. The idea that truth, for vague discourse and vague thought-content, is an indirect form of language-thought correspondence is invoked and applied. It is pointed out that supervaluationism provides one way, but not necessarily the only way, of implementing the idea of indirect correspondence.     

Against Phenomenal Conservatism

Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases where, intuitively, they should not be able to do so. I argue that there are cases where a belief that p can behave like an appearance that p and thereby make it seem to one that p.     

Examining epistemic beliefs across conceptual and procedural knowledge in statistics

The purpose of this paper was to examine whether students’ epistemic beliefs differed as a function of variations in procedural versus conceptual knowledge in statistics. Students completed Hofer’s (Contem Edu Psychol 25:378–405, 2000) Discipline-Focused Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire five times over the course of a semester. Differences were explored between students’ initial beliefs about statistics knowledge and their specific beliefs about conceptual knowledge and procedural knowledge in statistics. Results revealed differences across these contexts; students’ beliefs differed between procedural versus conceptual knowledge. Moreover, students’ initial beliefs about statistics knowledge were more similar to their beliefs about conceptual knowledge rather than procedural knowledge. Finally, regression analyses revealed that students’ beliefs about the justification of knowledge, attainability of truth and source of knowledge were significant predictors of examination performance, depending on the examination. These results have important theoretical, methodological and pedagogical implications.     

A Vision Educators Can Put Into Practice: Portraying the Constructivist Classroom as a Cultural System

Constructivist perspectives on learning have helped math and science educators better understand how students make sense of their experiences. Unfortunately, the intuitively appealing explanations of how learners construct knowledge have not been translated into a systematic body of pedagogical methods or a coherent curricular approach. Constructivist teaching is often portrayed in the literature as an alternative to traditional instructional approaches or as a toolbox of pedagogical techniques. These incomplete images do little to help practitioners understand constructivism or how it should be integrated into the life of the classroom. There may, however, be help for teachers in conceptualizing constructivism as a foundation for classroom practice. Recent anthropological investigations of learning have directed attention to the culture of classroom environments and the characteristic norms, beliefs, and practices that participants share in their dealings with one another. This article contends that envisioning the classroom as an articulated system of beliefs and practices not only serves an explanatory function for learning theorists but, more importantly, serves as a heuristic for teachers in conceptualizing constructivism and offers a starting point for teachers in implementing constructivist practices.     

Functionalism about Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction

Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order, domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to an explanatorily idle disjunction of its realization bases. This consequence undermines the alethic functionalists’ non-deflationary ambitions. A plausible response to Kim’s argument fails to carry over to alethic functionalism on account of significant differences between alethic functionalism and psychological functionalism. Lynch’s revised view in his book Truth as One and Many (2009) fails to answer our challenge. The upshot is that, while mental functionalism may survive Kim’s argument, it mortally wounds functionalism about truth.     

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon

In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New Evil Genius thought experiment is incomplete at best. Therefore, as presented, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains.     

Internalism empowered: how to bolster a theory of justification with a direct realist theory of awareness

The debate in the philosophy of perception between direct realists and representationalists should influence the debate in epistemology between internalists and externalists about justification. If direct realists are correct, there are more consciously accessible justifiers for internalists to exploit than externalists think. Internalists can retain their distinctive internalist identity while accepting this widened conception of internalistic justification: even if they welcome the possibility of cognitive access to external facts, their position is still quite distinct from the typical externalist position. To demonstrate this, Alvin Goldman??s critique of internalism is shown to ignore important lessons from the case for direct realism about perception. In particular, it unjustifiably assumes that internalism entails that only facts simultaneous with the justification of a belief can justify the belief. Goldman??s definition of a ??justifier?? is also inconsistent with the overall guidance conception of epistemology he takes for granted in his critique of internalism.     

Reliabilism and Brains in Vats

According to epistemic internalism, the only facts that determine the justificational status of a belief are facts about the subject’s own mental states, like beliefs and experiences. Externalists instead hold that certain external facts, such as facts about the world or the reliability of a belief-producing mechanism, affect a belief’s justificational status. Some internalists argue that considerations about evil demon victims and brains in vats provide excellent reason to reject externalism: because these subjects are placed in epistemically unfavorable settings, externalism seems unable to account for the strong intuition that these subjects’ beliefs are nonetheless justified. I think these considerations do not at all help the internalist cause. I argue that by appealing to the anti-individualistic nature of perception, it can be shown that skeptical scenarios provide no reason to prefer internalism to externalism.     

Elementary theory of factoring trinomials with integer coefficients over the integers

An important component of intermediate and college algebra courses involves teaching students methods to factor a trinomial with integer coefficients over the integers. The aim of this article is to present a theoretical justification of that which is often taught, but really never explained as to why it works. The theory is presented, and a suggestion for an inquiry-based learning project is given.     

The Leibniz’s Law Problem (For Stage Theory)

Stage theorists invoke the idea of counterpart relations to make sense of how objects are able to persist despite their claim that an object is identical with a single instantaneous stage. According to stage theorists, an object persists if and only if it has a later counterpart that bears the appropriate counterpart relation of identity to it. Whilst objects can and do persist, stages cannot and do not. This seems to amount to a refutation of Leibniz’s law. Stage theorists think that the nature of the counterpart relation invoked depends on how it is that the object is referred to. In this paper, I argue that the context sensitivity that they invoke here gives stage theorists a response to the Leibniz’s Law Problem.     

Defending Particularism from Supervenience/Resultance Attack

I take the debate between the particularists and the principlists to be centered on the issue of whether there are true moral principles. One argument the principlists often appeal to in support of their claim that there are true moral principles is the argument from supervenience. Roughly, the argument is made up of the following three statements: (P1) If the thesis of moral supervenience holds, then there are true moral principles. (P2) The thesis of moral supervenience holds. (C) There are true moral principles, and hence particularism is false. In this paper, I argue that the above argument is not sound by attacking (P1). I hold that no general supervenient/resultance base has a robust enough configuration of contextual features as to ground the existence of true moral principles. If I am right about this, I think it would be indicative of a reason to be less confident about the truth of principlism and more confident about the truth of particularism.     

Particularism and the structure of reasons

I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does not support the particularist’s general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles.     

A Blind-Spot Argument Against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief

Dispositionalist accounts of belief define beliefs in terms of specific sets of dispositions. In this article, I provide a blind-spot argument against these accounts. The core idea of the argument is that beliefs having the form [p and it is not manifestly believed that p] cannot be manifestly believed. This means that one cannot manifest such beliefs in one’s assertions, conscious thoughts, actions, behaviours, or any other type of activity. However, if beliefs are sets of dispositions, they must be manifestable in some way. Therefore, according to my argument, beliefs are not sets of dispositions. The argument is defended against some possible objections.     

Bergmann’s Dilemma and Internalism’s Escape

Michael Bergmann has argued that internalist accounts of justification face an insoluble dilemma. This paper begins with an explanation of Bergmann??s dilemma. Next, I review some recent attempts to answer the dilemma, which I argue are insufficient to overcome it. The solution I propose presents an internalist account of justification through direct acquaintance. My thesis is that direct acquaintance can provide subjective epistemic assurance without falling prey to the quagmire of difficulties that Bergmann alleges all internalist accounts of justification cannot surmount.     

Trust and relational capital

Trust can be viewed at the same time as an instrument both for an agent selecting the right partners in order to achieve its own goals, and for an agent of being selected from other potential partners in order to establish with them a cooperation/collaboration and to take advantage from the accumulated trust. In this paper we will analyze trust as the agents’ relational capital. Starting from the classical dependence network with potential partners, we introduce the analysis of what it means for an agent to be trusted and how this condition could be strategically used from it for achieving its own goals, that is, why it represents a form of power. The idea of taking another agent’s point of view is especially important if we consider the amount of studies in social science that connect trust with social capital related issues. Although there is a big interest in literature about ‘social capital’ and its powerful effects on the wellbeing of both societies and individuals, often it is not clear enough what is it the object under analysis. Individual trust capital (relational capital) and collective trust capital not only should be disentangled, but their relations are quite complicated and even conflicting. To overcome this gap, we propose a study that first attempts to understand what trust is as capital of individuals. In which sense “trust” is a capital. How this capital is built, managed and saved. In particular, how this capital is the result of the others’ beliefs and goals. Then we aim to analytically study the cognitive dynamics of this object.