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1.
Sharon R. Ford 《Metaphysica》2012,13(2):195-215
Sydney Shoemaker??s causal theory of properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper, I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar??s criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the causal theory of properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of objects if they are to be deemed genuine rather than ??mere-Cambridge??. The intrinsic criterion requires that all genuine properties and relations be intrinsic. Molnar??s S-property argument says that these criteria conflict if one considers extrinsic spatiotemporal properties and relations to contribute causally. In this paper, I argue that a solution to the contradiction that Molnar identifies involves a denial of discreteness between objects, leading to a power holist perspective and a resulting deflationary account of intrinsicality. 相似文献
2.
Janez Bregant 《Acta Analytica》2004,19(33):83-94
The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental
causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical
and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby
to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and
beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination
of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of
which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are
always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes
them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical
properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as
usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties
are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation
of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept.
Also called The Problem of Causal Exclusion. 相似文献
3.
N. M. L. Nathan 《Acta Analytica》2005,20(3):3-6
Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver.
Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism
invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the
same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal
principle. I suggest that although Direct Realism is in more than one respect implausible, it does not succumb to Robinson’s
argument. The causal principle is true only if ‘proximate cause’ means ‘proximate sufficient cause’, and the Direct Realist
need not concede that there is a sufficient cerebral cause for direct awareness of independent objects. 相似文献
4.
Sven Walter 《Acta Analytica》2005,20(3):32-47
Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation
account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’.
I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose,
viz., defends non-reductive physicalism against Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument according to which non-reductive physicalism is committed to epiphenomenalism because irreducible mental properties are ‘screened
off’ from causal relevance by their physical realizers. Jackson and Pettit’s most promising explication of a program explanation
appeals to the idea of invariance of effect under variation of realization, but I show that invariance of effect under variation of realization is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal relevance. 相似文献
5.
John Davenport 《Acta Analytica》2006,21(4):62-88
Readers familiar with Harry Frankfurt’s argument that we do not need leeway-liberty (or the power to bring about alternative
possible actions or intentions) to be morally responsible will probably also know that the most famous and popular response
on behalf of leeway-libertarianism remains a dilemma posed in similar forms by David Widerker, Robert Kane, and Carl Ginet:
either the agent retains significant residual leeway in Frankfurt-style cases, or these cases beg the question by presupposing
causal determinism. In the last few years, there have been several different attempts to defend Frankfurtian critiques of
PAP in response this dilemma. In a novel approach, Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna present cases in which all deliberatively
relevant or “robust” alternatives are blocked, but the agent’s act or decision is not determined. Pereboom and McKenna argue
that any plausible leeway-condition on responsibility must characterize the required alternatives as robust in two ways: being
voluntary performances and having a practical relevance accessible to the agent’s mind.
I agree with the requirement of robustness, and argue that we can build this notion into a complex concept of agent-possibility,
or “agentive-can.” However, I argue that both McKenna’s and Pereboom’s conceptions of robustness are too demanding: they exclude
alternatives that are intuitively relevant. Moreover, I argue that the alternative of refraining from deciding, or voluntarily
failing to decide, is robust in the right sense. In agreement with a tradition running from Ockham back through Scotus to
Aquinas, I argue that this robust alternative is necessary for responsibility. If the Frankfurt-controller eliminates it,
then the agent’s responsibility is undermined. In particular, I argue that Pereboom’s tax evasion cases do not refute this
leeway-condition on moral responsibility. 相似文献
6.
Jared Bates 《Acta Analytica》2004,19(32):45-64
The basic aim of Alvin Goldman’s approach to epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is naturalistic; that is, epistemological
theories in this tradition aim to identify the naturalistic, nonnormative criteria on which justified belief supervenes (Goldman,
1986; Markie, 1997). The basic method of Goldman’s epistemology, and the tradition it represents, is the reflective equilibrium
test; that is, epistemological theories in this tradition are tested against our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified
belief (Goldman, 1986; Markie, 1997). I will argue that the prospect of having to reject their standard methodology is one
epistemologists have to take very seriously; and I will do this by arguing that some current rival theories of epistemic justification
are in fact in reflective equilibrium with our intuitions about cases of justified and unjustified belief. That is, I will
argue that intuition underdetermines theory choice in epistemology, in much the way that observation underdetermines theory
choices in empirical sciences. If reflective equilibrium leads to the underdetermination problem I say it leads to, then it
cannot satisfy the aims of contemporary epistemology, and so cannot serve as its standard methodology. 相似文献
7.
Javier Kalhat 《Acta Analytica》2011,26(2):115-133
Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility faces the obvious difficulty that not all universals are compatible. In this
paper I develop three objections against Armstrong’s attempt to account for property incompatibilities. First, Armstrong’s account cannot handle incompatibilities holding among properties that are either simple, or that are complex but stand to one another in the relation of overlap rather than in the part/ whole relation. Secondly, at the heart of Armstrong’s account lies a notion of structural universals
which, building on an objection by David Lewis, is shown to be incoherent. I consider and reject two alternative ways of construing
the composition of structural universals in an attempt to meet Lewis’ objection. An important consequence of this is that
all putative structural properties are in fact simple. Finally, I argue that the quasi-mereological account presupposes modality in a way that undermines the reductionist aim
of the combinatorialist theory of which it is a central part. I conclude that Armstrong’ quasi-mereological account of property
incompatibility fails. Without that account, however, Armstrong’s combinatorial theory either fails to get off the ground,
or else must give up its goal of reducing the notion of possibility to something non-modal. 相似文献
8.
D. Bertrand 《Journal of Mathematical Sciences》2012,180(5):542-549
We present a general multiplicity estimate for linear forms in solutions of various types of functional equations, which extends
the zero estimates used in some recent works on the Siegel–Shidlovsky theorem and its q-analogues. We also present a dual version of this estimate, as well as a new interpretation of Siegel’s theorem itself in
terms of periods of Deligne’s irregular Hodge theory. 相似文献
9.
Steffen Borge 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(1):74-84
John Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities of objects has meet resistance. In this paper I bypass the
traditional critiques of the distinction and instead concentrate on two specific counterexamples to the distinction: Killer
yellow and the puzzle of multiple dispositions. One can accommodate these puzzles, I argue, by adopting Thomas Reid’s version
of the primary/secondary quality distinction, where the distinction is founded upon conceptual grounds. The primary/secondary
quality distinction is epistemic rather than metaphysical. A consequence of Reid’s primary/ secondary quality distinction
is that one must deny the original version of Molyneux’s question, while one must affirm an amended version of it. I show
that these two answers to Molyneux’s question are not at odds with current empirical research. 相似文献
10.
Joseph G. Moore 《Acta Analytica》2010,25(1):89-103
The paper is a critical discussion of the rich and insightful final chapter of Mitchell Green’s Self-Expression. There, Green seeks to elucidate the compelling, but inchoate intuition that when we’re fully and most expertly expressing
ourselves, we can ‘push out’ from within not just our inner representations, but also the ways that we feel. I question, first,
whether this type of ‘qualitative expression’ is really distinct from the other expressive forms that Green explores, and
also whether it’s genuinely ‘expressive’. I then scrutinize the nature of the ‘qualitative congruences’ that lie at the heart
of Green’s theory; and I wonder whether they can play the role Green claims they can in providing a novel account of artistic
expression. 相似文献
11.
John Sarnecki 《Acta Analytica》2006,21(3):41-73
The acquisition of concepts has proven especially difficult for philosophers and psychologists to explain. In this paper,
I examine Jerry Fodor’s most recent attempt to explain the acquisition of concepts relative to experiences of their referents.
In reevaluating his earlier position, Fodor attempts to co-opt informational semantics into an account of concept acquisition
that avoids the radical nativism of his earlier views. I argue that Fodor’s attempts ultimately fail to be persuasive. He
must either accept his earlier nativism or adopt a rational causal model of concept acquisition. His animus towards the latter
dictates, in my view, a return to the nativism with which he began. 相似文献
12.
We argue that the epistemic theory of vagueness cannot adequately justify its key tenet-that vague predicates have precisely
bounded extensions, of which we are necessarily ignorant. Nor can the theory adequately account for our ignorance of the truth
values of borderline cases. Furthermore, we argue that Williamson’s promising attempt to explicate our understanding of vague
language on the model of a certain sort of “inexact knowledge” is at best incomplete, since certain forms of vagueness do
not fit Williamson’s model, and in fact fit an alternative model. Finally, we point out that a certain kind of irremediable
inexactitude postulated by physics need not be-and is not commonly-interpreted as epistemic. Thus, there are aspects of contemporary
science that do not accord well with the epistemicist outlook. 相似文献
13.
Janine Jones 《Acta Analytica》2004,19(32):19-43
Given Kripke’s semantic views, a statement, such as ‘Water is H2O’, expresses a necessary a posteriori truth. Yet it seems that we can conceive that this statement could have been false; hence, it appears that we can conceive
impossible states of affairs as holding. Kripke used a de dicto strategy and a de re strategy to address three illusions that arise with respect to necessary a posteriori truths: (1) the illusion that a statement such as ‘Water is H2O’ possibly expresses a falsehood, (2) the illusion that conceivability can fail to latch on to a genuine metaphysical possibility,
and (3) the illusion that one can access a real metaphysical possibility by conceiving that water is not H2O. In this paper I argue that while Kripke’s de dicto strategy dispels (1), his strategies do not enable him to dispel (2) and (3). 相似文献
14.
Matthew Boyle 《Acta Analytica》2010,25(1):9-20
I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’
solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does
not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate
avowals about our own present mental states, but how we can reasonably regard ourselves as entitled to claim self-knowledge. Addressing this aspect of the problem of self-knowledge requires confronting questions about the
metaphysical nature of mental states, questions that Bar-On’s approach seeks to avoid. 相似文献
15.
16.
Javier Kalhat 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(2):161-176
In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes
modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality.
I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular,
I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.
相似文献
Javier KalhatEmail: |
17.
In this paper, we present a new variant of Chebyshev’s method for solving non-linear equations. Analysis of convergence shows
that the new method has sixth-order convergence. Per iteration the new method requires two evaluations of the function, one
of its first derivative and one of its second derivative. Thus the efficiency, in term of function evaluations, of the new
method is better than that of Chebyshev’s method. Numerical examples verifying the theory are given.
相似文献
18.
M. J. Cain 《Acta Analytica》2006,21(1):77-101
In this paper I argue that the most prominent and familiar features of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations generate
a powerful argument for the thesis that most of our concepts are innate, an argument that echoes a Chomskyan poverty of the
stimulus argument. This argument has a significance over and above what it tells us about Wittgenstein’s implicit commitments.
For, it puts considerable pressure on widely held contemporary views of concept learning, such as the view that we learn concepts
by constructing prototypes. This should lead us to abandon our general default hostility to concept nativism and be much more
sceptical of claims made on behalf of learning theories. 相似文献
19.
The article presents a new universal theory of dynamical chaos in nonlinear dissipative systems of differential equations,
including autonomous and nonautonomous ordinary differential equations (ODE), partial differential equations, and delay differential
equations. The theory relies on four remarkable results: Feigenbaum’s period doubling theory for cycles of one-dimensional
unimodal maps, Sharkovskii’s theory of birth of cycles of arbitrary period up to cycle of period three in one-dimensional
unimodal maps, Magnitskii’s theory of rotor singular point in two-dimensional nonautonomous ODE systems, acting as a bridge
between one-dimensional maps and differential equations, and Magnitskii’s theory of homoclinic bifurcation cascade that follows
the Sharkovskii cascade. All the theoretical propositions are rigorously proved and illustrated with numerous analytical examples
and numerical computations, which are presented for all classical chaotic nonlinear dissipative systems of differential equations. 相似文献
20.
Howard Robinson 《Acta Analytica》2005,20(3):7-10
Nicholas Nathan tries to resist the current version of the causal argument for sense-data in two ways. First he suggests that,
on what he considers to be the correct re-construction of the argument, it equivocates on the sense of proximate cause. Second
he defends a form of disjunctivism, by claiming that there might be an extra mechanism involved in producing veridical hallucination,
that is not present in perception. I argue that Nathan’s reconstruction of the argument is not the appropriate one, and that,
properly interpreted, the argument does not equivocate on proximate cause. Furthermore, I claim that his postulation of a
modified mechanism for hallucinations is implausibly ad hoc. 相似文献