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1.
Over the past few decades, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is an inherently unstable position. In his
view, the most serious problem is that non-reductive physicalism leads to type epiphenomenalism—the causal inefficacy of mental
properties. Kim suggests that we can salvage mental causation by endorsing functional reduction. Given the fact that Kim’s
goal in formulating functional reduction is to provide a robust account of mental causation it would be surprising if his
position implies eliminativism about mental properties or leads to a view that is similar to one of the versions of non-reductive
physicalism that he criticizes. We will show that depending on how certain key claims are interpreted, there are reasons for
thinking functional reduction has these implications, in which case either Kim fails to provide a robust account of mental
causation or there is reason to suspect that some of his criticisms of non-reductive physicalism are misguided. 相似文献
2.
Olga Markič 《Acta Analytica》2004,19(33):65-81
In this paper I describe basic features of traditional (British) emergentism and Popper’s emergentist theory of consciousness
and compare them to the contemporary versions of emergentism present in connectionist approach in cognitive sciences. I argue
that despite their similarities, the traditional form, as well as Popper’s theory belong to strong causal emergentism and
yield radically different ontological consequences compared to the weaker, contemporary version present in cognitive science.
Strong causal emergentism denies the causal closure of the physical domain and introduces genuine new mental causal powers
and genuine downward causation, while weak emergentism provides new insights in understanding the mechanisms and explanation
that is compatible with physicalism. 相似文献
3.
Our aim in this paper is to evaluate Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit’s ‘program explanation’ framework as an account of the
autonomy of the special sciences. We argue that this framework can only explain the autonomy of a limited range of special
science explanations. The reason for this limitation is that the framework overlooks a distinction between two kinds of properties,
which we refer to as ‘higher-level’ and ‘higher-order’ properties. The program explanation framework can account for the autonomy
of special science explanations that appeal to higher-level properties but it does not account for the autonomy of most of
those explanations that appeal to higher-order properties. 相似文献
4.
Warren Shrader 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(3):257-271
This paper is an investigation into the nature of physicalism as well as to the possibility of formulating physicalism as
a supervenience thesis. First, I review the motivation for finding a supervenience thesis that characterizes physicalism.
Second, I briefly survey the types of supervenience theses that have been proposed as necessary (or, in some cases, as necessary
and sufficient) for physicalism. Third, I analyze the recent supervenience thesis proposed by Frank Jackson and expounded
upon by Gene Witmer. Jackson claims the supervenience thesis is both necessary and sufficient for physicalism; Witmer has
proposed a different interpretation of one of the Jackson’s key notions and has suggested an amended supervenience thesis
that is, if not sufficient, at least necessary for physicalism. However, I will argue that neither Jackson’s nor Witmer’s
supervenience theses as stated are necessary for physicalism.
相似文献
Warren ShraderEmail: |
5.
G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be
‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true.
Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while
eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a better explanation of the absurdity
both in assertion and in belief that avoids our four objections. 相似文献
6.
Andrew Bailey 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(2):85-103
This paper resurrects two discredited ideas in the philosophy of mind. The first: the idea that perceptual illusion might
have something metaphysically significant to tell us about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The second: that the colours
and other qualities that ‘fill’ our sensory fields are occurrent properties (rather than representations of properties) that
are, nevertheless, to be distinguished from the ‘objective’ properties of things in the external world. Theories of consciousness
must recognize the existence of what Daniel Dennett mockingly labels ‘figment,’ but this result—though metaphysically and
epistemologically significant—is not incompatible with either physicalism or naturalized semantics.
相似文献
Andrew BaileyEmail: |
7.
Janez Bregant 《Acta Analytica》2004,19(33):83-94
The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental
causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical
and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby
to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and
beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination
of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of
which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are
always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes
them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical
properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as
usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties
are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation
of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept.
Also called The Problem of Causal Exclusion. 相似文献
8.
Joseph G. Moore 《Acta Analytica》2010,25(1):89-103
The paper is a critical discussion of the rich and insightful final chapter of Mitchell Green’s Self-Expression. There, Green seeks to elucidate the compelling, but inchoate intuition that when we’re fully and most expertly expressing
ourselves, we can ‘push out’ from within not just our inner representations, but also the ways that we feel. I question, first,
whether this type of ‘qualitative expression’ is really distinct from the other expressive forms that Green explores, and
also whether it’s genuinely ‘expressive’. I then scrutinize the nature of the ‘qualitative congruences’ that lie at the heart
of Green’s theory; and I wonder whether they can play the role Green claims they can in providing a novel account of artistic
expression. 相似文献
9.
We construct irreducible representations of affine Khovanov–Lauda–Rouquier algebras of arbitrary finite type. The irreducible
representations arise as simple heads of appropriate induced modules, and thus our construction is similar to that of Bernstein
and Zelevinsky for affine Hecke algebras of type A. The highest weights of irreducible modules are given by the so-called good words, and the highest weights of the ‘cuspidal
modules’ are given by the good Lyndon words. In a sense, this has been predicted by Leclerc. 相似文献
10.
N. M. L. Nathan 《Acta Analytica》2005,20(3):3-6
Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver.
Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism
invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the
same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal
principle. I suggest that although Direct Realism is in more than one respect implausible, it does not succumb to Robinson’s
argument. The causal principle is true only if ‘proximate cause’ means ‘proximate sufficient cause’, and the Direct Realist
need not concede that there is a sufficient cerebral cause for direct awareness of independent objects. 相似文献
11.
Matthew Boyle 《Acta Analytica》2010,25(1):9-20
I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’
solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does
not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate
avowals about our own present mental states, but how we can reasonably regard ourselves as entitled to claim self-knowledge. Addressing this aspect of the problem of self-knowledge requires confronting questions about the
metaphysical nature of mental states, questions that Bar-On’s approach seeks to avoid. 相似文献
12.
The paper is concerned with the ‘primal’ problem of maximizing a given quadratic pseudo-boolean function. Four equivalent
problems are discussed—the primal, the ‘complementation’, the ‘discrete Rhys LP’ and the ‘weighted stability problem of a
SAM graph’. Each of them has a relaxation—the ‘roof dual’, the ‘quadratic complementation,’ the ‘continuous Rhys LP’ and the
‘fractional weighted stability problem of a SAM graph’. The main result is that the four gaps associated with the four relaxations
are equal. Furthermore, a solution to any of these problems leads at once to solutions of the other three equivalent ones.
The four relaxations can be solved in polynomial time by transforming them to a bipartite maximum flow problem. The optimal
solutions of the ‘roof-dual’ define ‘best’ linear majorantsp(x) off, having the following persistency property: if theith coefficient inp is positive (negative) thenx
i=1 (0) in every optimum of the primal problem. Several characterizations are given for the case where these persistency results
cannot be used to fix any variable of the primal. On the other hand, a class of gap-free functions (properly including the
supermodular ones) is exhibited. 相似文献
13.
Elisabeth Schellekens 《Acta Analytica》2005,20(4):10-23
The principal concern of my paper is a distinction between two ways of appreciating works of art, characterised here in terms
of the phrases ‘seeing is believing’ and ‘believing is seeing’. I examine this distinction in the light of an epistemological
requirement at times at least grounded in what David Davies, in his Art as Performance, refers to as the ‘common sense theory of art appreciation’ in order to assess exactly what aspect of the philosophical approach
generally known as aesthetic empiricism his account commits him to reject. I argue that the ‘experiential requirement’, if
only conceived in a slightly broader way than is usual, might very well have an important role to play not only in the appropriate
appreciation of works that do not demonstrate the need for such a requirement (primarily works of late modern and conceptual
art), but also in the ontological account Davies himself favours. 相似文献
14.
15.
Wolfgang Barz 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(3):183-188
It is argued that Searle’s argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness
suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle’s argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions
of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of ‘aspectual shape’ and ‘irreducibly
subjective,’ I conclude that each version of Searle’s argument incorporates at least one false premise.
This paper is a descendant of a paper presented at the Wittgenstein Symposium at Kirchberg am Wechsel in August 2004. I would
like to thank the reviewer of this journal for his/her helpful comments on a previous draft. 相似文献
16.
T. Deck 《Potential Analysis》2006,24(1):63-86
This work investigates complex random fields Z, which have a rotation invariant path measure. Fields of this type are constructed and analyzed in terms of (pathwise convergent)
L2-expansions, and quasi invariance properties of their path measures are studied. The results are used to investigate ℋL2(Z), the space of holomorphic L2-functionals of Z. Conditions are given such that every F∈ℋL2(Z) admits an L2-power series expansion, and a general skeleton theorem is proved, which justifies the notion ‘holomorphic’.
Mathematics Subject Classifications (2000) 60G07, 60G30, 60G60.
T. Deck: Financial support from FCP, Portugal, is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
17.
Ioannis Dimitriou 《Zeitschrift für Angewandte Mathematik und Physik (ZAMP)》2007,58(1):100-120
The paper studies the geometrical aspects of steady, two-dimensional potential flows and their relation to the physics that
governs them. To achieve this, the streamline curvature of a flow is determined when the vector velocity field describing
it, is known. Two methods, which allow the calculation of streamline curvature at every point of a flow field, are developed:
the ‘Method of Rotation’ and the ‘Method of Directional Derivative’. Especially the first method reveals an interesting feature of curvature, allowing it to be interpreted kinematically. Furthermore,
an attempt has been made towards the formulation of a potential theory from a geometrical perspective. For this reason the
concept of ‘Global Curvature’ is introduced, being a measure of both stream and potential line curvature. It has been proven that it contains all the
information needed to determine the physical quantities of velocity and static pressure throughout a potential flow, thus
depicting the strong link between geometry and physics. 相似文献
18.
Wolfgang Lenzen 《Logica Universalis》2008,2(1):43-58
In the 18th century, Gottfried Ploucquet developed a new syllogistic logic where the categorical forms are interpreted as
set-theoretical identities, or diversities, between the full extension, or a non-empty part of the extension, of the subject
and the predicate. With the help of two operators ‘O’ (for “Omne”) and ‘Q’ (for “Quoddam”), the UA and PA are represented
as ‘O(S) – Q(P)’ and ‘Q(S) – Q(P)’, respectively, while UN and PN take the form ‘O(S) > O(P)’ and ‘Q(S) > O(P)’, where ‘>’ denotes set-theoretical disjointness. The use of the symmetric operators ‘–’ and ‘>’ gave rise to a new conception
of conversion which in turn lead Ploucquet to consider also the unorthodox propositions O(S) – O(P), Q(S) – O(P), O(S) > Q(P), and Q(S) > Q(P). Although Ploucquet’s critique of the traditional theory of opposition turns out to be mistaken, his theory of the “Quantification
of the Predicate” is basically sound and involves an interesting “Double Square of Opposition”.
My thanks are due to Hanno von Wulfen for helpful discussions and for transforming the word-document into a Latex-file. 相似文献
19.
Anthony Dardis 《Acta Analytica》2002,17(1):69-77
Stephen Yablo has recently argued for a novel solution to the mental causation problem: the mental is related to the physical as determinables are related to determinates; determinables are not causal rivals with their determinates; so the mental and the physical are not causal rivals. Despite its attractions the suggestion seems hard to accept. In this paper I develop the idea that mental properties and physical properties are not causal rivals. Start with property dualism, supervenience, multiple realizability, and the claim that no more than one supervenience base for a mental property can be had by a single instance of the mental property. Then a probabilistic account of causation will be unable to certify either mental properties or physical properties as causal factors for effect types. I suggest that this shows that we should not count mental properties as causal rivals with physical properties. 相似文献
20.
Seahwa Kim 《Acta Analytica》2012,27(1):73-76
In this paper, I examine Takashi Yagisawa’s response to van Inwagen’s ontic objection against David Lewis. Van Inwagen criticizes
Lewis’s commitment to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘there is,’ and Yagisawa claims that by adopting modal tenses he
avoids commitment to absolutely unrestricted quantification. I argue that Yagisawa faces a problem parallel to the one Lewis
faces. Although Yagisawa officially rejects the absolutely unrestricted sense of a quantifying expression, he is still committed
to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘is
a
real.’ 相似文献