THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERY RESOURCES UNDER THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA

The Agreement, arising from the recently concluded U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, calls for the management of these transboundary resources to be undertaken through regional fisheries management organizations. This paper represents a first attempt to analyze the optimal economic management of straddling/highly migratory stocks under the to-be-established regional organizations. Dynamic game theory, commonly used in analyzing the management of “shared” fishery resources, is brought to bear. An obvious question to be raised is whether the analysis applied to “shared” fish stocks management is sufficient for the purpose of examining the management of straddling/highly migratory fish stocks. The analysis is not sufficient for the purpose of examining the cooperative management of straddling/highly migratory fish stocks, because, in contrast to “shared” fish stock management, there is no guarantee that the number and nature of joint exploiters of the resource, in the aforementioned regional organization, will be constant through time. It is the existence of what is termed the “New Member Problem” which most clearly distinguishes the management of straddling/highly migratory fish stocks from the management of “shared” fish stocks. The paper discusses several approaches to addressing the “New Member Problem.”     

GAME-THEORETIC INSIGHTS INTO THE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES

Ongoing efforts to negotiate agreements on management of transboundary marine fisheries tend to be arduous and frustrating, often collapsing into spectacular “fish wars” that leave fishing communities impoverished and fish stocks decimated. Game theory models can provide insights into why this is so, and suggest ways in which cooperative agreements might be crafted to overcome the difficulties. This article illustrates these themes through a model of a bi-national “interception fishery.” The central focus of the analysis is on instabilities that result from stochastic variability and incomplete and asymmetric information.     

REBUILDING THE EASTERN BALTIC COD STOCK UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (PART II): TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COSTS OF A MARINE PROTECTED AREA

Abstract This study adds a cost analysis of the Eastern Baltic cod fishery to the existing model presented in Röckmann et al. [2007a] . As cost data on this international fishery do not exist, data from Denmark are extrapolated to the whole international fishery. Additionally, unit and total variable costs are simulated, and the sensitivity to a set of different cost–stock and cost–output elasticities is tested. The study supports preliminary conclusions that a temporary marine reserve policy, which focuses on protecting the Eastern Baltic cod spawning stock in the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) subdivision 25, is a valuable fisheries management tool to (i) rebuild the overexploited Eastern Baltic cod stock and (ii) increase operating profits. The negative effects of climate change can be postponed for at least 20 years—depending on the assumed rate of future climate change. Including costs in the economic analysis does not change the ranking of management policies as proposed in the previous study where costs were neglected.     

THE EFFECT OF INFORMATION ON A STOCHASTIC,SPATIALLY DISTRIBUTED FISHERY

ABSTRACT. Survival rates and carrying capacities in a fishery may be strongly affected by variations in climatic factors. When the stock is under the control of a single manager, information about the stochastic growth parameters leads to improved economic returns. However, when the stock is transboundary, additional information concerning the stochastic parameters can lead to over harvesting and in turn to lower economic returns. When the harvests are taken sequentially by more than one fleet, additional information will benefit the first harvester while harming those who follow.     

DEA-based predictors for estimating fleet size changes when modelling the introduction of rights-based management

The introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) into a fishery is going to change not only the amount of catch a fleet can take, but often also changes the fleet structure, particularly if total allowable catches are decreased. This can have an impact on the economic, social and environmental outcomes of fisheries management. Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) modelling approaches are recognised as the most appropriate method for assessing impacts of management, but these require information as to how fleets may change under different management systems. In this study, we test the applicability of data envelopment analysis (DEA) based performance measures as predictors of how a fishing fleet might change under the introduction of ITQs and also at different levels of quota. In particular, we test the assumption that technical efficiency and capacity utilisation are suitable predictors of which boats are likely to exit the fishery. We also consider scale efficiency as an alternative predictor. We apply the analysis to the Torres Strait tropical rock lobster fishery that is transitioning to an ITQ-based management system for one sector of the fishery. The results indicate that capacity utilisation, technical efficiency and scale efficiency are reasonable indicators of who may remain in the fishery post ITQs. We find that the use of these measures to estimate the impacts of lower quota levels provides consistent fleet size estimates at the aggregate level, but which individual vessels are predicted to exit is dependent on the measure used.     

OPTIMAL RECOVERY OF A SHARED RESOURCE STOCK: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL WITH EFFICIENT MEMORY EQUILIBRIA

We consider an optimal two-country management of depleted transboundary renewable resources. The management problem is modelled as a differential game, in which memory strategies are used. The countries negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient harvesting programs. They monitor the evolution of the agreement, and they memorize deviations from the agreement in the past. If the agreement is observed by the countries, they continue cooperation. If one of the countries breaches the contract, then both countries continue in a noncooperative management mode for the rest of the game. This noncooperative option is called a threat policy. The credibility of the threats is guaranteed by their equilibrium property. Transfer or side payments are studied as a particular cooperative management program. Transfer payments allow one country to buy out the other from the fishery for the purpose of eliminating the inefficiency caused by the joint access to the resources. It is shown that efficient equilibria can be reached in a class of resource management games, which allow the use of memory strategies. In particular, continuous time transfer payments (e.g., a share of the harvest) should be used instead of a once-and-for-all transfer payment.     

Optimization model to start harvesting in stochastic aquaculture system

Establishment of cost‐effective management strategy of aquaculture is one of the most important issues in fishery science, which can be addressed with bio‐economic mathematical modeling. This paper deals with the aforementioned issue using a stochastic process model for aquacultured non‐renewable fishery resources from the viewpoint of an optimal stopping (timing) problem. The goal of operating the model is to find the optimal criteria to start harvesting the resources under stochastic environment, which turns out to be determined from the Bellman equation (BE). The BE has a separation of variables type structure and can be simplified to a reduced BE with a fewer degrees of freedom. Dependence of solutions to the original and reduced BEs on parameters and independent variables is analyzed from both analytical and numerical standpoints. Implications of the analysis results to management of aquaculture systems are presented as well. Numerical simulation focusing on aquacultured Plecoglossus altivelis in Japan validates the mathematical analysis results. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

STEADY STATE AND INTERTEMPORAL MANAGEMENT MODELS FOR MARINE FISHERIES

Abstract Steady state and dynamic management models are developed for analyzing the Malaysian marine fisheries. These models originate from the theoretical concepts of the natural resource economics namely the open access, limited entry and the intertemporal fishery models. Such management models are deemed necessary because of the need to sustain the depleting resource and degrading environment. Marine fisheries had been managed under open access for a long time before government intervention took effect sometime during the 1960s. Open access and government intervention during the earlier phase of economic development contributed to the immediate pressure on fisheries. Community development programs geared to alleviate poverty among the fishermen apparently contradicted the effort of sustaining fisheries. Even today this fundamental management objective of sustainable development of fishery resource is not fully adhered to. This study suggests that ability to sustain fishery requires government intervention that can direct resource use to steady state or intertemporal optimal levels.     

Multi‐area transboundary pollution problems under learning by doing in Yangtze River Delta Region,China

In this paper, we investigate transboundary pollution problems in the Yangtze River Delta Region where emission permits trading and abatement costs under learning by doing. At first, we use the optimal control theory to analyze two‐area transboundary pollution problems and give an empirical study for the Shanghai Municipality and Zhejiang Province by using four‐order Runge‐Kutta method and the authentic economic data. Then, we extend two‐area transboundary pollution problems to three‐area transboundary pollution problems and also give an empirical study by adopting the authentic economic data of Shanghai Municipality, Zhejiang Province, and Jiangsu Province. Finally, we get a similar conclusion that the abatement cost will decrease with the amelioration of abatement technology.     

THE VALUE OF SHORT‐RUN CLIMATE FORECASTS IN MANAGING THE COASTAL COHO SALMON (ONCORHYNCHUS KISUTCH) FISHERY IN WASHINGTON STATE

ABSTRACT. . In recent years our understanding of the intricate connections between climate variability, marine and freshwater environmental conditions and the responses of fish stocks has improved considerably. With predictable relationships between the environment and stock abundance, fishery managers should be able to forecast variation in stock survival and recruitment. Such forecasts present an opportunity for increasing the economic value of fisheries and for achieving other management objectives, such as stock conservation and maintenance of population diversity. After describing a 4‐step framework for addressing the question ‘What is a forecast worth?’ in a fishery decision‐making context, we introduce the management system for Washington's coastal coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) fishery. Then we apply the 4‐step framework to estimate the value of improved run size forecasts in the annual harvest management of coho salmon in Washington State. Our principal analytical tool is a stochastic simulation model that incorporates the main characteristics of the fishery. The paper concludes with a discussion of opportunities and constraints to the use of climate‐based forecasts in fishery management on various spatial and temporal scales, and we consider the challenges associated with forecasting variations in fish stock size caused by shifts in climate and related ocean conditions.     

Multiple criterion management of a sequential fishery

A static stochastic simulation was used to assess the performance of alternative management strategies in the satisfaction of multiple objective criteria in the context of a sequentially exploited transboundary resource. The model was applied to the Yukon River chum salmon (Oncorhynchus keta) fishery. Four strategies were evaluated using three criteria: probability of satisfying escapement objectives; probability of jointly satisfying escapement and subsistence harvest objectives; and probability of simultaneously reaching escapement, subsistence and commercial harvest objectives. The modeled strategies were also compared with the actual performance of the fishery for 1980–1995. The results indicate that satisfaction of escapement and subsistence harvest goals in the middle Yukon depends on imposing restrictive limits on commercial harvests in the lower Yukon. However, even with full information, escapement objectives in the upper drainage are only satisfied 65–70% and 75–80% of the time for summer and fall chum, respectively. The model was also used to explore the effects of increased average run strength that could arise from reduced bycatch of Yukon origin chum in marine fisheries. The results suggest that reduced marine interceptions are unlikely to substantially increase the probability of satisfying catch and escapement goals for the middle and upper Yukon.     

EFFORT SUBSIDIES AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES

ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes a two-stage game, based on the Gordon-Schaefer model of the fishery, to examine the strategic entry-deterring role for effort subsidies in noncooper-ative transboundary fisheries. The game reveals that a country, whose domestic fleet has an effort cost advantage over a rival foreign fleet, may choose to subsidize domestic effort to the point that foreign entry in the fishery becomes unprofitable. Whether the outcome of the game is characterized by foreign entry deterrence or accommodation, and whether it is also characterized by a domestic effort subsidy or a tax, depends on domestic and foreign effort costs and the number of firms in each fleet. The various outcomes of the game analyzed here help to explain the persistence of subsidies in some world fisheries.     

AN ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION FROM LIMITED ENTRY TO TRANSFERABLE QUOTA: NON-MARSHALLIAN PRINCIPLES FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Static analysis shows that individual transferable quotas (ITQs) can dramatically increase economic efficiency comparable to a limited entry (LE) management by releasing excess capital. However, the transition from LE to ITQ management presents further efficiency questions. This paper shows that the rate of retirement of excess capital is determined by the opportunity cost of holding ITQ harvest rights on cost inefficient vessels. While restructuring is immediate with perfect foresight, delayed exit occurs with uncertainty and low opportunity costs of holding ITQ. Nearly cost-efficient fishers anticipate increasing their payoff by waiting for higher ITQ prices, e.g., game theoretic principles rather than static Marshallian principles apply. The results raise policy questions about allocating ITQ to incumbent fishers at no charge. The Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery which switched from LE to ITQ management in 1990 is analyzed as a case study. Results show that a large surplus was possible but unattained under LE management but also that adjustment has been slow and costly, consistent with the results of this paper.     

Impact of the cost of the time resource on efficiency of economic processes

The objective of the paper is to simulate behavior of economic agents with a special emphasis on the use of the time resource in economic processes. The case studied is from the fishing industry. With simulations, the study analyzes the behavior of economic agents as they lead their processes through time. The paper estimates the value of time in a fishery operation, and shows that the time cost is essential in clarifying some phenomena in the economic behavior of agents. Among the conclusions is that the difference in economic efficiency between strong and weak ownership is due to difference in time costs. The secondary goal of the paper is to develop a simulation tool for analyzing a range of problems in the fishing industry, ranging from decision situations onboard fishing vessels to serving as a tool for fishery managers and legislators.     

MODELING A RIGHTS‐BASED APPROACH FOR MANAGING HABITAT IMPACTS OF FISHERIES

ABSTRACT. Limiting adverse consequences of fishing on essential fish habitat has emerged as a key fishery management objective. The conventional approach to providing habitat protection is to create MPAs or marine reserves that prohibit all or certain types of fishing in specific areas. However, there may be more cost‐effective and flexible ways to provide habitat protection. We propose an individual habitat quota (IHQ) system for habitat conservation that would utilize economic incentives to achieve habitat conservation goals cost‐effectively. Individual quotas of habitat impact units (HIU) would be distributed to fishers with an aggregate quota set to maintain a target habitat “stock.” HIU use would be based on a proxy for marginal habitat damage. We use a dynamic, explicitly spatial fishery and habitat simulation model to explore how such a system might work. We examine how outcomes are affected by spatial heterogeneity in the fishery and the scale of habitat regulation. We find that the IHQ system is a highly cost‐effective means of ensuring a given level of habitat protection, but that spatial heterogeneity and the scale of regulation can have significant effects on the distribution of habitat protection.     

A MODEL FOR THE BIOECONOMIC EVALUATION OF MARINE PROTECTED AREA SIZE AND PLACEMENT IN THE NORTH SEA

ABSTRACT. The use of marine protected areas (MPAs) as a basic management tool to limit exploitation rates in marine fisheries has been widely suggested. Models are important in predicting the consequences of management decisions and the design of monitoring programs in terms of policy goals. However, few tools are available that consider both multiple fleets and ecosystem scale dynamics. We use a new applied game theory tool, Ecoseed, that operates within a temporally and spatially explicit biomass dynamics model, Ecopath with Ecosim, to evaluate the efficacy of marine protected areas in the North Sea in both ecological and economic terms. The Ecoseed model builds MPAs based on the change in values of predicted economic rents of fisheries and the existence value of biomass pools in the ecosystem. We consider the market values of four fisheries operating in the North Sea: a trawl fishery, a gill net fishery, a seine fishery, and an industrial (reduction) fishery. We apply existence values, scaled such that their aggregate is similar to the total fishery value, to six biomass pools of concern: juvenile cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, seals, and the collective pool ‘Other predators’ that include marine mammals. Four policy options were considered: to maximize the rent only; to maximize the existence values only; to maximize the sum of the rent and existence values; and, finally, to maximize the sum of the rent and the existence values, but excluding only the trawl fleet from the MPA. The Ecoseed model suggests that policy goals that do not include ecological considerations can negatively impact the rents obtained by the different fishing sectors. The existence values will also be negatively impacted unless the MPA is very large. The Ecoseed model also suggests that policy goals based solely on existence values will negatively impact most fisheries. Under policy options that included ecological considerations, maximum benefits were derived from an MPA that covered 25–40% of the North Sea, placed along the southern and eastern coasts. Finally, the Ecoseed model suggests that an exclusion of the trawl fishery only from the MPA can provide small‐to‐substantial positive impacts to most species and fleets; this relative impact depends on level of interaction between the trawl fleet and the other fleets target species (e.g., through bycatch).     

Sustainable Yield Analysis in a Multicohort Single-species Fishery: A Mathematical Programming Approach

The concept of sustainable yield, i.e. the fish catch that can be maintained in the long run from a fishery in a steady state, is widely used in fisheries management. In traditional methods of sustainable yield analysis, based on the Schaefer model of a fish stock, the age structure of the stock is ignored. Approaches based on the Beverton-Holt multicohort fish population model take account of age structure but assume that instantaneous natural and fishing mortality rates are constant throughout the year. Using a fish population model in which this assumption is not required, a mixed integer programming model is developed for the analysis of a multicohort single-species fishery in a steady state. This new method of sustainable yield analysis is demonstrated using data for the western mackerel fishery. Comparisons with results from other studies of this fishery are presented.     

Different approaches to efficiency analysis. An application to the Spanish Trawl fleet operating in Moroccan waters

Several approaches exist for the estimation of technical efficiency. In this paper the four most relevant ones (data envelopment analysis, stochastic production frontiers, panel data and distance functions) have been compared. The different approaches have been applied to the to the Spanish Trawl fishery that operated in Moroccan waters. The study highlights some of the problems arising from the wrong management of the fishery. It can also be concluded that in most cases, the multi- vs single-output feature is determinant in producing higher differences in the efficiency estimates, though the effect of either ignoring or taking into account random error also influences the results.     

INTEGRATING MARINE PROTECTED AREAS INTO MODELS FOR FISHERY ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT

ABSTRACT. Marine protected areas (MPAs) have been proposed as an insurance policy against fishery management failures and as an integral part of an optimal management system for some fisheries. However, an incorrectly designed MPA can increase the risk of depletion of some species, and can reduce the value of the system of fisheries it impacts. MPAs may alter structural processes that relate fishery outcomes to management variables and thereby compromise the models that are used to guide decisions. New models and data gathering programs are needed to use MPAs effectively. This paper discusses the motivations and methods for incorporating explicitly spatial dynamics of both fish and fishermen into fishery models so that they can be used to assess spatial policies such as MPAs. Some important characteristics and capabilities which these models should have are outlined, and a topical review of some relevant modeling methodologies is provided.     

OPTIMAL-SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF MULTI-SPECIES FISHERIES: LESSONS FROM A PREDATOR-PREY MODEL

ABSTRACT. In this paper we consider the meaning of sustainable resource management in multi-dimensional resources. Based on the principle of intergenerational fairness, we define fisheries management as sustainable if it does not lead to a decline in the net present value of the fishery. If sustainability, or intergenerational fairness, were held as an obligation by fishery managers, then the traditional present-value maximization objective would be constrained. Using numerical solutions to a simple predator-prey model, we explore how the optimal-sustainable management of this fishery would differ from management that seeks to maximize the present value of the benefits. General lessons regarding the meaning of sustainable fishery management are discussed.