A class of differential games with state-dependent closed-loop feedback solutions

In this paper, a class ofN-person, nonzero-sum differential games with state-dependent closed-loop feedback solutions is presented. In particular, the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations for a closed-loop feedback solution turns out to be a set ofN-independent linear equations with viscosity solutions.The helpful comments of an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

Infinite dimensional differential games with hybrid controls

A two-person zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game of infinite duration with discounted payoff involving hybrid controls is studied. The minimizing player is allowed to take continuous, switching and impulse controls whereas the maximizing player is allowed to take continuous and switching controls. By taking strategies in the sense of Elliott-Kalton, we prove the existence of value and characterize it as the unique viscosity solution of the associated system of quasi-variational inequalities.     

Special symmetric periodic solutions of differential systems with distributed delay

We discuss the existence of periodic solutions to a system of differential equations with distributed delay which shows a certain type of symmetry. For this, such solutions are related to the solutions of a system of second-order ordinary differential equations.     

Zero-sum differential games involving impulse controls

In this paper we are concerned with zero-sum differential games with impulse controls, as well as continuous and switching controls. The motivation is optimal impulse control problems with disturbances. The main result is the existence of the value function of the game. Our approach is the theory of viscosity solutions for Hamilton-Jacobi equations.Part of this paper was done while the author was a visiting scholar at INRIA, Sophia-Antipolis, France. This work was also partially supported by the Chinese NSF, the Chinese State Education Commission Science Foundation, and the Fok Ying Tung Education Foundation.     

Existence of value in differential games with fixed time duration

A differential game of prescribed duration with general-type phase constraints is investigated. The existence of a value in the Varaiya-Lin sense and an optimal strategy for one of the players is obtained under assumptions ensuring that the sets of all admissible trajectories for the two players are compact in the Banach space of all continuous functions. These results are next widened on more general games, examined earlier by Varaiya.The author wishes to express his thanks to an anonymous reviewer for his many valuable comments.     

Preferred coalitions in cooperative differential games

There are many interesting situations which can be described by anN-person general-sum differential game. Such games are characterized by the fact that the strategy of each player depends upon reasonable assumptions about the strategies of the remaining players; and, thus, these games cannot be considered asN uncoupled optimal control problems. In such cases, we say that the game is not strictly competitive, but involves a mutual interest which makes it possible for all of the players to reduce their costs by cooperating with one another, provided the resulting agreement can be enforced. When cooperation is allowed and there are more than two players, there is always the question of whether all possible subcoalitions will be formed with equal ease. This work considers the situation in which a particular subcoalition is preferred. A theory of general-sum games with preferred coalitions is presented, together with constructive examples of alternative approaches which are unsatisfactory.     

Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations for differential games with asymmetric information on probabilistic initial condition

We investigate Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs equations associated to a two-players zero-sum differential game with incomplete information. The first player has complete information on the initial state of the game while the second player has only information of a – possibly uncountable – probabilistic nature: he knows a probability measure on the initial state. Such differential games with finite type incomplete information can be viewed as a generalization of the famous Aumann–Maschler theory for repeated games. The main goal and novelty of the present work consists in obtaining and investigating a Hamilton Jacobi Isaacs Equation satisfied by the upper and the lower values of the game. Since we obtain a uniqueness result for such Hamilton Jacobi equation, as a byproduct, this gives an alternative proof of the existence of a value of the differential game (which has been already obtained in the literature by different technics). Since the Hamilton Jacobi equation is naturally stated in the space of probability measures, we use the Wasserstein distance and some tools of optimal transport theory.     

On linear stochastic differential games with average cost criterions

In this paper, we consider scalar linear stochastic differential games with average cost criterions. We solve the dynamic programming equations for these games and give the synthesis of saddle-point and Nash equilibrium solutions.The authors wish to thank A. Ichikawa for providing the initial impetus and helpful advice.     

Hamilton-Jacobi Equations with Discontinuous Source Terms

We study the initial-value problem for a Hamilton-Jacobi equation whose Hamiltonian is discontinuous with respect to state variables. Our motivation comes from a model describing the two dimensional nucleation in crystal growth phenomena. A typical equation has a semicontinuous source term. We introduce a new notion of viscosity solutions and prove among other results that the initial-value problem admits a unique global-in-time uniformly continuous solution for any bounded uniformly continuous initial data. We also give a representation formula of the solution as a value function by the optimal control theory with a semicontinuous running cost function.     

Viable set computation for hybrid systems

In this paper, we revisit the problem of computing viability sets for hybrid systems with nonlinear continuous dynamics and competing inputs. As usual in the literature, an iterative algorithm, based on the alternating application of a continuous and a discrete operator, is employed. Different cases, depending on whether the continuous evolution and the number of discrete transitions are finite or infinite, are considered. A complete characterization of the reach-avoid computation (involved in the continuous time calculation) is provided based on dynamic programming. Moreover, for a certain class of automata, we show convergence of the iterative process by using a constructive version of Tarski’s fixed point theorem, to determine the maximal fixed point of a monotone operator on a complete lattice of closed sets. The viability algorithm is applied to a benchmark example and to the problem of voltage stability for a single machine-load system in case of a line fault.     

A necessary and sufficient condition of existence of positive solutions for nonlinear singular differential systems

In this paper, by means of monotone iterative technique, a necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of positive solution for a class of nonlinear singular differential system is established, the results of the existence and uniqueness of the positive solution and the iterative sequence of solution are given. In the end, two classes extending boundary value differential systems are discussed and some further results are obtained.     

Zero-sum games for continuous-time Markov jump processes with risk-sensitive finite-horizon cost criterion

In this paper we study the zero-sum games for continuous-time Markov jump processes under the risk-sensitive finite-horizon cost criterion. The state space is a Borel space and the transition rates are allowed to be unbounded. Under the suitable conditions, we use a new value iteration approach to establish the existence of a solution to the risk-sensitive finite-horizon optimality equations of the players, obtain the existence of the value of the game and show the existence of saddle-point equilibria.     

A necessary and sufficient condition of positive solutions for nonlinear singular differential systems with four-point boundary conditions

In this paper, we concert with the existence of positive solution for the following nonlinear singular differential system with four-point boundary conditions

     

On the core of cost-revenue games: Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues

In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking into account the generated revenues. To this cost-revenue sharing problem, we associate a cooperative game with transferable utility, called cost-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the maximum net revenues that the coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost-revenue games. Under the assumption that cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a nonempty core for any vector of revenues if, and only if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. We show that if every connection cost can take only two values (low or high cost), then, the corresponding minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues has a nonempty core. Furthermore, we provide an example of a minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues with an empty core where every connection cost can take only one of three values (low, medium, or high cost).     

Relations between game parameters,value, and optimal strategy spaces in stochastic games and construction of games with given solution

Results of Bohnenblust, Karlin, and Shapley and results of Shapley and Snow, concerning solutions of matrix games, are extended to the class of discounted stochastic games. Prior to these extensions, relations between the game parameters, value, and optimal stationary strategy spaces are established. Then, the inverse problem of constructing stochastic games, given the solution, is considered.     

Optimal non-proportional reinsurance control and stochastic differential games

We study stochastic differential games between two insurance companies who employ reinsurance to reduce risk exposure. We consider competition between two companies and construct a single payoff function of two companies’ surplus processes. One company chooses a dynamic reinsurance strategy in order to maximize the payoff function while its opponent is simultaneously choosing a dynamic reinsurance strategy so as to minimize the same quantity. We describe the Nash equilibrium of the game and prove a verification theorem for a general payoff function. For the payoff function being the probability that the difference between two surplus reaches an upper bound before it reaches a lower bound, the game is solved explicitly.     

Saddle point for differential games with strongly convex-concave integrand

On a fixed time interval we consider zero-sum nonlinear differential games for which the integrand in the criterion functional is a sufficiently strongly convex-concave function of chosen controls. It is shown that in our setting there exists a saddle point in the class of programmed strategies, and a minimax principle similar to Pontryagin's maximum principle is a necessary and sufficient condition for optimality. An example in which the class of games under study is compared with two known classes of differential games is given. Translated fromMatematicheskie Zametki, Vol. 62, No. 5, pp. 725–743, November, 1997. Translated by N. K. Kulman     

Existence and uniqueness of periodic solution for a class of differential systems

In this paper, sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of a unique periodic solution for a class of differential systems.     

Robust guaranteed cost control for uncertain linear differential systems of neutral type

In this paper, the robust guaranteed cost control problem for a class of uncertain linear differential systems of neutral type with a given quadratic cost functions is investigated. The uncertainty is assumed to be norm-bounded and time-varying nonlinear. The problem is to design a state feedback control laws such that the closed-loop system is robustly stable and the closed-loop cost function value is not more than a specified upper bound for all admissible uncertainty and time delay. A criterion for the existence of such controllers is derived based on the matrix inequality approach combined with the Lyapunov method. A parameterized characterization of the robust guaranteed cost controllers is given in terms of the feasible solutions to the certain matrix inequalities. A numerical example is given to illustrate the proposed method.     

Generic stability of Nash equilibria for noncooperative differential games

The stability of Nash equilibria against the perturbation of the right-hand side functions of state equations for noncooperative differential games is investigated. By employing the set-valued analysis theory, we show that the differential games whose equilibria are all stable form a dense residual set, and every differential game can be approximated arbitrarily by a sequence of stable differential games, that is, in the sense of Baire’s category most of the differential games are stable.