Moral coherence,moral worth and explanations of moral motivation

Moral internalism and moral externalism compete over the best explanation of the link between judgment and relevant motivation but, it is argued, they differ at best only verbally. The internalist rational-conceptual nature of the link’ as accounted by M. Smith in The Moral Problem is contrasted to the externalist, also rational, link that requires in addition support from the agent’s psychological-dispositional profile; the internalist link, however, is found to depend crucially on a, similarly to the externalist, psychologically ‘loaded’ profile. It is also argued that the differentiation of the two competing explanations is insufficient partly because they both fail to consider crucial quantitative parameters of the judgment-motivation link. Such parameters become very important particularly in the light of Smith’s claim that this link is grounded on the observable “striking fact” where changes in the set of one’s moral beliefs systematically bring about changes in one’s moral behavior. Examples of algorithms measuring moral coherence and moral worth are provided to serve as evidence for what it comes down to, vis-à-vis the alleged fact, only a verbal dispute between the two camps. Finally, the ‘misfiring’ of these explanations is understood in connection to the irreducibility of concepts such as ‘moral worth’, and/or, ‘moral sensitivity’.     

Particularism, perception and judgement

According to the most detailed articulation and defence of moral particularism, it is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of reasons. This paper addresses aspects of particularist epistemology. In rejecting the existence and efficacy of principles in moral thinking and reasoning particularists typically appeal to a theory of moral knowledge which operates with a ‘perceptual’ metaphor. This is problematic. Holism about valence can give rise to a moral epistemology that is a metaethical variety of atomistic empiricism. To avoid what could be called the Myth of the Moral Given, particularism has made use of a judgement-centred account of moral epistemology. This paper critically examines that account with reference to a proposed analogy between our moral knowledge and our knowledge of similarities.     

The deliberative relevance of refraining from deciding: A response to McKenna and Pereboom

Readers familiar with Harry Frankfurt’s argument that we do not need leeway-liberty (or the power to bring about alternative possible actions or intentions) to be morally responsible will probably also know that the most famous and popular response on behalf of leeway-libertarianism remains a dilemma posed in similar forms by David Widerker, Robert Kane, and Carl Ginet: either the agent retains significant residual leeway in Frankfurt-style cases, or these cases beg the question by presupposing causal determinism. In the last few years, there have been several different attempts to defend Frankfurtian critiques of PAP in response this dilemma. In a novel approach, Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna present cases in which all deliberatively relevant or “robust” alternatives are blocked, but the agent’s act or decision is not determined. Pereboom and McKenna argue that any plausible leeway-condition on responsibility must characterize the required alternatives as robust in two ways: being voluntary performances and having a practical relevance accessible to the agent’s mind. I agree with the requirement of robustness, and argue that we can build this notion into a complex concept of agent-possibility, or “agentive-can.” However, I argue that both McKenna’s and Pereboom’s conceptions of robustness are too demanding: they exclude alternatives that are intuitively relevant. Moreover, I argue that the alternative of refraining from deciding, or voluntarily failing to decide, is robust in the right sense. In agreement with a tradition running from Ockham back through Scotus to Aquinas, I argue that this robust alternative is necessary for responsibility. If the Frankfurt-controller eliminates it, then the agent’s responsibility is undermined. In particular, I argue that Pereboom’s tax evasion cases do not refute this leeway-condition on moral responsibility.     

Reasons and passions

Jonathan Dancy has argued that agents’ reasons for their actions are facts or features of the situations rather than their psychological states. The purpose of the paper is to show that even if we grant that this is so in most of the cases, there is a class of mental states that can be reasons. Although beliefs and desires are not reasons for actions, some emotional states—like loving, liking or disliking someone—can generate reasons. The distinctive feature of these states is that their content is a particular, and not a proposition. Hence in certain situations their love or admiration can provide agents with reasons to do one particular thing rather than another.     

Particularism and the contingent a priori

Particularism renders the options for a sound moral epistemology few and the prospects dim. One leading approach treats basic knowledge of particular cases as derivable from an a priori moral principle and a posteriori knowledge of the contingent non-moral facts to which the principle applies. Particularists must forgo this approach because it requires principles. Yet a purely a posteriori moral epistemology is also implausible, especially when combined with particularism. Particularists such as Jonathan Dancy are thus led to the view that our basic moral knowledge is a priori knowledge of contingent moral facts. We argue that this epistemology is unsound. While some cases of a priori knowledge of (even deeply) contingent facts may be defensible, they are not sufficient for particularist purposes. Moreover, neither Dancy’s appeal to the distinction between positive and negative dependence nor his discussion of intuitive examples provides sufficient support for this epistemology.     

Optimal enough?

An alleged weakness of heuristic optimisation methods is the stochastic character of their solutions: instead of finding the truly optimal solution, they only provide a stochastic approximation of this optimum. In this paper we look into a particular application, portfolio optimisation. We demonstrate that the randomness of the ‘optimal’ solution obtained from the algorithm can be made so small that for all practical purposes it can be neglected. More importantly, we look at the relevance of the remaining uncertainty in the out-of-sample period. The relationship between in-sample fit and out-of-sample performance is not monotonous, but still, we observe that up to a point better solutions in-sample lead to better solutions out-of-sample. Beyond this point there is no more cause for improving the solution any further: any in-sample improvement leads out-of-sample only to financially meaningless improvements and unpredictable changes (noise) in performance.     

Loop invariants,exploration of regularities,and mathematical games

Loop invariants are assertions of regularities that characterize the loop components of algorithms. They are fundamental components of computerprograms verification, but their relevance goes beyond verification—they can be significantly utilized for algorithm design and analysis. Unfortunately, they are only modestly introduced in the teaching of programming and algorithms. One reason for this is an unjustified notion that loop invariants are ‘tied to formality’, hard to illustrate, and difficult to comprehend. In this paper a novel approach is presented for illustrating on a rather intuitive level the significance of loop invariants. The illustration is based on mathematical games, which are attractive examples that require the exploration of regularities via problemsolving heuristics. Throughout the paper students' application of heuristics is described and emphasis is placed on the links between loop invariants, heuristic search activities, recognition of regularities and design and analysis of algorithms.     

Diffusion of information in a social group

A generalized model of diffusion of information in a closed, homogeneously mixing population of size N is considered. Apart from the provision of mass‐mediated and interactively mediated messages and the possibility of spontaneous loss of interest, the model allows for the possibility of the process being stifled by a section of the people who possess the information but do not propagate it; they rather hinder the process by “turning off” the spreaders that come in their contact. The master equation for the model is set up and both deterministic and stochastic aspects of the stable, steady‐state solution of the problem are analyzed. Existing models, such as the Kermack‐McKendrick model, the Daley‐Kendall model and the Bartholomew model, are retrieved as special cases. Several new features of the process emerging from our generalization are discussed and a special model displaying critical behavior is outlined.     

On the convergence of circle packings to the Riemann map

Rodin and Sullivan (1987) proved Thurston’s conjecture that a scheme based on the Circle Packing Theorem converges to the Riemann mapping, thereby providing a refreshing geometric view of Riemann’s Mapping Theorem. We now present a new proof of the Rodin–Sullivan theorem. This proof is based on the argument principle, and has the following virtues. 1. It applies to more general packings. The Rodin–Sullivan paper deals with packings based on the hexagonal combinatorics. Later, quantitative estimates were found, which also worked for bounded valence packings. Here, the bounded valence assumption is unnecessary and irrelevant. 2. Our method is rather elementary, and accessible to non-experts. In particular, quasiconformal maps are not needed. Consequently, this gives an independent proof of Riemann’s Conformal Mapping Theorem. (The Rodin–Sullivan proof uses results that rely on Riemann’s Mapping Theorem.) 3. Our approach gives the convergence of the first and second derivatives, without significant additional difficulties. While previous work has established the convergence of the first two derivatives for bounded valence packings, now the bounded valence assumption is unnecessary. Oblatum 15-V-1995 & 13-XI-1995     

Full does not imply strong, does it?

We give a duality for the variety of bounded distributive lattices that is not full (and therefore not strong) although it is full but not strong at the finite level. While this does not give a complete solution to the “Full vs Strong” Problem, which dates back to the beginnings of natural duality theory in 1980, it does solve it at the finite level. One consequence of this result is that although there is a Duality Compactness Theorem, which says that if an alter ego of finite type yields a duality at the finite level then it yields a duality, there cannot be a corresponding Full Duality Compactness Theorem. Received October 1, 2002; accepted in final form November 10, 2004.     

Program explanations and causal relevance

Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., defends non-reductive physicalism against Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Exclusion Argument according to which non-reductive physicalism is committed to epiphenomenalism because irreducible mental properties are ‘screened off’ from causal relevance by their physical realizers. Jackson and Pettit’s most promising explication of a program explanation appeals to the idea of invariance of effect under variation of realization, but I show that invariance of effect under variation of realization is neither necessary nor sufficient for causal relevance.     

Scepticism,context and modal reasoning

I analyze some classical solutions of the skeptical argument and some of their week points (especially the contextualist solution). First I have proposed some possible improvement of the contextualist solution (the introduction of the explicit-implicit belief and knowledge distinction beside the differences in the relevance of some counter-factual alternatives). However, this solution does not block too fast jumps of the everyday context (where empirical knowledge is possible) into skeptical context (where empirical knowledge is impossible). Then I analyze some formal analogies between some modal arguments on the contingency of empirical facts (and the world as whole) and the skeptical arguments against empirical knowledge. I try to show that the skeptical conclusion “Empirical knowledge does not exist” is logically coherent with the thesis that they are empirical facts and that we have true belief on them. In order to do that without contradictions I have to accept a non-classical definition of knowledge: S knows that p:= S is not justified to allow that non-p. Knowledge and justified allowance function here as some pseudo-theoretical concepts which allow only some partial and conditional definitions by some “empirical” terms and logical conditions.     

Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge

In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I claim that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by others uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. I develop an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge. In light of this alternative reading, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential.     

Moral responsibility for unprevented harm

That we are morally responsible for what we do willingly and knowingly is a commonplace. That our moral responsibility extends as far as to cover at least the intended consequences of our voluntary actions and perhaps also the ones we did not intend, but could or did foresee, is equally beyond dispute. But what about omissions? Are we, or can we be, (equally) morally responsible for the harm that has occured because we did not prevent it, even though we could have done so? Say, for all the enormous suffering, caused daily by famine, deprivation and curable diseases in the Third World countries?Moral intuitions and practices that one could consult in this matter seem to leave us in the dark. We regularly ascribe responsibility to people for harms resulting from their negligence or failure to fulfill professional duties. On the other hand, we tend to think that unless there is some evidence of the causal contribution that agents made to a harmful event and/or state, it is not really fair to blame it on them. And finally, to complicate things even more, most of us deny that omissions could effect anything (any change) in the world and consequently regard them as causally impotent (as well as possibly harmless).Most of the proposed solutions to this perplexing issue simply take negative moral responsibility for granted and then either try to revise our ordinary notion of causation accordingly or, alternatively, weaken the conditions for holding someone morally responsible. In the paper I present and defend the relative merits of the third approach, one sceptical of the notion of moral responsibility for the ‘outcomes’ of omissions. I try to show that for some identifiable core notion of moral responsibility and paradigmatic cases of omissions, the prospects for a happy marriage are rather slim.     

Moral Dilemmas and Vagueness

In this paper we point out some interesting structural similarities between vagueness and moral dilemmas as well as between some of the proposed solutions to both problems. Moral dilemma involves a situation with opposed obligations that cannot all be satisfied. Transvaluationism as an approach to vagueness makes three claims concerning the nature of vagueness: (1) it involves incompatibility between mutually unsatisfiable requirements, (2) the underlying requirements retain their normative power even when they happen to be overruled, and (3) this incompatibility turns out to be rather benign in practice. Given that transvaluationism is inspired by moral dilemmas, these claims are assessed in respect to them. Transvaluationism provides a smooth account of the mentioned claims concerning vagueness. Following a brief discussion of Sorensen’s views on moral dilemmas and conflict vagueness, we offer a model of moral pluralism accommodating structurally similar claims about the nature of moral conflict and moral dilemmas.     

Black the libertarian

The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) comes in the form of a dilemma: either the counterexample presupposes determinism, in which case it begs the question; or it does not presuppose determinism, in which case it fails to deliver on its promise to eliminate all alternatives that might plausibly be thought to satisfy PAP. I respond to this challenge with a counterexample in whichconsidering an alternative course of action is anecessary condition fordeciding to act otherwise, and the agent does not in fact consider the alternative. I call this a “buffer case,” because the morally relevant alternative is “buffered” by the requirement that the agent first consider the alternative. Suppose further that the agent’s considering an alternative action—entering the buffer zone—is what would trigger the counterfactual intervener. Then it would appear that PAP-relevant alternatives are out of reach. I defend this counterexample to PAP against three objections: that considering an alternative isitself a morally relevant alternative; that buffer cases can be shown to containother alternatives that arguably satisfy PAP; and that even if the agent’spresent access to PAP-relevant alternatives were eliminated, PAP could still be satisfied in virtue ofearlier alternatives. I conclude that alternative possibilities are a normal symptom, but not an essential constituent, of moral agency.     

Contractualism, Politics, and Morality

Rawls developed a contractualist theory of social justice and Scanlon attempted to extend the Rawlsian framework to develop a theory of rightness, or morality more generally. I argue that there are some good reasons to adopt a contractualist theory of social justice, but that it is a mistake to adopt a contractualist theory of rightness. I begin by illustrating the major shared features of Scanlon and Rawls’ theories. I then show that the justification for these features in Rawls’ theory, the centrality of cooperative fairness to social justice, cannot be used to defend their use in Scanlon’s. Finally, I argue that Scanlon has not provided an adequate alternative defense of these features, and show that they create problems when contractualists try to explain major features of our common-sense morality.     

The Factors that Contribute to the “Best Cases” of Standards-Based Reform

This article summarizes a study of the ways in which and the extent to which states and local school districts are pursuing standards-based reform in mathematics and science education. In particular, it presents a few common features of the “best cases” of states and districts using the national documents to guide their own improvement efforts. In particular, we found that standards-based reform is a highly personal process and very dependent on the strength of local leadership; we also found that, in the best cases, the standards were not “implemented” per se, but were used as tools for promoting deeper and more reflective approaches to setting state and district standards, creating assessments, selecting curriculum, and designing professional development. Additionally, we learned that the notion of standards-based reform is not singular but, rather, it has both an educational and political face, often at odds with one another. Finally, we found the degree to which standards-based reform becomes a reality is very dependent on the overall health and functionality of the systems that are seeking to transform themselves.     

‘Good enough’ performance measurement: a trade-off between activity and action

Performance measurement systems along the lines of the EFQM and the balanced scorecard have developed rapidly in recent years, and now occupy much management time and effort. There is limited evidence that performance improvement has received proportionate attention. Six organisations selected for their success were studied using a grounded theory approach based on interviews with management accountants and operations managers in each of the organisations. It is clear that they are all making strenuous efforts to use their performance measurement systems but with a focus on the ‘good enough’ rather than the detail. This gave managers in these organisations the time and space to concentrate on the use of performance measures on forward looking relevance, understanding and action, rather than retrospective and detailed control. This approach was promoted by senior managers and was based on their ability to see the business in simple terms and their understanding of the key drivers of business performance.     

On balking from an empty queue

The intuition while observing the economy of queueing systems, is that one’s motivation to join the system, decreases with its level of congestion. Here we present a queueing model where sometimes the opposite is the case. The point of departure is the standard first-come first-served single server queue with Poisson arrivals. Customers commence service immediately if upon their arrival the server is idle. Otherwise, they are informed if the queue is empty or not. Then, they have to decide whether to join or not. We assume that the customers are homogeneous and when they consider whether to join or not, they assess their queueing costs against their reward due to service completion. As the whereabouts of customers interact, we look for the (possibly mixed) join/do not join Nash equilibrium strategy, a strategy that if adopted by all, then under the resulting steady-state conditions, no one has any incentive not to follow it oneself. We show that when the queue is empty then depending on the service distribution, both ‘avoid the crowd’ (ATC) and ‘follow the crowd’ (FTC) scenarios (as well as none-of-the-above) are possible. When the queue is not empty, the situation is always that of ATC. Also, we show that under Nash equilibrium it is possible (depending on the service distribution) that the joining probability when the queue is empty is smaller than it is when the queue is not empty. This research was supported by The Israel Science Foundation Grant No. 237/02.