新产品供应链下考虑顾客体验效应的制造商渠道返利策略研究

随着体验经济的到来和新产品市场的竞争, 如何针对顾客体验进行渠道建设和品牌推广就显得尤为重要。本文针对新产品供应链的环境, 考虑顾客的体验效应及零售商对此所做的体验投入, 利用效用理论构建了线上和线下消费者的需求函数, 在此基础上分别探讨了批发价格模式和渠道返利模式制造商占优的供应链的决策行为, 分析了供应链各决策主体均衡解的特征, 并对渠道返利前后供应链节点企业的最优决策进行了比较, 最后用数值例子分析了制造商的返利点、零售商的体验投入水平、顾客的体验效应、旅行成本以及购买意愿等对供应链最优绩效的影响。     

考虑服务水平的双渠道供应链定价策略研究

研究单个制造商与单个零售商组成的双渠道供应链系统定价问题.在分散决策和集中决策条件下讨论了零售商传统销售渠道和制造商开拓网上销售渠道分别以不同服务水平销售产品的双渠道供应链,从而得到了在集中式决策和分散式决策条件下的最优定价,并分析了服务水平对定价决策和渠道需求的影响.研究表明,当零售商渠道服务水平增加时,批发价也随之增加.本渠道的服务水平对本渠道的价格影响会大于对竞争渠道的价格的影响.渠道服务水平的提高会导致本渠道销售价格和本渠道需求的提高,也会对另一渠道产生一定的溢出效应.     

无缺陷退货下考虑转运的双渠道供应链库存决策研究

电商环境下无缺陷退货的大幅增加给供应链带来新的挑战.文章针对一个供应商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链,结合无缺陷退货可再次销售的特征,考虑某一渠道缺货后顾客等待转运和顾客需求转移两种行为,分别在集中决策和分散决策模式下,基于无转运无转移(NN)、有转运无转移(YN)和有转运有转移(YY)三种情境构建无缺陷退货下的转运与库存决策模型.研究求解并比较了各情境下的最优决策,并且分析了转运价格、无缺陷退货率和顾客需求转移率对最优订货量及系统利润的影响.研究表明,考虑转运和顾客需求转移时,双渠道供应链中供应商和零售商库存水平及利润同时受到两渠道退货率的影响.通过设置合理的转运价格,转运策略可以有效地降低退货压力,提高库存管理效率,增加双渠道供应链利润.然而,顾客需求转移会降低转运策略的有效性.     

多地区情形下制造商渠道选择与定价策略研究

针对国内不同地区间市场差异以及国内的制造商采取地区间差异化定价策略这一现状,构建了传统供应链模式下制造商定价模型,证明了其采取地区差异化定价可以获得更多利润这一结论.研究了跨地区双渠道背景下制造商主导的供应链定价策略问题.分别通过理论和数值计算分析了制造商的3种不同定价策略对制造商和零售商的不同影响,并与基本定价策略下制造商和零售商利润进行比较分析,给出了相关结论.     

制造商质量投入竞争与合作的双渠道供应链动态博弈研究

针对具有不同质量投入和服务投入的双渠道供应链,主要研究其成员最优均衡决策问题.构建了包含两个制造商和一个零售商的两级双渠道供应链决策模型;采用微分博弈确定在制造商竞争和合作两种模型下各成员的最优均衡决策及其利润,并着重探讨质量投入系数、服务竞争系数和传统渠道市场占有率这三个关键参数对它们的影响;用算例对该模型进行仿真分析研究结果表明:在竞争模型下零售商的利润随着传统渠道市场占有率、质量投入竞争和服务竞争的增大而增大,但合作模型下的利润与服务竞争无关;制造商合作时制造商的利润之和提高,且两个制造商在两个渠道边际利润和之比在一定范围内,两个制造商会有合作意愿,但零售商的利润下降.研究能够为各成员企业的最优均衡决策提供支持和参考.     

质量信息更新下考虑顾客策略行为的供应链决策研究

研究单个制造商、单个零售商以及消费者组成的三级供应链系统的两阶段决策问题.探讨存在策略型消费者和消费者产生产品质量信息下,制造商零售商的价格策略和利润函数,并研究了质量信息下的消费者剩余,最后比较分析了存在消费者质量信息和不存在质量信息时的制造商零售商利润变化.研究表明,更多的产品质量信息对制造商是有利的,存在质量信息情况下,零售商的利润变化则是由其耐心水平和消费者的耐心水平决定,消费者剩余也会由于存在的质量信息而降低.     

权力结构影响下考虑预售的双渠道供应链决策研究

针对存在预售且通过网络与传统渠道销售的现实状况,基于消费者剩余理论和博弈论,构建不同权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈模型:制造商主导的Stackelberg、权力对等的Vertical Nash和零售商主导的Stackelberg。比较三种权力结构下各成员最优策略及绩效,分析关键因素的敏感性,检验模型的鲁棒性。研究发现:三种博弈下各权力主体的最优策略及绩效均受渠道替代程度、单位生产成本等关键因素影响。渠道替代程度越高,制定的双渠道价格越高;消费者对价格更敏感,预售市场需求呈现向现售市场转移的趋势。     

B2C模式下双渠道供应链定价策略研究

随着B2C模式的电子商务的发展与成熟,越来越多的企业引入了在线直销渠道与在线零售渠道的双渠道营销模式.如何制定有效的在线双渠道定价策略,实现不同在线渠道利益的均衡和渠道整体效益的最大化,成为企业需要解决的实际问题.构建了消费者效用函数模型和双渠道定价决策博弈模型,考察了消费者选择渠道的隐性成本和对在线渠道服务水平满意程度对双渠道定价决策的影响,对比了在线零售商与在线直销制造商分别在独立决策,零售商占主导地位和供应链纵向一体化的三种情况下的双渠道供应链定价策略.最后借助Matlab软件对决策模型进行了计算与仿真,为在线渠道内供应链中各成员的管理者制定最优的定价策略提供决策支持.     

利他偏好对双渠道供应链成员企业的策略影响研究

电子商务环境下,创新投入成为企业提升竞争优势的核心手段,而企业的偏好行为对其创新投入决策产生影响。本文探讨基于利他行为的供应链管理,通过在两类典型双渠道供应链研究中引入参与者的利他偏好,得到了供应商和零售商的均衡策略,并分析了利他偏好对均衡策略的影响。研究表明,当产品单位可变成本较低时,供应商和零售商的利他偏好有利于他方而不利于己方;当产品单位可变成本较高时,供应商和零售商的利他偏好只对己方有利而对他方不利。本研究在一定程度上揭示了供应链管理中利他行为存在的必要性和适度性,对促进供应链成员之间的合作具有积极意义。     

制造商公平偏好下双渠道闭环供应链定价与协调

将制造商公平偏好行为特征引入双渠道闭环供应链,针对非合作独立决策、完全合作联合决策两种不同情形分别建立相应的定价决策模型.运用博弈理论求得两种不同情形下的最优定价策略,并分析了公平偏好系数对供应链各成员最优定价策略及利润的影响.研究发现:制造商公平偏好行为特征能增强其讨价还价能力,但不利于提升供应链经济效益和社会绿色环保效益;非合作独立决策下的系统利润低于完全合作联合决策下的系统利润.为此,通过联合运用一个由批发价格、直销价格和回收转移价格组成的定价机制和一个两部定价补充协议对双渠道闭环供应链进行协调,可以实现双方的Pareto改进.     

Reverse channel decisions for a fuzzy closed-loop supply chain

This article reports the results of a study that explores the decisions of reverse channel choice in a fuzzy closed-loop supply chain. Specifically, a manufacturer produces new products by using original components or by remanufacturing used products and wholesales the new products to the retailer who then sells them to the consumers. The used products are collected by the manufacturer or the retailer or a third party. The primary goal of this paper is to investigate the implications of three different used-product collection modes on the decisions of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the third party, and on their own profits in the expected value model. By using game theory and fuzzy theory, the firms optimal strategies are obtained.     

A possibilistic decision model for new product supply chain design

This paper models supply chain (SC) uncertainties by fuzzy sets and develops a possibilistic SC configuration model for new products with unreliable or unavailable SC statistical data. The supply chain is modeled as a network of stages. Each stage may have one or more options characterized by the cost and lead-time required to fulfill required functions and may hold safety stock to prevent an inventory shortage. The objective is to determine the option and inventory policy for each stage to minimize the total SC cost and maximize the possibility of fulfilling the target service level. A fuzzy SC model is developed to evaluate the performance of the entire SC and a genetic algorithm approach is applied to determine near-optimal solutions. The results obtained show that the proposed approach allows decision makers to perform trade-off analysis among customer service levels, product cost, and inventory investment depending on their risk attitude. It also provides an alternative tool to evaluate and improve SC configuration decisions in an uncertain SC environment.     

双渠道模式下制造商线上定制策略研究

本文针对制造商在传统零售渠道和线上网络渠道同时销售标准产品的情况下,是否应该开放线上定制策略的相关问题进行分析。首先通过圆形市场模型完成市场划分;其次,在制造商不开放线上定制策略和开放线上定制策略两种情况下分别构建制造商和零售商利润最大化模型,得到了两种情况下的市场均衡结果。通过分析和比较两种情况下制造商和零售商的最优决策结果发现,当标准产品的边际生产成本较大且开放线上定制策略的成本较小时,制造商应该开放线上定制策略;制造商开放线上定制策略后,会使标准产品的批发价格和零售价格增加,并削弱零售商的利润;定制产品的生产成本越高,制造商开放定制产品的动机越小;消费者对标准产品的适应成本越高,制造商开放定制产品的动机越大。     

公平关切下参照价格效应的绿色供应链定价策略

以制造商主导的由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,基于消费者的参照价格构造了制造商公平关切、零售商公平关切和供应链成员均公平关切三种供应链模型,给出各模型下的最优定价策略,并分析了公平关切系数与消费者的参照价格效应对最优策略的影响。研究结果表明:公平关切系数与消费者的参照价格效应改变了产品的批发价格、绿色度水平和零售价格,且对供应链各成员以及整个供应链系统都产生了影响。     

Complexity analysis of dynamic noncooperative game models for closed-loop supply chain with product recovery

In this paper, we consider a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with product recovery, which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer is in charge of recollecting and the manufacturer is responsible for product recovery. The system can be regarded as a coupling dynamics of the forward and reverse supply chain. Under different decision criteria, two noncooperative game models: Stackelberg game model and peer-to-peer game model are developed. The dynamic phenomena, such as the bifurcation, chaos and sensitivity to initial values are analyzed through bifurcation diagrams and the largest Lyapunov exponent (LLE). The influences of decision parameters on the complex nonlinear dynamics behaviors of the two models are further analyzed by comparing parameter basin plots, and the results show that with the improvement of retailer’s competitive position, the CLSC system will be more easier to enter into chaos.     

Supply chain dynamic configuration as a result of new product development

This study considers supply chain network configuration in an innovative environment while the new product development (NPD) will affect the supply chain configuration (SCC). The time of new product introduction has a significant effect on the market performance while it has an effect on the supply chain configuration. Supplier integration into the new product introduction is the key parameter for successfully new product introduction, which may contribute to supply chain reconfiguration. Consequently By considering the new product development concept, we may face with dynamic supply chain configuration during a planning horizontal time. In this study, a new model is presented to consider the dynamic configuration of a supply chain by developing new products. In the proposed model, the dynamic configuration of a supply chain and the new product launching time is optimized simultaneously. The proposed model considers production, sales and transportation planning for the entire supply chain in order to achieve an integrative and efficient supply as well. Then some numerical analyses have been done to show the applicability of the proposed model. The results show that the new product development has a significant effect on the configuration of supply chain.     

Impact of product pricing and timing of investment decisions on supply chain co-opetition

In supply chain co-opetition, firms simultaneously compete and co-operate in order to maximize their profits. We consider the nature of co-opetition between two firms: The product supplier invests in the technology to improve quality, and the purchasing firm (buyer) invests in selling effort to develop the market for the product before uncertainty in demand is resolved. We consider three different decision making structures and discuss the optimal configuration from each firm’s perspective. In case 1, the supplier invests in product quality and sets the wholesale price for the product. The buyer then exerts selling effort to develop the market and following demand potential realization, sets the resale price. In case 2, the supplier invests in product quality followed by the buyer’s investment in selling effort. Then, after demand potential is observed, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. Finally, in case 3, both firms simultaneously invest in product quality and selling effort, respectively. Subsequently, observing the demand potential, the supplier sets the wholesale price and the buyer sets the resale price. We compare all configuration options from both the perspective of the supplier and the buyer, and show that the level of investment by the firms depends on the nature of competition between them and the level of uncertainty in demand. Our analysis reveals that although configuration 1 results in the highest profits for the integrated channel, there is no clear dominating preference on system configuration from the perspective of both parties. The incentives of the co-opetition partners and the investment levels are mainly governed by the cost structure and the level of uncertainty in demand. We examine and discuss the relation between system parameters and the incentives in desiging the supply contract structure.     

Revenue management for a supply chain with two streams of customers

In this paper, we consider revenue management for a service supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. The supplier has a limited capacity of a perishable product and both the supplier and the retailer face customers. Each customer may choose to buy a product from either the supplier or the retailer by considering prices and the cost associated with switching. For the centralized model, the supplier determines the selling prices for both herself and the retailer, and the retailer simply collects a commission fee for each product sold. We derive monotone properties for the revenue functions and pricing strategies. Further, we show that the commission fee increases the retailer’s price while decreasing the supplier’s and leads to efficiency loss of the chain. For the decentralized decision-making model, the supplier and the retailer compete in price over time. Two models are considered. In the first, the retailer buys products from the supplier before the selling season and in the second the retailer shares products with the supplier in retailing. For both models, we discuss the existence of the equilibrium and characterize the optimal decisions. Numerical results are presented to illustrate properties of the models and to compare the supply chain performance between the centralized and the decentralized models.     

Alternative supply chain production-sales policies for new product diffusion: An agent-based modeling and simulation approach

Applying agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) methodology, this paper analyzes the impact of alternative production-sales policies on the diffusion of a new generic product and the generated NPV of profit. The key features of the ABMS model, that captures the marketplace as a complex adaptive system, are: (i) supply chain capacity is constrained; (ii) consumers’ new product adoption decisions are influenced by marketing activities as well as positive and negative word-of-mouth (WOM) between consumers; (iii) interactions among consumers taking place in the context of their social network are captured at the individual level; and (iv) the new product adoption process is adaptive. Conducting over 1 million simulation experiments, we determined the “best” production-sales policies under various parameter combinations based on the NPV of profit generated over the diffusion process. The key findings are as follows: (1) on average, the build-up policy with delayed marketing is the preferred policy in the case of only positive WOM as well as the case of positive and negative WOM. This policy provides the highest expected NPV of profit on average and it also performs very smoothly with respect to changes in build-up periods. (2) It is critical to consider the significant impact of negative word-of-mouth in choosing production-sales policies. Neglecting the effect of negative word-of-mouth can lead to poor policy recommendations, incorrect conclusions concerning the impact of operational parameters on the policy choice, and suboptimal choice of build-up periods.