Teraoka-type two-person nonzero-sum silent duel

The paper discusses a silent nonzero-sum duel between two players each of whom has a single bullet. The duel is terminated at a random time in [0, 1] given by a cumulative distribution function. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium under a wide range of possible payoff values for simultaneous firing. This contrasts with a very similar game considered by Teraoka for which there are many Nash equilibria.This work was carried out while the second author was visiting the University of Southampton on a Postdoctoral Fellowship of The Royal Society of London.     

On a noisy-silent-versus-silent duel with equal accuracy functions

This paper deals with the noisy-silent-versus-silent duel with equal accuracy functions. Player I has a gun with two bullets and player II has a gun with one bullet. The first bullet of player I is noisy, the second bullet of player I is silent, and the bullet of player II is silent. Each player can fire their bullets at any time in [0, 1] aiming at his opponent. The accuracy function ist for both players. If player I hits player II, not being hit himself before, the payoff of the duel is +1; if player I is hit by player II, not hitting player II before, the payoff is –1. The optimal strategies and the value of the game are obtained. Although optimal strategies in past works concerning games of timing does not depend on the firing moments of the players, the optimal strategy obtained for player II depends explicitly on the firing moment of player I's noisy bullet.     

On the noisy-silent versus silent-noisy duel with equal accuracy functions

This paper deals with the noisy-silent versus silent-noisy duel with equal accuracy functions. Each of player I and player II has a gun with two bullets and he can fire his bullets at any time in [0, 1] aiming at his opponent. The first bullet of player I and the second bullet of player II are noisy, and the second bullet of player I and the first bullet of player II are silent. It is assumed that both players have equal accuracy functions. If player I hits player II, not being hit himself before, the payoff of the duel is +1; if player I is hit by player II, not hitting player II before, the payoff is ?1. The value of the game and the optimal strategies are obtained. We find that the firing time of the silent bullet by player II's optimal strategy depends directly on the firing time of player I's noisy bullet.     

Tactical problems involving uncertain actions

The purpose of this paper is to solve anm-silent versusn-silent duel with arbitrary accuracy functionsP andQ which are continuously differentiable in [0, 1] with positive derivatives in (0, 1) and such thatP(0)=Q(0)=0,P(1)(0, 1),Q(1)(0, 1). The game can be interpreted as a game in which the players know only that the numbers of their actions have binomial distribution.Part of this paper was written during the author's stay at the Institute of Statistics and Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe, FRG. The author wishes to thank Prof. S. Trybua, Technical University of Wrocaw, Poland, for helpful discussion in preparing the paper and Prof. D. Pallaschke, University of Karlsruhe, FRG, for help in preparing the numerical example.     

Games of timing with resources of mixed type

The paper considers a game of timing which is closely related to the so-called duels. This is a game connected with the distribution of resources by two players. Each of the players is in possession of some amount of resource to be distributed by him in the time interval [0, 1]. In his behavior, Player 1 is restricted by the necessity of taking all of his resources at a single point, while Player 2 has no restrictions. For the payoff function, defined as for duels, the game is solved; explicit formulas on the value of the game and the optimal strategies for the players are found.     

On a duel with time lag and equal accuracy functions

This paper deals with a duel with time lag that has the following structure: Each of two players I and II has a gun with one bullet and he can fire his bullet at any time in [0, 1], aiming at this opponent. The gun of player I is silent and the gun of player II is noisy with time lagt (i.e., if player II fires at timex, then player I knows it at timex+t). They both have equal accuracy functions. Furthermore, if player I hits player II without being hit himself before, the payoff is +1; if player I is hit by player II without hitting player II before, the payoff is –1; if they hit each other at the same time or both survive, the payoff is 0.This paper gives the optimal strategy for each player, the game value, and some examples.     

Product rule wins a competitive game

We consider a game that can be viewed as a random graph process. The game has two players and begins with the empty graph on vertex set . During each turn a pair of random edges is generated and one of the players chooses one of these edges to be an edge in the graph. Thus the players guide the evolution of the graph as the game is played. One player controls the even rounds with the goal of creating a so-called giant component as quickly as possible. The other player controls the odd rounds and has the goal of keeping the giant from forming for as long as possible. We show that the product rule is an asymptotically optimal strategy for both players.

     

On a duel with time lag and arbitrary accuracy functions

This paper deals with a two-person zero-sum game called duel with the following structure: Each of two players I and II has a gun with one bullet and he can fire his bullet at any time in [0, 1], aiming at his opponent. If I or II fires at timex, he hits his opponent with probabilityp (x) orq(x), respectively. The gun of I is silent, and hence, II does not know whether his opponent has fired or not, and the gun of II is noisy with time lagt, wheret is a positive constant,i.e., if II fires at timex then I knows it at timex +t. Further, if I hits II without being hit himself before, the payoff is 1; if I is hit by II without hitting II before, the payoff is ?1; if they hit each other at the same time or both survive, the payoff is 0. This paper gives optimal strategy for each player and the value of the game.     

A silent nversus 1 bullet duel with retreat after the shots

This paper is concerned with silent duel in which the first player has nbullets and the second one-one bullet. The accuracy functions are the same. It is assumed that each player removes to the back after firing all his bullets. The situation when players have different speeds are considered as well as that in which the speeds are the same. In both situations the optimal strategies are determined and the value of the game is found.     

Two-noisy-versus-one-silent duel with equal accuracy functions

This paper deals with the two-noisy-versus-one-silent duel which is still open, as pointed out by Styszyński (Ref. 1). Player I has a noisy gun with two bullets, and player II has a silent gun with one bullet. Each player fires his bullets aiming at his opponent at any time in [0, 1]. The accuracy function (the probability that one player hits his opponent if he fires at timet) isp(t)=t for each player. If player I hits player II, without being hit himself before, the payoff of the duel is +1; if player I is hit by player II, without hitting player II before, the payoff is taken to be ?1. In this paper, we determine the optimal strategies and the value of the game. The strategy for player II depends explicitly on the firing moment of player I's first shot.     

On Simple MIX game

We consider zero-sum game which is called Simple MIX game. Each of two players (I and II) draws a number (x andy respectively) according to a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. After observing his number each player can then choose to offer or not offer to exchange his number for the other player's number. Conditions for an exchange are the following: 1) both players must offer for a trade to occur with certainty; 2) if only one player offers, a trade occurs with probabilityp. A player's payoff is equal to 1, 0 or — 1 if the value of the number which he finally gets is greater, equal or less than the number of his opponent. In the present paper we shall investigate Simple MIX game in which both of the players can obtain additional information about the opponent's number. Besides, we consider two-stage variant of this game.     

Some problems in the theory of differential pursuit games in systems with distributed parameters

A game with dynamics described by partial differential equations is considered. The equations of the players are additively represented on the right-hand side and are subject to integral or pointwise restrictions. The goal of the first player, who is informed of the instantaneous value of the control of his partner, is to bring the system into an unperturbed state. To solve the problem the decomposition method developed in [1] for a controlled system (with one player) is used. Three combinations of restrictions on the players are considered. In all cases the control of the first player is presented explicitly. The main complication, compared with the problem considered previously [1] is that this control consists of two terms estimated in different norms.     

The Sequential Truel

The Sequential Truel is a three-person game which generalizes the simple duel. The players' positions are fixed at the vertices of an equilateral triangle, and they fire, in sequence, until there is only one survivor or until each survivor has fired a pre-specified number of times. The rules of the particular game may or may not permit the tactic of abstention, i.e. firing into the air. Several versions of Sequential Truel (with and without abstention) are examined here. It is found that, often, there is a single equilibrium point which can be called the solution of the truel for rational players. Quite frequently, the poorest marksman of the three has the greatest payoff at this equilibrium point.     

Equilibrium and Pareto-optimality in noisy discrete duels with an arbitrary number of actions

We study a nonzero-sum game of two players that is a generalization of the antagonistic noisy duel of discrete type. The game is considered from the point of view of various criteria of optimality. We prove the existence of ε-equilibrium situations and show that the ε-equilibrium strategies that we found are ε-maxmin. Conditions under which the equilibrium plays are Pareto-optimal are given. __________ Translated from Fundamentalnaya i Prikladnaya Matematika, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 147–155, 2007.     

On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games

We study the committee decision making process using game theory. Shenoy  [15] introduced two solution concepts: the one-core and the bargaining set, and showed that the one-core of a simple committee game is nonempty if there are at most four players. We extend this result by proving that whether the committee is simple or not, as far as there are less than five players, the one-core is nonempty. This result also holds for the bargaining set.     

Application of Atanassov’s I-fuzzy set theory to matrix games with fuzzy goals and fuzzy payoffs

We aim to extend some results in [6, 7, 8, 2] on two person zero sum matrix games (TPZSMG) with fuzzy goals and fuzzy payoffs to I-fuzzy scenario. Because the payoffs of the matrix game are fuzzy numbers, the aspiration levels of the players are fuzzy as well. It is reasonable to believe that there is some indeterminacy in estimating the aspiration levels of both players from their respective expected pay offs. This situation is modeled in the game using Atanassov??s I-fuzzy set theory. A new solution concept is proposed for such games and a procedure is outlined to obtain the degrees of suitability of the aspiration levels for each of the two players.     

Discounted Markov games; successive approximation and stopping times

This paper presents a number of successive approximation algorithms for the repeated two-person zero-sum game called Markov game using the criterion of total expected discounted rewards. AsWessels [1977] did for Markov decision processes stopping times are introduced in order to simplify the proofs. It is shown that each algorithm provides upper and lower bounds for the value of the game and nearly optimal stationary strategies for both players.     

Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals

We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of the two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was considered by Renault et al. [Renault, J., Scarlatti, S., Scarsini, M., 2005. A folk theorem for minority games. Games Econom. Behav. 53 (2), 208–230], who proved a folk theorem. Here we consider a discounted version and a finitely repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous result by showing that the set of equilibrium payoffs Hausdorff-converges to the feasible set as either the discount factor goes to one or the number of repetition goes to infinity. We show that the set of public equilibria for this game is strictly smaller than the set of private equilibria.     

More game-theoretic properties of boolean algebras

The following infinite game $\text{G}$ was investigated in [5]: Let B be a Boolean algebra. Two players, White and Black, take turns to choose successively a sequence     

Noisy duel with uncertain existence of the shot

The purpose of this paper is to discuss a noisy duel defined on the unit square in which both duelists have an uncertain knowledge about the existence of the shot fitted to their gun. This game ist solved as a two person zero-sum game under uncertainty.