Stationary,completely mixed and symmetric optimal and equilibrium strategies in stochastic games

In this paper, we address various types of two-person stochastic games—both zero-sum and nonzero-sum, discounted and undiscounted. In particular, we address different aspects of stochastic games, namely: (1) When is a two-person stochastic game completely mixed? (2) Can we identify classes of undiscounted zero-sum stochastic games that have stationary optimal strategies? (3) When does a two-person stochastic game possess symmetric optimal/equilibrium strategies? Firstly, we provide some necessary and some sufficient conditions under which certain classes of discounted and undiscounted stochastic games are completely mixed. In particular, we show that, if a discounted zero-sum switching control stochastic game with symmetric payoff matrices has a completely mixed stationary optimal strategy, then the stochastic game is completely mixed if and only if the matrix games restricted to states are all completely mixed. Secondly, we identify certain classes of undiscounted zero-sum stochastic games that have stationary optima under specific conditions for individual payoff matrices and transition probabilities. Thirdly, we provide sufficient conditions for discounted as well as certain classes of undiscounted stochastic games to have symmetric optimal/equilibrium strategies—namely, transitions are symmetric and the payoff matrices of one player are the transpose of those of the other. We also provide a sufficient condition for the stochastic game to have a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. We also provide examples to show the sharpness of our results.     

Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games

We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.     

Heterogeneous information lags and evolutionary stability

We investigate the effect of information lags in discrete time evolutionary game dynamics on symmetric games. At the end of each period, some players obtain information about the distribution of strategies among the entire population. They update their strategies according to this information. In contrast to the previous literature (e.g., Tao and Wang (1997)) where large delays lead to instability, we show that the relationship between information lags and the stability of equilibria is not “monotonic.” In anti-coordination games under smoothed best-response dynamics, a small probability of delay can stabilize the equilibrium, while a large probability can destabilize it.     

Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games

We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.Received October 2001/Revised May 2003     

Discrete-time analogues of integrodifferential equations modelling bidirectional neural networks

We formulate discrete-time analogues of integrodifferential equations modelling bidirectional neural networks studied by Gopalsamy and He. The discrete-time analogues are considered to be numerical discretizations of the continuous-time networks and we study their dynamical characteristics. It is shown that the discrete-time analogues preserve the equilibria of the continuous-time networks. By constructing a Lyapunov-type sequence, we obtain easily verifiable sufficient conditions under which every solution of the discrete-time analogue converges exponentially to the unique equilibrium. The sufficient conditions are identical to those obtained by Gopalsamy and He for the uniqueness and global asymptotic stability of the equilibrium of the continuous-time network. By constructing discrete-time versions of Halanay-type inequalities, we obtain another set of easily verifiable sufficient conditions for the global exponential stability of the unique equilibrium of the discrete-time analogue. The latter sufficient conditions have not been obtained in the literature of continuous-time bidirectional neural networks. Several computer simulations are provided to illustrate the advantages of our discrete-time analogue in numerically simulating the continuous-time network with distributed delays over finite intervals.     

Existence and Uniqueness of Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibria in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games

We present existence and uniqueness results for a hierarchical or Stackelberg equilibrium in a two-player differential game with open-loop information structure. There is a known convexity condition ensuring the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium, which was derived by Simaan and Cruz (Ref. 1). This condition applies to games with a rather nonconflicting structure of their cost criteria. By another approach, we obtain here new sufficient existence conditions for an open-loop equilibrium in terms of the solvability of a terminal-value problem of two symmetric Riccati differential equations and a coupled system of Riccati matrix differential equations. The latter coupled system appears also in the necessary conditions, but contrary to the above as a boundary-value problem. In case that the convexity condition holds, both symmetric equations are of standard type and admit globally a positive-semidefinite solution. But the conditions apply also to more conflicting situations. Then, the corresponding Riccati differential equations may be of H-type. We obtain also different uniqueness conditions using a Lyapunov-type approach. The case of time-invariant parameters is discussed in more detail and we present a numerical example.     

Nonzero-sum games for continuous-time Markov chains with unbounded transition and average payoff rates

This paper attempts to study two-person nonzero-sum games for denumerable continuous-time Markov chains determined by transition rates,with an expected average criterion.The transition rates are allowed to be unbounded,and the payoff functions may be unbounded from above and from below.We give suitable conditions under which the existence of a Nash equilibrium is ensured.More precisely,using the socalled "vanishing discount" approach,a Nash equilibrium for the average criterion is obtained as a limit point of a sequence of equilibrium strategies for the discounted criterion as the discount factors tend to zero.Our results are illustrated with a birth-and-death game.     

Novel results for global robust stability of delayed neural networks

This paper investigates the global robust convergence properties of continuous-time neural networks with discrete time delays. By employing suitable Lyapunov functionals, some sufficient conditions for the existence, uniqueness and global robust asymptotic stability of the equilibrium point are derived. The conditions can be easily verified as they can be expressed in terms of the network parameters only. Some numerical examples are also given to compare our results with previous robust stability results derived in the literature.     

Constructing bimatrix games with unique equilibrium points

We construct bimatrix games with prefixed equilibrium points in the mixed extension. The uniqueness conditions are studied and we obtain a wide class of games with unique arbitrary prefixed equilibrium points.     

Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium

We show on a 4×4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.     

Multi-player stopping games with redistribution of payoffs and BSDEs with oblique reflection

We examine the connections between a novel class of multi-person stopping games with redistribution of payoffs and multi-dimensional reflected BSDEs in discrete- and continuous-time frameworks. Our goal is to provide an essential extension of classic results for two-player stopping games (Dynkin games) to the multi-player framework. We show the link between certain multi-period m$m$-player stopping games and a new kind of m$m$-dimensional reflected BSDEs. The existence and uniqueness of a solution to continuous-time reflected BSDEs are established. Continuous-time redistribution games are constructed with the help of reflected BSDEs and a characterization of the value of such stopping games is provided.     

Global asymptotical stability of continuous-time delayed neural networks without global Lipschitz activation functions

This paper investigates the global asymptotic stability of equilibrium for a class of continuous-time neural networks with delays. Based on suitable Lyapunov functionals and the homeomorphism theory, some sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium point are derived. These results extend the previously works without assuming boundedness and Lipschitz conditions of the activation functions and any symmetry of interconnections. A numerical example is also given to show the improvements of the paper.     

Discontinuous differential equations,II

The concepts and results of the first part of this paper are applied in three situations: differential games, specifically feedback controls in a linear game with hyperplane target; an example of Nash equilibrium with feedback strategies; uniqueness properties, theorems, and stability with respect to measurement; control theory, specifically time-optimal feedback.     

Some interesting properties of maximin strategies

Since the seminal paper of Nash (1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. We study the properties of these strategies in non-zero-sum strategic games that possess (completely) mixed Nash equilibria. We find that under certain conditions maximin strategies have several interesting properties, some of which extend beyond 2-person strategic games. In particular, for n-person games we specify necessary and sufficient conditions for maximin strategies to yield the same expected payoffs as Nash equilibrium strategies. We also show how maximin strategies may facilitate payoff comparison across Nash equilibria as well as refine some Nash equilibrium strategies.     

Threat bargaining games with a variable population

In this paper we establish links between desirable properties satisfied by familiar solutions to bargaining games with a variable population and the Nash equilibrium concept for threat bargaining games. We introduce three new concepts for equilibrium threat strategies called strategic stability, strategic monotonicity with respect to changes in the number of agents and strategic constancy. Our primary objective in this paper is to show that familiar assumptions satisfied by bargaining games with a variable population yield equilibrium threat strategies which satisfies in a very natural way the concepts we have introduced.     

无限阶段网络博弈中合作解的策略稳定性

合作博弈的经典合作解不满足时间一致性, 并缺乏策略稳定性. 本文研究无限阶段网络博弈合作解的策略稳定性理论. 首先建立时间一致的分配补偿程序实现合作解的动态分配, 然后建立针对联盟的惩罚策略, 给出合作解能够被强Nash均衡策略支撑的充分性条件, 最后证明了博弈中的惩罚策略局势是强Nash均衡, 从而保证了合作解的策略稳定性. 作为应用, 考察了重复囚徒困境网络博弈中Shapley值的策略稳定性.     

On Nash Equilibrium Strategy of Two-person Zero-sum Games with Trapezoidal Fuzzy Payoffs

In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Based on fuzzy max order, Maeda and Cunlin constructed several models in symmetric triangular and asymmetric triangular fuzzy environment, respectively. We extended their models in trapezoidal fuzzy environment and proposed the existence of equilibrium strategies for these models. We also established the relation between Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and parametric bi-matrix game. In addition, numerical examples are presented to find Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy from bi-matrix game.     

Dynamics of a rate equation describing cluster-size evolution

In this paper, we show dynamics of Smoluchowski's rate equation which has been widely applied to studies of aggregation processes (i.e., the evolution of cluster-size distribution) in physics. We introduce dissociation in the rate equation while dissociation is neglected in previous works. We prove the positiveness of solutions of the equation, which is a basic guarantee for the effectiveness of the model since the possibility that some solution may be negative is excluded. For the case of cluster coalesce without dissociation, we show both the equilibrium uniqueness and the equilibrium stability under the condition that the monomer deposition stops. For the case that clusters evolve with dissociation and there is no monomer deposition, we show the equilibrium uniqueness and prove the equilibrium stability if the maximum cluster size is not larger than three while we show the equilibrium stability by numerical simulations if the maximum size is larger than three.     

Equilibrium in a war of attrition with an option to fight decisively

We develop a symmetric incomplete-information continuous-time two-player war-of-attrition game with an option to fight decisively. We show that there exists an essentially unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Under equilibrium, the game does not end immediately, and a costly delay persists even with the availability of the fighting option that ends the game if chosen. In addition, there exists a critical time in which a fight occurs unless a player resigns before that time.     

Limit Consistent Solutions in Noncooperative Games

Strong and limit consistency in finite noncooperative games are studied. A solution is called strongly consistent if it is both consistent and conversely consistent (Ref. 1). We provide sufficient conditions on one-person behavior such that a strongly consistent solution is nonempty. We introduce limit consistency for normal form games and extensive form games. Roughly, this means that the solution can be approximated by strongly consistent solutions. We then show that the perfect and proper equilibrium correspondences in normal form games, as well as the weakly perfect and sequential equilibrium correspondences for extensive form games, are limit consistent.