“齐王赛马＂的Nash谈判解

“齐王赛马”是一个典型的对策论例子,本文运用对策论相关知识,求出了“齐王赛马”的Nash谈判解．同时得出结论：齐王和田忌的期望收益正好与问题的Nash谈判解一致．     

求矩阵对策全部解的单纯形法

给出求矩阵对策全部解的一种单纯形法 ,并指出参考文献 [1 ]中的两个错误 .     

0-1对策的完全混合Nash均衡的代数求解法

将求解一般0-1策略对策的完全混合Nash均衡的问题转化为求解根为正的纯小数的高次代数方程组的问题.作为一种特殊而重要的情形,利用Pascal矩阵,Newton矩阵(对角元素为Newton二项式系数的对角矩阵)和Pascal-Newton矩阵(Pascal矩阵和Newton矩阵的逆阵的乘积)将求解对称0-1对策的完全混合Nash均衡的问题转化为求解根为正的纯小数的高次代数方程的问题,并给出第二问题的反问题(由完全混合Nash均衡求解对称0-1对策族)的求解方法.同时,给出了一些算例来说明对应问题的算法.     

关于矩阵2-范数的一个定理

证明了矩阵2-范数的一个定理.该定理指出了一类实方阵的2-范数恒不大于1.在未来的研究中,这个定理可以用来分析图像处理中的某些算法.     

三步矩阵对策上的无中生有计及其实例

基于一个历史实例及假定:①三步矩阵对策中赢得矩阵都不变,②每步都是局中人1先行动,③对于每步对策,局中人2观测不到对手究竟使用了何策略;但局中人1可以观测到对手所用的策略,建立了三步矩阵对策上的无中生有计(《三十六计》中的第七计)的对策模型.研究了当局中人2中计,半识破和完全识破对手的无中生有计时的赢得和所用的策略的情况.并用上述实例对模型作了说明.     

三对角矩阵求逆的算法

研究了一般的非奇三对角矩阵的求逆,并给出了一个求逆矩阵的简单算法.首先研究了具有Doolittle分解的三对角矩阵的求逆,得到一个求逆的算法,然后将该算法推广到一般的非奇三对角矩阵上.最后给出了该算法与其它求逆方法的比较,可以看到该算法一方面计算量低,另一方面适用于不需任何附加条件的一般的非奇三对角矩阵.     

求分块三对角矩阵和分块周期三对角矩阵逆矩阵的快速算法

给出了分块三对角矩阵逆矩阵的快速算法,并利用所给算法得到了求分块周期三对角矩阵逆矩阵的快速算法.最后通过算例表示算法的有效性.     

可压缩欧拉-泊松方程组平衡解的存在性

可压缩欧拉-泊松方程组描述的是具自引力势能气态星体内部气体的运动变化.对于满足质量守恒和能量守恒的一些速度场,本文在熵函数的光滑性较弱的条件下研究欧拉-泊松方程组平衡解的存在性.在本文中,作者应用变分方法得到6/5＜γ＜2时方程组平衡解的存在性结果.该结果减弱了关于非旋转星体欧拉-泊松方程组平衡解存在的条件,从而适用于更一般的物理环境.     

求三对角矩阵特征多项式一种简便方法

本文通过递推关系 ,直接给出求三对角矩阵特征多项式的一种简便方法 .该方法具有操作简单 ,计算量小的特点 .并给出算例 .     

一个矩阵方程的0-1矩阵解

本文给出矩阵方程XXT=mX有0-1矩阵解的充要条件以及解的置换合同等类.     

约束形式下广义最大元Nash均衡的存在性

运用广义最大元方法在非传递性偏好下给出了博弈均衡的存在性定理,推广了一些经典的博弈均衡存在性定理.在文中介绍策略式博弈的Nash均衡具有宽泛的条件,在微观经济理论中有广泛的应用.     

向量对策理想-Nash平衡点的存在性

本文采用向量优化问题中理想解的概念,定义向量对策理想-Nash平衡点,并证明这一平衡点的存在性．这一结果一方面体现了向量对策Pareto-Nash平衡点和弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性,同时,还给出了特殊的Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性．     

求解一类广义Nash均衡问题

Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is an important model that has many applications in practice. However, a GNEP usually has multiple or even infinitely many Nash equilibrium points and it is not easy to choose a favorable solution from those equilibria. This paper considers a class of GNEP with some kind of separability. We first extend the so-called normalized equilibrium concept to the stationarity sense and then, we propose an approach to solve the normalized stationary points by reformulating the GNEP as a single optimization problem. We further demonstrate the proposed approach on a GNEP model in similar product markets.     

流域水资源分配纳什均衡实现过程的进化博弈分析

由于有限理性，流域不同地区在水资源数量与质量分配上就不像完全理性情况下分析的那样，一开始就能找到最好的对策来直接实现纳什均衡。本运用进化博弈理论，说明有限理性的流域不同地区能够通过不断地学习、协调，逐步地提高自己的理性程度并相应地调整对策，来达到一个具有一致性的水资源数量与质量分配的纳什均衡。本的结论可为流域管理机构制定相应的水资源管理政策提供理论依据。     

公共物品私人供给的纳什均衡分析

按私人供给的决定方式,公共物品可以划分为三类,替代型、互补型和包含型。本采用博弈论的方法,通过模型对三种情况下参与方的供给决策行为进行分析,并求出纳什均衡解,章最后讨论了所求解的合理性,并通过比较提出了一些有益的结论和启示。     

一种n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性判别法

本首先给出了n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在的充要条件。然后给出n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性的一种判别方法。最后在判别纯策略纳什均衡存在的条件下，给出判定该静态博弈存在多少纯策略纳什均衡以及哪些纯策略组合是纯策略纳什均衡(解)的方法。     

On the Convergence to Nash Equilibrium in Problems of Distributed Computing

This paper studies two problems that arise in distributed computing. We deal with these problems from a game theoretical approach. We are interested in the convergence to the Nash equilibrium of algorithms based on the best reply strategy in a special case of linear costs. We present three specific types of algorithm that converge to the equilibrium. In our first model, composed of two processors, the convergence is established through monotonicity of the sequence of updates generated by each of the three algorithms. In the second model, made up of N processors, the convergence is due to the contraction of the algorithms.     

超级模数博弈的存在性

本文定义了一类在有序Banach空间上的超模博弈,并利用著名的Birkhoff不动点定理证明了有序Banach空间上超模博弈Nash均衡的存在性.     

The Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Point in an m-player Game “Shoot Later, Shoot First!”

We consider the following “silent duel” of m players with a possible economic interpretation. Each player has one “bullet”, which she can shoot at any time during the time interval [0,1]. The probability that the i-th player hits the “target” at moment t is given by an increasing accuracy function f _i (t). The winner is the player who hits the target first. Under natural assumptions on the functions f _i (t) we prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium point in this game, and we provide an explicit construction of this equilibrium. This construction allows us to obtain exact solutions for many specific examples. Some of them are presented.This work was partly supported by RBRF grants 03-01-00479.     

Finding a Nash equilibrium in noncooperativeN-person games by solving a sequence of linear stationary point problems

In this paper we present an algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative normal formN-person game. More generally, the algorithm can be applied for solving a nonlinear stationary point problem on a simplotope, being the Cartesian product of several simplices. The algorithm solves the problem by solving a sequence of linear stationary point problems. Each problem in the sequence is solved in a finite number of iterations. Although the overall convergence cannot be proved, the method performs rather well. Computational results suggest that this algorithm performs at least as good as simplicial algorithms do.For the special case of a bi-matrix game (N=2), the algorithm has an appealing game-theoretic interpretation. In that case, the problem is linear and the algorithm always finds a solution. Furthermore, the equilibrium found in a bi-matrix game is perfect whenever the algorithm starts from a strategy vector at which all actions are played with positive probability.This research is part of the VF-program Co-operation and Competition, which has been approved by the Netherlands Ministery of Education and Sciences.