部分信息下一类一主多从激励策略

本文研究在部分信息下,一主多从且从者之间非合作的激励问题,给出了寻找主者的激励策略的一般方法;并对线性二次情形提出了仿射型激励策略所应满足的充分条件.     

随机Nash平衡的存在性定理

本文利用Aumann的可测选择定理得到一些随机Nash平衡及随机权Nash平衡的存在性定理．     

多目标决策问题的博弈论方法初探

本通过对多目标决策中常用解法的改进，提出了运用博弈论的方法求解多目标评价的思想，讨论了相互冲突的目标决策和非合作博弈问题中的三种类型，并给出了相应的求解路径。     

图象拓扑下的Ky Fan引理解集的本质连通区及其在对策论上的应用

本文在集值映射的图象拓扑意义下,证明了赋范线性空间中的Ky Fan引理的解集的本质连通区的存在性,由此得到一类对策的Nash平衡点集的本质连通区的存在性.     

土木工程投标报价模型研究(英文)

本文主要研究单一不可分土木工程的n人投标报价模型.报价高低不是是否中标的唯一决定性因素,施工方案和工程报价为赢得工程施工合同共同发挥组合效应,并且在一定条件下,通过工程竟标,中标价会趋于Nash平衡.     

“齐王赛马＂的Nash谈判解

“齐王赛马”是一个典型的对策论例子,本文运用对策论相关知识,求出了“齐王赛马”的Nash谈判解．同时得出结论：齐王和田忌的期望收益正好与问题的Nash谈判解一致．     

管理中的Nash平衡与Braess悖论现象

本给出了交通规划、经济贸易以及其它管理中的一些Nash平衡和Braess悖论实例，分析了Nash平衡和Braess悖论现象及其本质特征，指出它们在管理工作中具有普遗性和潜在应用性。     

土木工程投标报价模型研究

本文主要研究单一不可分土木工程的n人投标报价模型,报价高低不是是否中标的唯一决定性因素,施工方案和工程报价为赢得工程施工合同共同发挥组合效应,并且在一定条件下,通过工程竞标,中标价会趋于Nash平衡。     

Finding a Nash equilibrium in noncooperativeN-person games by solving a sequence of linear stationary point problems

In this paper we present an algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative normal formN-person game. More generally, the algorithm can be applied for solving a nonlinear stationary point problem on a simplotope, being the Cartesian product of several simplices. The algorithm solves the problem by solving a sequence of linear stationary point problems. Each problem in the sequence is solved in a finite number of iterations. Although the overall convergence cannot be proved, the method performs rather well. Computational results suggest that this algorithm performs at least as good as simplicial algorithms do.For the special case of a bi-matrix game (N=2), the algorithm has an appealing game-theoretic interpretation. In that case, the problem is linear and the algorithm always finds a solution. Furthermore, the equilibrium found in a bi-matrix game is perfect whenever the algorithm starts from a strategy vector at which all actions are played with positive probability.This research is part of the VF-program Co-operation and Competition, which has been approved by the Netherlands Ministery of Education and Sciences.     

Strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games

We study strong stability of Nash equilibria in load balancing games of m(m 2)identical servers,in which every job chooses one of the m servers and each job wishes to minimize its cost,given by the workload of the server it chooses.A Nash equilibrium(NE)is a strategy profile that is resilient to unilateral deviations.Finding an NE in such a game is simple.However,an NE assignment is not stable against coordinated deviations of several jobs,while a strong Nash equilibrium(SNE)is.We study how well an NE approximates an SNE.Given any job assignment in a load balancing game,the improvement ratio(IR)of a deviation of a job is defined as the ratio between the pre-and post-deviation costs.An NE is said to be aρ-approximate SNE(ρ1)if there is no coalition of jobs such that each job of the coalition will have an IR more thanρfrom coordinated deviations of the coalition.While it is already known that NEs are the same as SNEs in the 2-server load balancing game,we prove that,in the m-server load balancing game for any given m 3,any NE is a(5/4)-approximate SNE,which together with the lower bound already established in the literature yields a tight approximation bound.This closes the final gap in the literature on the study of approximation of general NEs to SNEs in load balancing games.To establish our upper bound,we make a novel use of a graph-theoretic tool.     

On differential games with a feedback nash equilibrium

This note provides a lemma on differential games which possess a feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE). In particular, it shows that (i) a class of games with a degenerate FNE can be constructucted from every game which has a nondegenerate FNE and (ii) a class of games with a nondegenerate FNE can be constructed from every game which has a degenerate FNE.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee for invaluable comments and suggestions.     

本质连通区的存在性和稳定性

本文首先给出了一个统一的本质连通区的存在性定理．应用这个定理，容易地导出了不动点集和Nash平衡点集本质连通区的存在性定理．此外，还首先给出了一个统一的本质连通区的稳定性定理．     

集值映射的Nash平衡点集的通有稳定性

本文讨论了集值映射的Nash平衡点的存在及平衡点集的通有稳定性,得到大多数的集值映射的Nash平衡点集是稳定的。     

抽象凸空间中集值映射的不动点定理及其应用

A new fixed point theorem and the selection property for upper semi-continuous set-valued mappings in abstract convexity space are established. As their applications the existence of Nash equilibrium for n-person non-cooperative generalized games is proved.     

On Coincidence of Feedback Nash Equilibria and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games

The scope of the applicability of the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. First, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium and the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium are given in terms of the instantaneous payoff functions of the players and the state equations of the game. Second, a class of differential games representing the underlying structure of a good number of economic applications of differential games is defined; for this class of differential games, it is shown that the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium. The conclusion is that the feedback Stackelberg solution is generally not useful to investigate leadership in the framework of a differential game, at least for a good number of economic applications This paper was presented at the 8th Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games, and Nonlinear Dynamics: Theory and Applications in Economics and OR/MS, Vienna, Austria, May 14–16, 2003, at the Seminar of the Instituto Complutense de Analisis Economico, Madrid, Spain, June 20, 2003, and at the Sevilla Workshop on Dynamic Economics and the Environment, Sevilla, Spain, July 2–3, 2003. The author is grateful to the participants in these sessions, in particular F.J. Andre and J. Ruiz, for their comments. Five referees provided particularly helpful suggestions. Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia under Grant BEC2000-1432 is gratefully acknowledged.     

A note on equilibrium points of Green's function

We answer a question raised by Ahmet Sebbar and Thérèse Falliero (2007) by showing that for every finitely connected planar domain there exists a compact subset , independent of , containing all critical points of Green's function of with pole at .