Kinetic-growth self-avoiding walks on small-world networks

Kinetically-grown self-avoiding walks have been studied on Watts-Strogatz small-world networks, rewired from a two-dimensional square lattice. The maximum length L of this kind of walks is limited in regular lattices by an attrition effect, which gives finite values for its mean value 〈L 〉. For random networks, this mean attrition length 〈L 〉 scales as a power of the network size, and diverges in the thermodynamic limit (system size N ↦∞). For small-world networks, we find a behavior that interpolates between those corresponding to regular lattices and randon networks, for rewiring probability p ranging from 0 to 1. For p < 1, the mean self-intersection and attrition length of kinetically-grown walks are finite. For p = 1, 〈L 〉 grows with system size as N^1/2, diverging in the thermodynamic limit. In this limit and close to p = 1, the mean attrition length diverges as (1-p)^-4. Results of approximate probabilistic calculations agree well with those derived from numerical simulations.     

Cooperative dynamics of snowdrift game on spatial distance-dependent small-world networks

We investigate the evolution of cooperative behaviors of small-world networking agents in a snowdrift game mode, where two agents (nodes) are connected with probability depending on their spatial Euclidean lattice distance in the power-law form controlled by an exponent α. Extensive numerical simulations indicate that the game dynamics crucially depends on the spatial topological structure of underlying networks with different values of the exponent α. Especially, in the distance-independent case of α=0, the small-world connectivity pattern contributes to an enhancement of cooperation compared with that in regular lattices, even for the case of having a high cost-to-benefit ratio r. However, with the increment of α>0, when r≥0.4, the spatial distance-dependent small-world (SDSW) structure tends to inhibit the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game.     

Coevolution of game and network structure with adjustable linking

Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, in the real world, social interaction could change the relationship among people. And the change of social structure will also affect people’s strategies. We build a coevolution model of prisoner’s dilemma game and network structure to study the dynamic interaction in the real world. Differing from other coevolution models, players rewire their network connections according to the density of cooperation and other players’ payoffs. We use a parameter α to control the effect of payoff in the process of rewiring. Based on the asynchronous update rule and Monte Carlo simulation, we find that, when players prefer to rewire their links to those who are richer, the temptation can increase the cooperation density.     

Spatial Games Based on Pursuing the Highest Average Payoff

We propose a strategy updating mechanism based on pursuing the highest average payoff to investigate the prisoner＇s dilemma game and the snowdrift game. We apply the new rule to investigate cooperative behaviours on regular, small-world, scale-free networks, and find spatial structure can maintain cooperation for the prisoner＇s dilemma game. fn the snowdrift game, spatial structure can inhibit or promote cooperative behaviour which depends on payoff parameter. We further study cooperative behaviour on scale-free network in detail. Interestingly, non-monotonous behaviours observed on scale-free network with middle-degree individuals have the lowest cooperation level. We also find that large-degree individuals change their strategies more frequently for both games.     

Other-regarding preference and the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on complex networks

Prevailing models of the evolutionary prisoner’s game on networks always assume that agents are pursuing their own profit maximization. But the results from experimental games show that many agents have other-regarding preference. In this paper, we study the emergence of cooperation from the prisoner’s dilemma game on complex networks while some agents exhibit other-regarding preference such as inequality aversion, envious and guilty emotions. Contrary to common ideas, the simulation results show that the existence of inequality aversion agents does not promote cooperation emergence on a BA (Barabási and Albert) scale-free network in most situations. If the defection attraction is big and agents exhibit strong preference for inequality aversion, the frequency of cooperators will be lower than in situations where no inequality aversion agents exist. In some cases, the existence of the inequality agents will even induce the frequency of cooperators to zero, a feature which is not observed in previous research on the prisoner’s dilemma game when the underlying interaction topology is a BA scale-free network. This means that if an agent cares about equality too much, it will be difficult for cooperation to emerge and the frequency of cooperators will be low on BA networks. The research on the effect of envy or guilty emotions on the emergence of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game on BA networks obtains similar results, though some differences exist. However, simulation results on a WS (Watts and Strogatz) small-world network display another scenario. If agents care about the inequality of agents very much, the WS network favors cooperation emergence in the prisoners’ dilemma game when other-regarding agents exist. If the agent weight on other-regarding is lowered, the cooperation frequencies emerging on a WS network are not much different from those in situations without other-regarding agents, although the frequency of cooperators is lower than those of the situation without other-regarding preference agents sometimes. All the simulation results imply that inequality aversion and its variations can have important effects on cooperation emergence in the prisoner’s dilemma game, and different network topologies have different effects on cooperation emergence in the prisoner’s dilemma game played on complex networks.     

An effective method to improve the robustness of small-world networks under attack

In this study, the robustness of small-world networks to three types of attack is investigated. Global efficiency is introduced as the network coefficient to measure the robustness of a small-world network. The simulation results prove that an increase in rewiring probability or average degree can enhance the robustness of the small-world network under all three types of attack. The effectiveness of simultaneously increasing both rewiring probability and average degree is also studied, and the combined increase is found to significantly improve the robustness of the small-world network.Furthermore, the combined effect of rewiring probability and average degree on network robustness is shown to be several times greater than that of rewiring probability or average degree individually. This means that small-world networks with a relatively high rewiring probability and average degree have advantages both in network communications and in good robustness to attacks. Therefore, simultaneously increasing rewiring probability and average degree is an effective method of constructing realistic networks. Consequently, the proposed method is useful to construct efficient and robust networks in a realistic scenario.     

Evolutionary ultimatum game on complex networks under incomplete information

This paper studies the evolutionary ultimatum game on networks when agents have incomplete information about the strategies of their neighborhood agents. Our model assumes that agents may initially display low fairness behavior, and therefore, may have to learn and develop their own strategies in this unknown environment. The Genetic Algorithm Learning Classifier System (GALCS) is used in the model as the agent strategy learning rule. Aside from the Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world network and its variations, the present paper also extends the spatial ultimatum game to the Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free network. Simulation results show that the fairness level achieved is lower than in situations where agents have complete information about other agents’ strategies. The research results display that fairness behavior will always emerge regardless of the distribution of the initial strategies. If the strategies are randomly distributed on the network, then the long-term agent fairness levels achieved are very close given unchanged learning parameters. Neighborhood size also has little effect on the fairness level attained. The simulation results also imply that WS small-world and BA scale-free networks have different effects on the spatial ultimatum game. In ultimatum game on networks with incomplete information, the WS small-world network and its variations favor the emergence of fairness behavior slightly more than the BA network where agents are heterogeneously structured.     

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma on heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network

We focus on the heterogeneity of social networks and its role to the emergence of prevailing cooperators and sustainable cooperation. The social networks are representative of the interaction relationships between players and their encounters in each round of games. We study an evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game on a variant of Newman-Watts small-world network, whose heterogeneity can be tuned by a parameter. It is found that optimal cooperation level exists at some intermediate topological heterogeneity for different temptations to defect. That is, frequency of cooperators peaks at a certain specific value of degree heterogeneity — neither the most heterogeneous case nor the most homogeneous one would favor the cooperators. Besides, the average degree of networks and the adopted update rule also affect the cooperation level.     

Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Clustered Scale-Free Networks under Different Initial Distributions

The evolutionary prisoner＇s dilemma game is investigated under different initial distributions for cooperators and defectors on scale-free networks with a tunable clustering coefficient. It is found that, on the one hand, cooperation can be enhanced with the increasing clustering coefficient when only the most connected nodes are occupied by cooperators initially. On the other hand, if cooperators just occupy the lowest-degree nodes at the beginning, then the higher the value of the clustering coefficient, the more unfavorable the environment for cooperators to survive for the increment of temptation to defect. Thereafter, we analytically argue these nontrivial phenomena by calculating the cooperation probability of the nodes with different degrees in the steady state, and obtain the critical values of initial frequency of cooperators below which cooperators would vanish finally for the two initial distributions.     

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma Game Based on Pursuing Higher Average Payoff

We investigate the prisoner＇s dilemma game based on a new rule： players will change their current strategies to opposite strategies with some probability if their neighbours＇ average payoffs are higher than theirs. Compared with the cases on regular lattices （RL） and Newman-Watts small world network （NW）, cooperation can be best enhanced on the scale-free Barabasi-Albert network （BA）. It is found that cooperators are dispersive on RL network, which is different from previously reported results that cooperators will form large clusters to resist the invasion of defectors. Cooperative behaviours on the BA network are discussed in detail. It is found that large-degree individuals have lower cooperation level and gain higher average payoffs than that of small-degree individuals. In addition, we find that small-degree individuals more frequently change strategies than do large- degree individuals.     

Small World Properties Generated by a New Algorithm Under Same Degree of All Nodes

Based on the model of the same degree of all nodes we proposed before, a new algorithm, the so-called “spread all over vertices” (SAV) algorithm, is proposed for generating small-world properties from a regular ring lattices. During randomly rewiring connections the SAV is used to keep the unchanged number of links. Comparing the SAV algorithm with the Watts-Strogatz model and the “spread all over boundaries” algorithm, three methods can have the same topological properties of the small world networks. These results offer diverse formation of small world networks. It is helpful to the research of some applications for dynamics of mutual oscillator inside nodes and interacting automata associated with networks.     

Self-similarity, small-world, scale-free scaling, disassortativity, and robustness in hierarchical lattices

In this paper, firstly, we study analytically the topological features of a family of hierarchical lattices (HLs) from the view point of complex networks. We derive some basic properties of HLs controlled by a parameter q: scale-free degree distribution with exponent γ=2+ln 2/(ln q), null clustering coefficient, power-law behavior of grid coefficient, exponential growth of average path length (non-small-world), fractal scaling with dimension d_B=ln (2q)/(ln 2), and disassortativity. Our results show that scale-free networks are not always small-world, and support the conjecture that self-similar scale-free networks are not assortative. Secondly, we define a deterministic family of graphs called small-world hierarchical lattices (SWHLs). Our construction preserves the structure of hierarchical lattices, including its degree distribution, fractal architecture, clustering coefficient, while the small-world phenomenon arises. Finally, the dynamical processes of intentional attacks and collective synchronization are studied and the comparisons between HLs and Barabási-Albert (BA) networks as well as SWHLs are shown. We find that the self-similar property of HLs and SWHLs significantly increases the robustness of such networks against targeted damage on hubs, as compared to the very vulnerable non fractal BA networks, and that HLs have poorer synchronizability than their counterparts SWHLs and BA networks. We show that degree distribution of scale-free networks does not suffice to characterize their synchronizability, and that networks with smaller average path length are not always easier to synchronize.     

Delay-induced synchronization transitions in small-world neuronal networks with hybrid electrical and chemical synapses

We study the dependence of synchronization transitions in small-world networks of bursting neurons with hybrid electrical–chemical synapses on the information transmission delay, the probability of electrical synapses, and the rewiring probability. It is shown that, irrespective of the probability of electrical synapses, the information transmission delay can always induce synchronization transitions in small-world neuronal networks, i.e., regions of synchronization and nonsynchronization appear intermittently as the delay increases. In particular, all these transitions to burst synchronization occur approximately at integer multiples of the bursting period of individual neurons. In addition, for larger probability of electrical synapses, the intermittent synchronization transition is more profound, due to the stronger synchronization ability of electrical synapses compared with chemical ones. More importantly, chemical and electrical synapses can perform complementary roles in the synchronization of hybrid small-world neuronal networks: the larger the electrical synapse strength is, the smaller the chemical synapse strength needed to achieve burst synchronization. Furthermore, the small-world topology has a significant effect on the synchronization transition in hybrid neuronal networks. It is found that increasing the rewiring probability can always enhance the synchronization of neuronal activity. The results obtained are instructive for understanding the synchronous behavior of neural systems.     

Limited ability driven phase transitions in the coevolution process in Axelrod's model

We study the coevolution process in Axelrod's model by taking into account of agents' abilities to access information, which is described by a parameter α to control the geographical range of communication. We observe two kinds of phase transitions in both cultural domains and network fragments, which depend on the parameter α. By simulation, we find that not all rewiring processes pervade the dissemination of culture, that is, a very limited ability to access information constrains the cultural dissemination, while an exceptional ability to access information aids the dissemination of culture. Furthermore, by analyzing the network characteristics at the frozen states, we find that there exists a stage at which the network develops to be a small-world network with community structures.     

Naming game on small-world networks with geographical effects

The naming game model characterizes the main evolutionary features of languages or more generally of communication systems. Very recently, the combination of complex networks and the naming game has received much attention and the influences of various topological properties on the corresponding dynamical behavior have been widely studied. In this paper, we investigate the naming game on small-world geographical networks. The small-world geographical networks are constructed by randomly adding links to two-dimensional regular lattices, and it is found that the convergence time is a nonmonotonic function of the geographical distance of randomly added shortcuts. This phenomenon indicates that, although a long geographical distance of the added shortcuts favors consensus achievement, too long a geographical distance of the added shortcuts inhibits the convergence process, making it even slower than the moderates.     

A tree-like complex network model

We propose a new tree-like network model. Our results indicate that the tree-like model has a small-world effect with a small average path length and large clustering coefficient. Strikingly, our tree-like model is scale-free. We also add weight to the links following the network structure. With this adding-weight method, the weight of the nodes shows exponential growth, which is ubiquitous in social networks.     

小世界网络与无标度网络的社区结构研究

模块性(modularity)是度量网络社区结构(community structure)的主要参数.探讨了Watts和Strogatz的小世界网络(简称W-S模型)以及Barabàsi 等的B-A无标度网络(简称B-A模型)两类典型复杂网络模块性特点.结果显示，网络模块性受到网络连接稀疏的影响，W-S模型具有显著的社区结构，而B-A模型的社区结构特征不明显.因此，应用中应该分别讨论网络的小世界现象和无标度特性.社区结构不同于小世界现象和无标度特性，并可以利用模块性区别网络类型，因此网络复杂性指标应该包括 关键词： 模块性 社区结构 小世界网络 无标度网络     

Vibrational resonance in excitable neuronal systems

In this paper, we investigate the effect of a high-frequency driving on the dynamical response of excitable neuronal systems to a subthreshold low-frequency signal by numerical simulation. We demonstrate the occurrence of vibrational resonance in spatially extended neuronal networks. Different network topologies from single small-world networks to modular networks of small-world subnetworks are considered. It is shown that an optimal amplitude of high-frequency driving enhances the response of neuron populations to a low-frequency signal. This effect of vibrational resonance of neuronal systems depends extensively on the network structure and parameters, such as the coupling strength between neurons, network size, and rewiring probability of single small-world networks, as well as the number of links between different subnetworks and the number of subnetworks in the modular networks. All these parameters play a key role in determining the ability of the network to enhance the outreach of the localized subthreshold low-frequency signal. Considering that two-frequency signals are ubiquity in brain dynamics, we expect the presented results could have important implications for the weak signal detection and information propagation across neuronal systems.     

Networking effects on evolutionary snowdrift game in networks with fixed degrees

We study the effects of spatial structures other than the degree distribution on the extent of the emergence of cooperation in an evolutionary snowdrift game. By swapping the links in three different types of regular lattices with a fixed degree k, we study how the frequency of cooperator f_C changes as the clustering coefficient (CC), which signifies how the nearest neighbors of a vertex are connected, and the sharing coefficient (SC), which signifies how the next-nearest neighbors of a vertex are shared by the nearest neighbors, are varied. For small k, a non-vanishing CC tends to suppress f_C. A non-vanishing SC also leads to a suppressed f_C for the networks studied. As the degree increases, the sensitivity of f_C to the network properties is found to become increasingly weak. The result is discussed within the context of the ranking patterns of average payoffs as k changes. An approximation for f_C, which is based on the idea of a finite fully connected network and gives results in good agreement with numerical results, is derived in the limit of large k.     

Prisoner's Dilemma Game on Two Types of Positively Correlated Networks

We study the effects of degree correlations on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner＇s dilemma game with individuals located on two types of positively correlated networks. It is shown that the positive degree correlation can either promote or inhibit the emergence of cooperation depending on network configurations. Furthermore, we investigate the probability to cooperate as a function of connectivity degree, and find that high-degree individuals generally have a higher tendency to cooperate. Finally, it is found that small-degree individuals usually change their strategy more frequently, and such change is shown to be unfavourable to cooperation for both kinds of networks.