共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
In this paper, we consider power control for the uplink of a direct-sequence code-division multiple-access data network. In
the uplink, the purpose of power control is for each user to transmit enough power so that it can achieve the required quality
of service without causing unnecessary interference to other users in the system. One method that has been very successful
in solving this purpose for power control is the game-theoretic approach. The problem for power control is modified as a Nash
equilibrium problem in which each user can choose its transmit power in order to maximize its own utility, and a Nash equilibrium
is an ideal solution of the power-control game. We present a noncooperative power-control game in which each user can choose
the transmit power in a way that it gets the sufficient signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio and maximizes its own utility.
To ensure the existence of a solution, we also propose the variational inequality problem which is connected with the proposed
game. On a linear receiver, we deal with the matched filter receiver. Next we present a new ergodic algorithm for the proposed
power control because the existing iterative algorithms can not be applied effectively to the proposed power control. We also
present convergence analysis for the proposed algorithm. In addition, applying the proposed algorithm to the proposed power
control, we provide numerical examples for the transmit power, the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio and so on. Numerical
results for the proposed algorithm shall show that as compared with the existing power-control game and its method, all users
in the network can enjoy the sufficient signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio and achieve the required quality of service.
相似文献
2.
We propose two flexible game models to represent and analyze cases that cannot be modeled by current game models. One is called sharing creditability game (SCG) and the other is called bottomline game (BLG). The new models transform cooperative games into new games that incorporate auxiliary information (noncooperative in nature) usually neglected in previous theories. The new games will be solved only by traditional noncooperative game theory. When the new solutions are applied to the original games, the solutions can reflect the auxiliary information in addition to the original objectives of the decision makers or players. Generally, the new solutions are different from the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions of the original games. Existing transferable utility (TU) games and noncooperative games will coincide with special cases of the two new game models. Using SCG and BLG, the prisoner’s dilemma can be reformulated and a richer set of decisions can be considered for the players. The two new game models have potential applications in military and socioeconomic situations.This research was partly funded by the College Engineering, Ohio State University. 相似文献
3.
Meisam Razaviyayn Zhi-Quan Luo Paul Tseng Jong-Shi Pang 《Mathematical Programming》2011,129(2):197-224
We consider a cognitive radio system with one primary (licensed) user and multiple secondary (unlicensed) users. Given the
interference temperature constraint, the secondary users compete for the available spectrum to fulfill their own communication
need. Borrowing the concept of price from market theory, we develop a decentralized Stackelberg game formulation for power
allocation. In this scheme, the primary user (leader) announces prices for the available tones such that a system utility
is maximized. Using the announced prices, secondary users (followers) compete for the available bandwidth to maximize their
own utilities. We show that this Stackelberg game is polynomial time solvable under certain channel conditions. When the individual
power constraints of secondary users are inactive (due to strict interference temperature constraint), the proposed distributed
power control method is decomposable across the tones and unlike normal water-filling it respects the interference temperature
constraints of the primary user. When individual power constraints are active, we propose a distributed approach that solves
the problem under an aggregate interference temperature constraint. Moreover, we propose a dual decomposition based power
control method and show that it solves the Stackelberg game asymptotically when the number of tones becomes large. 相似文献
4.
M. Abbad R. El. Azouzi M. El. Kamili 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2006,63(3):461-471
In this paper we consider some properties on prices under flow control in a network that is to be shared by noncooperative users. Each user is faced with an optimization problem which is formulated as the minimization of its own criterion subject to constraint on the flows of the other users. The operating points of the network are the Nash equilibria of the underlying routing game. Our objective is to study the behavior of prices of all users when the network designer needs to allocate capacities to network links. For parallel links topologies, we show that degradation of the performances such as prices will not take place, as well as the users may find it beneficial to improve their requests 相似文献
5.
Rugnvaldur Hannesson 《Natural Resource Modeling》1995,9(1):51-59
Two agents control the areas in which a migrating fish stock is located. The harvesting is sequential. The stock available to Agent 1 depends on the growth of the stock, which in turn depends on the amount left after harvesting by Agent 2. The stock available to Agent 2 is the quantity left after harvesting by Agent 1. Each agent fishes down the stock in each period to an “abandonment level” deemed appropriate. The problem is analyzed as a noncooperative versus cooperative, repeated game with an infinite time horizon. In the noncooperative solution, both agents will harvest the stock if the unit cost of Agent 2 is not too much higher than the unit cost of Agent 1. A cooperative solution supported by a threat to revert to the noncooperative solution if deviation occurs implies greater differences in unit costs at which both agents will harvest the stock. The problem is illustrated by a simple, numerical example. 相似文献
6.
Shoude Li 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2014,163(2):642-659
Transboundary pollution is a particularly serious problem as it leads people located at regional borders to disproportionately suffer from pollution. In 2007, a cooperative differential game model of transboundary industrial pollution was presented by Yeung. It is the first time that time-consistent solutions are derived in a cooperative differential game on pollution control with industries and governments being separate entities. In this paper, we extend Yeung’s model to an even more general model, in which emission permits trading is taken into account. Our objective is to make use of optimal control theory to find the two regions’ noncooperative and cooperative optimal emission paths such that the regions’ discounted stream of net revenues is maximized. We illustrate the results with a numerical example. 相似文献
7.
8.
Ehud Kalai 《Mathematical Social Sciences》1981,1(4):375-379
In order to improve outcomes of one shot noncooperative games a formal procedure for conducting preplay negotiations is proposed. For the prisoners' dilemma game it is shown that all the perfect equilibrium in the induced game (the game with the preplays) yield the cooperative pay-off. For another game it is shown that all perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to be Pareto optimal as the number of preplays increases. 相似文献
9.
《Applied Mathematics Letters》2003,16(5):683-687
A cooperative game engendered by a noncooperative n-person game (the master game) in which any subset of n players may form a coalition playing an antagonistic game against the residual players (the surrounding) that has a (Nash equilibrium) solution, is considered, along with another noncooperative game in which both a coalition and its surrounding try to maximize their gains that also possesses a Nash equilibrium solution. It is shown that if the master game is the one with constant sum, the sets of Nash equilibrium strategies in both above-mentioned noncooperative games (in which a coalition plays with (against) its surrounding) coincide. 相似文献
10.
《European Journal of Operational Research》2001,135(3):527-544
In the literature of cooperative (co-op) advertising, the focus of research is on a relationship in which a manufacturer is the leader and retailers are followers. This relationship implies the dominance of the manufacturer over retailers. Recent market structure reviews have shown a shift of retailing power from manufacturers to retailers. Retailers have equal or even greater power than a manufacturer when it comes to retailing. Based on this new market phenomenon, we intend to explore the role of vertical co-op advertising efficiency with respect to transactions between a manufacturer and a retailer through brand name investments, local advertising expenditures, and sharing rules of advertising expenses. Three co-op advertising models are discussed which are based on two noncooperative games and one cooperative game. In a leader–follower noncooperative game, the manufacturer is assumed to be a leader who first specifies the brand name investment and the co-op subsidization policy. The retailer, as a follower, then decides on the local advertising level. In a noncooperative simultaneous move game, the manufacturer and the retailer are assumed to act simultaneously and independently. In a cooperative game, the system profit is maximized for every Pareto efficient co-op advertising scheme, but not for any other schemes. All Pareto efficient co-op advertising schemes are associated with a single local advertising level and a single brand name investment level, but with variable sharing policies of advertising expenses. The best Pareto efficient advertising scheme is obtained taking members' risk attitudes into account. Utilizing the Nash bargaining model, we discuss two situations that (a) both members are risk averse, and (b) both members are risk neutral. Our results are consistent with the bargaining literature. 相似文献
11.
Human beings have a prevailing drive to achieve their self-interest goals or equilibrium states, which may subsume their social interests. An ideal working environment or cooperative game situation would be one in which each participant or player maximizes his/her own interest while maximizing his/her contribution to the collective group interest. This paper addresses the feasibility, methods, and bounds for reframing a generaln-person game into an ideal game in which full cooperation or a targeted solution can be induced and maintained by the players' self-interest maximization. Criteria for good reframing are introduced. Monotonic games, self-interest cooperative and noncooperative games, and a decomposition theory of general games are also introduced to facilitate the study. It is shown that everyn-person game can be written as the sum of a self-interest cooperative game and a self-interest noncooperative game. Everyn-person game can be reframed so that full cooperation can be achieved by the players' self-interest maximization. Everyn-person game can be reframed so that a targeted solution can be obtained and maintained through the players' self-interest maximization. 相似文献
12.
《Operations Research Letters》2021,49(5):759-766
We consider a peer-to-peer electricity market, where agents hold private information that they might not want to share. The problem is modeled as a noncooperative communication game, which takes the form of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem, where the agents determine their randomized reports to share with the other market players, while anticipating the form of the peer-to-peer market equilibrium. In the noncooperative game, each agent decides on the deterministic and random parts of the report, such that (a) the distance between the deterministic part of the report and the truthful private information is bounded and (b) the expectation of the privacy loss random variable is bounded. This allows each agent to change her privacy level. We characterize the equilibrium of the game, prove the uniqueness of the Variational Equilibria and provide a closed form expression of the privacy price. Numerical illustrations are presented on the 14-bus IEEE network. 相似文献
13.
14.
A two-country differential game model of whaling is used for analysing a dynamic bargaining problem. At a given initial time, the two countries may either continue on a noncooperative mood of play characterized by an open-loop Nash-equilibrium, or negotiate a bargaining solution which we define as the Kalaï-Smorodinsky solution. The cooperative solution calls for a restraint in the whaling efforts which leaves a temptation to cheat for any player. The model shows how, by announcing a credible threat, namely to make whaling an ‘open-access’ fishery, a country can eliminate this temptation to cheat and transform the cooperative solution into an equilibrium. 相似文献
15.
Dr. E. B. Yanovskaya 《International Journal of Game Theory》1971,1(1):209-215
Noncooperative games in normal form and in characteristic function form are considered. The supergame of the noncooperative game is defined as an infinite sequence of plays of the original game. The notions of strong Pareto equilibrium point (s.p.e.p.) and essential core are introduced. A relationship between the essential core of a noncooperative game and the set of s.p.e.p. of its supergame is asserted. This result is similar to that ofAumann for cooperative games without side payments. 相似文献
16.
A simple model is proposed for collective bargaining during a strike. It is assumed that the rates of change of offer and demand depend on their current difference, and that both labor and management desire to minimize strike duration, but that the former wishes to maximize the final demand whereas the latter wishes to minimize the final offer. The resultant nonzero game is discussed, both for a noncooperative and a cooperative situation. 相似文献
17.
E. G. Gol’shtein 《Computational Mathematics and Mathematical Physics》2009,49(9):1483-1492
A noncooperative multiperson game can be associated with a mapping that generates a variational inequality. The problem of
searching for Nash points in the game is equivalent to solving this inequality. Numerical methods for solving the variational
inequality rely heavily on the monotonicity of the mapping generating the inequality. At the same time, the mapping associated
with the noncooperative multiperson game may not be monotone. Necessary and sufficient conditions are established under which
the mapping associated with a finite noncooperative mixed-strategy game of three or more persons is monotone. 相似文献
18.
The point of departure for this analysis is Bjørndal and Lindroos [2012], who developed an empirical bioeconomic model to analyze cooperative and noncooperative management of Northeast Atlantic cod. In their analysis, only constant strategies were analyzed for noncooperative games. In this paper, nonconstant strategies are considered. Moreover, the fishery in question is characterized by cooperative management. What may happen in the real world is that one nation breaks the cooperative agreement by fishing in excess of its quota. Often, it takes time for the other agent to detect this and respond. In this paper, we allow this kind of delayed response into a two‐agent noncooperative game so that, if country 2 exceeds its quota, there will be a time lag before this is detected by country 1; moreover, there may also be a delay until country 1 is able to respond. Results show that the outcome critically depends on the length of these two lags as well as initial conditions. 相似文献
19.
建立一个由两个制造商和一个零售商组成供应链模型,以求解制造商和零售商的最优定价决策,其中两个制造商向零售商批发的产品是不完美互补的,且零售商采取混合捆绑策略销售这两种产品。考虑三种情形下的决策:(1)完全非合作博弈;(2)局部合作博弈;(3)合作博弈。通过比较前两种情形下的决策,利用Nash协商模型求解得到消除水平和垂直供应链冲突的最优定价决策。与完全非合作博弈决策相比,局部合作博弈决策对制造商是有利的,在一定的条件下也可以实现对零售商收益的帕累托改进;而合作博弈决策在任何情况下都要明显地优于完全非合作博弈决策以及局部合作博弈决策,同时合作博弈决策下的最优产品需求量相比局部合作博弈决策下的最优产品需求量提高了一倍。最后,通过数值试验验证了文章所得结论。 相似文献