NONMALLEABLE CAPITAL AND EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF A NONRENEWABLE RESOURCE

Using a discrete-time model with nonmallable and durable capital embodied in a two-period recovery profile, we determine the efficient allocation of a nonrenewable resource and compare it with the corresponding Hotelling allocation for which capital is malleable. Depending on the recovery profile, efficient prices can rise strictly monotonically over time, rise in a stairwise fashion or rise in a sawtooth fashion around a rising price trend. Except for the sawtooth rise, this price behavior requires faster exhaustion than when capital is malleable, implying that the nonmalleability and durability of capital should not be ignored in nonrenewable resource models.     

COALITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Abstract We show that with symmetric agents, noncooperation is the only stable coalition structure in a fishery with more than two countries. In the case of asymmetric fishing nations, partial or full cooperation may be stable even if the number of countries exceeds two. These are important results for recent fisheries economics papers that have not allowed for coalition formation. As an example how of one can use the model, we study the problem of new entrants into Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). We show that depending on the economic structure of the fishery, new entrants may make cooperation more difficult or easier.     

ISSUES IN MULTISPECIES MODELS

ABSTRACT. It is generally acknowledged that models of population dynamics need to include realistic biological and statistical assumptions if they are to be of any use. The “realistic” complexity of these models is defined not only by the underlying biology but also by what the available data can reasonably determine. As complexity increases through inclusion of interactions, new issues arise which need to be resolved before these complex models can be reliably applied. Specific issues in new models for management include proper statistical fitting to the data and incorporation of time‐dependent and spatially explicit biological interactions. These current problem issues are presented in this paper and some potential solutions are discussed.     

EFFORT SUBSIDIES AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES

ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes a two-stage game, based on the Gordon-Schaefer model of the fishery, to examine the strategic entry-deterring role for effort subsidies in noncooper-ative transboundary fisheries. The game reveals that a country, whose domestic fleet has an effort cost advantage over a rival foreign fleet, may choose to subsidize domestic effort to the point that foreign entry in the fishery becomes unprofitable. Whether the outcome of the game is characterized by foreign entry deterrence or accommodation, and whether it is also characterized by a domestic effort subsidy or a tax, depends on domestic and foreign effort costs and the number of firms in each fleet. The various outcomes of the game analyzed here help to explain the persistence of subsidies in some world fisheries.     

STOCHASTIC OPTIMIZATION FOR MULTISPECIES FISHERIES IN THE BARENTS SEA

We present a multispecies stochastic model that suggests optimal fishing policy for two species in a three‐species predator–prey ecosystem in the Barents Sea. We employ stochastic dynamic programming to solve a three‐dimensional model, in which the catch is optimized by using a multispecies feedback strategy. Applying the model to the cod, capelin, and herring ecosystem in the Barents Sea shows that the optimal catch for the stochastic interaction model is more conservative than that implied by the deterministic model. We also find that stochasticity has a stronger effect on the optimal exploitation policy for prey (capelin) than for predator (cod).     

TWO INFORMATIONAL ISSUES IN RESOURCE MODELING

Neither the pattern of future resource demand nor the level of available supply is known with any great certainty. This paper quantifies the uncertainty in key demand and supply elements for the California Redwood Industry. The paper then shows that the loss to imperfect information about available supply is not very large.     

RESTRICTED COALITIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANIZATIONS

ABSTRACT. In this paper, we examine a game theoretic setting in which four countries have established a regional organization for the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks as recommended by the United Nations Agreement. These countries consist of two coastal states and two distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation. We are specifically interested in the effect of possible coalition restrictions on these shares. According to our results the distant water fishing nations, by individually refusing to join with the coastal states, can considerably improve their negotiation position if their harvesting costs are relatively high and similar. The results show that the DWFNs may have economic reasons for negotiating as a group against coastal states. However, if the coastal states are clearly more efficient than the DWFNs then coalition restrictions may be prevented by coastal states.     

POLITICS,ENVIRONMENT, AND FISHERIES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES

Pacific salmon have always been a lucrative commodity in Alaska history. The primary contribution of this paper is to assess the effects of statewide policy changes such as the 1959 Alaska Statehood and the 1974 Limited Entry Act on the harvest of Pacific salmon in Alaska, controlling for changes in oceanic environmental conditions such as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation. An autoregressive distributed lag approach is employed to annual time‐series data for 1899–1996. We find that, while the 1974 Limited Entry Act has a significant effect on Alaska salmon harvests, the 1959 Alaska Statehood had little impact. In addition, the oceanic environment has an important determinant of long‐run Alaska salmon harvests.     

CLIMATE CHANGE AND FISHERIES: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT IN ICELAND AND GREENLAND

ABSTRACT. . Climate changes in the 21st century are expected to significantly increase ocean temperatures and modify other oceanographic conditions in the North Atlantic. Marine biological research suggests that the impacts on the commercially most important fish stocks in the Icelandic‐Greenland ecosystem may well be quite substantial. This will obviously lead to a corresponding impact on the economies of these two countries. However, the timing, extent and biological impact of global warming is quite uncertain. As a result the economic impact is similarly uncertain. This paper attempts to provide estimates of the impact of altered fish stocks due to global warming on the Icelandic and Greenland economies. The approach is one of stochastic simulations. This involves essentially three steps. The first is to obtain predictions of the impact of global warming on fish stocks and the associated probability distribution. For this we rely on recent marine biological predictions. The second step is to estimate the role of the fisheries sector in the two economies. This is done with the help of modern econometric techniques based on economic growth theory and historical data. Obviously these estimates are also subject to stochastic errors and uncertainty. The third step is to carry out Monte Carlo simulations on the basis of the above model and the associated uncertainties. The result of the Monte Carlo simulations consists of a set of dynamic paths for GDP over time with an expected value and a probability distribution for each future year. On this basis it is possible to calculate confidence intervals for the most likely path of GDP over time. The results indicate that the fisheries impact of global warming on the Icelandic GDP is more likely to be positive than negative but unlikely to be of significant magnitude compared to historical economic growth rates and fluctuations. The uncertainty of this prediction, however, is large. For Greenland, the impact on fish stocks and the GDP is highly likely to be positive and quite substantial relative to the current GDP. Due to less knowledge of the relationship between the fisheries sector and the Greenland economy, however, the confidence interval of this prediction is even wider than in the case of Iceland.     

THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT STRATEGIC VARIABLES IN NONCOOPERATIVE FISHERIES GAMES

Abstract In this paper, we use stock size, harvest quantity, and fishing effort as strategic variables. We model a two‐agent noncooperative fishery game, where the agents (nations) harvest a common fish stock. The planning horizon is infinite. The model is solved successively using one instrument at a time as the strategic variable in the game. The net present values of fishing and the escapement stock level from the three different models are compared to show how the choice of variables affects the results. The choice of strategic variable is not a trivial one, as the results are shown to be sensitive to the discounting, the stock's rate of growth, and the assumptions about the distribution of the fish in response to harvesting.     

ON DEVELOPMENT,FISHERIES AND DYNAMITE: A BRIEF REVIEW OF TROPICAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT

Some features of underdevelopment in Third World countries are reviewed with emphasis on their impact on fisheries and fisheries management. Poverty in rural communities is highlighted as the key issue preventing rational management of tropical inshore fisheries and shown to be - along with (misguided) export-oriented development strategies - the root cause for destructive fishing techniques and environmental degradation. Some implications for modelling are outlined. A reorientation of investments towards job creation in fish-erfolk and other rural communities is advocated as the key aspect of any solution of fisheries problems in Third World countries.     

RANDOM PENALTIES AND RENEWABLE RESOURCES: A MECHANISM TO REACH OPTIMAL LANDINGS IN FISHERIES

Abstract Recent literature considers illegal landings a moral hazard problem that arises because individual landings are unobservable. The literature proposes incentive schemes to solve the information problem. However, most of the proposed schemes raise huge information requirements and social budget balance is not secured. In this paper, we suggest a random penalty mechanism that reduces the information requirements and secures budget balance in the case of a given number of licensed vessels. In the random penalty mechanism, aggregate landings are measured through stock sizes and the natural growth function. If aggregate landings are below optimal landings, each fisherman receives a subsidy. If aggregate catches are above optimal landings, the mechanism works such that either the fisherman is randomly selected and pays a fine or the fisherman is not selected and receives a subsidy. The fine and subsidy can be designed such that budget balance is secured. Provided risk aversion is sufficiently large and the fine is high enough, the random penalty mechanism will generate optimal individual landings. The budget balance combined with risk aversion drives the result for this advanced tax/subsidy system that does not exhaust the resource rents. The budget balance creates interdependence between fishermen that secure optimality.