防御差分功耗分析攻击技术研究

差分功耗分析(DPA)攻击依赖于密码芯片在执行加密/解密过程中功耗与数据及指令的相关性,利用统计学等方法对收集到的功耗曲线进行分析,盗取关键信息,对密码芯片的安全性构成极大威胁。防御DPA攻击技术的开发与研究,已经成为信息安全领域的迫切需求。该文在归纳DPA攻击原理的基础上,对主流防御DPA攻击技术的理论与设计方法进行概述与分析,指出防御DPA前沿技术的研究进展。重点讨论防御DPA攻击技术的原理、算法流程和电路实现,包括随机掩码技术、功耗隐藏技术、功耗扰乱技术等等,并详细分析这些技术存在的优缺点。最后,对该领域潜在的研究方向与研究热点进行探讨。     

能量分析攻击基本原理与实践验证

论文介绍了旁路攻击的一种方法:能量分析攻击。通过实践验证能量分析攻击的理论基础,并最终用DPA(DifferentialPowerAnalysis)破译了单片机实现的DES算法。     

DDOS攻击原理及其防御策略研究

阐述了DDOS攻击的原理;论述了目前主要的几种DDOS攻击方式即SYN／ACK Flood攻击。TCP全连接攻击和刷Script脚本攻击;针对这些主要的攻击方式提出了采用高性能的网络设备、尽量避免NAT的使用、使用网络和主机扫描工具检测脆弱性、采用网络入侵检测系统NIDS和探测器、增强操作系统的TCP／IP栈、速率限制法、调整服务器的各项参数等防御策略;并结合一个实际的DDOS攻击案例讨论了相应的解决措施．     

未来巡航导弹发展趋势及其防御策略

随着我国经济的不断发展,国家地位慢慢的到提高,增强我国的国防实力势在必行,是我国的重要的国策,巡航导弹在战争中占据着重要的地位,主要是实施远程打击,在大气层中巡航的导弹,从近几年的战争形势来考虑,巡航导弹的作用越来越明显,在战争中起着战略和战术作用,巡航导弹主要对地方的重要基地进行远程打击,既能起到精确打击的作用,又能整体上提升战斗力。各个国家对于巡航导弹的研究力度不断加大,本文谈一谈未来巡航导弹的发展趋势,以及对于巡航导弹的防御策略。     

计算机网络防御策略模型探析

建立了以Or-BAC模型为基础的计算机网络防御策略模型,该模型对检测、保护、响应等策略实现统一建模,并引入角色、视图自动分配方法来提高分配效率.     

计算机网络防御策略求精关键技术分析

伴随着我国计算机技术与应用范围的快速发展,计算机逐渐进入到人们的生活当中,并成为人们生活中不可缺失的一部分,也成为社会各领域之间发展的重点.计算机网络防御求精美技术对于网络安全性的发展有很大的影响,这也是种安全监测计算机网络的一种有效方法,在相关的基础之下,计算机网络需要构建出合理的防御模块,并且根据其安全性的主要特征,加强防御求精系统,有效的提高计算机网络运行的效率.     

计算机网络防御策略描述语言研究

随着不断发展的计算机信息网络,计算机给人们带来方便快捷的生活方式的同时也引起了网络安全问题如计算机网络容易受到病毒、黑客、恶意软件及其它不轨意图行为等的攻击。作为社会基础设施建设的重要组成部分的计算机网络,社会生活也越来越依赖计算机及网络系统。本文对计算机网络防御策略描述语言进行研究。     

计算机网络防御策略求精关键技术研究

网络技术在我们周围不断发展兴起,使得我们现代化社会已逐步迈向了信息化网络时代,人们对于计算机网络的应用也更为普遍。计算机网络为我们带来更多信息数据,为我们人类提供了极大地方便,但同时也造成了计算机网络安全方面的问题。加强计算机网络安全管理是人们使用计算机的过程中首先解决的问题,相关人员需要在计算机网络防御策略方面加强研究,并且实现求精关键技术,这样才能保护计算机网络的安全,从而为人们提供更优质化的拂去。     

网络攻击与防御策略分析研究

随着无线网络与通信技术的发展,网络攻击及安全防范问题显得尤为突出,本文从网络攻击的目的及危害性、网络攻击的方法及流程、网络安全策略、网络防范方法等方面作了详细阐述。     

Equalization attacks against OFDM: analysis and countermeasures

This paper introduces, investigates, and proposes power‐efficient equalization jamming attacks against the orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) and possible countermeasures. Signals known a priori, called pilot tones, are employed in the conventional OFDM‐based systems to estimate the channel response and perform equalization. Attacks against these pilot tones can hamper equalization and degrade target's performance. This paper begins with noise‐based pilot tone jamming and moves onto pilot nulling attack. The paper embraces two mitigation strategies of randomizing the pilot tones. The paper presents mathematical model of effective noise per symbol and simulation results for OFDM systems with conventional and randomized pilot‐tones under such attacks. The paper concludes that the noise‐based pilot tone attacks are power efficient than conventional attacks, and the pilot nulling is capable of doing the most damage, but in the expense of additional channel state information. The paper also claims that the mitigation strategies offer a remedy, but works relatively poorly when no jammer is present. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

等功耗编码算法的改进实现及抗功耗分析攻击研究

等功耗编码算法是一种既能提高算法效率,又能提高抗功耗分析攻击安全性的算法,但由于伪操作设计缺陷,原型算法在全零段时存在抗攻击弱点.经过对伪操作重新设计的优化改进,算法的安全性得到进一步加强.同时还给出了一种使用蒙哥马利算法的快速算法实现,在进一步提高算法效率的同时,并未削弱其安全性.在功耗测试平台上的实测结果也验证了该改进算法抗功耗分析攻击的有效性.     

Vulnerability modeling of cryptographic hardware to power analysis attacks

Designers and manufacturers of cryptographic devices are always worried about the vulnerability of their implementations in the presence of power analysis attacks. This article can be categorized into two parts. In the first part, two parameters are proposed to improve the accuracy of the latest hypothetical power consumption model, so-called toggle-count model, which is used in power analysis attacks. Comparison between our proposed model and the toggle-count model demonstrates a great advance, i.e., 16%, in the similarity of hypothetical power values to the corresponding values obtained by an analog simulation. It is supposed that the attacker would be able to build such an accurate power model. Thus, in the second part of this article we aim at evaluating the vulnerability of implementations to power analysis attacks which make use of our proposed power model. Simple power analysis, various types of differential power analysis, and correlation power analysis are taken into account. Then, some techniques are proposed to examine the vulnerability of implementations to such kinds of power analysis attacks.     

基于模板和KNN算法的能量分析攻击对比研究

能量分析攻击至今仍是针对密码芯片最具威胁的攻击方法之一,针对传统的模板分析攻击和KNN算法的攻击进行对比研究,对比模板攻击和机器学习中的KNN优缺点。首先对皮尔逊相关系数、互信息和最大信息系数、距离相关系数3种降维方法进行了研究;然后对比了相同数量功耗曲线下,特征点数量对两种能量分析的成功率等性能的影响;同时研究了不同降维技术在相同功耗曲线数量和不同功耗曲线数量时对两种能量分析攻击的影响。结果表明,模板攻击在运行速度、占用内存方面优于KNN算法攻击,而在攻击成功率和鲁棒性方面,KNN算法攻击具有更好的表现。     

A bi-channel voltage regulator protecting smart cards against power analysis attacks

The bi-channel voltage regulator proposed in this paper has been specifically developed for smart cards. Its purpose is to protect the supplied system against power analysis attacks. It generates the internal power supply voltage from the external power supply voltage provided by card readers, while ensuring the uncorrelation between the external power supply current and the internal power supply current. The power supply current of an electronic system can be decomposed into a DC component, which contains little information, and an AC component, which handles considerably more. In order to reach a good compromise between regulation and security, while respecting the smart card stringent technological constraints, these two components are treated separately by a bi-channel power structure. The presented implementation has been simulated from the process parameters of a STMicroelectronics 0.18 \upmum0.18\,\upmu\hbox{m} CMOS technology. It provides a 1.8 V output voltage from a 2 to 5.5 V input voltage range. The structure has been sized to handle a 25 mA DC current while hiding a 20 MHz AC current presenting 75 mA peaks. Its estimated area is approximatively 0.8 mm²0.8\,\hbox{mm}^2.     

PFM：一种抗高阶功耗攻击的SMS4算法

针对已有的SMS4功耗攻击方法,设计了一种适合低功耗小面积的固定值掩码SMS4算法.首先,对SMS4算法结构及内部加密运算流程进行研究;设计了一种SMS4原子掩码算法来抗高阶功耗攻击,该方法使各中间变量均被掩码;在此方法的基础上,为了减少芯片的面积和功耗以适应特殊环境下的加密应用(如特殊环境的传感器加密通信节点),提出了一种改进的固定值掩码算法:伪随机固定值掩码算法(PFM)及其实现技术.实验结果证明,该方法在芯片面积和功耗增加不大的情况下,可以有效抵抗二阶差分功耗攻击.     

可信平台芯片的一种硬件攻击防范设计

信息安全芯片已逐渐向SoC、平台芯片的方向发展，同时其面临的各种来自硬件攻击的威胁也渐渐增加，分析了常见的主动、被动式旁路攻击的手段和原理，并结合一款可信平台芯片的设计实例提出了一些有针对性的防范手段及实现方式。     

A survey on jamming attacks and countermeasures in WSNs

Jamming represents the most serious security threat in the field of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), as it can easily put out of order even WSNs that utilize strong highlayer security mechanisms, simply because it is often ignored in the initial WSN design. The objective of this article is to provide a general overview of the critical issue of jamming in WSNs and cover all the relevant work, providing the interested researcher pointers for open research issues in this field. We provide a brief overview of the communication protocols typically used in WSN deployments and highlight the characteristics of contemporary WSNs, that make them susceptible to jamming attacks, along with the various types of jamming which can be exercised against WSNs. Common jamming techniques and an overview of various types of jammers are reviewed and typical countermeasures against jamming are also analyzed. The key ideas of existing security mechanisms against jamming attacks in WSNs are presented and open research issues, with respect to the defense against jamming attacks are highlighted.     

区块链网络安全保障:攻击与防御

随着区块链技术的迅猛发展,区块链系统的安全问题正逐渐暴露出来,给区块链生态系统带来巨大风险.通过回顾区块链安全方面的相关工作,对区块链潜在的安全问题进行了系统的研究.将区块链框架分为数据层、网络层、共识层和应用层4层,分析其中的安全漏洞及攻击原理,并讨论了增强区块链安全的防御方案.最后,在现有研究的基础上展望了区块链安...     

Secure routing in wireless sensor networks: attacks and countermeasures

We consider routing security in wireless sensor networks. Many sensor network routing protocols have been proposed, but none of them have been designed with security as a goal. We propose security goals for routing in sensor networks, show how attacks against ad-hoc and peer-to-peer networks can be adapted into powerful attacks against sensor networks, introduce two classes of novel attacks against sensor networks––sinkholes and HELLO floods, and analyze the security of all the major sensor network routing protocols. We describe crippling attacks against all of them and suggest countermeasures and design considerations. This is the first such analysis of secure routing in sensor networks.