Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?

I consider two player games, where player 1 can use only pure strategies, and player 2 can use mixed strategies. I indicate a class of such games with the property that under public randomization both the discounted and the undiscounted finitely repeated perfect folk theorems do hold, but the discounted theorem does not without public randomization. Further, I show that the class contains games such that without public randomization the un-discounted theorem does not hold, as well as games such that without public randomization the undiscounted theorem does hold.I am grateful to Gita Gopinath for her close critical reading of an earlier version of the paper. I would like to acknowledge two anonymous referees for their detailed reports and suggestions. Financial support from the Foundation for Polish Science is also gratefully acknowledged.     

An intersection theorem in TU cooperative game theory

We prove a theorem on the intersection of the Weber sets (Weber, 1988) of two ordered cooperative games. From this theorem several consequences are derived, the inclusion of the core in the Weber set (Weber, 1988), the fact that every convex game has a large core (Sharkey, 1982), and a discrete separation theorem (Frank, 1982). We introduce a definition of general largeness, proving that the Weber set is large for any cooperative game.Institutional support from research grants SGR2001-0029 and BEC 2002-00642 is gratefully acknowledged.     

On Coincidence of Feedback Nash Equilibria and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games

The scope of the applicability of the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. First, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium and the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium are given in terms of the instantaneous payoff functions of the players and the state equations of the game. Second, a class of differential games representing the underlying structure of a good number of economic applications of differential games is defined; for this class of differential games, it is shown that the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium. The conclusion is that the feedback Stackelberg solution is generally not useful to investigate leadership in the framework of a differential game, at least for a good number of economic applications This paper was presented at the 8th Viennese Workshop on Optimal Control, Dynamic Games, and Nonlinear Dynamics: Theory and Applications in Economics and OR/MS, Vienna, Austria, May 14–16, 2003, at the Seminar of the Instituto Complutense de Analisis Economico, Madrid, Spain, June 20, 2003, and at the Sevilla Workshop on Dynamic Economics and the Environment, Sevilla, Spain, July 2–3, 2003. The author is grateful to the participants in these sessions, in particular F.J. Andre and J. Ruiz, for their comments. Five referees provided particularly helpful suggestions. Financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia under Grant BEC2000-1432 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Remarks on sensitive equilibria in stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure

A class of stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure is studied. For zero-sum games under some ergodicity assumptions 1-equilibria are shown to exist. They correspond to so-called sensitive optimal policies in dynamic programming. For a class of nonzero-sum stochastic games with nonatomic transitions nonrandomized Nash equilibrium points with respect to the average payoff criterion are also obtained. Included examples show that the results of this paper can not be extented to more general payoff or transition structure.     

Non-additive anonymous games

This paper introduces a class of non-additive anonymous games where agents are assumed to be uncertain (in the sense of Knight) about opponents’ strategies and about the initial distribution over players’ characteristics in the game. We model uncertainty by non-additive measures or capacities and prove the Cournot–Nash equilibrium existence theorem for this class of games. Equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized under milder conditions than in the case of additive games. In particular, it is not required for the space characteristics to be atomless under capacities. The set-valued map of the Cournot–Nash equilibria is upper-semicontinuous as a function of initial beliefs of the players for non-additive anonymous games.     

Sensitive equilibria for ergodic stochastic games with countable state spaces

We consider stochastic games with countable state spaces and unbounded immediate payoff functions. Our assumptions on the transition structure of the game are based on a recent work by Meyn and Tweedie [19] on computable bounds for geometric convergence rates of Markov chains. The main results in this paper concern the existence of sensitive optimal strategies in some classes of zero-sum stochastic games. By sensitive optimality we mean overtaking or 1-optimality. We also provide a new Nash equilibrium theorem for a class of ergodic nonzero-sum stochastic games with denumerable state spaces.     

Neighbor games and the leximax solution

Neighbor games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbor games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (Curiel et al. (1994)). We first present some elementary features of neighbor games. After that we provide a polynomially bounded algorithm of order p ³ for calculating the leximax solution (cf. Arin and Iñarra (1997)) of neighbor games, where p is the number of players. This authors work has been supported by CentER and the Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University and by the Foundation for the Hungarian Higher Education and Research (AMFK).     

The Shapley–Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games

In this paper we address multi-criteria simple games which constitute an extension of the basic framework of voting systems and related social-choice situations. For these games, we propose the extended Shapley–Shubik index as the natural generalization of the Shapley–Shubik index in conventional simple games, and establish an axiomatic characterization of this power index.     

A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide

It is well known that, in general, Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies do not coincide with those in closed-loop strategies. This note identifies a class of differential games in which the Nash equilibrium in closed-loop strategies is degenerate, in the sense that it depends on time only. Consequently, the closed-loop equilibrium is also an equilibrium in open-loop strategies.The helpful comments of Professors Y. C. Ho, G. Leitmann, H. Y. Wan, Jr., and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

A generalization of the Shapley–Ichiishi result

The Shapley–Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper, we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear inequalities with each equivalence class, and we show that the system defines the class. Application of this general theorem to the class of convex games yields an alternative proof of the Shapley–Ichiishi result. Other applications range from computation of stable sets in non-cooperative game theory to determination of classes of TU games on which the core correspondence is additive (even linear). For the case of convex games we prove that the theorem provides the minimal defining system of linear inequalities. An example shows that this is not necessarily true for other equivalence classes of balanced games.     

On solutions of generalized complementarity and eigenvector problems

From a new Fan–Browder type fixed point theorem due to the second author, we deduce an existence theorem for a solution of an equilibrium problem in Section 3. This theorem is applied to generalized complementarity problems in Section 4 and to eigenvector problems in Section 5.     

Dynamic common property resources and environmental problems

Problems of interacting common-property resources are set up as stochastic differential games. A class of models is solved where equilibrium closed-loop strategies keep harvest rates proportional to stocks. Corrective taxes, etc., are considered.Dedicated to G. LeitmannEarlier versions of this paper (Ref. 1) were presented at the International Conference on Economics and Control, Cambridge University, England, June 18–21, 1979, and at the Winter Econometric Society Meetings, Atlanta, Georgia, December 1978. Space limitations shortened this paper; a complete working paper is available from the authors. The authors would like to extend their appreciation to George Leitmann, who first introduced them to differential games.     

An exponential differential game which admits a simple Nash solution

This paper deals with a class ofN-person nonzero-sum differential games where the control variables enter into the state equations as well as the payoff functionals in an exponential way. Due to the structure of the game, Nash-optimal controls are easily determined. The equilibrium in open-loop controls is also a closed-loop equilibrium. An example of optimal exploitation of an exhaustible resource is presented.The helpful comments of Professor Y. C. Ho and Dipl. Ing. E. Dockner are gratefully acknowledged.     

Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention

It is well known that he influence relation orders the voters the same way as the classical Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices do when they are extended to the voting games with abstention (VGA) in the class of complete games. Moreover, all hierarchies for the influence relation are achievable in the class of complete VGA. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we show that all hierarchies are achievable in a subclass of weighted VGA, the class of weighted games for which a single weight is assigned to voters. Secondly, we conduct a partial study of achievable hierarchies within the subclass of H-complete games, that is, complete games under stronger versions of influence relation.     

Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games

A multi-choice game is a generalization of a cooperative game in which each player has several activity levels. Cooperative games form a subclass of the class of multi-choice games.This paper extends some solution concepts for cooperative games to multi-choice games. In particular, the notions of core, dominance core and Weber set are extended. Relations between cores and dominance cores and between cores and Weber sets are extensively studied. A class of flow games is introduced and relations with non-negative games with non-empty cores are investigated.     

The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games

This paper studies two classical solution concepts for the structure of bicooperative games. First, we define the core and the Weber set of a bicooperative game and prove that the core is always contained in the Weber set. Next, we introduce a special class of bicooperative games, the so-called bisupermodular games, and show that these games are the only ones in which the core and the Weber set coincide.      

超级模数博弈的存在性

本文定义了一类在有序Banach空间上的超模博弈,并利用著名的Birkhoff不动点定理证明了有序Banach空间上超模博弈Nash均衡的存在性.     

Focal points and bargaining

This is a contribution to the growing experimental literature on how trial-and-error adjustment processes can establish a convention for coordination on an equilibrium in a game. A simple bargaining game introduced by Nash is used for this purpose. Subjects are conditioned in different treatments to use four different bargaining solutions. The stability of the conditioning is then studied as the bargaining game is played over an extended period. The data obtained is unusually sharp. In the long run, the median subject behaves as though optimizing often down to a fraction of a penny. The results are therefore not supportive of the view that strategic considerations in such situations can be neglected in favor of a study of fairness norms. Indeed, the equilibrium actually achieved in a session turns out to be a very good predictor of what the median subject says is fair in the game after play is over.We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for funding the experiments reported in this paper under Grant NSF-SES-8821521. We also gratefully acknowledge funding from the University of Michigan to set up the Michigan Economics Laboratory, where the experiments were conducted. We would also like to thank Richard Stallman and the Free Software Foundation for developing EMACS, Luke Tierney for developing LISPSTAT, and Hal Varian for showing us how to use both.     

A note on Berge equilibrium

This work is a contribution on the problem of the existence of Berge equilibrium. Abalo and Kostreva give an existence theorem for this equilibrium that appears in the papers [K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Berge equilibrium: Some recent results from fixed-point theorems, Appl. Math. Comput. 169 (2005) 624–638; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge equilibria, Appl. Math. Lett. 17 (2004) 569–573]. We found that the assumptions of these theorems are not sufficient for the existence of Berge equilibrium. Indeed, we construct a game that verifies Abalo and Kostreva’s assumptions, but has no Berge equilibrium. Then we provide a condition that overcomes the problem in these theorems. Our conclusion is also valid for Radjef’s theorem, which is the basic reference for [K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Berge equilibrium: Some recent results from fixed-point theorems, Appl. Math. Comput. 169 (2005) 624–638; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Some existence theorems of Nash and Berge equilibria, Appl. Math. Lett. 17 (2004) 569–573; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Fixed points, Nash games and their organizations, Topol. Methods Nonlinear Anal. 8 (1996) 205–215; K.Y. Abalo, M.M. Kostreva, Equi-well-posed games, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 89 (1996) 89–99].