Multiple criterion management of a sequential fishery

A static stochastic simulation was used to assess the performance of alternative management strategies in the satisfaction of multiple objective criteria in the context of a sequentially exploited transboundary resource. The model was applied to the Yukon River chum salmon (Oncorhynchus keta) fishery. Four strategies were evaluated using three criteria: probability of satisfying escapement objectives; probability of jointly satisfying escapement and subsistence harvest objectives; and probability of simultaneously reaching escapement, subsistence and commercial harvest objectives. The modeled strategies were also compared with the actual performance of the fishery for 1980–1995. The results indicate that satisfaction of escapement and subsistence harvest goals in the middle Yukon depends on imposing restrictive limits on commercial harvests in the lower Yukon. However, even with full information, escapement objectives in the upper drainage are only satisfied 65–70% and 75–80% of the time for summer and fall chum, respectively. The model was also used to explore the effects of increased average run strength that could arise from reduced bycatch of Yukon origin chum in marine fisheries. The results suggest that reduced marine interceptions are unlikely to substantially increase the probability of satisfying catch and escapement goals for the middle and upper Yukon.     

MODELS FOR COOPERATION AND CONSPIRACY IN FISHERIES: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

Fisheries regulation is considered necessary to counteract the effects of competitive forces which can lead to a “tragedy of the commons”. Yet management initiatives have often failed because they did not take into account competitive responses of fishing enterprises. In particular, open access fisheries provide strong incentives for the development of excessive harvesting capacity. This in turn leads to harvesting that is concentrated in space and time, with adverse effects on both the resource and markets. A coalition of fishermen, such as a fishermen's cooperative, has interests similar to those of a sole owner, and thus would be expected to produce more efficient behaviour. In practice, however, fishermen's cooperatives seldom persist. Game theory is used to explore relationships between the coalition structure of the industry, economic variables, and regulation. The models are based loosely on a purse seine fishery for herring. The results suggest that the potential to form stable coalitions is affected by changes in price and harvest. Changes in regulation also affect stability of coalitions. When interpreted in the light of historical changes in the herring fishery, these results suggest that industry may not accept regulations which do not permit formation of stable coalitions.     

Endogenous optimization fisheries models

This paper deals with a special class of fisheries models referred to as endogenous optimization models. The distinctive feature of these models is that behaviour of the agents in the model is not predetermined by exogenous behavioural rules. In endogenous optimization models, the model agents are merely furnished with objectives such as profit or utility maximization. Given these objectives and the various constraints determined by the state of the model at each point of time, the agents solve their maximization problem. The corresponding values of their control variables then constitute their behaviour.Having generated individual agents' behaviour by endogenous optimization, summing over agents yields aggregate behaviour. Aggregate behaviour must conform with the overall constraints of the model, be they physical or otherwise. Within the market system, individual behaviour or rather plans are made compatible via changes in relative prices. Therefore, outside equilibrium, behavioural plans must be repeatedly modified to become mutually compatible. This implies iteratively solving the maximization problem of a number of different agents. Endogenous optimization models therefore tend to be computationally very demanding.Clearly, the basic principles of endogenous optimization are just as applicable to any model involving maximizing agents.     

Optimal control systems with state variable jump discontinuities

Consideration is given to continuous-time, parameter-dependent optimal control problems with state-variable jump discontinuities atN variable interior times. A maximum principle involving known costate jump conditions is stated and is proved by transforming the problem into a standard Mayer control problem. An illustrative example for fisheries management is included.This work was partially supported by a grant from Control Data. The authors are grateful to Professor T. L. Vincent for drawing their attention to Refs. 4–6 listed below.     

OPTIMAL RECOVERY OF A SHARED RESOURCE STOCK: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL WITH EFFICIENT MEMORY EQUILIBRIA

We consider an optimal two-country management of depleted transboundary renewable resources. The management problem is modelled as a differential game, in which memory strategies are used. The countries negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient harvesting programs. They monitor the evolution of the agreement, and they memorize deviations from the agreement in the past. If the agreement is observed by the countries, they continue cooperation. If one of the countries breaches the contract, then both countries continue in a noncooperative management mode for the rest of the game. This noncooperative option is called a threat policy. The credibility of the threats is guaranteed by their equilibrium property. Transfer or side payments are studied as a particular cooperative management program. Transfer payments allow one country to buy out the other from the fishery for the purpose of eliminating the inefficiency caused by the joint access to the resources. It is shown that efficient equilibria can be reached in a class of resource management games, which allow the use of memory strategies. In particular, continuous time transfer payments (e.g., a share of the harvest) should be used instead of a once-and-for-all transfer payment.