MARINE PROTECTED AREAS IN THE HIGH SEAS AND THEIR IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL FISHING AGREEMENTS

Abstract Marine protected areas (MPAs) are gaining momentum as tools within fisheries management. Although many studies have been conducted to their use and potential, only few authors have considered their use in the High Seas. In this paper, we investigate the effects of fish growth enhancing MPAs on the formation of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) for highly migratory fish stocks. We argue that in absence of enforcement MPAs constitute a weakest‐link public good, which can only be realized if everyone agrees. We combine this notion with a game theoretic model of RFMO formation to derive potentially stable RFMOs with and without MPAs. We find that MPAs generally increase the parameter range over which RFMOs are stable, and that they increase stability in a number of cases as compared to the case without MPAs. They do not necessarily induce a fully cooperative solution among all fishing nations. In summary, results of this paper suggest a positive role for MPAs in the High Seas.     

MODELING A RIGHTS‐BASED APPROACH FOR MANAGING HABITAT IMPACTS OF FISHERIES

ABSTRACT. Limiting adverse consequences of fishing on essential fish habitat has emerged as a key fishery management objective. The conventional approach to providing habitat protection is to create MPAs or marine reserves that prohibit all or certain types of fishing in specific areas. However, there may be more cost‐effective and flexible ways to provide habitat protection. We propose an individual habitat quota (IHQ) system for habitat conservation that would utilize economic incentives to achieve habitat conservation goals cost‐effectively. Individual quotas of habitat impact units (HIU) would be distributed to fishers with an aggregate quota set to maintain a target habitat “stock.” HIU use would be based on a proxy for marginal habitat damage. We use a dynamic, explicitly spatial fishery and habitat simulation model to explore how such a system might work. We examine how outcomes are affected by spatial heterogeneity in the fishery and the scale of habitat regulation. We find that the IHQ system is a highly cost‐effective means of ensuring a given level of habitat protection, but that spatial heterogeneity and the scale of regulation can have significant effects on the distribution of habitat protection.     

A MODEL FOR THE BIOECONOMIC EVALUATION OF MARINE PROTECTED AREA SIZE AND PLACEMENT IN THE NORTH SEA

ABSTRACT. The use of marine protected areas (MPAs) as a basic management tool to limit exploitation rates in marine fisheries has been widely suggested. Models are important in predicting the consequences of management decisions and the design of monitoring programs in terms of policy goals. However, few tools are available that consider both multiple fleets and ecosystem scale dynamics. We use a new applied game theory tool, Ecoseed, that operates within a temporally and spatially explicit biomass dynamics model, Ecopath with Ecosim, to evaluate the efficacy of marine protected areas in the North Sea in both ecological and economic terms. The Ecoseed model builds MPAs based on the change in values of predicted economic rents of fisheries and the existence value of biomass pools in the ecosystem. We consider the market values of four fisheries operating in the North Sea: a trawl fishery, a gill net fishery, a seine fishery, and an industrial (reduction) fishery. We apply existence values, scaled such that their aggregate is similar to the total fishery value, to six biomass pools of concern: juvenile cod, haddock, whiting, saithe, seals, and the collective pool ‘Other predators’ that include marine mammals. Four policy options were considered: to maximize the rent only; to maximize the existence values only; to maximize the sum of the rent and existence values; and, finally, to maximize the sum of the rent and the existence values, but excluding only the trawl fleet from the MPA. The Ecoseed model suggests that policy goals that do not include ecological considerations can negatively impact the rents obtained by the different fishing sectors. The existence values will also be negatively impacted unless the MPA is very large. The Ecoseed model also suggests that policy goals based solely on existence values will negatively impact most fisheries. Under policy options that included ecological considerations, maximum benefits were derived from an MPA that covered 25–40% of the North Sea, placed along the southern and eastern coasts. Finally, the Ecoseed model suggests that an exclusion of the trawl fishery only from the MPA can provide small‐to‐substantial positive impacts to most species and fleets; this relative impact depends on level of interaction between the trawl fleet and the other fleets target species (e.g., through bycatch).     

STEADY STATE AND INTERTEMPORAL MANAGEMENT MODELS FOR MARINE FISHERIES

Abstract Steady state and dynamic management models are developed for analyzing the Malaysian marine fisheries. These models originate from the theoretical concepts of the natural resource economics namely the open access, limited entry and the intertemporal fishery models. Such management models are deemed necessary because of the need to sustain the depleting resource and degrading environment. Marine fisheries had been managed under open access for a long time before government intervention took effect sometime during the 1960s. Open access and government intervention during the earlier phase of economic development contributed to the immediate pressure on fisheries. Community development programs geared to alleviate poverty among the fishermen apparently contradicted the effort of sustaining fisheries. Even today this fundamental management objective of sustainable development of fishery resource is not fully adhered to. This study suggests that ability to sustain fishery requires government intervention that can direct resource use to steady state or intertemporal optimal levels.     

DEA-based predictors for estimating fleet size changes when modelling the introduction of rights-based management

The introduction of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) into a fishery is going to change not only the amount of catch a fleet can take, but often also changes the fleet structure, particularly if total allowable catches are decreased. This can have an impact on the economic, social and environmental outcomes of fisheries management. Management Strategy Evaluation (MSE) modelling approaches are recognised as the most appropriate method for assessing impacts of management, but these require information as to how fleets may change under different management systems. In this study, we test the applicability of data envelopment analysis (DEA) based performance measures as predictors of how a fishing fleet might change under the introduction of ITQs and also at different levels of quota. In particular, we test the assumption that technical efficiency and capacity utilisation are suitable predictors of which boats are likely to exit the fishery. We also consider scale efficiency as an alternative predictor. We apply the analysis to the Torres Strait tropical rock lobster fishery that is transitioning to an ITQ-based management system for one sector of the fishery. The results indicate that capacity utilisation, technical efficiency and scale efficiency are reasonable indicators of who may remain in the fishery post ITQs. We find that the use of these measures to estimate the impacts of lower quota levels provides consistent fleet size estimates at the aggregate level, but which individual vessels are predicted to exit is dependent on the measure used.     

FISHERIES AND MARINE PROTECTED AREAS: A SPATIAL BIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS

Abstract Marine protected areas (MPAs), used increasingly as a tool for conservation of ocean and coastal environments, typically interact with fisheries. Indeed, implementation of an MPA in a coastal region will likely affect fishing communities along that coast but to differing degrees depending on their location relative to the MPA. The resulting creation of “winners” and “losers” has implications for the acceptance and long‐term viability of the MPA. This paper develops a spatially explicit bioeconomic simulation model to assess the distributional implications resulting from creation of a no‐take MPA. The key assumption is that this results in certain fishers being displaced from the MPA to new fishing locations, leading to decreased fishing time and increased costs. Is it possible for those being displaced to end up as “winners” in the fishery? Analysis of the model indicates that such an outcome can occur in certain circumstances, notably if the biological effects of the MPA produce (i) improved ecosystem health inside the MPA, such that fish stock carrying capacity increases; or (ii) to some extent, high fish stock migration rates between neighboring areas. The results indicate that in creating MPAs, careful attention to their design is needed in order to deal with corresponding distributional impacts on fishing communities.     

THE OPTIMAL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES: GAME THEORETIC CONSIDERATIONS

One of the most ubiquitous of the fishery management problems to have arisen as a result of E.F.J. is that of managing transboundary resources. Economic analysis of this problem rests upon models blending the standard dynamic economic analysis of fisheries with game theory. The analysis reveals that noncooperation is likely to have severe economic consequences and that cooperative arrangements must deal with possible conflicting goals of management, as well as the division of economic returns from the fishery. While the existing economic analysis of transboundary fishery management is far from complete, it can be shown that the analysis is capable of providing important insights into existing real world cases of transboundary resource management.     

A model of rational equilibrium in quota-regulated multiple-species fisheries

This paper derives rational ecological–economic equilibrium outcomes—capital and variable input allocations, harvests, discards, revenue, costs, and stock abundances—in a spatially heterogeneous, multispecies fishery that is regulated with individual fishing quotas (IFQs). The production setting is decentralized; a manager chooses species-specific, seasonal, and spatially nondelineated quotas. Industry controls all aspects of harvesting operations. We present a solution concept and computational algorithm to solve for equilibrium harvests, discards, and profits across species, space, and time (within the regulatory cycle). The rational equilibrium mapping that we derive, used recursively, can be used to implement management-preferred bioeconomic outcomes. The model offers an essential IFQ regulation-to-outcome mapping that enables more precise implementation of management goals in multiple-species and heterogeneous fishery settings. Recommendations for Resource Managers Knowing where and when individual tradeable fishing quotas will be utilized across heterogeneous space and time in multiple-species fisheries is essential for effective fisheries management. Ad hoc models, while simple, contribute to “implementation uncertainty” whereby predicted mortality, discards, cost, and rent outcomes across fish species, space, and time are poorly matched to the realized outcomes that are implemented by resource users. A model of rational equilibrium mortality, discards, costs, and rent across space and time offers and powerful tool to improve the management of quota-regulated fisheries.     

MARINE PROTECTED AREA PERFORMANCE IN A MODEL OF THE FISHERY

ABSTRACT. What bio‐economic benefits can be expected from the implementation of marine protected areas (MPAs) in a fishery facing a shock in the form of recruitment failure, and managed jointly compared to separately? What are the optimal sizes of MPAs under cooperation and non‐cooperation? I explore these questions in the current paper by developing a computational two‐agent model, which incorporates MPAs using the North East Atlantic codfishery as an example. Results from the study indicate that MPAs can protect the discounted economic rent from the fishery if the habitat is likely to face a shock, andfishers have a high discount rate. The total standing biomass increases with increasing MPA size but only up to a point. Basedon the specifics of the model, the study also shows that the economically optimal size of MPA for cod varies between 50 70% depending on (i) the exchange rate between the protectedandunprotectedareas of the habitat; (ii) whether fishers behalf cooperatively or non‐cooperatively; and(iii) the severity of the shock that the ecosystem may face.     

A MODEL OF TROPICAL MARINE RESERVE‐FISHERY LINKAGES

ABSTRACT. The excessive and unsustainable exploitation of our marine resources has led to the promotion of marine reserves as a fisheries management tool. Marine reserves, areas in which fishing is restricted or prohibited, can offer opportunities for the recovery of exploited stock and fishery enhancement. In this paper we examine the contribution of fully protected tropical marine reserves to fishery enhancement by modeling marine reserve‐fishery linkages. The consequences of reserve establishment on the long‐run equilibrium fish biomass and fishery catch levels are evaluated. In contrast to earlier models this study highlights the roles of both adult (and juvenile) fish migration and larval dispersal between the reserve and fishing grounds by employing a spawner‐recruit model. Uniform larval dispersal, uniform larval retention and complete larval retention combined with zero, moderate and high fish migration scenarios are analyzed in turn. The numerical simulations are based on Mombasa Marine National Park, Kenya, a fully protected coral reef marine reserve comprising approximately 30% of former fishing grounds. Simulation results suggest that the establishment of a fully protected marine reserve will always lead to an increase in total fish biomass. If the fishery is moderately to heavily exploited, total fishery catch will be greater with the reserve in all scenarios of fish and larval movement. If the fishery faces low levels of exploitation, catches can be optimized without a reserve but with controlled fishing effort. With high fish migration from the reserve, catches are optimized with the reserve. The optimal area of the marine reserve depends on the exploitation rate in the neighboring fishing grounds. For example, if exploitation is maintained at 40%, the ‘optimal’ reserve size would be 10%. If the rate increases to 50%, then the reserve needs to be 30% of the management area in order to maximize catches. However, even in lower exploitation fisheries (below 40%), a small reserve (up to 20%) provides significantly higher gains in fish biomass than losses in catch. Marine reserves are a valuable fisheries management tool. To achieve maximum fishery benefits they should be complemented by fishing effort controls.     

ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL MARINE RESERVES WITHOUT SPATIAL HETEROGENEITY IN A SIMPLE TWO‐PATCH MODEL

Bioeconomic analyses of spatial fishery models have established that marine reserves can be economically optimal (i.e., maximize sustainable profit) when there is some type of spatial heterogeneity in the system. Analyses of spatially continuous models and models with more than two discrete patches have also demonstrated that marine reserves can be economically optimal even when the system is spatially homogeneous. In this note we analyze a spatially homogeneous two‐patch model and show that marine reserves can be economically optimal in this case as well. The model we study includes the possibility that fishing can damage habitat. In this model, marine reserves are necessary to maximize sustainable profit when dispersal between the patches is sufficiently high and habitat is especially vulnerable to damage.     

THE VALUE OF SHORT‐RUN CLIMATE FORECASTS IN MANAGING THE COASTAL COHO SALMON (ONCORHYNCHUS KISUTCH) FISHERY IN WASHINGTON STATE

ABSTRACT. . In recent years our understanding of the intricate connections between climate variability, marine and freshwater environmental conditions and the responses of fish stocks has improved considerably. With predictable relationships between the environment and stock abundance, fishery managers should be able to forecast variation in stock survival and recruitment. Such forecasts present an opportunity for increasing the economic value of fisheries and for achieving other management objectives, such as stock conservation and maintenance of population diversity. After describing a 4‐step framework for addressing the question ‘What is a forecast worth?’ in a fishery decision‐making context, we introduce the management system for Washington's coastal coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch) fishery. Then we apply the 4‐step framework to estimate the value of improved run size forecasts in the annual harvest management of coho salmon in Washington State. Our principal analytical tool is a stochastic simulation model that incorporates the main characteristics of the fishery. The paper concludes with a discussion of opportunities and constraints to the use of climate‐based forecasts in fishery management on various spatial and temporal scales, and we consider the challenges associated with forecasting variations in fish stock size caused by shifts in climate and related ocean conditions.     

THE FAO PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH AFTER ALMOST 10 YEARS: HAVE WE PROGRESSED TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING SIMULATION‐TESTED FEEDBACK‐CONTROL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT?

ABSTRACT. It is almost ten years since the FAO Technical Consultation on the Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries took place in Lysekil, Sweden. One outcome from this Technical Consultation was a set of guidelines on the precautionary approach to capture fisheries and species introductions. These guidelines include the need to incorporate harvest control rules in management plans. Harvest control rules should specify what action is to be taken when specified deviations from the operational targets and constraints are observed. The specification should include minimum data requirements for the types of assessment methods to be used for decision‐making. Combinations of harvest control rules, assessment methods and data collection schemes are referred to as management procedures. It is now well‐recognized that using management procedures is likely to lead to improved conservation of fishery resources, and that they should be evaluated to assess whether they are likely to achieve the goals for fishery management given the types of uncertainties that are likely to frustrate this venture. In general, evaluation of management procedures has been based on simulation modeling. This paper reviews the progress that has been made in various fisheries jurisdictions in terms of implementing management procedures, and why and where it has proved difficult or even impossible to implement management procedures.     

OPTIMAL-SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF MULTI-SPECIES FISHERIES: LESSONS FROM A PREDATOR-PREY MODEL

ABSTRACT. In this paper we consider the meaning of sustainable resource management in multi-dimensional resources. Based on the principle of intergenerational fairness, we define fisheries management as sustainable if it does not lead to a decline in the net present value of the fishery. If sustainability, or intergenerational fairness, were held as an obligation by fishery managers, then the traditional present-value maximization objective would be constrained. Using numerical solutions to a simple predator-prey model, we explore how the optimal-sustainable management of this fishery would differ from management that seeks to maximize the present value of the benefits. General lessons regarding the meaning of sustainable fishery management are discussed.     

FISHING YIELD,CURVATURE AND SPATIAL BEHAVIOR: IMPLICATIONS FOR MODELING MARINE RESERVES

ABSTRACT. Given a paucity of empirical data, policymakers are forced to rely on modeling to assess potential impacts of creating marine reserves to manage fisheries. Many modeling studies of reserves conclude that fishing yield will increase (or decrease only modestly) after creating a reserve in a heavily exploited fishery. However, much of the marine reserves modeling ignores the spatial heterogeneity of fishing behavior. Contrary to empirical findings in fisheries science and economics, most models assume explicitly or implicitly that fishing effort is distributed uniformly over space. This paper demonstrates that by ignoring this heterogeneity, yield‐per‐recruit models systematically overstate the yield gains (or understate the losses) from creating a reserve in a heavily exploited fishery. Conversely, at very low levels of exploitation, models that ignore heterogeneous fishing effort overstate the fishing yield losses from creating a reserve. Starting with a standard yield‐per‐recruit model, the paper derives a yield surface that maps spatially differentiated fishing effort into total long‐run fishing yield. It is the curvature of this surface that accounts for why the spatial distribution of fishing effort so greatly affects predicted changes from forming a reserve. The results apply generally to any model in which the long‐run fishing yield has similar curvature to a two‐patch Beverton‐Holt model. A simulation of marine reserve formation in the California red sea urchin fishery with Beverton‐Holt recruitment, eleven patches, and common larval pool dispersal dynamics reinforces these results.     

MODELS FOR COOPERATION AND CONSPIRACY IN FISHERIES: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

Fisheries regulation is considered necessary to counteract the effects of competitive forces which can lead to a “tragedy of the commons”. Yet management initiatives have often failed because they did not take into account competitive responses of fishing enterprises. In particular, open access fisheries provide strong incentives for the development of excessive harvesting capacity. This in turn leads to harvesting that is concentrated in space and time, with adverse effects on both the resource and markets. A coalition of fishermen, such as a fishermen's cooperative, has interests similar to those of a sole owner, and thus would be expected to produce more efficient behaviour. In practice, however, fishermen's cooperatives seldom persist. Game theory is used to explore relationships between the coalition structure of the industry, economic variables, and regulation. The models are based loosely on a purse seine fishery for herring. The results suggest that the potential to form stable coalitions is affected by changes in price and harvest. Changes in regulation also affect stability of coalitions. When interpreted in the light of historical changes in the herring fishery, these results suggest that industry may not accept regulations which do not permit formation of stable coalitions.     

Sustainable Yield Analysis in a Multicohort Single-species Fishery: A Mathematical Programming Approach

The concept of sustainable yield, i.e. the fish catch that can be maintained in the long run from a fishery in a steady state, is widely used in fisheries management. In traditional methods of sustainable yield analysis, based on the Schaefer model of a fish stock, the age structure of the stock is ignored. Approaches based on the Beverton-Holt multicohort fish population model take account of age structure but assume that instantaneous natural and fishing mortality rates are constant throughout the year. Using a fish population model in which this assumption is not required, a mixed integer programming model is developed for the analysis of a multicohort single-species fishery in a steady state. This new method of sustainable yield analysis is demonstrated using data for the western mackerel fishery. Comparisons with results from other studies of this fishery are presented.     

OPTIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF MEDITERRANEAN DEMERSAL FISHERIES

Research and management actions are reviewed with respect to demersal fisheries of the Mediterranean since the Second World War, as reflected in the activities of the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean, (GFCM). The scientific background to the priority concern expressed for minimum size limits in the 1960's and 1970's is discussed, and in particular, the mesh selectivity experiments that formed the basis for yield per recruit calculations, with respect to the trawl fishery. More recent considerations, changing our perception of the appropriateness of size at first capture of demersal fish as a management tool in trawl fisheries, are reviewed. It is concluded that for multispecies fisheries where the first priority for fishing effort control is not respected, size limits based on size at maturity, rather than yield per recruit criteria, are more feasible, but that changes in mesh size need to take into account subsequent changes in equity between inshore and offshore fleets, and changes in species composition and areas of distribution during the life history. They also need to consider the high landed value of small fish in many Mediterranean fisheries. Alternative, or supplementary, measures to mesh size regulation that affect capture of small fish are also reviewed, including seasonal closures, closed areas, bans on trawling inshore, and regulations on minimum size at sale. A range of problems to be considered prior to deciding on an increase in mesh size are reviewed, including changes in total effort exerted, changes in increases in fishing power (and especially the impacts on the spawning stock), changes in discard rate, “meshing” of small fish, and indirect mortality during fishing. A strategy for introducing new mesh sizes is suggested, with emphasis, where possible, on the experimental approach, and on supplementary measures to control fishing effort. The paper concludes by considering an alternative paradigm to minimum size regulation for demersal fisheries management; namely, the exploitation of juvenile fish, with provision for escapement of a small proportion of large, mature fish offshore, for which exploitation rate declines and remains low. It is suggested that this strategy may be, de facto, the one prevailing in the small mesh size inshore trawl fishery prior to development of offshore fisheries. The implications of this possibility have to be considered seriously if high effort levels are to be maintained while effective size limits are raised.     

GAME-THEORETIC INSIGHTS INTO THE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF FISHERIES

Ongoing efforts to negotiate agreements on management of transboundary marine fisheries tend to be arduous and frustrating, often collapsing into spectacular “fish wars” that leave fishing communities impoverished and fish stocks decimated. Game theory models can provide insights into why this is so, and suggest ways in which cooperative agreements might be crafted to overcome the difficulties. This article illustrates these themes through a model of a bi-national “interception fishery.” The central focus of the analysis is on instabilities that result from stochastic variability and incomplete and asymmetric information.     

Resource allocation in the North Sea demersal fisheries: A goal programming approach

The management of a fishery is a complex task generally involving multiple, often conflicting, objectives. These objectives typically include economic, biological and social goals such as improving the income of fishers, reducing the catch of depleted species and maintaining employment.Multicriteria decision making (MCDM) techniques appear wellsuited to such a management problem, allowing compromises between conflicting objectives to be analysed in a structured framework. In comparison to other fields, such as water resource planning, forestry and agriculture, there have been few applications of MCDM to fisheries.In this paper, a goal programming model of the North Sea demersal fishery is presented. The model is used to demonstrate the potential applicability of this type of approach to the analysis and development of fisheries management plans with multiple objectives. Alternative scenarios are considered for the problem, and tradeoffs between given objectives are also highlighted and discussed.