Explicit optimal value for Dynkin's stopping game

Under the One-step Look Ahead rule of Dynamic Programming, an explicit game value of Dynkin's stopping problem for a Markov chain is obtained by using a potential operator. The condition on the One-step rule could be extended to the k-step and infinity-step rule. We shall also decompose the game value as the sum of two explicit functions under these rules.     

Maximizing the expected number of components in an online search of a graph

The following optimal stopping problem is considered. The vertices of a graph G are revealed one by one, in a random order, to a selector. He aims to stop this process at a time t that maximizes the expected number of connected components in the graph ${\stackrel{?}{G}}_t$, induced by the currently revealed vertices. The selector knows G in advance, but different versions of the game are considered depending on the information that he gets about ${\stackrel{?}{G}}_t$. We show that when G has N vertices and maximum degree of order $o(\sqrt{N})$, then the number of components of ${\stackrel{?}{G}}_t$ is concentrated around its mean, which implies that playing the optimal strategy the selector does not benefit much by receiving more information about ${\stackrel{?}{G}}_t$. Results of similar nature were previously obtained by M. Lasoń for the case where G is a k-tree (for constant k). We also consider the particular cases where G is a square, triangular or hexagonal lattice, showing that an optimal selector gains cN components and we compute c with an error less than 0.005 in each case.     

Robust non-zero-sum stochastic differential reinsurance game

This paper considers the non-zero-sum stochastic differential game problem between two ambiguity-averse insurers (AAIs) who encounter model uncertainty and seek the optimal reinsurance decision under relative performance concerns. Each AAI manages her own risks by purchasing reinsurance with the objective of maximizing the expected utility of her relative terminal surplus with respect to that of her counterparty. The two AAIs’ decisions influence each other through the insurers’ relative performance concerns and the correlation between their surplus processes. We establish a general framework of Nash equilibrium for the associated non-zero-sum game with model uncertainty. For the representative case of exponential utilities, we solve the equilibrium strategies explicitly. Numerical studies are conducted to draw economic interpretations.     

The best choice problem with an unknown number of objects

The secretary problem with a known prior distribution of the number of candidates is considered. Ifp(i)=p(N=i),i [, ] , where=inf{i :p(i) > 0} and=sup{i :p(i)0}, is the prior distribution of the numberN of candidates it will be shown that, if the optimal stopping rule is of the simple form, then the optimal stopping indexj=min satisfies asymptotically (as ) the equationj=exp .The probability of selecting the best object by the corresponding policy will be (j-1) p(i)/i. We also give an example of the distributionp for which the optimal stopping rule consists of a stopping set with two islands. We present an asymptotical solution for this example.     

Robust non-zero-sum investment and reinsurance game with default risk

This paper investigates a non-zero-sum stochastic differential game between two competitive CARA insurers, who are concerned about the potential model ambiguity and aim to seek the robust optimal reinsurance and investment strategies. The ambiguity-averse insurers are allowed to purchase reinsurance treaty to mitigate individual claim risks; and can invest in a financial market consisting of one risk-free asset, one risky asset and one defaultable corporate bond. The objective of each insurer is to maximize the expected exponential utility of his terminal surplus relative to that of his competitor under the worst-case scenario of the alternative measures. Applying the techniques of stochastic dynamic programming, we derive the robust Nash equilibrium reinsurance and investment policies explicitly and present the corresponding verification theorem. Finally, we perform some numerical examples to illustrate the influence of model parameters on the equilibrium reinsurance and investment strategies and draw some economic interpretations from these results.     

A note on a nonlinear functional equation and its application

This paper treats the following type of nonlinear functional equations

     

A SECRETARY PROBLEM ON FUZZY SETS

This paper deals with a secretary problem on fuzzy sets, which allows both the recall of applicants and the uncertainty of a current applicant receiving an offer of employment. A new decision criterion is given to select a satisfactory applicant. This result extends the works of M.C.K. Yang and M.H. Smith.     

Properties of game options

A game option is an American option with the added feature that not only the option holder, but also the option writer, can exercise the option at any time. We characterize the value of a perpetual game option in terms of excessive functions, and we use the connection between excessive functions and concave functions to explicitly determine the value in some examples. Moreover, a condition on the two contract functions is provided under which the value is convex in the underlying diffusion value in the continuation region and increasing in the diffusion coefficient.Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) Primary 91A15, Secondary 60G40, 91B28     

On the numerical feasibility of continuation methods for nonlinear programming problems

In the present paper the radius of convergence of a class of locally convergent nonlinear programming algorithms (containing Robinson's and Wilson's methods) applied to a parametric nonlinear programming problem is estimated. A consequence is the numerical feasibility of globalizations of Robinson's and Wilson's methods by means of continuation techniques.     

A stopping game in a stochastic and fuzzy environment

A zero-sum stopping game for a sequence of fuzzy-valued random variables is discussed. The fuzzy random variables are estimated by probabilistic expectation and fuzzy expectation. A saddle point is given for the stopping game.     

On an optimal stopping problem of Gusein-Zade

We study the problem of selecting one of the r best of n rankable individuals arriving in random order, in which selection must be made with a stopping rule based only on the relative ranks of the successive arrivals. For each r up to r=25, we give the limiting (as n→∞) optimal risk (probability of not selecting one of the r best) and the limiting optimal proportion of individuals to let go by before being willing to stop. (The complete limiting form of the optimal stopping rule is presented for each r up to r=10, and for r=15, 20 and 25.) We show that, for large n and r, the optical risk is approximately (1−t^*)^r, where t^*≈0.2834 is obtained as the roof of a function which is the solution to a certain differential equation. The optimal stopping rule τ_r,n lets approximately t^*n arrivals go by and then stops ‘almost immediately’, in the sense that τ_r,n/n→t^* in probability as n→∞, r→∞     

Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games

This paper deals with an extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games. The Nash equilibrium approach to solving nonzero-sum stopping games may give multiple solutions. An arbitrator can suggest to each player the decision to be applied at each stage based on a joint distribution over the players’ decisions according to some optimality criterion. This is a form of equilibrium selection. Examples of correlated equilibria in nonzero-sum games related to the best choice problem are given. Several concepts of criteria for selecting a correlated equilibrium are used.     

Convexity of the optimal stopping boundary for the American put option

We show that the optimal stopping boundary for the American put option is convex in the standard Black-Scholes model. The methods are adapted from ice-melting problems and rely upon studying the behavior of level curves of solutions to certain parabolic differential equations.     

Selection of nonextremal candidates from a random sequence

Problems of optimal choice generally invoke monotone preference functions; consequently, optimal strategies consider stopping the sequence only when extremal (best/worst) or nearly extremal candidates are presented. The objective of the present investigation is to select a candidate representative of the entire sequence. In particular, selection of the median object and selection of any object from a set of middle ranks are considered.Portions of this paper were presented at the Joint National Meeting of the Institute of Management Sciences and the Operations Research Society of America, Washington, DC, 1980.The author is grateful to Professor M. DeGroot, who suggested the median problem of Section 2 and who has been most encouraging.The proof of Theorem 2.1 is due to an anonymous referee and constitutes a significant improvement upon the original version.     

An equilibrium model for urban transit assignment based on game theory

The urban public transport system is portrayed as a special commodity market where passenger is consumer, transit operator is producer and the special goods is the service for passenger’s trip. The generalized Nash equilibrium game is applied to describe how passengers adjust their route choices and trip modes. We present a market equilibrium model for urban public transport system as a series of mathematical programmings and equations, which is to describe both the competitions among different transit operators and the interactive influences among passengers. The proposed model can simultaneously predict how passengers choose their optimal routes and trip modes. An algorithm is designed to obtain the equilibrium solution. Finally, a simple numerical example is given and some conclusions are drawn.     

一类经典”秘书问题”的推广

”秘书问题”在最优停时理论的发展中曾起过重要作用 ,实际中的一类问题与”秘书问题”有类似之处 ,但比”秘书问题”更复杂 .本文将经典”秘书问题”进行推广 ,建立了一类比经典”秘书问题”更有实际意义的模型 ,并给出了该类模型的解 .     

Optimal variance stopping with linear diffusions

We study the optimal stopping problem of maximizing the variance of an unkilled linear diffusion. Especially, we demonstrate how the problem can be solved as a convex two-player zero-sum game, and reveal quite surprising application of game theory by doing so. Our main result shows that an optimal solution can, in a general case, be found among stopping times that are mixtures of two hitting times. This and other revealed phenomena together with suggested solution methods could be helpful when facing more complex non-linear optimal stopping problems. The results are illustrated by a few examples.     

A Bayesian-martingale approach to the general disorder problem

We consider a Bayesian-martingale approach to the general change-point detection problem. In our setting the change-point represents a random time of bifurcation of two probability measures given on the space of right-continuous functions. We derive a reflecting backward stochastic differential equation (RBSDE) for the value process related to the disorder problem and show that in classical cases of the Wiener and Poisson disorder problems this RBSDE is equivalent to free-boundary problems for parabolic differential and differential–difference operators respectively.     

The monotone case approach for the solution of certain multidimensional optimal stopping problems

This paper studies explicitly solvable multidimensional optimal stopping problems of sum- and product-type in discrete and continuous time using the monotone case approach. It gives a review on monotone case stopping using the Doob decomposition, resp. Doob–Meyer decomposition in continuous time, also in its multiplicative versions. The approach via these decompositions leads to explicit solutions for a variety of examples, including multidimensional versions of the house-selling and burglar’s problem, the Poisson disorder problem, and an optimal investment problem.