Groups and facilitators within problem structuring processes

In problem structuring methods, facilitators often ask of themselves questions such as: what makes a ‘good’ problem structuring group (PSG) and indeed what does ‘good’ mean? How can group dynamics be improved and does it matter in terms of the quality of the problem structuring that that group engages in? On the surface these questions seem to be straightforward. Indeed, those who have helped facilitate many participatory workshops will think they intuitively know the answers to these questions; they can, from their professional practice, ‘feel’ which PSGs are doing well and producing novel insights and those which are functioning less well and perhaps generating something that is less imaginative and more routine as a consequence. The intuitive, practice-learned insight will depend upon a rich array of visual signals that become more obvious with experience. This paper asks whether there is value in being much more open and analytical about these questions and answers. If so, then how can we make the unwritten processes and outcomes of PSGs written? Indeed, open to whom? Finally, how much of any insights learned by facilitators should be shared with those engaged in workshops?     

Human Rationality Challenges Universal Logic

Tarski’s conceptual analysis of the notion of logical consequence is one of the pinnacles of the process of defining the metamathematical foundations of mathematics in the tradition of his predecessors Euclid, Frege, Russell and Hilbert, and his contemporaries Carnap, Gödel, Gentzen and Turing. However, he also notes that in defining the concept of consequence “efforts were made to adhere to the common usage of the language of every day life.” This paper addresses the issue of what relationship Tarski’s analysis, and Béziau’s further generalization of it in universal logic, have to reasoning in the everyday lives of ordinary people from the cognitive processes of children through to those of specialists in the empirical and deductive sciences. It surveys a selection of relevant research in a range of disciplines providing theoretical and empirical studies of human reasoning, discusses the value of adopting a universal logic perspective, answers the questions posed in the call for this special issue, and suggests some specific research challenges.     

Concerning filtrations on commutative rings

We discuss the following three questions concerning multiplicative filtrations on commutative rings: (1) Must every filtration with finite power type be an AP-filtration? (2) Is the intersection of two AP-filtrations always an AP-filtration?, and (3) Does the multiplicity limit for a module of finite type with respect to a O-dimensional filtration on a noetherian ring always exist? We give examples to show that all three questions have in general negative answers for noetherian rings. However, in case of Dedekind domains the questions all have affirmative answers.     

Automating Change of Representation for Proofs in Discrete Mathematics (Extended Version)

Representation determines how we can reason about a specific problem. Sometimes one representation helps us to find a proof more easily than others. Most current automated reasoning tools focus on reasoning within one representation. There is, therefore, a need for the development of better tools to mechanise and automate formal and logically sound changes of representation. In this paper we look at examples of representational transformations in discrete mathematics, and show how we have used tools from Isabelle’s Transfer package to automate the use of these transformations in proofs. We give an overview of a general theory of transformations that we consider appropriate for thinking about the matter, and we explain how it relates to the Transfer package. We show a few reasoning tactics we developed in Isabelle to improve the use of transformations, including the automation of search in the space of representations. We present and analyse some results of the use of these tactics.     

Ontological aspects of the implementation of norms in agent-based electronic institutions

In order to regulate different circumstances over an extensive period of time, norms in institutions are stated in a vague and often ambiguous manner, thereby abstracting from concrete aspects which become instead relevant for the actual functioning of the institutions. If agent-based electronic institutions, which adhere to a set of abstract requirements, are to be built, how can those requirements be translated into more concrete constraints, the impact of which can be described directly in the institution? We address this issue considering institutions as normative systems based on articulate ontologies of the agent domain they regulate. Ontologies, we hold, are used by institutions to relate the abstract concepts in which their norms are formulated, to their concrete application domain. In this view, different institutions can implement the same set of norms in different ways as far as they presuppose divergent ontologies of the concepts in which that set of norms is formulated. In this paper we analyse this phenomenon introducing a notion of contextual ontology. We will focus on the formal machinery necessary to characterise it as well.     

Optimal fractional matchings and covers in infinite hypergraphs: Existence and duality

We study fractional matchings and covers in infinite hypergraphs, paying particular attention to the following questions: Do fractional matchings (resp. covers) of maximal (resp. minimal) size exist? Is there equality between the supremum of the sizes of fractional matchings and the infimum of the sizes of fractional covers? (This is called weak duality.) Are there a fractional matching and a fractional cover that satisfy the complementary slackness conditions of linear programming? (This is called strong duality.) In general, the answers to all these questions are negative, but for certain classes of infinite hypergraphs (classified according to edge cardinalities and vertex degrees) we obtain positive results. We also consider the question of the existence of optimal fractional matchings and covers that assume rational values.     

Ten questions and one problem on fuzzy logic

Recently, I had a very interesting friendly e-mail discussion with Professor Parikh on vagueness and fuzzy logic. Parikh published several papers concerning the notion of vagueness. They contain critical remarks on fuzzy logic and its ability to formalize reasoning under vagueness [10,11]. On the other hand, for some years I have tried to advocate fuzzy logic (in the narrow sense, as Zadeh says, i.e. as formal logical systems formalizing reasoning under vagueness) and in particular, to show that such systems (of many-valued logic of a certain kind) offer a fully fledged and extremely interesting logic [4, 5]. But this leaves open the question of intuitive adequacy of many-valued logic as a logic of vagueness. Below I shall try to isolate eight questions Parikh asks, add two more and to comment on all of them. Finally, I formulate a problem on truth (in)definability in Łukasiewicz logic which shows, in my opinion, that fuzzy logic is not just “applied logic” but rather belongs to systems commonly called “philosophical logic” like modal logics, etc.     

How syntactic reasoners can develop understanding, evaluate conjectures, and generate counterexamples in advanced mathematics

This paper presents a case study of a highly successful student whose exploration of an advanced mathematical concept relies predominantly on syntactic reasoning, such as developing formal representations of mathematical ideas and making logical deductions. This student is observed as he learns a new mathematical concept and then completes exercises about it. The paper focuses on how Isaac developed an understanding of this concept, how he evaluated whether a mathematical assertion is true or false, how he generated counterexamples to disprove a statement, and the general role examples play for him in concept development and understanding.     

Inequalities,assessment and computer algebra

The goal of this paper is to examine single variable real inequalities that arise as tutorial problems and to examine the extent to which current computer algebra systems (CAS) can (1) automatically solve such problems and (2) determine whether students’ own answers to such problems are correct. We review how inequalities arise in contemporary curricula. We consider the formal mathematical processes by which such inequalities are solved, and we consider the notation and syntax through which solutions are expressed. We review the extent to which current CAS can accurately solve these inequalities, and the form given to the solutions by the designers of this software. Finally, we discuss the functionality needed to deal with students’ answers, i.e. to establish equivalence (or otherwise) of expressions representing unions of intervals. We find that while contemporary CAS accurately solve inequalities there is a wide variety of notation used.     

Question selection responding to information on customers from heterogeneous populations to select offers that maximize expected profit

The advent of Internet broking pages allows customers to ‘apply’ to a number of different companies at one time, leading to multiple offers made to a customer. The saturated condition of the personal financial products has led to falling ‘take’ rates. Financial institutions are trying to increase the ‘take’ rates of their personal financial products. Applicants for credit will have to provide information for risk assessment, which can be used to assess the probability of a customer accepting an offer. Interactive channels such as the Internet and telephone allow questions that are asked to depend on previous answers. The questions selected need to provide information to assess the probability of acceptance of a particular variant of financial product. In this paper, we investigate a model to predict the best offer to extend next to a customer based on the response for the questions, as well as the question selection itself.     

Expressivist Perspective on Logicality

Various attempts at demarcating logic were undertaken, many of them based on specific understanding of how logical knowledge is formal and not material. MacFarlane has persuasively shown that general idea of formality of logic can be understood in various ways. I take two of the accounts of formality, namely the requirement of conservativity and the requirement of schematicity of logical vocabulary, into consideration as promising candidates to make the all too unclear notion of formality more precise and study to what degree they could be considered as either necessary or sufficient conditions for logicality of some piece of vocabulary. Finding both notion unsatisfactory, as they stand, I propose combining them and envisage a hierarchy of logicality of expressions of a given language. Such a hierarchy is complicated and not linear, yet still offers a valuable explication of both the range and pragmatic significance of logic, if we combine it with logical expressivism.     

Space of valuations

The general framework of this paper is a reformulation of Hilbert’s program using the theory of locales, also known as formal or point-free topology [P.T. Johnstone, Stone Spaces, in: Cambridge Studies in Advanced Mathematics, vol. 3, 1982; Th. Coquand, G. Sambin, J. Smith, S. Valentini, Inductively generated formal topologies, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 124 (1–3) (2003) 71–106; G. Sambin, Intuitionistic formal spaces–a first communication, in: D. Skordev (Ed.), Mathematical Logic and its Applications, Plenum, New York, 1987, pp. 187–204]. Formal topology presents a topological space, not as a set of points, but as a logical theory which describes the lattice of open sets. The application to Hilbert’s program is then the following. Hilbert’s ideal objects are represented by points of such a formal space. There are general methods to “eliminate” the use of points, close to the notion of forcing and to the “elimination of choice sequences” in intuitionist mathematics, which correspond to Hilbert’s required elimination of ideal objects. This paper illustrates further this general program on the notion of valuations. They were introduced by Dedekind and Weber [R. Dedekind, H. Weber, Theorie des algebraischen Funktionen einer Veränderlichen, J. de Crelle t. XCII (1882) 181–290] to give a rigorous presentation of Riemann surfaces. It can be argued that it is one of the first example in mathematics of point-free representation of spaces [N. Bourbaki, Eléments de Mathématique. Algèbre commutative, Hermann, Paris, 1965, Chapitre 7]. It is thus of historical and conceptual interest to be able to represent this notion in formal topology.     

The modality principle and work-relativity of modality

Davies argues that the ontology of artworks as performances offers a principled way of explaining work-relativity of modality. Object oriented contextualist ontologies of art (Levinson) cannot adequately address the problem of work-relativity of modal properties because they understand looseness in what counts as the same context as a view that slight differences in the work-constitutive features of provenance are work-relative. I argue that it is more in the spirit of contextualism to understand looseness as context-dependent. This points to the general problem—the context of appreciation is not robust enough to ground modal intuitions about objective entities. In general, when epistemology dictates ontology there is always a threat of anti-realism, scepticism and relativism. Davies also appeals to the modality principle—an entity’s essential properties are all and only its constitutive properties. Davies understands essentiality in a traditional way: a property P is an essential property of an object o iff o could not exist and lack P. Kit Fine has recently made a convincing case for the view that the notion of essence is not to be understood in modal terms. I explore some of the implications of this view for Davies’ modal argument for the performance theory.     

Assessing ‘functionality’ in school mathematics examinations: what does being human have to do with it?

This article analyses aspects of the process of developing ‘functional’ assessments of mathematics at the end of compulsory schooling in England. A protocol that was developed for scrutinising assessment items is presented. This protocol includes an indicator of the ‘authenticity’ of each assessment item. The data are drawn from scrutiny of 589 assessment items from thirty-nine formal unseen examinations taken by students aged sixteen, and the article illustrates ways that mathematics is presented in different contexts in examinations. We suggest that currently the ‘human face’ of the questions may serve to disguise routine calculations, and we argue that, in formal examinations, connections between mathematics assessments situated in context and functional mathematics have yet to be established.     

The Logic of Analogy

How should a scientist argue when the data are insufficient to allow him to reason by classical or statistical models? After all, in most real world situations - in business or in war - that is the unhappy norm. In such cases the ordinary man instinctively argues by analogy, as Leibniz long ago showed; indeed if time presses, there is no alternative. The trouble, however, is that if we then include such arguments in our scientific reasoning, then, as we all know, this can lead to false conclusions. To escape from this dilemma, is there any alternative logical basis from which we can start our reasoning? What is proposed here is that instead of the well tried three valued logic of true, false or probable, we should adopt the three valued logic of true, false or possible. A rational system for analogue arguments can then be developed by these means, and with it the advantages brought by the use of symbols and so on. Such a method, however, includes many necessary changes as to how to structure our problems and how to apply new criteria; and it is some of these changes that are outlined in this note. For instance, it outlines the meaning of ‘causal relationships’ in analogue arguments, as well as how to define ‘rational choice’ in terms of analogue propositions. The advantage throughout is that this allows us to argue with less rather than more data.     

An analytical comparison of students’ reasoning in the context of Inquiry-Oriented Instruction: The case of span and linear independence

In this report we analyze differences in reasoning about span and linear independence by comparing written work of 126 linear algebra students whose instructors received support to implement a particular inquiry-oriented (IO) instructional approach compared to 129 students whose instructors did not receive that support. Our analysis of students’ responses to open-ended questions indicated that IO students’ concept images of span and linear independence were more aligned with the formal concept definition than the concept images of Non-IO students. Additionally, IO students exhibited more coordinated conceptual understandings and used deductive reasoning at higher rates than Non-IO students. We provide illustrative examples of systematic differences in how students from the two groups reasoned about span and linear independence.     

Precovers,Modalities and Universal Closure Operators in a Topos

In this paper we develop the notion of formal precover in a topos by defining a relation between elements and sets in a local set theory. We show that such relations are equivalent to modalities and to universal closure operators. Finally we prove that these relations are well characterized by a convenient restriction to a particular set. Mathematics Subject Classification: 03G30, 03B20, 03F55.     

O.R. and the Systems Movement: Mappings and Conflicts

The ‘crisis’ debate in O.R. expresses concern at the divergence between textbook O.R. and what practitioners actually do. The debate is examined by comparing O.R., systems analysis and systems engineering. They are all wedded to logic in situations in which logic may not be paramount. The science in O.R. applies only to aggregate results, but the practitioner must deal with a specific situation. The tradition of systems thinking which emerged from organismic biology is described. It leads to a way out of the O.R. ‘crisis’, by providing a formal structuring of a paradigm of learning rather than optimization. O.R. can aspire to match natural science, and pass the problems by; or it can close the textbook/practitioner gap by changing its concept of ‘being scientific’.     

质量符合性评价体系的本体化建模及评价支持实证研究

本文面向质量管理评价领域对精细化和科学性的需求,研究质量符合性评价体系所蕴涵的知识共性,提出了一种构建符合性评价知识系统的多层本体化模型框架,设计了涵盖两种不同粒度水平的评价知识构成元模型,以此获取质量符合性评价在语义层次上的支持。最后,以信息安全产品防火墙质量评价为例实证了一类质量符合性评价体系知识本体的构建,以及基于规则推理的自动评价决策支持应用。