Multicriteria Goal Games

In this paper, we deal with multicriteria matrix games. Different solution concepts have been proposed to cope with these games. Recently, the concept of Pareto-optimal security strategy which assures the property of security in the individual criteria against an opponent's deviation in strategy has been introduced. However, the idea of security behind this concept is based on expected values, so that this security might be violated by mixed strategies when replications are not allowed. To avoid this inconvenience, we propose in this paper a new concept of solution for these games: the G-goal security strategy, which includes as part of the solution the probability of obtaining prespecified values in the payoff functions. Thus, attitude toward risk together with payoff values are considered jointly in the solution analysis.     

Multicriteria games and potentials

In this note we study how far the theory of strategic games with potentials, as reported by Monderer and Shapley (Games Econ Behav 14:124–143, 1996), can be extended to strategic games with vector payoffs, as reported by Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 6:57–61, 1959). The problem of the existence of pure approximate Pareto equilibria for multicriteria potential games is also studied.      

Two-Person Second-Order Games,Part 1: Formulation and Transition Anatomy

It is well known that human psychology determines his/her action and behavior. This fact has not been fully incorporated in game theory. This paper intends to incorporate human psychology in formulating games as people play them. In Part 1 of the paper, we formulate a two-person game by the habitual domain theory and the Markov chain theory. Using the habitual domains theory, we present a new model describing the evolution of the states of mind of players over time, the two-person second-order game. We introduce the concept of the focal mind profile as well as the solution concept of the win-win mind profile. In addition, we provide also a method to predict the average number of steps needed for a game to reach a focal or win-win mind profile. Then, in Part 2 of the paper, under some reasonable assumptions, we derive the possibility theorem stating that it is always possible to reach a win-win mind profile when suitable conditions are satisfied. This research was partially supported by the National Science Council, Taiwan, NSC96-2416-H009-013.     

On minimax and Pareto optimal security payoffs in multicriteria games

In this paper, we characterize minimax and Pareto-optimal security payoff vectors for general multicriteria zero-sum matrix games, using properties similar to the ones that have been used in the single criterion case. Our results show that these two solution concepts are rather similar, since they can be characterized with nearly the same sets of properties. Their main difference is the form of consistency that each solution concept satisfies. We also prove that both solution concepts can transform into each other, in their corresponding domains.     

On the Tikhonov Well-Posedness of Concave Games and Cournot Oligopoly Games

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether theorems known to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria, provide also sufficient conditions for the Tikhonov well-posedness (T-wp). We consider several hypotheses that ensure the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium (NE), such as strong positivity of the Jacobian of the utility function derivatives (Ref. 1), pseudoconcavity, and strict diagonal dominance of the Jacobian of the best reply functions in implicit form (Ref. 2). The aforesaid assumptions imply the existence and uniqueness of NE. We show that the hypotheses in Ref. 2 guarantee also the T-wp property of the Nash equilibrium.As far as the hypotheses in Ref. 1 are concerned, the result is true for quadratic games and zero-sum games. A standard way to prove the T-wp property is to show that the sets of -equilibria are compact. This last approach is used to demonstrate directly the T-wp property for the Cournot oligopoly model given in Ref. 3. The compactness of -equilibria is related also to the condition that the best reply surfaces do not approach each other near infinity.     

Approximations and Well-Posedness in Multicriteria Games

First, sufficient conditions of minimal character are given which guarantee the sequential closedness of the set-valued function defined by the parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria of a parametric multicriteria game, that is to say: a convergent sequence of parametric weak-multicriteria Nash equilibria, corresponding to an approximate value of the parameter x_n, converges to a weak-multicriteria Nash equilibrium corresponding to the limit value x of the sequence (x_n)_n. Then, approximating sequences and parametrically well-posedness for a multicriteria game are introduced and investigated.     

On Optimization over the Efficient Set in Linear Multicriteria Programming

The efficient set of a linear multicriteria programming problem can be represented by a reverse convex constraint of the form g(z)≤0, where g is a concave function. Consequently, the problem of optimizing some real function over the efficient set belongs to an important problem class of global optimization called reverse convex programming. Since the concave function used in the literature is only defined on some set containing the feasible set of the underlying multicriteria programming problem, most global optimization techniques for handling this kind of reverse convex constraint cannot be applied. The main purpose of our article is to present a method for overcoming this disadvantage. We construct a concave function which is finitely defined on the whole space and can be considered as an extension of the existing function. Different forms of the linear multicriteria programming problem are discussed, including the minimum maximal flow problem as an example. The research was partly done while the third author was visiting the Department of Mathematics, University of Trier with the support by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. He thanks the university as well as the foundation.     

On Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form games

In this paper we investigate the existence of Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form games. In particular we show that every vector-valued extensive form game with perfect information has at least one subgame perfect Pareto equilibrium in pure strategies. If one tries to prove this and develop a vector-valued backward induction procedure in analogy to the real-valued one, one sees that different effects may occur which thus have to be taken into account: First, suppose the deciding player at a nonterminal node makes a choice such that the equilibrium payoff vector of the subgame he would enter is undominated under the equilibrium payoff vectors of the other subgames he might enter. Then this choice need not to lead to a Pareto equilibrium. Second, suppose at a nonterminal node a chance move may arise. The combination of the Pareto equilibria of the subgames to give a strategy combination of the entire game need not be a Pareto equilibrium of the entire game.     

On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. We show that these sequencing games are convex if the initial order of the jobs is a concatenation of chains. F. Klijn's research is supported by a Ramón y Cajal contract of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The main part of F. Klijn's work was supported by a Marie Curie Fellowship of the European Community programme “Improving Human Research Potential and the Socio-economic Knowledge Base” under contract number HPMF-CT-2001-01232, carried out at the Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His work is also partially supported by Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA     

Multicriteria optimisation and simulation: an industrial application

This paper deals with multicriteria discrete-continuous problems of scheduling nonpreemptable jobs. The need for reusability and modularity leads us to build a “generic” optimisation and simulation framework, while the need to quickly generate good compromises between conflicting objectives requires the implementation of multicriteria scheduling models. This paper describes the practical possibilities of three hybrid models within this framework. The validation of the framework is presented in terms of its application to a real, highly constrained, discrete-continuous problem. The optimisation model is based on the hybridisation of a classical hill-climber meta-heuristic with the Promethee II multicriteria method.     

Search and Ambush Games with Capacities

Search games with capacities are bipersonal zero-sum games where a player has to hide a number of objects or an amount of material in a fixed number of containers and his opponent attempts to locate them. In this article, we deal with games on a discrete structureless set and on a discrete set with linear order. In both cases, the capacities under consideration are continuous. Some of the games studied generalize previously studied games.     

Continuous Accumulation Games in Continuous Regions

In a continuous accumulation game on a continuous region, a Hider distributes material over a continuous region at each instant of discrete time, and a Seeker examines the region. If the Seeker locates any of the material hidden, the Seeker confiscates it. The goal of the Hider is to accumulate a certain amount of material before a given time, and the goal of the Seeker is to prevent this. In previous works, we have studied accumulation games involving discrete objects and continuous material over discrete locations. The issues raised when the region is continuous are substantially different. In this paper, we study accumulation of continuous material over two types of continuous regions: the interval and the circle.     

凸对策核仁的非空性及合成凸对策核仁的单调性

本文给出了核仁与核及最小核心之间的关系 ,且证明了凸对策核仁的存在性和唯一性 ,证明了凸对策的合成对策仍是凸对策 .最后 ,我们讨论了合成凸对策的核仁不满足单调性 .     

On the Selection of One Feedback Nash Equilibrium in Discounted Linear-Quadratic Games

We study a selection method for a Nash feedback equilibrium of a one-dimensional linear-quadratic nonzero-sum game over an infinite horizon. By introducing a change in the time variable, one obtains an associated game over a finite horizon T > 0 and with free terminal state. This associated game admits a unique solution which converges to a particular Nash feedback equilibrium of the original problem as the horizon T goes to infinity.     

On the Probability of Existence of Pure Equilibria in Matrix Games

In a recent paper (Ref. 1), Papavassilopoulos obtained results on the probability of the existence of pure equilibrium solutions in stochastic matrix games. We report a similar result, but where the payoffs are drawn from a finite set of numbers N. In the limiting case, as N tends to infinity, our result and that of Papavassilopoulos are identical. We also cite similar results obtained independently by others, some of which were already independently brought to the notice of Papavassilopoulos by Li Calzi as reported in Papavassilopoulos (Ref. 2). We cite a much earlier result obtained by Goldman (Ref. 3). We also cite our related work (Ref. 4), in which we derive the conditions for the existence of mixed strategy equilibria in two-person zero-sum games.     

Generalized Maximin Solutions in Multicriteria Bargaining

In this paper we address bargaining games where the agents have to take into account different criteria to value the decisions. We propose the class of generalized maximin solutions, as the natural extension for these games of the maximin solutions in conventional bargaining. In order to refine this solution concept, we define a multicriteria lexicographic partial ordering and present the class of generalized leximin solutions as those that are nondominated with respect to this relation. We establish some properties of these solutions and characterize them as solutions of multicriteria problems. The research of the authors is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology projects BFM2002-11282-E and BEC2003-03111.     

Multicriteria tour planning for mobile healthcare facilities in a developing country

A multiobjective combinatorial optimization (MOCO) formulation for the following location-routing problem in healthcare management is given: For a mobile healthcare facility, a closed tour with stops selected from a given set of population nodes has to be found. Tours are evaluated according to three criteria: (i) An economic efficiency criterion related to the tour length, (ii) the criterion of average distances to the nearest tour stops corresponding to p-median location problem formulations, and (iii) a coverage criterion measuring the percentage of the population unable to reach a tour stop within a predefined maximum distance. Three algorithms to compute approximations to the set of Pareto-efficient solutions of the described MOCO problem are developed. The first uses the P-ACO technique, and the second and the third use the VEGA and the MOGA variant of multiobjective genetic algorithms, respectively. Computational experiments for the Thiès region in Senegal were carried out to evaluate the three approaches on real-world problem instances.     

Static and Dynamic Equilibria in Games With Continuum of Players

This paper is a study of a general class of deterministic dynamic games with an atomless measure space of players and an arbitrary time space. The payoffs of the players depend on their own strategy, a trajectory of the system and a function with values being finite dimensional statistics of static profiles. The players' available decisions depend on trajectories of the system.The paper deals with relations between static and dynamic open-loop equilibria as well as their existence. An equivalence theorem is proven and theorems on the existence of a dynamic equilibrium are shown as consequences.     

Effort Games and the Price of Myopia

We consider Effort Games, a game‐theoretic model of cooperation in open environments, which is a variant of the principal‐agent problem from economic theory. In our multiagent domain, a common project depends on various tasks; carrying out certain subsets of the tasks completes the project successfully, while carrying out other subsets does not. The probability of carrying out a task is higher when the agent in charge of it exerts effort, at a certain cost for that agent. A central authority, called the principal, attempts to incentivize agents to exert effort, but can only reward agents based on the success of the entire project. We model this domain as a normal form game, where the payoffs for each strategy profile are defined based on the different probabilities of carrying out each task and on the boolean function that defines which task subsets complete the project, and which do not. We view this boolean function as a simple coalitional game, and call this game the underlying coalitional game. We suggest the Price of Myopia (PoM) as a measure of the influence the model of rationality has on the minimal payments the principal has to make in order to motivate the agents in such a domain to exert effort. We consider the computational complexity of testing whether exerting effort is a dominant strategy for an agent, and of finding a reward strategy for this domain, using either a dominant strategy equilibrium or using iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We show these problems are generally #P‐hard, and that they are at least as computationally hard as calculating the Banzhaf power index in the underlying coalitional game. We also show that in a certain restricted domain, where the underlying coalitional game is a weighted voting game with certain properties, it is possible to solve all of the above problems in polynomial time. We give bounds on PoM in weighted voting effort games, and provide simulation results regarding PoM in another restricted class of effort games, namely effort games played over Series‐Parallel Graphs (© 2009 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

On Applied Nonlinear and Bilevel Programming or Pursuit-Evasion Games

Motivated by the benefits of discretization in optimal control problems, we consider the possibility of discretizing pursuit-evasion games. Two approaches are introduced. In the first approach, the solution of the necessary conditions of the continuous-time game is decomposed into ordinary optimal control problems that can be solved using discretization and nonlinear programming techniques. In the second approach, the game is discretized and transformed into a bilevel programming problem, which is solved using a first-order feasible direction method. Although the starting points of the approaches are different, they lead in practice to the same solution algorithm. We demonstrate the usability of the discretization by solving some open-loop representations of feedback solutions for a complex pursuit-evasion game between a realistically modeled aircraft and a missile, with terminal time as the payoff. The solutions are compared with those obtained via an indirect method.