Risk minimizing portfolios and HJBI equations for stochastic differential games

In this paper, we consider the problem to find a market portfolio that minimizes the convex risk measure of the terminal wealth in a jump diffusion market. We formulate the problem as a two player (zero-sum) stochastic differential game. To help us find a solution, we prove a theorem giving the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI) conditions for a general zero-sum stochastic differential game in a jump diffusion setting. We then use the theorem to study particular risk minimization problems. Finally, we extend our approach to cover general stochastic differential games (not necessarily zero-sum), and we obtain similar HJBI equations for the Nash equilibria of such games.     

Forward–Backward Stochastic Differential Games and Stochastic Control under Model Uncertainty

We study optimal stochastic control problems with jumps under model uncertainty. We rewrite such problems as stochastic differential games of forward–backward stochastic differential equations. We prove general stochastic maximum principles for such games, both in the zero-sum case (finding conditions for saddle points) and for the nonzero sum games (finding conditions for Nash equilibria). We then apply these results to study robust optimal portfolio-consumption problems with penalty. We establish a connection between market viability under model uncertainty and equivalent martingale measures. In the case with entropic penalty, we prove a general reduction theorem, stating that a optimal portfolio-consumption problem under model uncertainty can be reduced to a classical portfolio-consumption problem under model certainty, with a change in the utility function, and we relate this to risk sensitive control. In particular, this result shows that model uncertainty increases the Arrow–Pratt risk aversion index.     

A Type of General Forward-Backward Stochastic Differential Equations and Applications

The authors discuss one type of general forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) with It?o’s stochastic delayed equations as the forward equations and anticipated backward stochastic differential equations as the backward equations. The existence and uniqueness results of the general FBSDEs are obtained. In the framework of the general FBSDEs in this paper, the explicit form of the optimal control for linearquadratic stochastic optimal control problem with delay and the Nash equilibrium point for nonzero sum differential games problem with delay are obtained.     

A maximum principle for Markov regime-switching forward–backward stochastic differential games and applications

In this paper, we present an optimal control problem for stochastic differential games under Markov regime-switching forward–backward stochastic differential equations with jumps. First, we prove a sufficient maximum principle for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games problems and obtain equilibrium point for such games. Second, we prove an equivalent maximum principle for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. The zero-sum stochastic differential games equivalent maximum principle is then obtained as a corollary. We apply the obtained results to study a problem of robust utility maximization under a relative entropy penalty and to find optimal investment of an insurance firm under model uncertainty.     

An inverse optimal problem in discrete-time stochastic control

In this paper, we study an inverse optimal problem in discrete-time stochastic control. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution to a system of stochastic difference equations to be the solution of a certain optimal control problem. Our results extend to the stochastic case the work of Dechert. In particular, we present a stochastic version of an important principle in welfare economics.     

On stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure

In this paper, we introduce a new class of two-person stochastic games with nice properties. For games in this class, the payoffs as well as the transitions in each state consist of a part which depends only on the action of the first player and a part dependent only on the action of the second player.For the zero-sum games in this class, we prove that the orderfield property holds in the infinite-horizon case and that there exist optimal pure stationary strategies for the discounted as well as the undiscounted payoff criterion. For both criteria also, finite algorithms are given to solve the game. An example shows that, for nonzero sum games in this class, there are not necessarily pure stationary equilibria. But, if such a game possesses a stationary equilibrium point, then there also exists a stationary equilibrium point which uses in each state at most two pure actions for each player.     

Zero-sum stochastic games with average payoffs: New optimality conditions

In this paper we study zero-sum stochastic games. The optimality criterion is the long-run expected average criterion, and the payoff function may have neither upper nor lower bounds. We give a new set of conditions for the existence of a value and a pair of optimal stationary strategies. Our conditions are slightly weaker than those in the previous literature, and some new sufficient conditions for the existence of a pair of optimal stationary strategies are imposed on the primitive data of the model. Our results are illustrated with a queueing system, for which our conditions are satisfied but some of the conditions in some previous literatures fail to hold.     

含有随机波动的非线性的最优投资和消费模型

在连续时间模型假设下,研究风险资产价格服从一个带有随机波动的几何布朗运动的最优消费和投资问题．首先建立了最优消费和投资同题随机最优控制数学模型;然后运用随机最优控制理论,得到了最优投资和消费随机最优控制问题的值函数所满足的线性抛物线偏微分方程和非线性抛物线偏微分方程．     

Remarks on sensitive equilibria in stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure

A class of stochastic games with additive reward and transition structure is studied. For zero-sum games under some ergodicity assumptions 1-equilibria are shown to exist. They correspond to so-called sensitive optimal policies in dynamic programming. For a class of nonzero-sum stochastic games with nonatomic transitions nonrandomized Nash equilibrium points with respect to the average payoff criterion are also obtained. Included examples show that the results of this paper can not be extented to more general payoff or transition structure.     

Algorithms for uniform optimal strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information

We deal with zero-sum two-player stochastic games with perfect information. We propose two algorithms to find the uniform optimal strategies and one method to compute the optimality range of discount factors. We prove the convergence in finite time for one algorithm. The uniform optimal strategies are also optimal for the long run average criterion and, in transient games, for the undiscounted criterion as well.     

OPTIMAL GRAZING MANAGEMENT RULES IN SEMI‐ARID RANGELANDS WITH UNCERTAIN RAINFALL

Abstract. We study optimal adaptive grazing management under uncertain rainfall in a discrete‐time model. As in each year actual rainfall can be observed during the short rainy season, and grazing management can be adapted accordingly for the growing season; the closed‐loop solution of the stochastic optimal control problem does not only depend on the state variable, but also on the realization of the random rainfall. This distinguishes optimal grazing management from the optimal use of most other natural resources under uncertainty, where the closed‐loop solution of the stochastic optimal control problem depends only on the state variables. Solving this unusual stochastic optimization problem allows us to critically contribute to a long‐standing controversy over how to optimally manage semi‐arid rangelands by simple rules of thumb.     

Optimal control problems constrained by the stochastic Navier–Stokes equations with multiplicative Lévy noise

We consider the controlled stochastic Navier–Stokes equations in a bounded multidimensional domain, where the noise term allows jumps. In order to prove existence and uniqueness of an optimal control w.r.t. a given control problem, we first need to show the existence and uniqueness of a local mild solution of the considered controlled stochastic Navier–Stokes equations. We then discuss the control problem, where the related cost functional includes stopping times dependent on controls. Based on the continuity of the cost functional, we can apply existence and uniqueness results provided in [4], which enables us to show that a unique optimal control exists.     

均值-方差准则下具有负债的随机微分博弈

研究了均值-方差准则下,具有负债的随机微分博弈.研究目标是:在终值财富的均值等于k的限制下,在市场出现最坏的情况下找到最优的投资策略使终值财富的方差最小.即:基于均值-方差随机微分博弈的投资组合选择问题.使用线性-二次控制的理论解决了该问题,获得了最优的投资策略、最优市场策略和有效边界的显示解.并通过对所得结果进行进一步分析,在经济上给出了进一步的解释.通过本文的研究,可以指导金融公司在面临负债和金融市场情况恶劣时,选择恰当的投资策略使自身获得一定的财富而面临的风险最小.     

A stochastic target formulation for optimal switching problems in finite horizon

We consider a general optimal switching problem for a controlled diffusion and show that its value coincides with the value of a well-suited stochastic target problem associated to a diffusion with jumps. The proof consists in showing that the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations of both problems are the same and in proving a comparison principle for this equation. This provides a new family of lower bounds for the optimal switching problem, which can be computed by Monte-Carlo methods. This result has also a nice economical interpretation in terms of a firm's valuation.     

基于再保险和投资的随机微分博弈

本文研究了具有再保险和投资的随机微分博弈.应用线性-二次控制的理论,在指数效用和幂效用下,求得了最优再保险策略、最优投资策略、最优市场策略和值函数的显示解,推广了文[8]的结果.通过本文的研究,当市场出现最坏的情况时,可以指导保险公司选择恰当的再保险和投资策略使自身所获得的财富最大化.     

Optimal controls for second-order stochastic differential equations driven by mixed-fractional Brownian motion with impulses

We study optimal control problems for a class of second-order stochastic differential equation driven by mixed-fractional Brownian motion with non-instantaneous impulses. By using stochastic analysis theory, strongly continuous cosine family, and a fixed point approach, we establish the existence of mild solutions for the stochastic system. Moreover, the optimal control results are derived without uniqueness of mild solutions of the stochastic system. Finally, the main results are validated with the aid of an example.     

Optimal Trade Execution Under Stochastic Volatility and Liquidity

Abstract

We study the problem of optimally liquidating a financial position in a discrete-time model with stochastic volatility and liquidity. We consider the three cases where the objective is to minimize the expectation, an expected exponential or a mean-variance criterion of the implementation cost. In the first case, the optimal solution can be fully characterized by a forward-backward system of stochastic equations depending on conditional expectations of future liquidity. In the other two cases, we derive Bellman equations from which the optimal solutions can be obtained numerically by discretizing the control space. In all three cases, we compute optimal strategies for different simulated realizations of prices, volatility and liquidity and compare the outcomes to the ones produced by the deterministic strategies of Bertsimas and Lo (1998; Optimal control of execution costs. Journal of Financial Markets, 1, 1–50) and Almgren and Chriss (2001; Optimal execution of portfolio transactions. Journal of Risk, 3, 5–33).     

Stochastic Discrete-Time Nash Games with Constrained State Estimators

In this paper, we consider stochastic linear-quadratic discrete-time Nash games in which two players have access only to noise-corrupted output measurements. We assume that each player is constrained to use a linear Kalman filter-like state estimator to implement his optimal strategies. Two information structures available to the players in their state estimators are investigated. The first has access to one-step delayed output and a one-step delayed control input of the player. The second has access to the current output and a one-step delayed control input of the player. In both cases, statistics of the process and statistics of the measurements of each player are known to both players. A simple example of a two-zone energy trading system is considered to illustrate the developed Nash strategies. In this example, the Nash strategies are calculated for the two cases of unlimited and limited transmission capacity constraints.     

Relations between game parameters,value, and optimal strategy spaces in stochastic games and construction of games with given solution

Results of Bohnenblust, Karlin, and Shapley and results of Shapley and Snow, concerning solutions of matrix games, are extended to the class of discounted stochastic games. Prior to these extensions, relations between the game parameters, value, and optimal stationary strategy spaces are established. Then, the inverse problem of constructing stochastic games, given the solution, is considered.