Saturating stable matchings

I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my analysis to perfect stable matchings, where every agent on both sides is matched.     

The stable marriage problem with master preference lists

We study variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the men or the women, or both, are derived from a master preference list. This models real-world matching problems in which participants are ranked according to some objective criteria. The master list(s) may be strictly ordered, or may include ties, and the lists of individuals may involve ties and may include all, or just some, of the members of the opposite sex. In fact, ties are almost inevitable in the master list if the ranking is done on the basis of a scoring scheme with a relatively small range of distinct values. We show that many of the interesting variants of stable marriage that are NP-hard remain so under very severe restrictions involving the presence of master lists, but a number of special cases can be solved in polynomial time. Under this master list model, versions of the stable marriage problem that are already solvable in polynomial time typically yield to faster and/or simpler algorithms, giving rise to simple new structural characterisations of the solutions in these cases.     

Hyperuniform and rigid stable matchings

We study a stable partial matching τ of the d‐dimensional lattice with a stationary determinantal point process Ψ on R^d with intensity α>1. For instance, Ψ might be a Poisson process. The matched points from Ψ form a stationary and ergodic (under lattice shifts) point process Ψ^τ with intensity 1 that very much resembles Ψ for α close to 1. On the other hand Ψ^τ is hyperuniform and number rigid, quite in contrast to a Poisson process. We deduce these properties by proving more general results for a stationary point process Ψ, whose so‐called matching flower (a stopping set determining the matching partner of a lattice point) has a certain subexponential tail behavior. For hyperuniformity, we also additionally need to assume some mixing condition on Ψ. Furthermore, if Ψ is a Poisson process then Ψ^τ has an exponentially decreasing truncated pair correlation function.     

(Un)stable matchings with blocking costs

We introduce and study weighted bipartite matching problems under strict preferences where blocking edges can be paid for, thus imposing costs rather than constraints as in classical models. We focus on the setting in which the weight of an edge represents the benefit from including it in the matching and/or the cost if it is a blocking edge. We show that this setting encompasses interesting special cases that remain polynomially-solvable, although it becomes APX-hard even in a quite restricted case.     

The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game

The Multiple Partners assignment game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) to the case where the participants can form more than one partnership.  In Sotomayor (1992) the existence of stable outcomes was proved. For the sake of completeness the proof is reproduced in Appendix I. In this paper we show that, as in the Assignment Game, stable payoffs form a complete lattice and hence there exists a unique optimal stable payoff for each side of the market. We also observe a polarization of interests between the two sides of the matching, within the whole set of stable payoffs. Our proofs differ technically from the Shapley and Shubik's proofs since they depend on a central result (Theorem 1) which has no parallel in the Assignment model. Received: June 1996/Revised version: February 1999     

An upper bound for the solvability probability of a random stable roommates instance

It is well-known that not all instances of the stable roommates problem admit a stable matching. Here we establish the first nontrivial upper bound on the limiting behavior of P_n, the probability that a random roommates instance of size n has a stable matching, namely, lim _n→∞ Pn? e^1/2/2 (=0.8244…). © 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

The stable crews problem

In this paper the classical stable roommates problem is generalized to situations when the two partners in a pair perform different roles. We propose an efficient algorithm to decide the existence of a stable matching in this problem.     

The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students’ strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised.     

Some remarks on the stable matching problem

The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no two unmatched agents prefer each other to their mates. We establish three results on properties of these matchings and present two short proofs of a recent theorem of Dubins and Freedman.     

Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism

The stable allocation problem is the generalization of (0,1)-matching problems to the allocation of real numbers (hours or quantities) between two separate sets of agents. The same unique-optimal matching (for one set of agents) is characterized by each of three properties: “efficiency”, “monotonicity”, and “strategy-proofness”.     

On the invariance of male optimal stable matching

The stable matching problem is that of matching two sets of agents in such a manner that no two unmatched agents prefer each other to their actual partners under the matching. In this paper, we present a set of sufficient conditions on the preference lists of any given stable matching instance, under which the optimality of the original male optimal stable matching is still preserved.     

基于语言偏好信息的稳定双边匹配决策方法

针对语言偏好信息下的双边匹配问题,提出一种双边匹配决策方法。首先,将双边主体给出的语言偏好信息转化为三角模糊数;然后,基于去模糊化处理方法将三角模糊数转化为匹配满意度,在此基础上,考虑稳定匹配约束条件,以最大化每方主体的匹配满意度为目标,建立双边匹配多目标优化模型,求解模型,获得双边匹配结果;最后,通过一个算例验证了提出方法的可行性和有效性。     

A maximum stable matching for the roommates problem

The stable roommates problem is that of matchingn people inton/2 disjoint pairs so that no two persons, who are not paired together, both prefer each other to their respective mates under the matching. Such a matching is called a complete stable matching. It is known that a complete stable matching may not exist. Irving proposed anO(n ²) algorithm that would find one complete stable matching if there is one, or would report that none exists. Since there may not exist any complete stable matching, it is natural to consider the problem of finding a maximum stable matching, i.e., a maximum number of disjoint pairs of persons such that these pairs are stable among themselves. In this paper, we present anO(n ²) algorithm, which is a modified version of Irving's algorithm, that finds a maximum stable matching.This research was supported by National Science Council of Republic of China under grant NSC 79-0408-E009-04.     

The integral stable allocation problem on graphs

As a generalisation of the stable matching problem Baïou and Balinski (2002) [1] defined the stable allocation problem for bipartite graphs, where both the edges and the vertices may have capacities. They constructed a so-called inductive algorithm, that always finds a stable allocation in strongly polynomial time. Here, we generalise their algorithm for non-bipartite graphs with integral capacities. We show that the algorithm does not remain polynomial, although we also present a scaling technique that makes the algorithm weakly polynomial.     

Assignment games with stable core

We prove that the core of an assignment game (a two-sided matching game with transferable utility as introduced by Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is stable (i.e., it is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern solution) if and only if there is a matching between the two types of players such that the corresponding entries in the underlying matrix are all row and column maximums. We identify other easily verifiable matrix properties and show their equivalence to various known sufficient conditions for core-stability. By these matrix characterizations we found that on the class of assignment games, largeness of the core, extendability and exactness of the game are all equivalent conditions, and strictly imply the stability of the core. In turn, convexity and subconvexity are equivalent, and strictly imply all aformentioned conditions. Final version: April 1, 2001     

匹配对策模型的核心稳定性

本文研究匹配合作对策模型的核心稳定性。基于线性规划对偶理论和图论的相关知识，我们首先证明了匹配对策有稳定核心当且仅当其基础二部图有完美匹配。其次我们讨论了几个与核心稳定性密切相关的性质（核心的包容性、对策的精确性和可扩性）并证明了它们的等价性。基于这些结果，我们还讨论了相应问题的算法。     

多对一双方匹配市场中的最优化

在双方市场中定义的博弈概念，可以使市场同方参与者的收益同时达到最大．这种最优化存在的理论依据是选择匹配的稳定性．用博弈论的分析与证明方法研宄多对一双方匹配市场中的最优化．在替代偏好和LAD（Law of Aggregate Demend）偏好下，证明由企业作选择的选择函数一定是个稳定匹配，由工人做选择的选择函数也是一个稳定匹配．     

An efficient algorithm for the “stable roommates” problem

The stable marriage problem is that of matching n men and n women, each of whom has ranked the members of the opposite sex in order of preference, so that no unmatched couple both prefer each other to their partners under the matching. At least one stable matching exists for every stable marriage instance, and efficient algorithms for finding such a matching are well known. The stable roommates problem involves a single set of even cardinality n, each member of which ranks all the others in order of preference. A stable matching is now a partition of this single set into n/2 pairs so that no two unmatched members both prefer each other to their partners under the matching. In this case, there are problem instances for which no stable matching exists. However, the present paper describes an O(n²) algorithm that will determine, for any instance of the problem, whether a stable matching exists, and if so, will find such a matching.     

图匹配多项式的因式分解及其应用

通过讨论几类图簇匹配多项式的因式分解,给出了两类图簇匹配等价图的结构性质,从而得到几类新的非匹配唯一图.     

On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model ∗

For the many-to-one matching model with firms having substitutable and q-separable preferences we propose two very natural binary operations that together with the unanimous partial ordering of the workers endow the set of stable matchings with a lattice structure. We also exhibit examples in which, under this restricted domain of firms' preferences, the classical binary operations may not even be matching