平台型企业定价影响因素研究:以银行卡为例

本文运用双边市场理论,构建了平台型企业的定价模型及回归方程,并运用国内14家商业银行2001~2017年的实际运营数据,对构建的模型和方程进行了实证检验。研究结论表明,平台对买方价格决定的主要影响因素有:平台向消费者(买方)提供产品或服务的成本、买方边的需求价格弹性,产品(服务)差异化程度,以及相对方(商户)接入平台的数量;而平台对卖方价格决定的主要影响因素有:卖方给买方产生的网络外部性强度,卖方边的需求价格弹性,以及市场份额。     

网络平台企业合作的定价机制研究——基于多归属情形

本研究以近期日益增长的网络平台企业间的合作为背景,在双边平台均为部分多归属的假定下,结合产业间平台企业合作会使不同平台用户的固有收益出现差异这一基本特征,建立双边用户多归属的双寡头竞争模型,分析平台企业参与合作与不合作这两种状态对企业定价的影响,并深入探讨交叉网络外部性、平台差异性及边际成本对平台企业均衡定价策略的影响。研究表明在双边用户都是多归属的情况下,无论合作平台还是非合作平台对双边用户的定价存在严格的对称关系,属于对称均衡。此外,研究也证明交叉网络外部性、平台差异性及边际成本对合作平台与非合作平台产生的影响存在差异。     

网络外部性条件下差异化双边平台买者参与问题

双边平台存在的基础是参与的用户,因此用户的分配是双边市场上各利益主体最关心的问题。为研究用户分配问题,本文在具有差异性的竞争双边市场上,建立了两阶段的双边平台竞争模型。第一阶段使用Rubinstein讨价还价模型对卖者的参与人数进行分配,利用讨价还价顺序描述卖者进入的先后顺序;第二阶段分别在平台利润最大化和社会福利最大化两种情况下,刻画买者对平台的规模偏好,并求均衡的市场份额。通过此模型分析竞争性平台差异化的情况下,网络外部性系数对平台均衡市场份额以及市场利益相关者利得的影响。研究表明:在考虑平台利润最大化的情况下,买者参与人数受卖者规模与网络外部性系数的影响,平台规模并非越大越好;在考虑社会福利最大化的情况下,买者的网络外部性系数与买者参与人数不相关,但与总社会福利正相关。     

供应商竞争下的供应链多边谈判

探讨了单买方多供应商基于供应链利润分配的多边谈判,其中的供应商具有不同讨价还价力.多边谈判程序为买方与单个供应商轮流进行双边谈判.此种情形下,供应商参与双边谈判的顺序影响供应商所获谈判利润,同时基于讨价还价力供应商通过向买方支付排位费用竞争双边谈判位置.结果给出了供应商竞争下多边谈判的唯一均衡,以及均衡状态下各方所获利润.本文构建了供应商讨价还价力不同情形下供应链多边谈判分析框架,并指出讨价还价力的不同使能力强的供应商通过竞争双边谈判位置而获利.     

基于网络外部性下双边平台延伸服务最优定价

在考虑交叉网络外部性的前提下,探讨平台提供延伸服务对平台定价策略的影响,结论表明,提供延伸服务可以增加平台利润,而具体的定价策略又分为两种情形,第一:在双边平台形成初期,用户规模较小,平台采取不对称定价,标准取决于延伸服务的互补强度:如果互补强度较小时,平台对卖方采取免费策略,如果互补强度较大时,平台则直接对卖方采取高价策略,此时平台利润最高;第二:当双边平台逐渐成熟之后,用户达到一定规模,平台直接对双边用户采取较高定价,此时平台利润最高.     

多归属情形下产业间平台合作的经济效应

本文针对合作后平台用户固有收益水平提高这一特征,在用户多归属情形下构建双寡头Hotelling竞争模型,分析了产业间平台合作的经济效应。研究发现,随着合作带来参与平台用户固有收益提高,该平台两边用户定价、价格非对称性和用户规模均上升。对非合作平台,合作会降低其双边用户定价和用户规模,而合作对定价非对称性的影响,则须视平台差异的程度而定。研究还表明,合作提高了参与平台利润,降低了非参与平台利润,同时还增加了消费者总剩余和社会总福利。这启示规制机构在对双边平台合作进行规制时要特别谨慎,切忌过度干预。     

马氏调制强度的传染模型下CDS的CVA计算

本文考虑了具有马氏调制强度的传染模型下,信用违约互换(CDS)的双边信用估值调整(CVA).在我们考虑的模型中,利率、回收率以及CDS的买方、卖方和参照实体三方的违约强度均受宏观经济环境的影响,该经济状况由一连续时间状态的齐次马氏链所刻画.利用测度变换和累积强度的Laplace变换,我们给出了CDS合同的双边CVA的表达公式,该公式可以表示为线性常微分方程组的基本解的形式.利用所得到的公式,我们数值分析了马氏调制和违约相关性对双边CVA的影响.     

考虑交叉网络外部性的网约车平台市场定价研究

随着移动互联网的发展,具有双边市场特征的以网约车平台为载体的多种新型出行方式相继出现,但同时也带来了新的交通管理问题。基于双边市场理论,考虑了交叉网络外部性,从用户、司机均为单归属以及用户多归属、司机单归属两个方面研究了网约车平台的市场定价问题。同时,引入了时间敏感系数和司机提成比例表征网约车行业特征。最终得到了网约车平台对用户和司机的定价结构公式、用户和司机规模及平台收益。研究显示平台定价及收益与交叉网络外部性及时间敏感系数的关系与用户归属结构相关;平台定价及收益与差异化程度正相关,且在用户多归属情况下提高差异化程度会导致多归属方用户规模降低;在双边均为单归属情况下,提高司机提成比例会降低平台对出行用户的定价且增加对司机方的定价,最终导致平台均衡收益降低;但多归属下平台对司机的定价与司机提成比例的关系还与双边交叉网络外部性的相对大小有关。     

双边市场下商家和电子商务平台的演化博弈分析

互联网平台经济中存在的“二选一”和“多选一”现象引起了国内外社会各界的广泛关注,在此现实情境下,本文作了具体参数设置和相应假设,构建了双边市场下商家和电子商务平台关于排他性竞争行为的演化博弈模型,得到商家和电子商务平台在不同条件下的演化稳定均衡策略,并讨论了参数变化对演化稳定均衡策略的影响。最后,通过数值算例分析对系统演化稳定均衡结果进行了验证。研究结果对商家和电子商务平台企业的管理决策,以及政府监管部门对互联网经济下不正当竞争行为的有效监管有着一定启示意义。     

约化模型中含有对手风险的信用违约互换定价

在约化模型中研究了含有对手风险的信用违约互换的定价问题.通过构建信用违约互换买方、卖方和参考资产之间的衰减传染结构,借助于测度变换的方法分别导出了含有单边和双边对手风险的信用违约的定价表达式.     

A decision approach to competitive electronic sealed-bid auctions for land

Electronic markets for land are innovative techniques potentially advantageous to buyers and private sellers, the latter being interested in sealed-bid auctions assuring high levels of competition among many bidders so that coalitions and cooperative games are ruled out. Land electronic tendering requires sufficient online information for bidders such as valuation reports by prestigious surveyors. To help the bidder make his best choice, we propose a decision model for moderately pessimistic players facing tenders where competition among a great number of independent antagonists excludes the use of cooperative games and involves strict uncertainty. A worked example concerning farmland in Spain is presented.     

Mutual rankings

This paper analyzes some ranking methods in two-sided settings through their axiomatization. In these settings, there are two sets (the sides) and each member of one side evaluates each member of the other side. Such settings with mutual evaluations abound, for instance between buyers and sellers, students and teachers, or individuals and clubs.     

A procedure to compute the nucleolus of the assignment game

The assignment game introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972)  [6] is a model for a two-sided market where there is an exchange of indivisible goods for money and buyers or sellers demand or supply exactly one unit of the goods. We give a procedure to compute the nucleolus of any assignment game, based on the distribution of equal amounts to the agents, until the game is reduced to fewer agents.     

Analysis of the core of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets

We introduce the class of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games which generalizes the well-known two-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games to markets with an arbitrary number of sectors. We reach the core and the corresponding extreme allocations of any multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game by means of an associated convex game defined on the set of sectors instead of the set of sellers and buyers. We also study when the core of a multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game is stable in the sense of von Neumann–Morgenstern.     

双边市场中平台企业兼容策略选择研究

为了研究双边市场中平台企业的兼容策略选择,构建了反映不同兼容策略的双边市场模型.假设一个垄断者同时拥有两个存在横向差异的平台,运用两阶段博弈的思想分析了平台两边用户的兼容策略选择,发现两边都希望平台是完全兼容的;进而分析了平台企业的兼容策略选择,发现如果没有新用户的进入,平台之间的任何兼容策略都是无差异的,但如果存在新用户的进入,则完全兼容是垄断者的最优策略选择.     

Competitive Multi-period Pricing for Perishable Products: A Robust Optimization Approach

We study a multi-period oligopolistic market for a single perishable product with fixed inventory. Our goal is to address the competitive aspect of the problem together with demand uncertainty using ideas from robust optimization and variational inequalities. The demand function for each seller has some associated uncertainty and we assume that the sellers would like to adopt a policy that is robust to adverse uncertain circumstances. We believe this is the first paper that uses robust optimization for dynamic pricing under competition. In particular, starting with a given fixed inventory, each seller competes over a multi-period time horizon in the market by setting prices and protection levels for each period at the beginning of the time horizon. Any unsold inventory at the end of the horizon is worthless. The sellers do not have the option of periodically reviewing and replenishing their inventory. We study non-cooperative Nash equilibrium policies for sellers under such a model. This kind of a setup can be used to model pricing of air fares, hotel reservations, bandwidth in communication networks, etc. In this paper we demonstrate our results through some numerical examples.     

Duality and martingales: a stochastic programming perspective on contingent claims

The hedging of contingent claims in the discrete time, discrete state case is analyzed from the perspective of modeling the hedging problem as a stochastic program. Application of conjugate duality leads to the arbitrage pricing theorems of financial mathematics, namely the equivalence of absence of arbitrage and the existence of a probability measure that makes the price process into a martingale. The model easily extends to the analysis of options pricing when modeling risk management concerns and the impact of spreads and margin requirements for writers of contingent claims. However, we find that arbitrage pricing in incomplete markets fails to model incentives to buy or sell options. An extension of the model to incorporate pre-existing liabilities and endowments reveals the reasons why buyers and sellers trade in options. The model also indicates the importance of financial equilibrium analysis for the understanding of options prices in incomplete markets. Received: June 5, 2000 / Accepted: July 12, 2001?Published online December 6, 2001     

Equilibrium two-part cost structures

We consider an oligopolistic product market in which two competing firms instead of paying a competitive input price choose a two-part tariff. Costs for the input are divided up into upfront fixed costs independent of the output level and reductions in marginal costs. We explore under which competitive settings will such a two-part cost structure correspond to equilibrium behavior in a two stage game. We find that firms in a static model do have an incentive to choose a two-part cost structure when competition in the product market is not too strong and oligopoly rents can be shifted form the rival to the own firm. In a dynamic market when firms use Markov strategies competition is so intense that there are no rents to be shifted and firms do not benefit from two-part cost structures.