Network effects in a human capital based economic growth model

We revisit a recently introduced agent model [ACS, 11, 99 (2008)], where economic growth is a consequence of education (human capital formation) and innovation, and investigate the influence of the agents’ social network, both on an agent’s decision to pursue education and on the output of new ideas. Regular and random networks are considered. The results are compared with the predictions of a mean field (representative agent) model.     

Cooperation and community structure in social networks

Situations of conflict giving rise to social dilemmas are widespread in society. One way of studying these important phenomena is by using simplified models of individual behavior under conflicting situations such as evolutionary game theory. Starting from the observation that individuals interact through networks of acquaintances, we study the evolution of cooperation on model and real social networks through well known paradigmatic games. Using a new payoff scheme which leaves replicator dynamics invariant, we find that cooperation is sustainable in such networks, even in the difficult case of the prisoner’s dilemma. The evolution and stability of cooperation implies the condensation of game strategies into the existing community structures of the social network in which clusters of cooperators survive thanks to their higher connectivity towards other fellow cooperators.     

Other-regarding preference and the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on complex networks

Prevailing models of the evolutionary prisoner’s game on networks always assume that agents are pursuing their own profit maximization. But the results from experimental games show that many agents have other-regarding preference. In this paper, we study the emergence of cooperation from the prisoner’s dilemma game on complex networks while some agents exhibit other-regarding preference such as inequality aversion, envious and guilty emotions. Contrary to common ideas, the simulation results show that the existence of inequality aversion agents does not promote cooperation emergence on a BA (Barabási and Albert) scale-free network in most situations. If the defection attraction is big and agents exhibit strong preference for inequality aversion, the frequency of cooperators will be lower than in situations where no inequality aversion agents exist. In some cases, the existence of the inequality agents will even induce the frequency of cooperators to zero, a feature which is not observed in previous research on the prisoner’s dilemma game when the underlying interaction topology is a BA scale-free network. This means that if an agent cares about equality too much, it will be difficult for cooperation to emerge and the frequency of cooperators will be low on BA networks. The research on the effect of envy or guilty emotions on the emergence of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game on BA networks obtains similar results, though some differences exist. However, simulation results on a WS (Watts and Strogatz) small-world network display another scenario. If agents care about the inequality of agents very much, the WS network favors cooperation emergence in the prisoners’ dilemma game when other-regarding agents exist. If the agent weight on other-regarding is lowered, the cooperation frequencies emerging on a WS network are not much different from those in situations without other-regarding agents, although the frequency of cooperators is lower than those of the situation without other-regarding preference agents sometimes. All the simulation results imply that inequality aversion and its variations can have important effects on cooperation emergence in the prisoner’s dilemma game, and different network topologies have different effects on cooperation emergence in the prisoner’s dilemma game played on complex networks.     

Elimination mechanism promotes cooperation in coevolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games

We propose an elimination mechanism in the study of the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games on evolving networks. It assumes that after each round of playing, players whose payoffs are below a certain threshold will be eliminated from the game and the same number of new nodes will be added to the network to maintain the size of the network constant. Numerical results show that moderate values of elimination threshold can result in a maximum cooperation level in the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game. Moreover, the elimination mechanism can make the network structure evolve into a high heterogeneity in degree distribution, which is considered to be helpful in promoting cooperation in evolutionary games. The present study may provide new insight for understanding the evolution of cooperation in light of the law ‘survival of the fittest’ in nature.     

Coevolution of game and network structure with adjustable linking

Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, in the real world, social interaction could change the relationship among people. And the change of social structure will also affect people’s strategies. We build a coevolution model of prisoner’s dilemma game and network structure to study the dynamic interaction in the real world. Differing from other coevolution models, players rewire their network connections according to the density of cooperation and other players’ payoffs. We use a parameter α to control the effect of payoff in the process of rewiring. Based on the asynchronous update rule and Monte Carlo simulation, we find that, when players prefer to rewire their links to those who are richer, the temptation can increase the cooperation density.     

The effect of recommended role models in prisoner’s dilemma game

Previous studies concerning the prisoner’s dilemma game on graphs conventionally assume that individuals select role models from their replacement graphs at random. We propose a extended prisoner’s dilemma game model to study the impact of recommended role models on the evolution of cooperation in a homogeneous population. Individuals are endowed with the capacity to recommend the ones they imitated in the past to their neighbors for strategy updating. Numerical simulations show that cooperation can be improved significantly when recommendation is allowed. Our results might be helpful in explaining the widespread cooperation in the real world.     

The roles of heterogeneous investment mechanism in the public goods game on scale-free networks

The public goods game is an important theoretical model for investigating the emergence of cooperation in the multi-player social dilemma. It has been proven that scale-free networks can significantly promote cooperation, but fail to sustain cooperation when the player obtains the normalized payoff. In this paper, we introduce heterogeneous investment mechanism into the public goods game on scale-free networks, and study the evolution of cooperation in both cases of accumulated and normalized payoff. Our research reveals that the heterogeneous investment mechanism can obviously facilitate cooperation as the adjusted parameter α increases. The increase of α allows cooperators to emerge under lower values of r. In the case of accumulated payoff, cooperators always firmly occupy the hubs, and the population keeps high cooperation level. In the case of normalized payoff, the increase of α changes the situation that the hubs are easily invaded by defectors, and inhibits the spread of defectors.     

Motif structure and cooperation in real-world complex networks

Networks of dynamical nodes serve as generic models for real-world systems in many branches of science ranging from mathematics to physics, technology, sociology and biology. Collective behavior of agents interacting over complex networks is important in many applications. The cooperation between selfish individuals is one of the most interesting collective phenomena. In this paper we address the interplay between the motifs’ cooperation properties and their abundance in a number of real-world networks including yeast protein-protein interaction, human brain, protein structure, email communication, dolphins’ social interaction, Zachary karate club and Net-science coauthorship networks. First, the amount of cooperativity for all possible undirected subgraphs with three to six nodes is calculated. To this end, the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is considered and the cooperativity of each subgraph is calculated as the percentage of cooperating agents at the end of the simulation time. Then, the three- to six-node motifs are extracted for each network. The significance of the abundance of a motif, represented by a Z-value, is obtained by comparing them with some properly randomized versions of the original network. We found that there is always a group of motifs showing a significant inverse correlation between their cooperativity amount and Z-value, i.e. the more the Z-value the less the amount of cooperativity. This suggests that networks composed of well-structured units do not have good cooperativity properties.     

Memory-based evolutionary game on small-world network with tunable heterogeneity

Most papers about evolutionary games on graph assume agents have no memory. Yet, in the real world, interaction history can also affect an agent’s decision. So we introduce a memory-based agent model and investigate the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on a Heterogeneous Newman-Watts small-world network based on a Genetic Algorithm, focusing on heterogeneity’s role in the emergence of cooperative behaviors. In contrast with previous results, we find that a different heterogeneity parameter domain range imposes an entirely different impact on the cooperation fraction. In the parameter range corresponding to networks with extremely high heterogeneity, the decrease in heterogeneity greatly promotes the proportion of cooperation strategy, while in the remaining parameter range, which relates to relatively homogeneous networks, the variation of heterogeneity barely affects the cooperation fraction. Also our study provides a detailed insight into the microscopic factors that contribute to the performance of cooperation frequency.     

Effect of community structure on coevolutionary dynamics with dynamical linking

We investigate the effect of community structure on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game with dynamical linking. We show both analytically and numerically that cooperators are generally more favorable on community networks than on networks without community structure, and in particular, there exists an optimal intermediate value of the model parameter leading to the easiest fixation of cooperators. We show that our results are robust with respect to the initial number of cooperators and are valid for a wide range of the ratio of time scales associated with linking and strategy dynamics. Since community structure is ubiquitous in real social networks, our results may provide new insights into the evolution of cooperation in real world.     

Reputation-based network selection mechanism using game theory

Current and future wireless environments are based on the coexistence of multiple networks supported by various access technologies deployed by different operators. As wireless network deployments increase, their usage is also experiencing a significant growth. In this heterogeneous multi-technology multi-application multi-terminal multi-user environment users will be able to freely connect to any of the available access technologies. Network selection mechanisms will be required in order to keep mobile users “always best connected” anywhere and anytime. In such a heterogeneous environment, game theory techniques can be adopted in order to understand and model competitive or cooperative scenarios between rational decision makers. In this work we propose a theoretical framework for combining reputation-based systems, game theory and network selection mechanism. We define a network reputation factor which reflects the network’s previous behaviour in assuring service guarantees to the user. Using the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, we model the user–network interaction as a cooperative game and we show that by defining incentives for cooperation and disincentives against defecting on service guarantees, repeated interaction sustains cooperation.     

Assortative mixing in networks

A network is said to show assortative mixing if the nodes in the network that have many connections tend to be connected to other nodes with many connections. Here we measure mixing patterns in a variety of networks and find that social networks are mostly assortatively mixed, but that technological and biological networks tend to be disassortative. We propose a model of an assortatively mixed network, which we study both analytically and numerically. Within this model we find that networks percolate more easily if they are assortative and that they are also more robust to vertex removal.     

Evolutionary game on a stochastic growth network

In some real complex systems the structures are difficult to map or changing over time. To explore the evolution of strategies on these complex systems, it is not realistic enough to specify their structures or topological properties in advance. In this paper, we address the evolutionary game on a stochastic growth network adopting the prisoner’s dilemma game. We introduce a growing rate q$q$ to control the ratio of network growth to strategy evolution. A large q$q$ denotes that the network grows faster than strategy evolution. Simulation results show that a fast growing rate is helpful to promote the average payoffs of both cooperators and defectors. Moreover, this parameter also significantly influences the cooperation frequency on the resulting networks. The coexisting mechanisms in this paper may provide a beneficial insight for understanding the emergence of complex topological structures and game behaviors in numerous real systems.     

Effects of Topological Randomness on Cooperation in a Deterministic Prisoner's Dilemma Game

In this work, we consider an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a homogeneous random network with the richest-following strategy adoption rule. By constructing homogeneous random networks from a regular ring graph, we investigate the effects of topological randomness on cooperation. In contrast to the ordinary view that the presence of small amount of shortcuts in ring graphs favors cooperation, we find the cooperation inhibition by weak
topological randomness. The explanations on the observations are presented.     

Adjusting learning motivation to promote cooperation

An evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game with players adjusting their learning motivation is studied. At each time step, each player can adjust his/her learning motivation according to the difference between the current payoff and payoff aspiration. Greater payoff aspiration means stronger learning motivation, and vice versa. We find that the density of cooperation in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game is enhanced when the learning motivation mechanism is considered. Meanwhile, we show that proper noise can not only induce the highest cooperation level but also can maintain the cooperation phenomenon even though there is more temptation to defect.     

Evolution of cooperation among interacting individuals through molecular dynamics simulations

Using molecular dynamics (MD) simulation and evolutionary game theory, we incorporate the spacial structure of individuals into the study of the behaviors of cooperation, by adopting the prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift game as metaphors of cooperation between unrelated individuals. The results show that the introduction of spacial structure enhances cooperation using the strategy of prisoner's dilemma while does not make much changes to the cooperation if the strategy of snowdrift game is used. It is also found that our model is a meta-phase between regular ring graph model and complex network model. And the “activity of players” T^* we introduced makes our simulation much more closer to real world problems.     

Evolution of donations on scale-free networks during a COVID-19 breakout

Having a large number of timely donations during the early stages of a COVID-19 breakout would normally be considered rare. Donation is a special public goods game with zero yield for donors, and it has the characteristics of the prisoners' dilemma. This paper discusses why timely donations in the early stages of COVID-19 occurred. Based on the idea that donation is a strategy adopted by players during interconnection on account of their understanding of the environment, donation-related populations are placed on social networks and the inter-correlation structures in the population are described by scale-free networks. Players in donation-related populations are of four types: donors, illegal beneficiaries, legal beneficiaries, and inactive people. We model the evolutionary game of donation on a scale-free network. Donors, illegal beneficiaries and inactive people learn and update strategies under the Fermi update rule, whereas the conversion between legal beneficiaries and the other three types is determined by the environment surrounding the players. We study the evolution of cooperative action when the agglomeration coefficient, the parameters of the utility function, the noise intensity, the utility coefficient, the donation coefficient and the initial states of the population on the scale-free network change. For population sizes of 50, 100, 150, and 200, we give the utility functions and the agglomeration coefficients for promoting cooperation and study the corresponding steady states and structural characteristics of the population. We identify the best ranges of the noise intensity K, the donation coefficient α and the utility coefficient β for promoting cooperation at different population sizes. Furthermore, with the increase of the population size, the donor traps are found. At the same time, it is discovered that the initial states of the population have a great impact on the steady states; thus the upper and lower triangle phenomena are proposed. We also find that the population size itself is also an important factor for promoting donation, pointing out the direction of efforts to further promote donation and achieve better social homeostasis under the donation model.     

Cooperation in networked populations of selfish adaptive agents: Sensitivity to network structure

This paper investigates the adaptation of cooperating strategies in an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game with individually learning agents, subject to the structure of the interaction network. In particular, we study how cooperation or defection comes to dominate the population on Watts–Strogatz networks, under varying average path lengths. Our results are in good agreement with previous works on discrete choice dynamics on networks, but are in stark contrast with results from the evolution of cooperation literature. We argue that the latter is because the different adaptation method used (i.e., adaptive learning instead of ‘evolutionary’ strategy switching).     

Does “game participation cost” affect the advantage of heterogeneous networks for evolving cooperation?

Masuda [N. Masuda, Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation, Proceedings of the Royal Society B 274 (2007) 1815-1821] reported that a game participation cost (expressed by adding same negative values to all four elements in a 2 × 2 payoff matrix) affects the advantage of heterogeneous networks in the evolution of cooperation. We show that this finding is not always true depending on the features of the network, indicating that participation costs help cooperation in certain situations rather than destroy it. In a weaker dilemma game on a scale free network derived from the Barabasi & Albert algorithm with a larger average degree, game participation cost helps rather than destroy the network reciprocity.     

Modeling network growth with assortative mixing

We propose a model of an underlying mechanism responsible for the formation of assortative mixing in networks between “similar” nodes or vertices based on generic vertex properties. Existing models focus on a particular type of assortative mixing, such as mixing by vertex degree, or present methods of generating a network with certain properties, rather than modeling a mechanism driving assortative mixing during network growth. The motivation is to model assortative mixing by non-topological vertex properties, and the influence of these non-topological properties on network topology. The model is studied in detail for discrete and hierarchical vertex properties, and we use simulations to study the topology of resulting networks. We show that assortative mixing by generic properties directly drives the formation of community structure beyond a threshold assortativity of r ∼0.5, which in turn influences other topological properties. This direct relationship is demonstrated by introducing a new measure to characterise the correlation between assortative mixing and community structure in a network. Additionally, we introduce a novel type of assortative mixing in systems with hierarchical vertex properties, from which a hierarchical community structure is found to result. Electronic supplementary material Supplementary Online Material