ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND UNILATERAL CONTROL IN AN OPEN ECONOMY

In this paper we study two questions in environmental economics. First, within the context of a simple 2 × 2 × 2 static general equilibrium model, we seek to determine the conditions under which environmental policy, pursued unilaterally by a large country will make that country worse off. The empirical dimension of this question is stressed, and the key parameters which are germane to any policy discussion regarding this issue are identified. Second, we study—once again from the perspective of a large country—the possibility of using the domestic tax structure optimally to attain environmental policy objectives. Keeping the empirical dimension of the question in mind, we show how to compute optimal externality correcting taxes. We then briefly focus on the links between our stylized analytical model and the applied general equilibrium models currently being developed to study the effects of environmental policy quantitatively.     

A dynamic analysis of protection and environmental policy in a small trading developing country

We analyze a dynamic model of protection and environmental policy in a small trading developing country (DC). The DC government protects the import competing (and the polluting) sector of the economy with a tariff. The employment and output effects of three different pollution taxes are analyzed. These taxes incorporate different assumptions about the DC government's ability to commit to its announced policy. First, we describe the taxes, we study the dependence of these taxes on the tariff, and we show that in general an activist environmental policy is called for, irrespective of the length of time to which the government can commit to its announced policy. Second, we identify a situation in which the conduct of environmental policy raises welfare unambiguously, and the situations in which it does not do so. Finally, we show that the time inconsistency of certain optimal programs can prevent the DC government from achieving its environmental and employment objectives.     

Revenue recycling of a CO2 tax: Results from a general equilibrium model for Switzerland

This paper combines a recent proposal by the Swiss government for a CO₂ tax with a policy that uses the tax revenues to lower the pre-existing marginal labor income tax rates, and examines the efficiency and distribution effects of such a revenue recycling policy. The investigation, based on a large-scale general equilibrium model, contrary to other studies, indicates that an environmental tax reform involves negative gross cost, that is, increases welfare even when environmental benefits are not accounted for. The simulation results further show that the adverse distributional effects of a pure CO₂ tax are neutralized or even reversed when tax revenues finance cuts of existing taxes.We thank Tom Rutherford, Reto Schleiniger and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Financial support by the Federal Agency for Energy under the SOEFF program is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent the opinions of the granting agency.     

基于“黑箱”问题的政府碳排放调控政策设计及影响分析

本文在低碳经济背景下,针对我国制造企业生产和碳排放现状,在设定经济发展速度所决定的制造企业限额碳排放约束下,构建了基于“黑箱”问题的碳排放量-环境政策模型,研究政府如何制定碳税和补贴相结合的复合调控政策以控制企业的碳排放量。通过数值仿真结果,分析企业产量、产品价格与调控政策之间的关系,得出结论:基于“黑箱”问题的碳排放量-环境政策能够在降低碳排放量的同时维持企业的发展,单位碳税和超标碳排放量并不是一定的线性关系,但是总趋势可以看出,超标的碳排放量与单位碳税是正向关系;不同情境下的单一制造企业或不同情境下的多个制造企业的单位碳税和补贴不同,政府可以设置差异化碳税和补贴;碳税和补贴的变动对产品价格的变化幅度在-1%和1.5%之间,说明可以在降低碳排放量和满足生产量的同时使现实生活中产品的价格保持基本稳定。     

基于“黑箱”问题的政府碳排放调控政策设计及影响分析

本文在低碳经济背景下,针对我国制造企业生产和碳排放现状,在设定经济发展速度所决定的制造企业限额碳排放约束下,构建了基于“黑箱”问题的碳排放量-环境政策模型,研究政府如何制定碳税和补贴相结合的复合调控政策以控制企业的碳排放量。通过数值仿真结果,分析企业产量、产品价格与调控政策之间的关系,得出结论:基于“黑箱”问题的碳排放量-环境政策能够在降低碳排放量的同时维持企业的发展,单位碳税和超标碳排放量并不是一定的线性关系,但是总趋势可以看出,超标的碳排放量与单位碳税是正向关系;不同情境下的单一制造企业或不同情境下的多个制造企业的单位碳税和补贴不同,政府可以设置差异化碳税和补贴;碳税和补贴的变动对产品价格的变化幅度在-1%和1.5%之间,说明可以在降低碳排放量和满足生产量的同时使现实生活中产品的价格保持基本稳定。     

我国能源-环境-经济系统的区域间建模

本研究试图探讨用“自上而下”和“自下而上”相结合的建模方法,对我国二氧化硫和二氧化碳减排进行区域间建模.本研究以一个用于分析硫税的区域间波及影响、以及评价电力部门的脱硫技术的区域间可计算一般均衡模型为基础平台;从理论上探讨了如何对该模型进行扩展和改进.首先本研究对该模型的要点进行了阐述,强调了把能源技术模型融合在区域间可计算一般均衡模型中的建模方法.然后本研究对于实行环境税和排放权交易的环境经济效果进行了比较,用成本收益法分析了工业部门对减排技术的选择,并以前述模型为基础建立了区域间模型.本研究所提出的模型可以被用来从区域统筹的观点,对我国能源-环境-经济系统的可持续发展进行预测和分析.最后本研究提出应该从更新数据、研究环境政策和技术进步之间的关系等方面,进一步发展该模型.     

OPTIMAL TAXES FOR POLLUTION REGULATION: DYNAMIC,SPATIAL AND STOCHASTIC CHARACTERISTICS

The paper develops a model that incorporates the dynamic, spatial and stochastic aspects of environmental pollution. Conditions for optimal resource allocation between output production and pollution abatement processes are derived. Optimal emission (Pigouvian) taxes which may be used to efficiently regulate pollution in each region are determined. The pattern of emission taxes over time and their relative sizes among different regions are additionally explored with the help of a simplified numerical example.     

General financial equilibrium with policy interventions: a variational inequality approach

In this paper a model of general financial equilibrium with policy interventions is introduced, which yields the optimal composition of assets and liabilities in each sector's portfolio, as well as the market prices for each instrument. The policy interventions considered are taxes and price ceilings. The variational inequality formulation of the equilibrium conditions is derived and then utilized to establish existence and uniqueness properties of the solution pattern. An algorithm is proposed for the computation of the problem. Finally, the algorithm is applied to some special utility functions as numerical examples.     

环境治理政策的减排、增效与结构优化效果动态评价

为测度环境治理政策波动对产出、减排、要素配置、消费与产业结构的影响及其传导机制,将异质性消费偏好、产出差异性、环境效用和环境损失函数引入E-DSGE模型。政策强度分析发现,技术进步、排污税和消费税政策效果较强,环境控制和治污支出冲击效果较弱。政策效应分析发现,技术进步政策效应最优,能实现增产和减排双重目标,促进要素配置和居民消费、产出与消费结构改进;排污税和政府治污支出政策次优,能实现增产和减排的双赢目标,促进要素供给和产出结构清洁化,不利于消费提升和消费结构优化;环境控制与消费税政策效果最差,以牺牲产出实现减排,不利于要素配置,产出与消费结构改进效果较弱,消费税会抑制居民消费,但消费税政策效果随环境友好型家庭比例提升而加强。     

Variational inequalities for international general financial equilibrium modeling and computation

In this paper, a variational inequality approach for modeling competitive general international financial equilibrium is presented, within which general utility functions and taxes, transaction costs, and price policy interventions are explicitly incorporated. The paper examines taxes that depend both on the origin and on the type of investing sector, and price policy interventions that allow the monetary authorities to set upper and lower prices for all instruments and currencies. The optimal composition of assets and liabilities for each sector of each country, as well as the prices of the instruments and the exchange rates, in terms of a basic currency are obtained. We present both qualitative properties of the equilibrium pattern, and propose an algorithm for the computation of the pattern along with convergence results. Finally, we study the special case where the utility function is quadratic and we apply the proposed algorithm in order to compute the equilibrium pattern for a series of numerical examples.     

An extension of the Antoci-Dei-Galeotti evolutionary model for environment protection through financial instruments

This work moves from a recent paper by Antoci et al. (2009) [1] where a dynamic model is proposed to describe an innovative method for improving environmental quality based on the exchange of financial activities, promoted by a Public Administration, between firms and tourists in a given region. We extend their analysis in two directions: we first perform a global analysis of the basins of attraction to check the stability extents of the coexisting stable attractors of the model, and we show that some undesirable and sub-optimal stable equilibria always exist, whose basins may be quite intermingled with those of the optimal equilibrium; then we introduce a structural change of the model by assuming that the Public Administration, besides its action as an intermediary between visitors and polluting firms, also performs a direct action for the pollution control. We show how the cost of this direct action of the Public Administration can be balanced by proper taxes and we prove that undesired equilibria can be ruled out by a suitable balance of financial instruments and direct actions of Public Administration for environmental remediation.     

Applied general equilibrium modeling for environmental policy analysis

Incorporating environmental regulation and its impact in general equilibrium models has by now a twenty years long tradition. In 1970, Leontief extended his input-output approach to quantify environmental repercussions on the economic structure. The shortcomings of this model, such as fixed coefficients in technological processes or zero price and income elasticities of demand, can be resolved by using a quantitative general equilibrium model. The objective of this paper is to employ such a model to quantify the economic effects of environmental policy and to present a cost-effectiveness analysis of different market instruments in environmental policy.     

SECOND BEST TAXES AND QUOTAS IN NITROGEN REGULATION

This paper investigates second best policies to regulate nitrogen leaching. When the policy maker controls the total nitrogen use, an overall tax is superior to an action equivalent overall quota. When the goal is to regulate the expected level of nitrogen leaching, expected profit of a risk neutral farmer is greater under an overall tax than under an overall quota under a reasonable condition. The welfare ranking of action equivalent taxes and quotas for a risk averse farmer is generally ambiguous. In the numerical analyses, overall taxes turned out to be superior to overall quotas with both targets, despite a very high value of absolute risk aversion, 0.01. These results suggest that an overall tax is probably a superior policy to an overall quota to regulate expected total nitrogen use or expected nitrogen leaching for risk neutral and most of risk averse farmers.     

环境规制、环境研发与绿色技术进步

为鼓励和引导绿色技术发展,驱动预防性技术和处理性技术协同进步,有必要开发环境规制的绿色技术进步导向功能,并探究其传导机理。论文通过建立双寡头同时博弈模型对环境规制、环境研发与绿色技术进步进行关联分析。研究表明:环境研发是环境规制推动绿色技术进步的重要传导路径;环境补贴力度会显著影响环境规制政策组合的技术进步效果;绿色技术进步导向的环境规制的政策组合存在一个普适性较强的应用策略;环境税和环境补贴的规制政策组合能够有效增进社会福利,具体表现为通过污染预防技术和污染处理技术的协同进步带来的产量增加、生产成本减少、污染产生量减少以及污染处理量增加。     

基于综合开采率的煤炭资源最优开采问题研究

针对我国煤炭资源开采中的低效率和浪费现象,在综合考虑了煤炭资源利用率和回采率等方面问题后,通过建立煤炭资源最优开采的动态优化模型,分析了影响煤炭资源利用率和回采率的因素,提出了提高煤炭资源利用率的合理方案.分析表明,对煤炭资源的基础储量征税可以实现煤炭企业在兼顾利润最大化的同时提高煤炭资源的利用率和回采率,同时通过级差税的调节可以有效降低因放弃低品位资源带来的浪费.     

FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES AND ENVIRONMENT

ABSTRACT. We consider a North‐South model of capital mobility in which foreign investment adversely impacts the environment in South. By focusing on the strategic aspects of environmental policies, among other things, we compare different policy regimes, i.e., different combinations of tax and quota. More specifically, we investigate the (non)equivalence of these policy regimes.     

一般交叉规划与经济均衡模型

本文首先给出了有多个子规划的一般交叉规划模型,然后把它转化为抽象经济模型,并给出其均衡解存在的条件.最后利用一般交叉规划建立了一类非合作型寡头垄断市场的均衡模型.     

Random sampling within the framework of a multivariate principal-agent approach

In this paper, we analyze a specific class of principal-agent models which seems to be sufficiently general to cover applications in environmental economics with upstream-downstream problems as an example. In our basic model, the observation outcome is ann-dimensional random vectorx and only the first and second moments ofx are common knowledge. We study the effects of random sampling in the presence of costly signals. For this purpose, we assume that the principal and the agent use a simple statistical procedure, i.e. their contract will be based on the mean of a random sample with sampling costs dependent on the sample size. It is shown that there exists an optimal sample size. We investigate the relationship between the optimal sample size, the marginal sampling costs, and the agent's risk aversion.     

Political aspects of environmental policy

To the economist, many environmental problems are really allocation problems which can be solved by means of market prices that should approximate the shadow prices of environmental restrictions. Why is it so difficult to implement the corresponding institutional arrangements politically?     

ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND OPTIMAL OIL AND GAS EXPLOITATION

This paper examines the impacts of environmental regulations on firms in the oil and gas industry. A model is developed using optimal control theory, which extends the existing models by incorporating the environmental compliance costs into the exploration and production stages. An approach for measuring the cumulative impacts of these regulations on the firm's exploration and production is presented. The results indicate that rising environmental compliance costs lead to reductions in investment and production, and the alteration of investment and production profiles. This implies that less resources will be developed and associated economic benefit will decline. Therefore, it is vital for policy makers to consider carefully whether the perceived environmental benefits derived from these regulations justify associated compliance costs.