POLITICS,ENVIRONMENT, AND FISHERIES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES

Pacific salmon have always been a lucrative commodity in Alaska history. The primary contribution of this paper is to assess the effects of statewide policy changes such as the 1959 Alaska Statehood and the 1974 Limited Entry Act on the harvest of Pacific salmon in Alaska, controlling for changes in oceanic environmental conditions such as the Pacific Decadal Oscillation. An autoregressive distributed lag approach is employed to annual time‐series data for 1899–1996. We find that, while the 1974 Limited Entry Act has a significant effect on Alaska salmon harvests, the 1959 Alaska Statehood had little impact. In addition, the oceanic environment has an important determinant of long‐run Alaska salmon harvests.     

OPTIMAL-SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF MULTI-SPECIES FISHERIES: LESSONS FROM A PREDATOR-PREY MODEL

ABSTRACT. In this paper we consider the meaning of sustainable resource management in multi-dimensional resources. Based on the principle of intergenerational fairness, we define fisheries management as sustainable if it does not lead to a decline in the net present value of the fishery. If sustainability, or intergenerational fairness, were held as an obligation by fishery managers, then the traditional present-value maximization objective would be constrained. Using numerical solutions to a simple predator-prey model, we explore how the optimal-sustainable management of this fishery would differ from management that seeks to maximize the present value of the benefits. General lessons regarding the meaning of sustainable fishery management are discussed.     

FISHERIES AND MARINE PROTECTED AREAS: A SPATIAL BIOECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS

Abstract Marine protected areas (MPAs), used increasingly as a tool for conservation of ocean and coastal environments, typically interact with fisheries. Indeed, implementation of an MPA in a coastal region will likely affect fishing communities along that coast but to differing degrees depending on their location relative to the MPA. The resulting creation of “winners” and “losers” has implications for the acceptance and long‐term viability of the MPA. This paper develops a spatially explicit bioeconomic simulation model to assess the distributional implications resulting from creation of a no‐take MPA. The key assumption is that this results in certain fishers being displaced from the MPA to new fishing locations, leading to decreased fishing time and increased costs. Is it possible for those being displaced to end up as “winners” in the fishery? Analysis of the model indicates that such an outcome can occur in certain circumstances, notably if the biological effects of the MPA produce (i) improved ecosystem health inside the MPA, such that fish stock carrying capacity increases; or (ii) to some extent, high fish stock migration rates between neighboring areas. The results indicate that in creating MPAs, careful attention to their design is needed in order to deal with corresponding distributional impacts on fishing communities.     

A STATE SPACE BIOECONOMIC MODEL OF PACIFIC HALIBUT

Abstract Evaluation of potential economic consequences of alternative management actions requires an understanding of how the biological stock will be affected by the management action and an understanding of the response of economic systems to changes in the timing, magnitude, and size distribution of harvests and changes in the location and catchability of the biological stock. We use a hybrid structural time series model to represent Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) stock and recruitment dynamics and a system of structural equations to represent supply and demand relationships for Pacific halibut from Alaska and British Columbia. Model simulations explore the economic effects of changes in recruitment success, growth rate, and carrying capacity, and changes in international supplies of halibut.     

A PREDICTIVE MODEL TO INFORM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF DOUBLE‐CRESTED CORMORANTS AND FISHERIES IN MICHIGAN

The proliferation of double‐crested cormorants (DCCOs; Phalacrocorax auritus) in North America has raised concerns over their potential negative impacts on game, cultured and forage fishes, island and terrestrial resources, and other colonial water birds, leading to increased public demands to reduce their abundance. By combining fish surplus production and bird functional feeding response models, we developed a deterministic predictive model representing bird–fish interactions to inform an adaptive management process for the control of DCCOs in multiple colonies in Michigan. Comparisons of model predictions with observations of changes in DCCO numbers under management measures implemented from 2004 to 2012 suggested that our relatively simple model was able to accurately reconstruct past DCCO population dynamics. These comparisons helped discriminate among alternative parameterizations of demographic processes that were poorly known, especially site fidelity. Using sensitivity analysis, we also identified remaining critical uncertainties (mainly in the spatial distributions of fish vs. DCCO feeding areas) that can be used to prioritize future research and monitoring needs. Model forecasts suggested that continuation of existing control efforts would be sufficient to achieve long‐term DCCO control targets in Michigan and that DCCO control may be necessary to achieve management goals for some DCCO‐impacted fisheries in the state. Finally, our model can be extended by accounting for parametric or ecological uncertainty and including more complex assumptions on DCCO–fish interactions as part of the adaptive management process.     

ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF GLOBAL WARMING: THE CASE OF THE BARENTS SEA FISHERIES

ABSTRACT. . Regional analyses of possible physical and biological effects of global warming in the Barents Sea area have been carried out recently. Based on such studies possible economic impacts of global warming on the Barents Sea fisheries have been quantified, assuming different types of management regimes. The EconSimp2000 model, consisting of the ecosystem model AggMult and the fleet model EconMult have been parameterized based on fleet and catch records from the Norwegian Barents Sea fisheries. The model has been used to study biological and economic impacts of different environmental scenarios representing possible consequences of global warming. The current environmental situation, including normal seasonal and other variations, has been used as a reference scenario. Several biological and economic indicators have been defined in order to evaluate the simulation results of different environmental scenarios and different types of management regimes. The findings support earlier studies where biological and economic impacts of changes in management regime is found to be more pronounced than impacts caused by effects of global warming.     

A BIOECONOMIC APPROACH TO THE FAUSTMANN–HARTMAN MODEL: ECOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS IN MANAGED FOREST

Abstract This paper develops a bioeconomic forestry model that makes it possible to take ecosystem services that are independent of the age structure of trees into account. We derive the Faustmann–Hartman optimal harvesting strategy as a special case. The bioeconomic model is then extended to account for the fact that forest harvesting decisions impact on other ecological resources, which provide benefits for the wider community. The paper focuses on impacts associated with disturbance caused by logging operations and habitat destruction due to tree removal. This enables us to explore the interactions between forest management and the dynamics of ecological resources. The optimal rotation rule is obtained as a variation on the traditional Faustmann–Hartman equation, where an additional term captures the potential benefits derived from the growth of the ecological resource valued at its shadow price. The steady‐state solutions to the problem and sensitivity to model parameter are identified using numerical analysis.     

RANDOM PENALTIES AND RENEWABLE RESOURCES: A MECHANISM TO REACH OPTIMAL LANDINGS IN FISHERIES

Abstract Recent literature considers illegal landings a moral hazard problem that arises because individual landings are unobservable. The literature proposes incentive schemes to solve the information problem. However, most of the proposed schemes raise huge information requirements and social budget balance is not secured. In this paper, we suggest a random penalty mechanism that reduces the information requirements and secures budget balance in the case of a given number of licensed vessels. In the random penalty mechanism, aggregate landings are measured through stock sizes and the natural growth function. If aggregate landings are below optimal landings, each fisherman receives a subsidy. If aggregate catches are above optimal landings, the mechanism works such that either the fisherman is randomly selected and pays a fine or the fisherman is not selected and receives a subsidy. The fine and subsidy can be designed such that budget balance is secured. Provided risk aversion is sufficiently large and the fine is high enough, the random penalty mechanism will generate optimal individual landings. The budget balance combined with risk aversion drives the result for this advanced tax/subsidy system that does not exhaust the resource rents. The budget balance creates interdependence between fishermen that secure optimality.     

MODELS FOR COOPERATION AND CONSPIRACY IN FISHERIES: CHANGING THE RULES OF THE GAME

Fisheries regulation is considered necessary to counteract the effects of competitive forces which can lead to a “tragedy of the commons”. Yet management initiatives have often failed because they did not take into account competitive responses of fishing enterprises. In particular, open access fisheries provide strong incentives for the development of excessive harvesting capacity. This in turn leads to harvesting that is concentrated in space and time, with adverse effects on both the resource and markets. A coalition of fishermen, such as a fishermen's cooperative, has interests similar to those of a sole owner, and thus would be expected to produce more efficient behaviour. In practice, however, fishermen's cooperatives seldom persist. Game theory is used to explore relationships between the coalition structure of the industry, economic variables, and regulation. The models are based loosely on a purse seine fishery for herring. The results suggest that the potential to form stable coalitions is affected by changes in price and harvest. Changes in regulation also affect stability of coalitions. When interpreted in the light of historical changes in the herring fishery, these results suggest that industry may not accept regulations which do not permit formation of stable coalitions.     

CLIMATE CHANGE AND FISHERIES: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT IN ICELAND AND GREENLAND

ABSTRACT. . Climate changes in the 21st century are expected to significantly increase ocean temperatures and modify other oceanographic conditions in the North Atlantic. Marine biological research suggests that the impacts on the commercially most important fish stocks in the Icelandic‐Greenland ecosystem may well be quite substantial. This will obviously lead to a corresponding impact on the economies of these two countries. However, the timing, extent and biological impact of global warming is quite uncertain. As a result the economic impact is similarly uncertain. This paper attempts to provide estimates of the impact of altered fish stocks due to global warming on the Icelandic and Greenland economies. The approach is one of stochastic simulations. This involves essentially three steps. The first is to obtain predictions of the impact of global warming on fish stocks and the associated probability distribution. For this we rely on recent marine biological predictions. The second step is to estimate the role of the fisheries sector in the two economies. This is done with the help of modern econometric techniques based on economic growth theory and historical data. Obviously these estimates are also subject to stochastic errors and uncertainty. The third step is to carry out Monte Carlo simulations on the basis of the above model and the associated uncertainties. The result of the Monte Carlo simulations consists of a set of dynamic paths for GDP over time with an expected value and a probability distribution for each future year. On this basis it is possible to calculate confidence intervals for the most likely path of GDP over time. The results indicate that the fisheries impact of global warming on the Icelandic GDP is more likely to be positive than negative but unlikely to be of significant magnitude compared to historical economic growth rates and fluctuations. The uncertainty of this prediction, however, is large. For Greenland, the impact on fish stocks and the GDP is highly likely to be positive and quite substantial relative to the current GDP. Due to less knowledge of the relationship between the fisheries sector and the Greenland economy, however, the confidence interval of this prediction is even wider than in the case of Iceland.     

SHARING THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES: A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME APPROACH

In the current paper we examine a game-theoretic setting in which three countries have established a regional organization for the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. A characteristic function game approach is applied to describe the sharing of the surplus benefits from cooperation. We demonstrate that the nucleolus and the Shapley value give more of the benefits to the coalition with substantial bargaining power than does the Nash bargaining scheme. We also compare the results that are obtained by using the nucleolus and the Shapley value as solution concepts. The outcomes from these solution concepts depend on the relative efficiency of the most efficient coalition. Furthermore, the question of fair sharing of the benefits is considered in the context of straddling stocks.     

A COALITION APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF HIGH SEAS FISHERIES IN THE PRESENCE OF EXTERNALITIES

ABSTRACT. The current paper extends the coalition approach of the management of high seas fisheries to the presence of externalities. The coalition approach is set within the framework of a two‐stage game in which the payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure and are determined through a partition function. The relationship between the presence of externalities and the stability of the coalition structures is explored. The equilibrium coalition structures of the game are also examined. The application of the game to the Northern Atlantic bluefin tuna shows a typical picture of the high seas fisheries: the simultaneous presence of strong externalities in the coalition structures and the absence of stability of the grand coalition. A fundamental conclusion of this paper is that, generally, in order to guarantee the stability of the cooperative agreements it is not sufficient to implement a fair sharing rule for the distribution of the returns from cooperation. Stability requires a legal regime preventing the players that engage in noncooperative behavior from having access to the resource.     

THE EFFECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON WETLANDS AND WATERFOWL IN WESTERN CANADA: INCORPORATING CROPPING DECISIONS INTO A BIOECONOMIC MODEL

Abstract We extend an earlier bioeconomic model of optimal duck harvest and wetland retention in the Prairie Pothole Region of Western Canada to include cropping decisions. Instead of a single state equation, the model has two state equations representing the population dynamics of ducks and the amount of wetlands. We use the model to estimate the impact of climate change on wetlands and waterfowl, including direct climate effects as well as land use change due to biofuel policies aimed at mitigating climate change. The model predicts that climate change will reduce wetlands by 37–56% from historic levels. Land use change due to biofuel policies is expected to reduce wetlands by between 35% and 45% from historic levels, whereas direct climate effects will range from a reduction of 2–11%, depending on the future climate scenario. This result indicates that models that neglect the effect of land use changes underestimate the effect of climate change on wetlands. Further, wetlands loss is geographically heterogeneous, with losses being the largest in Saskatchewan.     

A BIOECONOMIC SHEEP–VEGETATION TRADE‐OFF MODEL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NORDIC SHEEP FARMING SYSTEM

Abstract. The paper studies the economy and ecology of sheep farming at the farm level and includes 2 different categories of the animals, ewes (adult females) and lambs. The model is analyzed in a Nordic economic and biological setting. During the outdoor grazing season, animals face limited grazing resources so that the weight gain of lambs is determined by the per‐animal vegetation consumption. On the other hand, the number of grazing animals, lambs as well as ewes, determines the grazing pressure. This problem is studied under the assumption of a rational and well‐informed farmer who aims to maximize profit in ecological equilibrium with zero animal and vegetation growth. We find that lamb‐only slaughtering is optimal and that it is never beneficial for the farmer to keep livestock that overgraze pasture. It is also shown that higher meat prices and more profitable slaughtering make it economically rewarding for the farmer to keep more animals. A numerical illustration indicates that the optimal sheep farming decision may be more sensitive to changes in pasture quality and productivity than changes in economic conditions.     

OPTIMAL RECOVERY OF A SHARED RESOURCE STOCK: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL WITH EFFICIENT MEMORY EQUILIBRIA

We consider an optimal two-country management of depleted transboundary renewable resources. The management problem is modelled as a differential game, in which memory strategies are used. The countries negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient harvesting programs. They monitor the evolution of the agreement, and they memorize deviations from the agreement in the past. If the agreement is observed by the countries, they continue cooperation. If one of the countries breaches the contract, then both countries continue in a noncooperative management mode for the rest of the game. This noncooperative option is called a threat policy. The credibility of the threats is guaranteed by their equilibrium property. Transfer or side payments are studied as a particular cooperative management program. Transfer payments allow one country to buy out the other from the fishery for the purpose of eliminating the inefficiency caused by the joint access to the resources. It is shown that efficient equilibria can be reached in a class of resource management games, which allow the use of memory strategies. In particular, continuous time transfer payments (e.g., a share of the harvest) should be used instead of a once-and-for-all transfer payment.     

OPTIMAL HARVESTING OF A SPATIALLY EXPLICIT FISHERY MODEL

Abstract We consider an optimal fishery harvesting problem using a spatially explicit model with a semilinear elliptic PDE, Dirichlet boundary conditions, and logistic population growth. We consider two objective functionals: maximizing the yield and minimizing the cost or the variation in the fishing effort (control). Existence, necessary conditions, and uniqueness for the optimal harvesting control for both cases are established. Results for maximizing the yield with Neumann (no‐flux) boundary conditions are also given. The optimal control when minimizing the variation is characterized by a variational inequality instead of the usual algebraic characterization, which involves the solutions of an optimality system of nonlinear elliptic partial differential equations. Numerical examples are given to illustrate the results.     

SUSTAINABLE YIELDS IN FISHERIES: UNCERTAINTY,RISK‐AVERSION,AND MEAN‐VARIANCE ANALYSIS

Abstract We consider a model of a fishery in which the dynamics of the unharvested fish population are given by the stochastic logistic growth equation Similar to the classical deterministic analogon, we assume that the fishery harvests the fish population following a constant effort strategy. In the first step, we derive the effort level that leads to maximum expected sustainable yield, which is understood as the expectation of the equilibrium distribution of the stochastic dynamics. This replaces the nonzero fixed point in the classical deterministic setup. In the second step, we assume that the fishery is risk averse and that there is a tradeoff between expected sustainable yield and uncertainty measured in terms of the variance of the equilibrium distribution. We derive the optimal constant effort harvesting strategy for this problem. In the final step, we consider an approach that we call the mean‐variance analysis to sustainable fisheries. Similar as in the now classical mean‐variance analysis in finance, going back to Markowitz [1952] , we study the problem of maximizing expected sustainable yields under variance constraints, and with this, minimizing the variance, e.g., risk, under guaranteed minimum expected sustainable yields. We derive explicit formulas for the optimal fishing effort in all four problems considered and study the effects of uncertainty, risk aversion, and mean reversion speed on fishing efforts.     

THE FAO PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH AFTER ALMOST 10 YEARS: HAVE WE PROGRESSED TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING SIMULATION‐TESTED FEEDBACK‐CONTROL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT?

ABSTRACT. It is almost ten years since the FAO Technical Consultation on the Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries took place in Lysekil, Sweden. One outcome from this Technical Consultation was a set of guidelines on the precautionary approach to capture fisheries and species introductions. These guidelines include the need to incorporate harvest control rules in management plans. Harvest control rules should specify what action is to be taken when specified deviations from the operational targets and constraints are observed. The specification should include minimum data requirements for the types of assessment methods to be used for decision‐making. Combinations of harvest control rules, assessment methods and data collection schemes are referred to as management procedures. It is now well‐recognized that using management procedures is likely to lead to improved conservation of fishery resources, and that they should be evaluated to assess whether they are likely to achieve the goals for fishery management given the types of uncertainties that are likely to frustrate this venture. In general, evaluation of management procedures has been based on simulation modeling. This paper reviews the progress that has been made in various fisheries jurisdictions in terms of implementing management procedures, and why and where it has proved difficult or even impossible to implement management procedures.     

FISHERIES SCIENCE AND MODELING: A LOOK TO THE FUTURE

In this paper I forecast that the fisheries management problems we face as we enter the twenty-first century will have less to do with extractive conservation and more to do with protection of regional and global environments. I present two contemporary fisheries management case histories which tend to bear this out: (1) Pacific Northwest salmon, with particular reference to the Columbia River, and (2) the high-seas driftnet fisheries of the North Pacific. Characterizing these types of problems in a few words, I would say that their effects are long-term and perhaps irreversible, and that they lead to conditions that we have yet to experience. Because of the type of input needed from the scientific community in order to forge rational solutions, modeling becomes ever more important in translating scientific experience into a form that will enlighten and move decisionmakers.     

ESTIMATING A STOCHASTIC MODEL OF POPULATION DYNAMICS WITH AN APPLICATION TO KANGAROOS

In this study, we derive stochastic models of population dynamics and devise a new method of estimating the models. The models allow growth and harvest to be nonlinear functions of stochastic processes and the error terms to be nonlinear and heteroskedastic. Ordinary least-squares estimates would be biased and inefficient and generalized least-squares estimates cannot be calculated. Therefore, we implement nonlinear maximum likelihood methods to find unbiased and efficient estimates of parameters. The method is applied to the population dynamics of kangaroos in South Australia. Aerial survey data of kangaroo numbers are combined with harvest, effort and rainfall data to estimate the growth and harvest functions and the variances of the stochastic processes which drive the system. Results suggest that growth and harvest should be modeled as functions of stochastic processes and that observations on kangaroo numbers are critical for estimating population dynamics. The results also indicate that the estimation method works well and is a viable alternative to ARIMA and GARCH models, particularly for small data sets.