新媒介影响下的创新产品信息扩散模型研究

随着科技的飞速发展,新媒介越来越受到关注,成为信息获取的主要途径.鉴于新媒介与传统媒介的巨大不同,为了研究新型电子商务环境下的创新产品扩散特征,基于BASS模型,构建了新媒体渠道下的两种创新产品信息扩散模型.通过仿真模拟得到新媒介影响下的两类产品信息的扩散规律及扩散状态差异.新媒介环境下的产品扩散具有非常明显的优势,企业管理者需要调整的营销渠道战略以适应时代发展步伐.     

供应链互补产品广告投入和捆绑销售联合决策研究

以一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链为研究对象,制造商生产两种互补产品,零售商可选择分开或捆绑两种销售策略。考虑互补品的负交叉弹性和广告外部性的特点,构建基于溢出效应的需求模型,运用博弈论的方法,求解零售商采取分开和捆绑两种销售策略时的均衡结果。通过比较不同销售策略下的均衡结果及利润关系,探讨在分散式和集中式两种情况下,零售商的最优广告投入和捆绑销售的联合决策问题。最后,通过数值算例,讨论产品互补程度和广告成本系数对决策结果的影响。研究结果表明,无论是在分散式还是集中式决策下,当产品互补程度较高或广告成本系数低时,分开销售是占优策略而广告费用较高;当产品互补程度较低且广告成本系数高时,捆绑销售是占优策略且广告费用较低。     

基于差异化产品的专利联盟竞争效应研究

针对专利联盟对"上游许可专利,下游生产差异化产品"纵向市场效率的影响,构建了一个能同时描述上游专利关系和下游产品关系的动态博弈模型,并据此比较了不同情况下各博弈方的利润及社会福利,最后得出专利联盟提高社会福利的充要条件.均衡分析表明,当且仅当上游专利的互补程度足够高时联盟才是提高福利水平的,但联盟总是会提高专利权人的利润.在此模型均衡基础上,进一步分析了联盟形成、对创新的影响、许可费形式及专利联盟以外其他形式的联合等相关问题.     

制造商广告激励策略对灰色市场的影响研究

在灰色市场的背景下,构建了由一个制造商和两个独立市场的零售商构成的两阶段供应链模型。依据产品估值将市场分为高端和低端市场,基于价格差异,低端市场的零售商为了实现投机套利会在高端市场中销售原本属于低端市场的产品。研究了灰色市场与制造商广告激励策略对供应链的影响问题。研究表明：若低端市场消费者对产品评价较低,灰色市场可增加制造商的利润;而低端市场消费者对产品估值较高时,灰色市场会减少制造商利润。进一步引入了制造商广告激励策略,得出广告激励不仅可以抑制灰色市场,而且可以在不降低高端市场零售商利润的情况下,让制造商和低端市场零售商的收益增加。     

考虑盗版容忍度的软件产品动态定价模型

基于收益管理理论,对产品瞬态扩散模型进行拓展,选择盗版容忍度、价格和创新改进作为控制变量,扩散速度和创新水平作为状态变量,构建收益最大化的动态定价模型,依据最优化控制理论,建立哈密尔顿方程进行求解,探讨了三个控制变量的联合优化策略和相关特性,通过算例仿真验证其结论。结论显示:应采取撇脂定价策略;当由盗版引起边际收益增加的价值量与损失价值相等时,盗版容忍度达到最优;与产品生命周期的成长阶段相比较,在成熟阶段,应逐渐增加盗版容忍度,同时,减缓创新改进的速度;当损失结构降低时,应提高盗版容忍度,并且可采用创新与保护监管相互互补的策略。动态建模能够拓展静态模型中关于网络外部性的概念,分析连续状态下的变量,与自适应学习机制相一致,对实践具有更好的借鉴作用。     

技术创新的反应扩散模型研究

首先利用微分方程来描述技术创新的反应扩散过程，在充分考虑技术与环境之间相互关系的基础上，给出了具有代表性的几种技术创新扩散模型：竞争、互补、替代等模型；再根据微分方程定性理论，对所建立的模型进行经济分析，以寻求技术与环境之间的最佳协调状态。为模拟与预测市场的新旧技术更替及结构演变过程提供了理论依据，同时对技术创新的发展完善及创新技术的扩散推广具有一定的现实意义。     

多企业竞争条件下的产品创新扩散研究

产品创新扩散中,生产同类产品的企业相互竞争,实力不同的企业在产品生命周期的不同阶段会采取不同的扩散策略.以往的研究多是基于单个企业或两个企业,其模型难以扩展或推广,具有很大的局限性.本文分析多个企业竞争条件下的产品创新扩散,通过建模和求解,对结果进行分析和讨论,为实践提供一些启示.     

融合两阶段过程模型和改进Bass模型的网络社交平台上产品信息扩散研究

提出并验证了融合两阶段过程模型和改进Bass模型的网络社交平台上产品信息扩散模型。考虑用户转发动机构建产品信息扩散两阶段过程模型;考虑用户兴趣衰减效应改进Bass模型;融合这两个模型,考虑产品信息发布者明星效应、产品信息质量对产品信息扩散的影响,提出了产品信息扩散模型。以2019年11～12月新浪电影发布的电影预告片转发数据验证了所提模型,并与Bass模型进行了比较。结果表明,用户转发动机和用户兴趣衰减效应对产品信息扩散均有显著影响,所提模型的预测精度和拟合效果均优于Bass模型。所提模型可用于存在不同转发动机及具有衰减效应的其他信息转发量预测,尤其适合于在产品信息投放前期和早期对转发量的预测,是对信息扩散模型的补充。     

不完全信息动态二维价格博弈模型及其分析

单位生产成本为不完全信息条件下,本文首先讨论了两个企业关于具有一定替代性的两种产品价格的动态二维博弈模型,并求得其精练Bayes均衡.然后分析了当两种产品不存在替代关系时,企业对这两种产品价格进行动态博弈的精练Bayes均衡相当于对这两种产品单独进行博弈的精练Bayes均衡的简单组合.     

考虑消费者策略行为的全渠道两阶段广告投放与动态定价决策

在需求为导向的全渠道市场环境下，切实从消费者行为属性制定广告与价格营销策略是促进全渠道零售长足发展的关键。本文将消费者策略行为引入到全渠道零售中，构建零售商在两阶段均不投放广告、第一阶段正常期投放广告及第二阶段优惠期投放广告等三种广告决策模式下全渠道两阶段广告投放与动态定价模型，探讨全渠道零售商的最优响应策略，并对模型进行数值算例。研究发现：当消费者的策略性水平较低时，零售商选择在正常期(优惠期)投放广告策略下，正常期产品定价较高(较低),优惠期产品定价较低(较高);零售商在正常期或优惠期投放广告对正常期销量都是有利的；当消费者的策略性水平较低或广告的影响系数较低时，零售商选择在正常期投放广告能获得最优收益；当消费者的策略性水平偏高、广告的影响系数适中时，零售商在优惠期投放广告是最优的；当消费者的策略性水平及广告的影响系数都偏高时，零售商选择在两阶段均不投放广告是最优策略。     

Signaling advertising by multiproduct firms

We consider the use of advertising expenses as quality signals in multiproduct firms, extending previous results on single product firms. In our model, a firm introduces sequentially two products whose qualities are positively correlated. We investigate whether there exist information spillovers from the first to the second market. We show that, when correlation is high, the equilibrium in market 2 depends on the quality reputation the firm has gained in market 1. Moreover, if a firm with a high-quality product 1 wants to separate from its low-quality counterpart, it needs to advertise more in this market than if the qualities of the two products are unrelated. This advertising level signals not only high quality in the first market, but also the likely quality of the second product. Thus, advertising in the first market has information spillovers in the second market.     

New product advertising in dynamic oligopolies

The success of the introduction of a new product in a market is very sensitive to the marketing decision variables adopted by the firm. In the present paper we are concerned with the question of new product advertising in a heterogeneous oligopoly market consisting of N firms. A dynamic game is formulated to model strategic as well as sales interactions in such a market. Optimal advertising strategies are identified as open-loop Nash solutions.The comments of two anonymous referees are appreciated. The first author wishes to acknowledge support from NSERC (Grant No. OGP0037342).     

Optimal advertising strategies with age-structured goodwill

The problem of a firm willing to optimally promote and sell a single product on the market is here undertaken. The awareness of such product is modeled by means of a Nerlove–Arrow goodwill as a state variable, differentiated jointly by means of time and of age of the segments in which the consumers are clustered. The problem falls into the class of infinite horizon optimal control problems of PDEs with age structure that have been studied in various papers either in cases when explicit solutions can be found or using Maximum Principle techniques. Here, assuming an infinite time horizon, we use some dynamic programming techniques in infinite dimension to characterize both the optimal advertising effort and the optimal goodwill path in the long run. An interesting feature of the optimal advertising effort is an anticipation effect with respect to the segments considered in the target market, due to time evolution of the segmentation. We analyze this effect in two different scenarios: in the first, the decision-maker can choose the advertising flow directed to different age segments at different times, while in the second she/he can only decide the activation level of an advertising medium with a given age-spectrum.     

Pricing policies for complementary products in a dual-channel supply chain

This paper investigates the pricing problem of complementary products in a supply chain with two manufacturers and one retailer, one of the two manufacturers uses dual channels including an online channel and a traditional retail channel to sell its product. We formulate four pricing game models through considering different market power structures of channel members, and derive the corresponding optimal pricing strategies. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, we study the effects of consumer channel loyalty, the level of complementarity, and the market power structures on the pricing strategies and the maximal profits of two complementary products. Some interesting and valuable managerial insights are obtained.     

Supply chain coordination through integration of innovation effort and advertising support

This study integrates firms’ innovation and advertising decisions in a two-echelon supply chain, where a monopoly manufacturer sells products to ultimate consumers through an autonomous retailer. Considering that both innovation and advertising contribute to the product demand, we first investigate the optimal equilibriums of channel members under two different game structures: the non-cooperative and cooperative. In the non-cooperative structure, the manufacturer controls the innovation effort and wholesale price while the retailer controls the advertising rate and retail pricing. In the cooperative structure, the manufacturer agrees to share part of retailer’s advertising expenditure. We find that both the optimal operation and marketing decisions are sensitive to effects of innovation and advertising on demand as well as the manufacturer’s cost reduction coefficient due to innovation. Further, we find that the manufacturer always prefers cooperation. Meanwhile, only when the firms’ investments significantly contribute to the market mechanism, does the retailer have incentive to implement a cooperative program. In addition, we further propose a new two-way subsidy policy to coordinate channel members’ business functions.     

Optimal production and distribution policies for a two-stage supply chain with imperfect items and price- and advertisement-sensitive demand: A note

This paper develops inventory models of a vendor–buyer supply chain with imperfect products and shortages based on Rad et al. (2014) and assumes that both the selling price and advertisements influence market demand. For this reason, the buyer mandates an advertising company for promoting the product. The objective of the paper is to determine pricing, advertising, lot-sizing, backordering, and shipment policies under independent and joint optimization. Numerical examples and a sensitivity analysis illustrate the proposed models. The results indicate that coordination becomes more and more advantageous for the supply chain as the sensitivity of demand to price or advertisements increases. Furthermore, as the uncertainty in item quality increases, the buyer reduces its demand to better match demand and supply.     

Advertising a new product in a segmented market

We bring some market segmentation concepts into the statement of the “new product introduction” problem with Nerlove-Arrow’s linear goodwill dynamics. In fact, only a few papers on dynamic quantitative advertising models deal with market segmentation, although this is a fundamental topic of marketing theory and practice. In this way we obtain some new deterministic optimal control problems solutions and show how such marketing concepts as “targeting” and “segmenting” may find a mathematical representation. We consider two kinds of situations. In the first one, we assume that the advertising process can reach selectively each target group. In the second one, we assume that one advertising channel is available and that it has an effectiveness segment-spectrum, which is distributed over a non-trivial set of segments. We obtain the explicit optimal solutions of the relevant problems.     

Optimal Multi-Period Advertising Budget Allocation within a Competitive Environment

A mathematical model approach is developed for the purpose of aiding advertising and marketing executives in advertising budget allocation decision-making in the face of a competitive environment. Two alternative model formulations are examined to study the dynamic market response to advertising expenditures. These embody numerous realistic characteristics of the advertising phenomenon including carry-over of past expenditures, diminishing returns and saturation effects, response decay in the absence of advertising and product diffusion effects. Through mathematical programming, the model determines the optimal advertising expenditures over a predetermined planning horizon under alternative constraint options (including competitive advertising assumptions). Illustrations of model applications are also presented.