负网络外部性情形下组织际信息系统动态协调机制研究

以制造商和供应商为视角,考虑网络外部性特性,研究组织际信息系统(Interorganizational information systems,IOS)的动态协调关系与策略.设定网络外部性的离散动态属性,引入吸引机制与竞争机制控制向量,给出网络外部性动态最优控制算法与命题;进而构建制造商对供应商有无补贴政策情形下的收益模型,并模拟正负网络外部性、制造商与供应商收益、供应商加入IOS数量的演化轨迹,从而得出组织际信息系统在协调制造商与供应商收益上的动态规律.研究认为:补贴政策可以在IOS的初始阶段实施,但此时注重实施效率;补贴政策在第二三阶段实施,此时竞争机制作用明显,应注重补贴政策的动态与差异性.     

基于网络外部性的港口FDI企业与内资港口企业博弈策略研究

将港口服务产品的网络外部性和服务质量水平引入到发货人的效用函数中,通过Hotelling价格竞争模型分析港口FDI企业与内资港口企业的博弈策略行为,分别研究在Nash和Stackelberg博弈条件下,港口服务价格、收益与网络外部性系数、服务质量水平之间的关系.理论研究的结论表明:港口FDI企业与内资港口企业在Stackelberg条件下的最优定价、均衡收益均大于Nash条件下的最优定价、均衡收益;企业最优定价随网络外部性强度线性递减,随服务水平线性递增;企业均衡收益受服务水平和网络外部性强度的影响,呈现出一定的区间变化规律,处于相同港口外部市场环境下,内资港口企业与港口FDI企业的服务策略选择和侧重点不相同.     

基于批发定价模型的电子书最优定价策略分析

电子书阅读器与电子书属于互补产品.考虑到电子书阅读器与电子书之间具有间接网络外部性,基于批发定价模型,引入一个斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型,从理论上分析了二级供应链中出版商和零售商在不同条件下的最优定价策略.结果表明,当消费者对电子书接受程度不高时,双渠道策略(同时销售纸质书和电子书)是最优均衡策略;而当消费者对电子书接受程度较高时,单渠道销售电子书则是最优选择.并进一步证明了:随着网络外部性的加强,双方的利润都能增加;零售商应该对电子书定较低的价格,而对电子书阅读器定较高的价格.最后结合现实给出了相应的管理启示.     

基于结构成本的产业类型与组织际信息系统拓扑结构匹配研究

论文以网络拓扑结构概念应用于组织际信息系统(interorganizational information systems,IOS)的管理运作研究上,研究了组织际信息系统结构的拓扑类型,提出结构成本概念,构建了IOS运营成本模型,对不同拓扑结构所对应的运营成本进行量化与比较、优化,并进一步基于结构成本的组织际信息系统拓扑结构与产业类型匹配问题展开应用研究。结果表明企业维护其IOS在产业链中具有竞争优势的位置而支付的费用会带来其与产业链其他企业的交易成本减少,同样的企业为了追求更具优势的IOS结构位置而支付的费用也会带来企业的交易成本减少。论文的贡献:一方面,结构成本概念引入IOS拓扑结构时可分析IOS各拓扑结构的成本优势,对企业加入或构建何种结构形式的IOS具有重要指导意义,进而扩展到产业上的应用;另一方面,对组织际信息系统的理论依据做出一定的调整,扩充了现有理论体系。     

带有网络外部性的动态寡头垄断定价

给出了带有网络外部性的两阶段寡头垄断定价模型,并用博弈论方法求解.通过与带有网络外部性的完全垄断定价模型的比较,得出重要结论:在网络外部性足够大的情况下,①寡头竞争情况下与完全垄断下情况一样,“科斯假设”将得到克服,均衡定价将呈现先低后高的情况.②对于完全垄断厂商来说,网络外部性k的增加能够增加其利润,但对于寡头竞争的企业来说,正好相反,k的增加将导致其利润的下降.     

考虑网络外部性的生鲜企业渠道选择策略研究

考虑到生鲜产品容易变质而且线上配送时间较长,并且线上销售可为消费者带来额外网络外部性,传统生鲜企业在电商冲击的背景下需要考虑是否入驻电商平台开拓线上业务。为解决此类企业所面临渠道选择问题,本文考虑一个传统生鲜企业和一个主导电商市场的电商平台,并通过构建理论模型研究企业最优生鲜产品定价和渠道选择策略。研究结果表明,若平台所收取年服务费较低,则企业应入驻平台;反之,企业不应入驻平台。此外,消费者网络外部性敏感程度对企业入驻平台行为具有正影响。在拓展模型,本文考虑分散式供应链情形下企业最优渠道选择,结果表明相较于集中式决策,分散式供应链情形下零售商更不愿意入驻平台。此外,本文通过设计收益共享契约以协调生鲜企业与电商平台,并发现通过契约协调,零售商更愿意入驻电商平台。     

用户不完全信息下物流平台增值服务投资决策

为了提高物流平台的竞争绩效,在考虑用户不完全信息状态下消极性预期对用户效用与平台利润的影响基础上,建立基于Hotelling的物流平台增值服务投资决策模型,分析了主从博弈时序和用户不同归属结构下平台增值服务投资决策的均衡解.通过研究发现,当增值服务的投资成本大于一定阈值且用户不完全信息时,跟随型物流平台的增值服务最优投资量高于领导型物流平台的最优投资量;当车主入驻多平台时,领导型物流平台的最优投资量随着用户的网络外部性强度增大而减少,而跟随型物流平台的最优投资量随着用户的网络外部性强度增大而增大;当货主入驻多平台且两边用户不完全信息时,领导型平台和跟随型物流平台应减少投资量;当车主和货主都入驻多平台且货主不完全信息时,领导型物流平台与跟随型物流平台应提高投资量.     

考虑相互依赖性的信息系统安全投资及协调机制

考虑信息系统安全相互依赖情形下最优化信息系统连续时间安全投资水平是一个值得研究的问题。首先讨论了非合作博弈下信息系统安全投资的最优策略选择,在此基础上讨论了安全投资效率参数、黑客学习能力、传染风险对信息系统脆弱性及信息系统安全投资率的影响。其次,在推导出两企业在合作博弈情形下最优策略选择的基础上,对比两种情形下的博弈均衡结果,得出合作博弈下的投资水平高于非合作博弈下的投资水平。原因是两个企业的相互依赖关系隐含着企业投资的负外部性,从而导致企业投资不足。最后,构建一种双边支付激励机制消除企业投资不足问题,从而使企业达到合作博弈下的最优投资水平,提高两个企业的收益。     

政府投资环保的随机增长模型

本文分析了一个带有污染的随机内生增长模型.利用随机最优化的方法,求出了最优的政府环保投资比率和最优的税收政策.并进一步得出了最优的收入税因污染的外部性指标、生产的扰动的增大而减少;而最优消费税则因这两个参数的增大而增加的结论.     

网络外部性条件下差异化双边平台买者参与问题

双边平台存在的基础是参与的用户,因此用户的分配是双边市场上各利益主体最关心的问题。为研究用户分配问题,本文在具有差异性的竞争双边市场上,建立了两阶段的双边平台竞争模型。第一阶段使用Rubinstein讨价还价模型对卖者的参与人数进行分配,利用讨价还价顺序描述卖者进入的先后顺序;第二阶段分别在平台利润最大化和社会福利最大化两种情况下,刻画买者对平台的规模偏好,并求均衡的市场份额。通过此模型分析竞争性平台差异化的情况下,网络外部性系数对平台均衡市场份额以及市场利益相关者利得的影响。研究表明:在考虑平台利润最大化的情况下,买者参与人数受卖者规模与网络外部性系数的影响,平台规模并非越大越好;在考虑社会福利最大化的情况下,买者的网络外部性系数与买者参与人数不相关,但与总社会福利正相关。     

区域物流的技术网络效应研究

建立了一个基于信息技术网络效应的物流信息化需求模型,来说明信息化带来的技术网络效应是物流厂商加入信息网络的动力所在.并基于1995-2010年30个省、直辖市、自治区的面板数据,运用面板单位根和面板协整方法,证明了区域物流中技术网络效应的存在.     

Exploring the trade-off between immediate gratification and delayed network externalities in the consumption of information goods

Our motivation for this paper originates from recent advances in consumption and payment technologies available for mobile commerce. Ubiquitous computing is enabling consumers worldwide to reach digital content and services whenever and wherever they request it. This capability further fuels “impatience” in consumption of such information goods. We model such consumer behavior using a hyperbolic discounting approach. A subset of these products, especially software, also inherit delayed network externalities as part of their consumption characteristics. This builds a tension between decision to consume now or to expedite consumption. We build a stylized model to assess the impact of immediate gratification on the profit maximizing behavior of a monopolist firm which produces an information good with network externalities. We find that serving “impatient” consumers is always profitable for a monopolist. For lower levels of network externalities, the monopolist can increase first period and decrease second period prices in equilibrium. As network externalities effect increases, prices converge to the traditional market (with exponential discounters) levels.     

Setting expediting repair policy in a multi-echelon repairable-item inventory system with limited repair capacity

Inventory systems with limited repair capacity are affected by congestion externalities, caused by use of a shared service. There is incompatibility between individual and system optimisation in considering congestion externalities. Three models are described that investigate the congestion effect in a multi-echelon inventory system which has two modes of repair, each with a limited repair capacity. An expanding repair policy employed by the bases in order to choose which repair mode to use is described and compared with different expediting policies related to congestion externalities. The expanding repair policy that considers congestion externalities was found to lead to better system performance measurement than an expanding policy with no congestion. The results of the numerical experiment indicate that the model that ignores congestion externalities—that is, the model that measures each base as an individual—leads to poorer performance measurement for every expediting repair policy, and particularly for the optimal expediting repair policy.     

A longitudinal study of evolving networks in response to natural disaster

In this study, we present a longitudinal analysis of the evolution of interorganizational disaster coordination networks (IoDCNs) in response to natural disasters. There are very few systematic empirical studies which try to quantify the optimal functioning of emerging networks dealing with natural disasters. We suggest that social network analysis is a useful method for exploring this complex phenomenon from both theoretical and methodological perspective aiming to develop a quantitative assessment framework which could aid in developing a better understanding of the optimal functioning of these emerging IoDCN during natural disasters. This analysis highlights the importance of utilizing network metrics to investigate disaster response coordination networks. Results of our investigation suggest that in disasters the rate of communication increases and creates the conditions where organizational structures need to move at that same pace to exchange new information. Our analysis also shows that inter-organizational coordination network structures are not fixed and vary in each period during a disaster depending on the needs. This may serve the basis for developing preparedness among agencies with an improved perspective for gaining effectiveness and efficiency in responding to natural disasters.     

Centralized decision of internal transfer-prices with congestion externalities for two modes of repair with limited repair capacity

The internal transfer-prices set by an organization are what an organization's bases ‘pay’ its service centre, the depot, for its services. Since each base has a limited budget, these transfer-prices control and motivate the base's usage of two types of repair services: normal and expedited. In this paper, we implement a unique approach—transfer-prices with congestion externalities—to determine the optimal transfer-price for the expedited repair service. Inventory systems with limited repair capacity are affected by congestion externalities, which reflect the negative externalities caused by the use of a shared service. We also describe different models that develop transfer prices schemas, and which differ in the way they consider congestion externalities. Numerical illustrations based on data from an air force display the incompatibility between two optimization models. One model ignores congestion externalities, while another considers congestion externalities. In the case of congestion externalities, the base must pay extra for the expedited repair service. The increased costs are due to expanded usage of the limited repair capacity which a particular base is imposing on the rest of the system in the form of longer queues that degrade service quality.     

Optimal control for supply network models: adjoint calculus

We consider a PDE based supply network model with controllable nodes for which we derive an optimal control problem and present an adjoint-based solution technique. The supply network has two basic building blocks: The dynamics in a supplier is governed by a PDE and the behavior inside a queue is described by an ODE. The network model provides a framework to couple these equations at nodes. We introduce controls at so-called dispersing nodes and discuss suitable cost functionals leading to optimal control problems which we solve by a projected gradient method. The gradient information can be obtained from adjoint equations which we derive in the context of our supply network model. (© 2008 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

Cournot vs. Bertrand under relative performance delegation: Implications of positive and negative network externalities

This paper demonstrates that relative-performance based strategic managerial delegation does not lead to the equivalence of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in the presence of network externalities, regardless of the strength and type of network externalities — positive or negative. In the presence of positive network externalities, under relative-performance based delegation, Bertrand competition yields lower prices and profits, and higher quantities, consumers surplus and welfare than Cournot competition. On the contrary, these rankings are completely reversed in the presence of negative network externalities. It also discusses the endogenous choice of price or quantity contract under delegation in the presence of network externalities.     

Optimal admission control in a queueing system with heterogeneous traffic

We consider optimal admission control of the GI/PH/1-type queueing system. The problem is then reduced to that of determining multi-threshold strategies. Some numerical examples are presented. The results have applications in the optimal input control of information flow in a computer communication network with heterogeneous traffic.