基于促销和延保的渠道入侵与订货时序策略

针对单个制造商和单个零售商组成的二级供应链,制造商一方面考虑是否开拓电子商务市场而建立直销渠道与零售商展开渠道竞争,另一方面为刺激市场需求开展促销活动并对所有消费者提供有偿延保服务。分别针对先后订货和同时订货两种情形,刻画了不同入侵成本下制造商的最优入侵、促销、定价以及销售策略,并分析了制造商渠道入侵策略对零售商订货决策和盈利能力的影响。研究表明：满足入侵成本阈值条件时,渠道入侵有利于改善制造商利润;同时订货会降低制造商的入侵动机和零售商利润;在延保服务价格敏感系数和促销成本系数满足相关约束时,零售商能够从制造商渠道入侵中攫取更多利润,实现供应链节点企业的互利共赢;无论订货时序如何,渠道入侵总会提高促销努力水平和延保服务价格。     

间接和混合渠道下零售商引入自有品牌的影响分析

自有品牌的引入使渠道中制造商和零售商的市场绩效发生了较大变化。本文构建了两个制造商和一个零售商情境下零售商引入自有品牌的模型,分析了在间接渠道和混合渠道两种条件下引入自有品牌对零售商、制造商市场绩效的影响。通过分析表明,在间接渠道和混合渠道下,零售商引入自有品牌后,一方面会导致制造商品牌的批发价格、零售价格和制造商利润的降低,对制造商不利;另一方面能增加渠道总利润、零售商利润及零售商在整个渠道中的利润分成,零售商应该将自有品牌的战略定位为高质高价的品牌,而非低价低质的原始状态型品牌,而制造商单纯靠改变销售渠道模式的策略并不足以对抗自有品牌的冲击。     

考虑消费者退货的双渠道订货量决策研究

在考虑消费者退货下,构建由制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链模型,研究了双方的订货量决策问题,并分析不同策略以及决策顺序对均衡结果和制造商开通直销渠道的影响。研究发现:在单渠道中,提供退款保证可提高订货量、制造商和零售商利润。当直销成本较大时,制造商将不开通直销渠道;提供退款保证有利于制造商开通直销渠道。在双渠道中,提供退款保证能够提高直销量、总订货量和制造商利润;直销量、总订货量、制造商利润和总利润都随直销成本递减;在顺序决策下,制造商利润和总利润更高。     

碳交易规制下信息不对称供应链的减排和低碳推广博弈研究

论文在碳交易规制下,研究单一制造商和双零售商组成的供应链减排与低碳推广决策以及零售商对制造商的成本信息分享问题,分析了零售商对制造商分享成本信息的条件,及不同情形下的制造商减排和零售商低碳推广策略。研究发现:零售商的最优低碳推广水平只与自身相关参数有关,零售商只有在自身低碳推广效率足够高时才会与制造商分享信息;制造商最优减排量随消费者低碳意识、碳交易价格、零售商低碳推广效率及其不确定性增大而提高,随零售商之间竞争程度提高而降低;无论零售商是否对制造商分享成本信息,供应链成员的最优利润随零售商之间竞争程度提高而增加,随消费者低碳意识、碳交易价格提高而提高;零售商低碳推广效率的不确定性越大则制造商的最优利润越低,零售商的最优利润越高;仅一家零售商分享成本信息时,制造商无法通过转移支付使另一家零售商与其分享信息。     

考虑成员风险态度的零售商资金约束闭环供应链定价与回收决策

针对由制造商、回收商和资金约束的零售商组成的三级闭环供应链,考虑供应链成员面对市场需求不确定时表现出不同的风险态度,研究了闭环供应链的定价与回收决策问题。首先给出了产品的市场需求函数与回收商的回收成本函数;然后基于均值-方差法,构建了各成员和闭环供应链的效用函数;进一步地,依据博弈论的思想,确定了不同渠道权力结构下的最优零售价格、最优回收率和最优批发价格;最后分析了闭环供应链成员风险态度和贷款利率对供应链最优决策和效用的影响。研究表明,成员风险态度和贷款利率能够影响闭环供应链最优决策和效用,其中,风险规避的零售商和制造商对闭环供应链其他成员均有利,但是对自身和闭环供应链不利;风险规避的回收商对闭环供应链成员均不利;贷款利率的增长会降低成员和闭环供应链的效用。     

不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响研究

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中, 制造商拥有线下传统渠道及线上直销双渠道。首先根据消费者剩余理论, 构建了制造商双渠道需求函数;接着分别构建了两类Stackelberg博弈及Nash博弈三种权力结构下制造商和零售商的利润模型并对模型进行了求解;最后分析了三种不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响。研究发现:制造商线上直销渠道价格不受三种博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格、需求, 线上直销渠道需求及制造商双渠道供应链总利润不受两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格及线上直销渠道需求在Nash博弈权力结构下最小, 而线下传统渠道需求及供应链总利润在Nash博弈权力结构下最大;制造商批发价格、利润及零售商利润对三种博弈权力结构较敏感, 随供应链成员自身博弈权力地位的下降而逐渐降低。     

低碳环境下供应链差异化定价与协调机制研究

以低碳和普通产品两个制造商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链系统为研究对象,探讨了供应链的差异化定价与协调机制问题。求解得到了两制造商和零售商的最优定价策略及可行的低碳产品生产成本范围。研究发现:1)分散决策的差异化定价策略无法达到供应链协调;2)在可行的低碳产品生产成本范围内,低碳产品制造商、零售商和整个供应链系统的利润都随低碳产品生产成本的增加而减少,只有普通产品制造商的利润随低碳产品生产成本的增加而增加。因此,降低低碳产品生产成本是促进低碳产品推广的关键。针对分散决策造成供应链效率损失的情况,采用Shapley值法进行协调,并给出了契约协调机制。最后,通过算例分析了消费者价格敏感性变化和低碳产品生产成本上升对最优决策和供应链利润的影响。     

Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures

We consider a supply chain channel with two manufacturers and one retailer. Each manufacturer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the retailer. We discuss and compare the results of two different types of contracts under different channel power structures, to check whether it is beneficial for manufacturers to use revenue-sharing contracts under different scenarios. Then we consider a supply chain channel with one manufacturer and two retailers. Each retailer can choose either a wholesale price contract or a revenue-sharing contract with the manufacturer. We analyze the likely outcomes under different scenarios to discover whether it is beneficial to use revenue-sharing contracts.     

Vendor Management Inventory with consignment contracts and the benefits of cooperative advertising

Most of the cooperative advertising literature has focused on studying the effects of such programs considering marketing variables. This paper integrates production and inventory management with pricing and advertising considerations to assess the effects of cooperative advertising programs in bilateral monopolies. We consider a supply chain where a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) along with a consignment contract is implemented to coordinate the chain. We develop and solve a differential model for two games. The first one is a benchmark scenario where no cooperative advertising is offered, while the manufacturer offers the cooperative program in the second game. The main results show that cooperative advertising programs, usually considered as successful marketing initiatives, can be very difficult to implement in a supply chain undertaking a VMI policy with a consignment contract, in which operations and marketing interface is taken into account. A cooperative program mainly hurts the manufacturer’s profits, and can be profit-Pareto-improving only in a few cases. Although the retailer is generally willing to receive a support from the manufacturer, she can opt for a non-cooperative program when the largest part of the supply chain profits goes to the manufacturer. We developed several special cases to strengthen our findings.     

基于顾客满意的渠道合作机制研究

将零售商的服务分为短期性服务和基于顾客满意的长期性服务,由于长期性服务对销售量的影响具有滞后性,因此本文建立了多时期渠道动态决策模型.在此基础上分析了三种情况:①制造商对零售商的长期性服务不激励、②制造商对零售商的长期性服务激励和③渠道整合结果表明:如果制造商不对零售商激励,零售商也有长期性服务偏好;如果对零售商激励,那么零售商付出的长期性服务更多,他们的努力程度由零售商利润的贴现系数决定.同时渠道整合时,渠道总利润要优于其余两种情况.制造商对零售商激励时双方的利润都要大于不激励时的利润,渠道整合时双方的利润与他们的分配比例有关.     

Consignment contracts with retail competition

Consignment contracts have been widely employed in many industries. Under such contracts, items are sold at a retailer’s but the supplier retains the full ownership of the inventory until purchased by consumers; the supplier collects payment from the retailer based on actual units sold. We investigate how competition among retailers influences the supply chain decisions and profits under different consignment arrangements, namely a consignment price contract and a consignment contract with revenue share. First, we investigate how these two consignment contracts and a price only contract compare from the perspective of each supply chain partner. We find that the retailers benefit more from a consignment price contract than from a consignment contract with revenue share or a price only contract, regardless of the level of retailer differentiation. The supplier’s most beneficial contact, however, critically depends upon the level of retailer differentiation: a consignment contract with revenue share is preferable for the supplier if retailer differentiation is strong; otherwise a consignment price contract is preferable. Second, we study how retailer differentiation affects the profits of all supply chain partners. We find that less retailer differentiation improves the supplier’s profit for both types of consignment contract. Moreover, less retailer differentiation improves profits of the retailers in a consignment price contract, but not necessarily in a consignment contract with revenue share.     

强制减排规制下基于碳减排利润增量分享契约的供应链协调研究

碳减排会增加制造商的成本,导致批发价和零售价提高,从而抑制市场需求。以此为背景,本文针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,研究了强制减排规制下考虑消费者低碳偏好时的供应链决策与协调。通过设计碳减排利润增量分享契约协调制造商和零售商的决策,实现帕累托改进,利用Rubinstein讨价还价模型最终确定减排利润分享比例。研究发现,实施碳减排利润分享契约能有效提高零售商的订货量,并降低批发价格;制造商的利润随着消费者低碳意识提高而提高;当净化率较低时,零售商的利润随消费者低碳意识提高而提高;当净化率较高时,零售商的利润随消费者低碳意识提高而降低;最后,论文通过数值模拟验证了碳减排利润分享契约的有效性。     

低碳双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略研究

在需求不确定环境下,研究考虑消费者低碳意识的双渠道供应链的需求信息共享策略。论文考虑由单个零售商和单个进行碳减排的制造商构成的两级双渠道供应链,构建三种情形的模型:信息不共享、信息共享和只有零售商作预测。通过三种情形下供应链中成员最优决策和利润的比较,得到需求信息共享策略对供应链的影响;并进一步研究消费者低碳意识等参数对供应链运营的影响。研究发现,需求信息共享未必使得供应链成员利润均提高,当制造商预测准确度优于零售商时,零售商会选择信息共享,制造商选择信息不共享情形;当零售商比制造商预测准确时,零售商会选择信息不共享的情形,而制造商会选择仅有零售商预测,此时制造商应采取一定的激励措施以获得零售商的预测信息;消费者低碳意识对批发价、零售价、单位产品减排量、供应链成员利润均产生正向影响。     

考虑消费者低碳偏好的供应链企业减排成本分摊比较研究

在低碳环境下,研究了单一制造商和单一零售商组成的两级低碳供应链成本分摊决策问题。考虑消费者具有环保意识,因此在购买产品时会考虑产品的碳排放。分别讨论了零售商参与减排成本分摊契约和双方Nash讨价还价成本分摊契约两种形式对碳减排、产品定价和整个供应链及其成员收益的影响。研究发现,在两种契约形式中,零售商都可以实现与制造商共同降低碳排放的目标,从而促进制造商提高碳减排率,提高供应链利润。但是基于Nash讨价还价方式的减排成本分摊契约的供应链绩效高于零售商成本分摊契约下的供应链绩效。同时消费者低碳偏好增加可以激励零售商更多地分摊减排成本,在此基础上,利用Nash讨价还价模型确定了零售商为制造商提供减排成本分摊的比例范围及其最优解。最后,通过数值分析验证了减排因子对不同决策结构的定价、零售商减排分摊比例、供应链利润等决策的影响。     

零售商信息分享对双渠道绿色供应链绩效影响研究

研究了零售商市场需求预测信息分享对双渠道绿色供应链绩效的影响。运用不完全信息动态博弈方法建立并求解零售商信息分享和信息不分享下的绿色供应链决策模型,得到贝叶斯均衡解和各方最优期望利润。研究发现:在双渠道绿色供应链中,若零售商对市场需求预测较为乐观,信息分享使得制造商更有动机提高产品绿色度;此外零售商信息分享总是有利于制造商利润增加,但并非总是使得零售商利润损失。当制造商绿色投资效率较高时,信息分享使得零售商利润增加,反之,信息分享使得零售商利润降低。对整个绿色供应链利润的影响取决于渠道间竞争强度、直销渠道市场份额及制造商绿色投资效率。最后用数值仿真验证了模型和结论的有效性。     

Sell through a local retailer or operate your own store? Channel structure and risk analysis

Either a company store or a local retailer can be used to establish a sales channel. For high-value products with an existing competing brand, this choice represents a crucial decision a brand-named manufacturer must make for a new market. Under the burden of high operating costs, a weak local retailer may find it difficult to sustain and using it may hurt the manufacturer’s chance to successfully establish the channel. We consider a chain-to-chain competition model comprising two manufacturers and two retailers, in which one retailer may be unable to continue its operation because of high financing costs. We identify a threshold policy for the manufacturers to select the channel structure. Interestingly, we find that channel integration is not always better. Without the consideration of contract termination risk, the manufacturer will bear the operating expenses when its opportunity cost is low or the retailer’s financing cost is sufficiently high. In equilibrium, the manufacturers will choose either (decentralized, decentralized) or (integrated, integrated) channel structure. However, when the termination risk is considered, the equilibrium channel structure would be more likely (integrated, integrated) or (integrated, decentralized).     

信息不对称下混合渠道零售商创新投入的供应链影响研究

通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了在混合渠道下零售商创新投入对供应链的影响,分析了零售商创新成本系数信息对称和不对称两种情况下各方的决策变量和利润受创新成本系数,制造商对零售商创新信息掌握的不确定性程度,需求转移系数,市场潜力及创新潜力等的影响关系。研究结果发现制造商总能通过信息分享受益,另外得到了零售商愿意分享成本信息以及使得供应链整体受益的条件,这些为制造商信息分享决策提供了依据。最后通过算例分析对结果进行了验证。     

Channel coordination in green supply chain management

Environmental consciousness has become increasingly important in everyday life and business practice. The effort to reduce the impact of business activities on the environment has been labelled as green supply chain management. Any major greening project would require efforts on the part of the entire supply chain. However, very few studies have addressed the issue of coordinating the green supply chain. We consider the problem of coordination of a manufacturer and a retailer in a vertical supply chain, who put in efforts for ‘greening’ their operations. We address some pertinent questions in this regard such as extent of effort in greening of operations by manufacturer or retailer, level of cooperation between the two parties, and how to coordinate their operations in a supply chain. The greening efforts by the manufacturer and retailer result in demand expansion at the retail end. The decision variables of the manufacturer are wholesale price and greening effort, while those of the retailer are retail price and its greening effort. We find that the ratio of the optimal greening efforts put in by the manufacturer and retailer is equal to the ratio of their green sensitivity ratios and greening cost ratios. Further, profits and efforts are higher in the integrated channel as compared to the case of the decentralized channel. Finally, a two-part tariff contract is found to produce channel coordination in this problem. A numerical example illustrates the results.     

供应中断风险下采购与定价决策分析

供应中断是供应链上的企业可能面临的问题,运用合理的采购策略可以帮助企业有效缓解供应中断风险。本文研究了供应中断下供应商和制造商之间的纵向竞争和两个制造商之间的横向竞争问题。供应商制定批发价,两个制造商采用不同的采购策略进行产量博弈,其中一个制造商采用紧急双源订货策略,另一个采用可靠单源订货策略。论文采用了多阶段博弈模型,分析了制造商之间的合谋与竞争两种行为,求出了供应商和制造商的最优决策,比较了这两种行为对供应商和制造商的影响。通过数值分析,讨论了成本参数和可靠性参数对于最优订货量的影响以及对于采用不同订货策略的制造商期望利润的影响。     

Customer rebates and retailer incentives in the presence of competition and price discrimination

Promotions are important tools for matching supply and demand in many industries. In the United States automotive industry, promotions are frequently offered, which may be given directly to customers (rebates) or given to dealers (incentives) to stimulate demand. We analyze the performance of customer rebate and retailer incentive promotions under competition. We study a setting with two manufacturers making simultaneous pricing and promotion decisions, and with two price-discriminating retailers as Stackelberg followers making simultaneous order quantity decisions. In the benchmark case with no promotions, we characterize the equilibria in closed form. We find that retailer incentives can be used by manufacturers to simultaneously improve each of their profits but can potentially lead to lower retailer profits. When manufacturers use customer rebates, we show that a manufacturer is able to decrease the profit of her competitor while increasing her own profit, although she is also at risk for her competitor to use rebates in a similar fashion. Unlike the monopoly case where the manufacturers are always better off with retailer incentives, customer rebates can be more profitable under some cases in the presence of competition. Using numerical examples we generate insights on the manufacturers’ preference of promotions in different market settings.